Tag Archives: Poland

Franziska Ehnert, Climate Policy in Denmark, Germany, Estonia and Poland, Ideas, Discourses and Institutions (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2019)

The book of Franziska Ehnert, entitled Climate Policy in Denmark, Germany, Estonia and Poland, Ideas, Discourses and Institutions approaches climate change in terms of interaction of institutional, policy and discourse aspects that form the path from reality to political priority, policy and solution. This topic is part of current political debates that began in the 1980s, despite climate scepticism or climate change denial, and despite the resistance to the transformation of lifestyles and infrastructures. Environmental movements succeeded in bringing science and policy together, to sustain a climate change critique of the status quo and to promote ecologist alternative values and solutions via environmental policy.

Climate policy analyses are paramount to assess the manner in which the “ministerial administrations” implement or change a policy to answer environmental issues, redefine problems and maintain the adequacy and efficiency of climate change policy.

Considering that previous studies have shown the tension between the expert public officials and the politicians, the research conducted by Franziska Ehnert argues that “policy change will be better understood by studying the actors formulating these policies, namely ministerial administrations. It captures, not merely party politics and interest group politics, but the departmental politics of policy change. The book therefore focuses on the coordinative discourses within governmental institutions (…) among the actors participating in the construction of a policy, which stand in contrast to the communicative discourses through which politicians communicate and justify their policies vis-à-vis the public”. (p. 5)

Thus, the investigation follows the factors and aspects involved in the continuation or change of a policy; how is policy shaped, how coordinative discourses, policy frames, institutional contexts and particular identities relate and evolve; and how can one assess the reframing of values, the redefinition of interests or the reinterpretation of the guiding ideas.

Methodologically the study combines ontological, epistemological and methodological characteristics of the positivist and interpretative research paradigms in a comparative research with qualitative and quantitative dimensions based on the singularities and not on the similarities of the cases. Literature reviews, document analyses and expert interviews are also combined. Moreover, state and non-state actors are taken into consideration via expert interviews. Interpretation plays an important role as well following the data-generation stage: meaning-focused methods are used to analyse empirical data (p. 15). The investigation has as its own particularity the fact that the researchers acknowledge the characteristics of the cases only in the process of data generation, which increases objectivity. The countries compared are similar enough as regards institutional democracy, rule of law and market economy, and, as EU members, they share similar political commitments to EU climate and energy policy. Having under investigation older and younger democracies, varied indicators such as historical backgrounds, territory, economic, political, military and financial power or population size, differences in policy styles and discourses are to be expected.

The analytic framework introduced in the second chapter investigates the causes and means for the continuation of policies, provided that ideas and narratives shape and do not merely reflect the field of action. Political power has an important dimension in the power of ideas. The agents have an activity expressing the “following of the rules” and the “reproduction of the institution”, but also one that indicates the meta-level of discourse, for they think about and outside their institutions too. In terms of “ideal types”, the entrepreneurial-style bureaucrats are more likely to perform as “policy brokers”, while servant-style bureaucrats are more likely to “refrain from mediation and brokerage” and be, more likely, policy followers. (pp. 21-31)

In contrast, the following chapters approach the empirical data and associated analyses and interpretations concerning the making of climate policy in two Western European countries (Denmark and Germany) and in two Central Eastern European countries (Estonia and Poland). The researcher finds that Denmark is performing an important role in climate policy (“a small, green state”) due to a consensus-seeking policy style, a coordination apparatus among cabinet committees, and extensive specialization of the ministerial administration on climate policy. (p. 36)

These aspects, next to the policy ideals, objectives and instruments that are investigated, indicate a multitude of actors sustaining and opposing climate policy, but at the same time a resulting strong societal support for climate policy arising from this polyphonic conversation. However, Denmark is not and does not aim to be a “green Leviathan”, but a green democracy and market economy, with a policy orientation towards consensus, openness and inclusiveness. (p. 61)

The coordinative and consensus-seeking discourses are the most important in this respect. In the case of Germany, the size of the country induces different consequences to the similar reality of the multitude of actors involved in the climate policy “conversation”. Political acceptance might be the result of the “early participation of stakeholders in policy deliberation” in improving policy implementation. In this respect, even if lobbying may be seen as a risk factor, it could be also a democratic-openness enhancement factor. (p. 94) The main climate policy discourse in Germany has become that of increased “participation and transparency in policy deliberation processes”, calling more attention to institutional policy aiming at a more consensus-seeking attitude.

The “small state” discourse is central to Estonian identity, influencing both politics and policies. The EU was the agenda setter in Estonian climate policy and in Estonian energy efficiency policy. Fighting the communist heritage of authoritarian rule, a paradoxical weakness of the culture of coordination, the institutional fragmentation, the limited resources, the poor interministerial  consultations, the weak citizen participation and the low professionalization of the environmental NGOs, the situation was improved slightly by the planning for the European Structural Funds (2014-2020), by the design and continuation of the National Development Plan of the Energy Sector until 2030, and by the academic expertise, making the discourse of the technocrats and departmental politics officials prevalent, to the detriment of other actors. (pp. 120-123)

Central to Polish identity is the idea of catching up with Western development and requirements. On the one hand, the “relationships between state and society were fluid and fragmented” and, on the other, we have the communist heritage of authoritarian rule “undermining parliamentary independence” and weakening the institutionalized character of the “informal practices of interministerial and public consultations” (p. 151) Environmental NGOs are professionalized in Poland, but they remain marginalized. Their discourse attempted to sustain a core idea of ecological modernization, which has gained more adepts with the support of the Ministry of Economy, academic experts and environmental NGOs (keeping the white certificate system in the EEA).

The volume advances a very interesting methodology approaching the climate policies in the EU and it emphasizes an important and original evolving perspective in assessing climate policy. Both environment issues and political “landscapes” are changing, inducing more debate over competing ideas and ideals, values, facts and interests. As a consequence, discursiveness becomes more important in the lives of the institutions, states and societies. At the same time, interpretive analysis emphasizes potential improvement on scientific arguments and agendas as a result of the improvement of the deliberation processes on climate change.

The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence in the Polish Social Safeguard System

The following article presents the social and cultural background behind the operations of the Council of Europe (CoE) Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence in Poland. These social and cultural conditions have significant bearing on the application of the provisions of the Convention in Poland and on related political decisions. The first section of the article concerns the reception of the Convention in Poland. Subsequently, it discusses the social, economic and legal conditions of the functioning of women in Polish society, including legal standards of equality between men and women. These issues are presented against the backdrop of official statistics on violence against women and domestic violence. The next part of the article focuses on legal regulations of the CoE Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence: the practical context of Poland. Of particular importance here is the protection of children. Observations concerning the influence of civil society on the functioning of the Convention in Poland conclude the article.


Reception of the Convention in Poland

Poland signed the Council of Europe (CoE) Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence on 18 December 2012, but this Act only came into force on 1 August 2015. Poland was the seventeenth country to ratify the Convention.

Ratified international agreements have the status of universally binding laws in Poland and are thus applied directly; therefore, the Convention is now an integral part of the apparatus for protection of human rights, including the safety of women and, in the broader context, also of children regardless of sex. This Act can also be considered part of the framework for combating and preventing domestic violence. Even prior to its accession to the Convention, Poland employed certain legal and institutional instruments that were in agreement with the spirit of the Act in question. Yet, the Convention introduces legal solutions that instil higher standards of protection, including specific means of responding to discrimination and acts of violence conditioned by culture.

The introduction of the Convention in Poland allows for closer examination of a situation in which socially important matters that arouse intense emotions become a tool in the struggle for political power. Examples may include debates and decisions of authorities both preceding and following the entry into force of the CoE Convention. To give one example, the signing and ratification of the Convention were accompanied by debates which questioned its purpose and validity. Shortly after the signing, the right-oriented Polish government took steps towards renunciation, which prompted strong reaction from the civil society. Such a strong social response was directly linked to the culturally conditioned position of women in Poland. It was also the proof that the contemporary opposition does not have to form a cohesive group, unified by shared political ideas. Contemporary opposition movements does not have to be a political party. It may be a social group without formalised bonds. Social issues have always been a factor that could unite communities of protest and such was the case in Poland. The ‘dispersed opposition’ was led by a strong need to protect the rights that had been to date guaranteed by law.


Culturally and Historically Conditioned Position of Women in Poland

The application of the Convention in Poland, the social reception of this Act and its consequences for public authorities and politicians are closely tied to the position of women in Polish society. Their current position arises from the conditions in which Polish society has operated in the last few hundred years and which can be seen as a conglomerate of historical, cultural, or – more specifically – religious, social and even geographical factors.

It seems clear that the social position of any group in any society is determined by both the history of the entire society as well as the roles that this group had to fulfil in the context of specific historical events. The same is true of the current situation of Polish women. It may be said that this position is and has been, relatively high; nevertheless, this does not mean that Poland is free from violence against women or its social consequences.

The primary factor worth considering is the impact of the Poland’s geographical location on its history and; consequently, on the social position of its female inhabitants. On closer inspection the history of the country appears to have been rather ‘drafty’ as Poland has been involved, willingly or not, in almost every major armed conflict in Europe, except, perhaps, for the religious wars. The spatial location of Poland is neither that of an island nor that of a peninsula and closer examination of the history of armed conflict in Central Europe reveals that the absence of significant natural barriers hindering free movement of troops is one of the reasons why wars were such an frequent occurrence in the Polish past. The country also happened to (literally) stand in the way of  its neighbours’ economic interests, which brought about the partition of Poland and the subsequent struggle for national independence.

Taking into account that it were usually men who participated in armed conflicts – at least until World War II – Polish women were forced to take the economy and welfare of their families into their own hands. The reason behind this were not  men’s wishes, but rather their absence; for decades they fought and died in wars, they were deported to Siberia or kept in Gulags. These events contributed to the relatively strong position of women with regard to their economic rights and their “social say”.

After the Second World War, Poland got into the orbit of socialism, which obviously had immense social consequences. Following World War II, the country was totally destroyed and the extermination of its population continued. Women were faced with very clear expectations regarding their social role. They were expected to engage in professional activity, but these expectations did not bring about equality in other spheres. On the home front, men might have helped, but women still bore the burden.

Lifestyle choices of the period also revealed the emancipation of women. The same tendency is described by A. G. Dijkstra and J. Plantega (2003) who claim that after the year 1950, socialist governments also emphasized the equality of men and women; they promoted the acquisition of the same education and the fulfilment of the same roles on the labour market. As a result, in 1985 the participation of women in the labour market in centrally planned economies was higher than in most of the OECD states. The average employment rate of women, in relation to men, amounted to 80% for Eastern Europe and 64% for developed industrial societies.

According to the authors – with whom it seems reasonable to agree – the idea of gender equality revolved around ensuring equal access to employment and equally low wages for both sexes. On the other hand, the distribution of responsibilities in the households remained unchanged. Nevertheless, the ideology, which may be summarized by the 50s slogan, ‘Women on tractors’, has been an important factor facilitating the present-day legitimization of equality on the labour market. As to gender equality, socialism clearly seemed to have levelled the chances, not only for women, but for other social groups as well. During the World War II and in the fifties, a substantial part of the Polish elite was exterminated. The aftermath of this massive cleansing is a post-peasant society, which, nevertheless, could benefit from those egalitarian tendencies in social life that became more prominent shortly afterwards.

Nowadays, Polish women enjoy a relatively strong position as regards their political rights and rights to participate in public life. They gained political rights when the country recovered its independence in 1918 and, compared to other parts of the globe, their situation was fairly good. Poland is the seventh country in the world to have granted these rights to women; the aforementioned circumstances were one of the primary reasons.

Regarding the culturally conditioned position of women in Poland, the question concerning respect for women proves to be a very interesting phenomenon of which two specific examples may be enumerated. One of the examples concerns a particular cultural artefact that comprises a specific behaviour that is often adopted by Polish men in dealing with women in general. This specific behaviour pertains to hand-kissing as a form of greeting and is common in all layers of society. According to the definition by E. Shein (1984), artefacts are the most visible external manifestations of a culture and they reflect specific tendencies characteristic of a given community. In Poland, the custom of kissing women on the hand is one of such visible manifestations of socially approved behaviours that are, in this case, used to show respect for women. Yet, outward displays of respect do not necessarily entail that respect would be present on deeper levels of organizational culture described by Stein, i.e. the level of norms, values and basic assumptions. Only then would it constitute a mental barrier preventing acts of violence against women.

Another noteworthy example related to respect for women may be difficult to observe directly; however, its numerous manifestations may be perceived in the broader context of social functioning. It is related to the specifically Polish framing of the essential elements of Catholicism and, particularly, their attitude towards the figure of Mother Mary. In Poland, Holy Mary is ‘forever a Virgin’; yet, the ‘Virgin’ is also a mother and these two facts are widely accepted as religious axioms, with the notion of undefiled conception helping to resolve this apparent contradiction. All in all, the glorification of Mother Mary and, indirectly, other mothers is clearly noticeable in Polish society.

This is confirmed by the analysis of the so-called homosocial cultures, i.e., cultures founded on male values and the community of men (e.g. men going to war), as conducted by M. Socha (2009), reveals an important role of the mother in such cultures. This conclusion is further reinforced by the observation that ‘idealized femininity’ safeguards male relationships and male history (qtd. in Ostrowska, 2004). According to Socha, the mother in Polish culture is conceived as Mother Poland or Mother Homeland. The author also notes that, on the symbolic plane, the Polish soul is a woman. The country is described in terms of Mater Polonia, while Mother Mary – the highest ideal of motherhood – becomes the spiritual patron of the nation (p. 81). Yet another proof of the importance of these two symbols may be the Resolution of the Polish Sejm of 15 December 2016, by virtue of which the year 2017 was considered the 300th anniversary of the coronation of the painting of the Mother Mary in Czestochowa (M.P. 2017, poz. 15) .

Since 1989, Polish Mother’s Memorial Hospital has operated in Poland. The history of the founding of this specialist medical unit, which deals with extremely severe maternity and childhood diseases provides an excellent illustration of how respect for women is conditioned by the homosocial culture. In 1982, when Poland strived for normalization after the imposition of martial law and during the celebration of Mother’s Day, the then-operating Military Council of National Salvation proposed that a monument of Poland Mother should be built, which was approved by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who represented the head of the national authority at the time. This monument, as Jaruzelski characterized it, was to be ‘a tribute to the Polish mothers, who made a tremendous contribution to the recovery of freedom by the Homeland’. Finally, the authorities decided that the monument to commemorate Polish mothers should be a hospital dedicated to them. A public collection to finance its construction managed to raise about 530 million zloties (which amounts to about 126 million euros) during the first year alone (See: http://www.dzienniklodzki.pl/artykul/3652770, 25lecie-instytutu-centrum-zdrowia-matki-polki-w-lodzi,id,t.html).

Another issue worth considering is how the problem of culturally conditioned violence towards women is actually perceived in Poland. In the Polish language, there exist numerous terms that condemn violence against women or express disapproval towards such acts. One example is a popular saying, ‘Don’t hit a woman even with a flower’. Another instance may be a negatively marked epithet, ‘woman beater’. It is a contemptuous name for a man who uses his superior position or strength to verbally or physically abuse women. To sum up, in Polish culture violence against women is not and will not be treated as self-explanatory, at least not to the same extent that violence against children has long been. In the national criminal law there is no lawful justification that would exclude criminal responsibility for abusing women; yet, up to 2010 there was a justification for corporal punishment of children.



Legal Standard of Equality between Men and Women

The equality of men and women in Poland is granted by the Constitution. The provisions of the CoE Convention are based on a legitimate assumption that the main cause of violence against women and domestic violence is the unequal socio-economic status of women and men (which is also true of Poland). Its provisions aim to implement the principles of equality de jure.

The Polish Constitution, in Article 33 proclaims expressis verbis the equality of women and men in family, political, social and economic life. As stated in paragraph (1) of this Article: ‘Men and women shall have equal rights in family, political, social and economic life in the Republic of Poland’. According to paragraph (2), ‘Men and women shall have equal rights, in particular, regarding education, employment and promotion, and shall have the right to equal compensation for work of similar value, to social security, to hold offices, and to receive public honours and decorations’.

What is more, Article 32 of the same document introduces the principle of equal treatment of all citizens by the public authorities as well the principle of non-discrimination in political, social or economic life for any reason whatsoever. These two regulations are the constitutional standard to which the ordinary and internally binding laws should be subjugated. They should regulate the operating practices of the public authorities and the patterns of social life.


Violence against Woman and Domestic Violence in Statistics

The following data, which illustrates the scale and extent of violence in Poland, has been taken from the Blue Card questionnaires dating from 2016. Consequently, it only reflects the range of situations in which the victims have broken the silence and decided to report the case to the police.

Total number of victims of violence 91 789


Total number of people suspected of violence 74 155


Number of female victims 66 930


Number of suspected women 5 461


Number of male victims 10 636


 Number of suspected men 68 321


Number of underage victims 14 223


Number of suspected minors 373


Compiled on the basis of the report “Przemoc w rodzinie”, retrieved from: http://statystyka.policja.pl/st/wybrane-statystyki/przemoc-w-rodzinie/50863,Przemoc-w-rodzinie.html

This report does not account for the grey zone of violence against women, that is, these occurrences of violence that have not been reported to the police. It seems unlikely; however, that the Polish statistics would differ significantly from the statistics of other European countries. Thus, the problem appears to be complex and multifaceted.

By contrast, the following data comes from the study on the level of domestic violence in the European Union, entitled ‘Violence against women: an EU wide survey’ and commissioned by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights in March 2014. The results of the survey were as follows:

33% of women throughout the EU have experienced physical or sexual violence since the age of 15;

22% women have experienced physical or sexual violence by a partner;

5% of all the women surveyed have been raped. This corresponds to more than 9 million women being raped in the EU;

55% of women have experienced some form of sexual harassment. In 32% of the cases the victims indicated their colleague, boss or client as a perpetrator;

75 % of women in top management positions have experienced sexual harassment at work;

33% of women have experienced physical or sexual violence by an adult in childhood;

12% of women experienced sexual violence in childhood. Half of them indicated that the perpetrator was a man they did not know before. The most common forms of violence were exposing genitals to children or touching their genitals or breasts.

(Source: http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-vaw-survey-at-a-glance-oct14_pl.pdf)

Surprisingly, this survey is often referenced by the opponents of the Convention in order to prove that Poland is not in the worst position and even that violence against women is actually a marginal phenomenon in this country (See: http://niezalezna.pl/62633-cala-prawda-o-konwencji-antyprzemocowej-wstrzasajacy-raport-zobacz-film). One of their ways to deprecate the Convention was to claim that it only presents the acts of physical or sexual violence against girls aged 15 and less or violence against woman perpetrated by their partners.

The survey also seems to prove that Poland, along with Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Croatia and Austria, is among the countries with the lowest levels of violence. More importantly, it claims that the highest levels of violence can be noted in Denmark, Finland and Latvia. These conclusions appear to be questionable on a number of grounds; for instance, all countries that reported relatively low violence are strongly catholic (even Spain, despite Zapatero’ s secularizing reforms). It may be argued; therefore, that culturally determined standards of public expression and understanding of violence as something that is “deserved”, might have significantly influenced the results.

Another reservation here may be linked to differing cultural convictions as to what words, gestures and other behaviours should be regarded as ‘violence’ and whether it is common to be open about it and publicly disclose such wrongdoings. Finally, one more phenomenon should be noted with regard to Poland; namely, the inferiority complex. The Poles who criticize the government in foreign press, for example, often face stigmatisation by the political forces. There exists a ‘social imperative’ to make a good impression on others because otherwise (perhaps due to economic reasons) Polish citizens might have thought of themselves as inferior; this may also have led the respondents to withhold certain facts.


Legal Regulations of the CoE Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence: The Practical Context of Poland.

Taking into account the specific context of Poland, it might be valuable to focus on these characteristics of the Convention that are important from the point of view of preventing violence in this country.

Firstly, the Convention interprets violence against women as the violation of human rights and as a form of discrimination. The law should clearly specify that certain social groups are also entitled to human rights. In the course of history, denying some people the status of full-fledged human beings always provided a justification to use violence towards them. Therefore, the law should hinder such practices.

Secondly, the Convention combats not only the effects but also the causes of violence against women. The financial independence of women – or the lack of it – is of fundamental importance. Articles 12 and 18 of the Convention have to be interpreted in the context of recent events in Poland. Since last year, there is a child benefit programme in Poland called 500+, in which the state gives families 500 zloties a month for each second and subsequent child. It was projected that this programme will make the position of women stronger.

For this reason, the publication of the Labour force survey in Poland in 2017 brought about a heated debate about the economic consequences of the 500+ programme for women. In this debate, the main argument against the programme was that 150,000 women decided to quit their jobs between March and September 2016, Indeed, the report revealed a tendency among women in working age to withdraw from employment for personal reasons, mostly related to family and household responsibilities. Family and household duties were the main reason for the lack of professional activity in the case of 45.9% unemployed women and only 9.1% unemployed men. Other reasons for unemployment included, e.g., education and improving qualifications, sickness or disability and retirement. Withdrawal from employment as a result of receiving unemployment benefits from the state will only weaken the position of women and make them more susceptible to violence. Negative consequences of employment withdrawal by women are illustrated by the model of household decisions, proposed by N. Ott (1992, 1995) and further analyzed in the context of G. Becker’s study by A.G. Dijkstra and J. Plantega. Ott’s model assumes that whenever a woman chooses to withdraw from employment and to produce goods and services for the benefit of the household, her utility (welfare) decreases as does her threat point, which is a parameter correlated directly with her earning capacity. At the same time, the threat point of her (male) partner increases. The woman thus exposes herself to the risk of losing occupational opportunities and/or the depreciation of her human capital. Ott claims that one consequence of such phenomenon is the loss of women’s power in the families, which will, as can easily be noted, negatively affect their decision-making powers not only in the household but also in the broader context of social life. Dijskra and Plantega add that political decisions leading to the increase in the bargaining power of men also have impact on the position of women. If a woman decides to bear a child and stay at home, her situation can be compared to a game called ‘the prisoner’s dilemma’. Although both partners sharing a household will benefit from this decision as the marginal utility will not be diminished; nevertheless, the female partner will still have lesser bargaining power in future negotiations.

Another positive consequence of the Convention is the introduction of regulations pertaining to the protection of children within families. The Convention forces the signatory states to adhere to high standards for the protection of children against violence. The provisions, which are presented in the figure below, establish a comprehensive protection system. This  is of fundamental importance from the point of view of societal developmentm since legal instruments ensuring children’s safety contribute to the development of a well-functioning society.




(The position of children: Holistic multidimensional protection. Prepared by: M. Tabernacka, on the basis of the provisions of the Convention.)


Protection of Children

Of particular significance to the Polish legal system is the commitment of the member states to the Convention to implement individual protection measures for children (adapted to the level of their emotional development) and to ensure that their best interests are served. The latter becomes even more important for these states in which the system of protecting children against violence does not have a long tradition, such as Poland.

It is thus of fundamental importance for such states that the Convention recognizes children who witness acts of domestic violence or violence against women as the victims of abuse. A key regulation that ensures the protection of children is Article 26, which requires all parties to the Convention to ‘take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that in the provision of protection and support services to victims, due account is taken of the rights and needs of child witnesses of all forms of violence covered by the scope of this Convention. [Moreover,] Measures taken pursuant to this Article (…) include age‐appropriate psychosocial counselling for child witnesses of all forms of violence covered by the scope of this Convention and (…) due regard to the best interests of the child’.

This regulation is supplemented by Article 56, paragraph 2, according to which a person who witness the commission of acts of violence covered by the scope of this Convention or who has reasonable grounds to believe that such an act may be committed, or that further acts of violence are to be expected, shoulkd report this to the competent organisations or authorities. A child victim and child witness of violence against women and domestic violence shall be afforded, where appropriate, special protection measures taking into account the best interests of the child. Higher standards of protection become available also by virtue of the application of the provisions of Article 46, point d., which states that whenever ‘the offence was committed against or in the presence of a child, such a situation should be regarded] as aggravating circumstances in the determination of the sentence in relation to the offences established’.

In turn, Article 27 discusses the witnesses’ liability to report instances of violence to appropriate authorities and organizations: ‘person witness[es] to the commission of acts of violence covered by the scope of this Convention or who has reasonable grounds to believe that such an act may be committed, or that further acts of violence are to be expected, to report this to the competent organisations or authorities.

Poland is a relatively homogeneous social area in terms of its culture and, as such, it does not have any established standards of response to problems resulting from conflicts of cultural diversity. The Convention takes the instances of such conflicts into account, which is particularly important from the perspective of children’s welfare. To provide with an example, Articles 37 and 38 establish an obligation for the parties to implement provisions that would assign legal responsibility for forcing children into early marriages and for ‘inciting, coercing or procuring a girl to undergo any of the acts [leading to] female genital mutilation’.


Convention as a Bargaining Chip in Political Debates in Poland

Signing and ratification of the Convention were preceded by a debate which questioned its purpose and validity; the Convention was even presented as harmful for Poland and for its culture. This debate was described in the liberal mass-media as absurd and many left wing thinkers perceived it as such. The alleged absurdity of objections raised against the Convention may denote that they were not substantive.

What is more, the signing and ratification proceedings were used by the then-opposition right wing parties to increase their political capital among the conservative minded voters, who tend to gravitate towards more ‘conventional’ modes of social functioning. The attachment to traditional Christian values and heterosexual family model often remain at the root of their convictions.

One should therefore expect that the main objections against the Convention were directed at the supposed promotion of homosexual values. Conservative communities claimed that the Convention contradicts the typically Polish and Christian traditions and that it may even be a threat to the current legal and systemic framework. Following are some examples of these accusations:

‘The anti-violence Convention fosters violence’ (See: http://www.deon.pl/wiadomosci/polska/art,21507,konwencja-antyprzemocowa-sprzyja-przemocy.html);

For corruption, for bureaucracy, for totalitarian regimes, not to mention ideologies that may get promoted along the way, this is a rare opportunity; It tries to smuggle gender ideology into our legal system. (See: http://niepoprawni.pl/blog/miarka/konwencja-przemocowa-6-niebezpieczne-zapisy-1zapisy 1);

The Poles would lose the right to protect basic natural and Christian values, in social and private life, in families and upbringing of their children (See: http://www.deon.pl/religia/kosciol-i-swiat/z-zycia-kosciola/art,18462,rzad-ratyfikuje-kontr-konwencje-przemocowa.html);

The axiological system of the Convention, which involves social engineering actions, is not compatible with the Polish constitutional order (J. Banasiuk 2014).

What is more, the critics of the Convention saw Article 14, paragraph (1) as a threat. This paragraph states that parties to the Convention shall take, where appropriate, the necessary steps to include teaching material on issues such as equality between women and men, non‐stereotyped gender roles, mutual respect, non‐violent conflict resolution in interpersonal relationships, gender‐based violence against women and the right to personal integrity, adapted to the evolving capacity of learners, in formal curricula and at all levels of education.

Surprisingly, the biggest controversy was raised by the notion of gender itself. In this case, accusations mostly referred to Article 3 point (c.), which defines ‘gender’ as socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for women and men. The notion of gender has been included in the Polish sociology textbooks for a couple of decades. In recent years, Polish society has become increasingly aware of the difference between the biological sex, indicated by ‘sex’, and socio-cultural sex, indicated by ‘gender’; yet, the distinction has not been questioned until recently.

Gender should be considered a normal social phenomenon. It can be noted that culturally conditioned expectations towards women are slightly different in Poland than, e.g., in Sweden or in Italy; they are defined specifically through the notion of ‘gender’. In Poland; however, this notion has in recent years become a kind of modern ‘witch’; a gateway to unload the frustrations of the conservative communities. As a result, the conflict that can be traced back to the division between the conservative right, actively influenced by the Catholic Church, and the progressive, pro-social left, was rekindled. In Poland, additional difficulty lies in the fact that the centre-right and the enlightened Catholic intellectual elite are not visible in the public sphere and, in debates, their voice simply disappears, which is the primary reason why the conflict is so polarized.

In December 2016, the Polish mass media informed about the alleged plans to renounce the Convention, something which had a very strong negative resonance. Its strength was further underscored by numerous social protests in November and December 2016, which were directed against political decisions limiting civil liberties. For example, the December strike was organized under the slogan, ‘Polite we already have been’ (e.g. http://strajkobywatelski.pl/event/strajk-obywatelski-gdansk-grzeczni-juz-bylismy/; https://pl-pl.facebook.com/events/340267749682840/)

The protests related to the plans of renouncing the Convention are a follow-up to the so-called black protests, which started in November 2016 in reaction to the attempts to tighten up the anti-abortion law. Political decisions pertaining to the Convention were thus taken in the situation in which the communities contesting the measures taken by public authorities had already been mobilised.

The Polish Ombudsman also reacted to the measures which could have resulted in renouncing the Convention. The official position of the state authorities presented to the Ombudsman by the Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment also sheds some light on the developments. In the first statement it was noted that the renunciation project, prepared by the Ministry of Justice, has been sent for inter-ministry consultations. The subsequent statement; however, noted that the project of renunciation remains unprocessed and has not been proceeded upon. What is more, it has been reported that the Government has not and does not intend to carry out any actions leading to the renunciation of the Convention.

It seems apparent that further steps to renounce the Convention would incite Polish society and the widening gap between governmental actions and societal expectations would be difficult to overcome. All the more so, since further protests were scheduled to take place on 8 March (the so-called “Women’s strike”), and on the 14 February (the so-called anti-violence “dance” and part of a larger global action known as “One Billion Rising) (See: http://warszawa.ngo.pl/x/844332). The decision of the public authorities to terminate these plans should then be considered a reasonable step, in accordance with the public interest. Utilizing such a socially sensitive issue as violence against women and domestic violence for political purposes, especially by means of negating the existing legal and institutional solutions to counteract violence would not be of benefit to the society.





(Women’s strike on the Wrocław market, 8 March 2017’, photo by: M. Tabernacka)


The Convention and Civil Society in Poland

The validity of the Convention, its social consequences and measures taken by public authorities in relation to its introduction display a certain connection to the functioning of civil society and its institutions in Poland.

The provisions of the Convention envision a close and multidimensional cooperation with non-governmental organisations and the civil society. One example of an important regulation might be Article 9, entitled: ‘Non-governmental organisations and civil society’. According to this provision, ‘parties shall recognise, encourage and support, at all levels, the work of relevant non-governmental organisations and of civil society active in combating violence against women and establish effective co-operation with these organisations’. By contrast, Article 7 places non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations among the institutions which will pursue a comprehensive and coordinated anti-violence policy. More specifically, Article 7, paragraph (3) states that ‘measures taken pursuant to this article shall involve, where appropriate, all relevant actors, such as government agencies, the national, regional and local parliaments and authorities, national human rights institutions and civil society organisations’. A guarantee instrument in this respect is Article 8, according to which non-governmental organizations and the institutions of civil society should be eligible to participate in funds used by the state parties to the Convention for preventing and combating domestic violence and violence against women. According to this provision, Parties shall allocate appropriate financial and human resources for the adequate implementation of integrated policies, measures and programmes to prevent and combat all forms of violence covered by the scope of this Convention, including those carried out by non-governmental organisations and civil society.

The system of helping the victims of domestic violence and women experiencing violence in Poland in the last 20 years has been based on the effective and active engagement of NGOs. They have acquired a well-educated staff and are recognized in their local communities. One of the most important of their initiatives is the so-called blue line (See: http://www.niebieskalinia.pl). As of lately, the system based on NGOs has begun to collapse as a result of the financial decisions made by the government. This is part of the problem tied to the government’s way of dealing with NGOs (similar to that in Hungary). A further example could be the Centre for Women’s Rights, an NGO working to ensure equal status of women and men and provide assistance for the victims of domestic violence. This organization did not receive state funding in 2016 on the grounds that its activities were devoted to helping only one social group, i.e. women. It has encountered similar financing difficulties in 2017

(cf. http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114871,20066209,rzad-odmowil-finansowania-centrow-praw-kobiet-bo-zawezaja.html, and https://oko.press/centrum-praw-kobiet-znow-srodkow-minister-dofinansuje-caritas/).)

In Poland, in view of the fact that a significant number of non-governmental organizations does not have its own accumulated capital, their operation is dependent on subsidies from the state. Yet, since NGOs work towards the fulfilment of public service objectives, which lie in the responsibility of the State, this is only to be understood.

Measures related to the plans of renouncing the Convention had a significant influence on the mobilization of the Polish civil society institutions. It can be noted that women’s grass-roots movements with significant potential began to form. One of the consequences of the mobilization of these social movements and their increasing activity is their inevitable institutionalization, which will have important influence on both social life and political conditions in Poland.

The illustration that follow provide examples of such activities. It is a website of a feminist movement called Gals4Gals. Its pejorative name is to reflect women’s anger. Some of the slogans to be found on this website are: “Stop violence against women” or “Hands off the anti-violence Convention”.




(“Gals4Gals” – Source: https://pl-pl.facebook.com/DziewuchyDziewuchomWroclaw/)



It can be noted that a real consequence of the attacks on the Convention is the unification and involvement in civic activity of social circles that have until now functioned rather separately. This may have a significant bearing on the question of legitimisation of political power in Poland.

The vigorous debate around the Convention seemed so unreasonable as to raise suspicions that this could be another “substitute” topic, used to divert the public’s attention from the real social, economic, and, recently, also systemic, problems. Perhaps this was indeed the case, but taking the situational context into account it appears that any measures taken to renounce the Convention should prove to be more detrimental than beneficial to the position of the Polish government. Moreover, developments concerning the plans of renouncing the Convention indicate that the government managed to retain its capacity to rationally evaluate the situation.

All things considered, the Convention is a wise document and, in the face of the current challenges for Europe, it lays out a uniform standard for dealing with violence. The latter is particularly important in the face of the crisis caused by the influx of refugees from various countries and cultures into Europe. The Convention is the foundation on which a common European framework of conduct may be developed and then adopted by individual European states, should they need to address the issues of culturally and religiously conditioned acts of violence. The culturally dependent position of women in European countries is generally similar, but fundamentally different from the position of women in Asia and Africa. The relatively high social position of women in Europe can be regarded as an essential component of the European identity. It is therefore justified to claim that the Convention may be one of the legal instruments to protect and maintain a shared European identity.




Banasiuk J.  (red.) (2014) Czy Polska powinna ratyfikować Konwencję Rady Europy o zapobieganiu i przeciwdziałaniu przemocy wobec kobiet i przemocy domowej? Raport Instytutu Ordo Iuris, Warszawa. Retrived from: http://www.ordoiuris.pl/public/pliki/dokumenty/Raport_przemoc_OI.pdf

Dijkstra A.G., Plantega J. (2003) Ekonmia i płeć. Pozycja zawodowa kobiet w Unii Europejskiej (Gender and Economics: A European perspective), Gdańsk: Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Psychologiczne.

Ostrowska E. (2004) Matki Polki i ich synowie. Kilka uwag o genezie obrazów kobiecości i męskości w kulturze polskiej, (in:) M. Radkiewicz (red.), Gender. Konteksty, Kraków: Rabid.

Ott N. (1992) Intrafamily Baring and Household Decisions, Berlin: Springer Verlag.

Ott N. (1995) Fertility and division of work in the family (in:) E. Kuiper, J. Sap. (red.) (in cooperation with) z S. Feiner, N. Ott,. Z. Tzannatos) Out of Margin: Feminist Perspectives on Economics, London-New York: Routledge.

Shein E.H., (1984, 2), Coming to a new awareness of organizational culture, Sloan Management Review 25

Socha M., (2009) Baba pruska. Etos Kobiety w XIX wieku wobec specyfiki etosu pruskiego, (in:) Kowalski P. Tabu, Etykieta, Dobre Obyczaje, Wrocław: Wydawnictwo uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.

Labour force survey in Poland, Retrieved from: http://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/rynek-pracy/pracujacy-bezrobotni-bierni-zawodowo-wg-bael/aktywnosc-ekonomiczna-ludnosci-polski-iv-kwartal-2016-roku,4,23.html

25-lecie Instytutu Centrum Zdrowia Matki Polki w Łodzi, Dziennik Łódzki, 19.11.2014, Retrieved from: http://www.dzienniklodzki.pl/artykul/3652770,25lecie-instytutu-centrum-zdrowia-matki-polki-w-lodzi,id,t.html



Authentic acts and sources of opinions:



http://niepoprawni.pl/blog/miarka/konwencja-przemocowa-6-niebezpieczne-zapisy-1zapisy 1










The Sex Offenders Public Registry of the Republic of Poland: Problems that Require Solutions

Introduction: A history of offender registries in Europe and the USA

The last decade can be characterised by the relevance improving of the topics of data privacy protection. Problems of data flow regulation during crime prevention activities have attracted substantially bigger attention due to the current legislative novelisations in the European Union in 2016-2018. Worth mentioning here is that the Polish criminal registry of sexual offenders seems to be the only public registry of offenders not only in the European Union but in whole European region as well. Simultaneously, despite its uniqueness, it is not well-known not only internationally but even in Poland.  It seems justified to say that registry remains an inherently controversial topic in social consciousness and due to that fact, very few substantial researches have been conducted in this field. But before we will proceed to the main topic of the current paper, it seems highly beneficial to analyse the history of sexual offender registries in the world.

Undoubtedly, the longest history of publicly available registries of criminals can be found in the United States of America. So it’s not surprising that the American experience inspired the Polish government to provide similar institutions into the Polish legislative system (we can find multiple comments on that of the former minister of Justice Z. Ziobro)[1]. In academic papers, it is also often mentioned that similar institutions exist in France and Germany[2], but we would need to emphasise here that those registries don’t have public character.

Registries of sexual offenders in the United States of America began to appear in the early 1930s[3]. Initially, they were the prerogative of local legislations (cities and counties); later, they began to be available on the level of states (Florida, since 1937). Registration was conducted, as a rule, at a police station, convicts were photographed and fingerprinted. The personal data of criminals with the indication of the place of residence after release were entered into the registry. The local authorities hoped that the registration requirement would make the stay of convicts on the territory of the city or district undesirable which is supposed to positively influence the criminal situation in a state[4].

The first regional registry of sex offenders was established in 1947 in California,  and after the next 20 years, in five states (Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Nevada, Ohio). They reflected the addresses of the place of residence of persons convicted of sexual crimes, but they were not publicly disclosed and were used only by law enforcement agencies and courts[5].

Intensive development of the Institute of the Registry of Sex Offenders in the United States occurred in the 1990s[6]. After several cases of sexual crimes against children were actively discussed in the media and became the subject of high interest of the publicity. The social expectations of Americans were focused on the guarantees of the best protection of potential victims. In 1994, Washington state began community notification of its most dangerous sex offenders, making it the first state to ever make any sex offender information publicly available[7]. Prior to 1994, only a few states required convicted sex offenders to register their addresses with local law enforcement.

But those registries were either not publicly available or were provided in a restricted area of one municipality. The first publicly available federal registry appeared only in 2005 – the National Sex Offender Public Registry (NSOPR) which, due to the inaction of The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act,[8] was renamed in honor of 22-year-old college student Dru Sjodin of Grand Forks, North Dakota, a young woman who was kidnapped and murdered. The Registry introduces a system for classifying sex offenders into three groups based on the legal qualification of the committed crime:

  • First of all, coercion to have sexual intercourse under threat of violence against a person who is in a helpless state; inducement to have sexual intercourse or commit other sexual acts with a person under the age of 12:
  • Second-level criminal cases (tier II) include the production and distribution of child pornography; the involvement of minors in prostitution; sexual intercourse with a minor over 13 years old.
  • Those guilty of other “minor sexual crimes”, who face up to a year in prison, belong to the category of first-degree sex offenders (tier I) (this is possession of child pornography or committing other sexual acts with a person over the age of 13 and under the age of majority).

If a  person commits a similar act during the period of public recording, it automatically falls into a more serious category[9].

Criminological assessment of the sex offender registry system in the USA.

In the USA, the sex offender registry covers about 900 thousand convicts (0.28% of all citizens), and this figure has been consistently increasing in last several years[10].

Many researchers question the impact of the registry on reducing sexual crime in general and reducing the rate of recidivism of sex offenders in particular[11]. When comparing the level of responsibility among adults and minors in the commission of similar sexual crimes, it was found that there were no statistical differences between registered persons and those who evaded this duty.

It is often argued that similar state legislation is based on false notions, although popular in societal assumptions and presumptions regarding the nature of sexual criminality. Society has come to believe, firstly, that sex offenders are more prone to recidivism than other categories of offenders. Secondly, there is an opinion that the majority of sex offenders are strangers, unfamiliar to the victims. Thirdly, society attributes to perpetrators of sexual crimes a tendency to kill their victims, especially children.

Official statistics do not confirm these theses. The average rate of recidivism of all US criminals released from prison from 2014 to 2019 is 36%, of which only 13-14% commit a similar type of a crime. Also, statistics confirms that most of the sexual crimes are committed a first time and display no recidivism[12].

Most of the victims of sexual crimes knew the attacker earlier, and the courts found guilty mainly the victim’s friends or relatives. According to one study, only 9% of perpetrators of child sexual abuse and 28% of perpetrators of adult sexual exploitation were previously unfamiliar with the victims, especially when sexually motivated murders of adults and children occurred[13].

It is difficult to get a clearer picture, due to the inclusion in statistics of data not only of criminal cases against sexual integrity but also of crimes related to non-fulfillment of registration obligations.  Some investigators claim that this is precisely the violation of the registration responsibilities of criminals the reason why the recidivism of American sex offenders is most often statistically reduced.

The study of the effectiveness of the registry institute should be distinguished from the perception of this institution by society and practicing lawyers. Society is very supportive of the registry, considering it as an effective tool to combat sexual crime. About 4/5 of ordinary American citizens have a positive attitude towards the registry, and there is unanimity among politicians and judges[14].

A different, more critical attitude towards the registry could be found amongst those who maintain the registry, as well as amongst those who are engaged in the rehabilitation and treatment of sexual offenders[15]. Researchers who are engaged into the mandatory treatment of sex offenders, usually disapprove of the requirement to publish data on sexual offenders. In practice, 1/4 to 1/3 of adult Americans visited the resource at least once; hence, for the biggest part of society, it remains unused.

However, the usefulness of the registry for law enforcement agencies and society is substantially reduced by the incompleteness and irrelevance of the data contained in it. Most often, violations relate to the place of residence of sex offenders, that is, information that is most important from the point of view of the purposes of the registry.

The problem is based on the shortage of personnel servicing registries, underfunding, and plain mistakes, including those made by convicts themselves when they intentionally do not perform registration duties. Some of them proceed from the fact that failure to fulfill registration obligations is a minor violation compared to the consequences of prolonged use in a publicly accessible registry, which causes problems with finding a place of work or residence.

It is officially estimated that about 5-6% of the criminals included in the register have disappeared, 18.5% have been re-imprisoned, 8.9% live outside the registration state and even 0.2% of the persons died while their information is still available in the registry. An interesting fact is that the victims of sexual crimes support mandatory treatment of sex offenders, but disapprove the requirement to publish data on sex offenders16].

it can be concluded that the registry creates a false sense of security, while at the same time it increases the feeling of fear in society. It is difficult to imagine the negative emotions of a person who has discovered that a sex offender lives in their neighborhood.

The Polish public registry of the sexual offenders: General overview.

Polish sex offenders registry and GDPR regulation

The efficiency of such a method of crime prevention remains highly controversial. Still, a new registry of sex offenders came into force in 2017 in Poland. Now after we’ve discussed the experience that was taken into consideration towards the legislative novelisation in the Republic of Poland it seems to be logical to proceed with the main topic of the article.

First of all, it is worth mentioning that the Polish Sex Offenders Registry consists of two modules, whereby the first is a register with limited access, and the second one is a public register.

The register with restricted access is a database that contains information about perpetrators of sexual crimes. The basis for placing data in the Register is the act of 13 May 2016 on countering threats of sexual crime. Following Article 12 of the act, everyone has the right to find out whether his / her data is in the register.

In turn, the public register is a publicly available database, which contains information about the most dangerous perpetrators of sexual crimes. These are, above all, data on people who have committed child (minors up to 13 years old) rapes and rapes committed with particular cruelty.

Unlike the American prototype, the Polish registry also provides the sentences information to the public access (amount of the years of imprisonment, committed crime, date of the sentence, and court which stated the sentence).

Firstly it supposed that the convicted perpetrators could request their data not be included in the public Registry up until the first of October of 2017 but after the statement of the High Court of the Republic of Poland that such regulation would be non-constitutional and would violate the fundamental principle of “Lex retro non agit“, i.e., all information about the convictions before the inaction of the registry were erased in its final version[17].

The registry was supposed to be supplemented with a publicly available map of sexual crime threats, which includes the places of sexual offenses and the places of residence of offenders, but this option wasn’t included in the final version.

Access to the Public Register is unlimited. There is no fee for providing information from the Sex Offenders Register.  Also, simultaneously with the launch of the Register, the regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament on 27 of April 2016 on the protection of individuals and information privacy in the European Union (EU) and the European Economic Area (EEA).  commonly known as the GDPR, entered into force.

This regulation has been valid throughout the European Union, including the Republic of Poland, since May 25, 2018, and has revolutionized the perception of issues related to the protection of personal data. Individuals have acquired a number of new rights, the meaning of which is largely to intensify their protection, more broadly understood as the so-called right to privacy. An important innovation is the introduction in Article 17 (1) of the GDPR of the so-called “right to be forgotten”, also called the “right to delete data”, which from the very first moments of the GDPR has aroused particular interest of individuals, and therefore it can be estimated that sooner or later it will also draw the attention of convicted persons.

This leads us to the question: can the former offenders ask for the data erasure after it has been uploaded to the registry? Or, in a more simple way: does the internal Polish regulation violate the requirements of the GDPR?

First, what should be mentioned here is that, according to the GDPR Art.2 “the Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security”[18].

This clause, in our opinion, excludes any possibility of using the GDPR requirements in the topic of crime prevention activities provided by any member State of the European Union. Which also allows us to conclude that such registries could be shortly implemented in other European countries as well.  Hence, the answer for the second question should be a negative one.

This attitude is reflected by the Art. 86 of GDPR which states that personal data in official documents held by a public authority or a public body or a private body for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest may be disclosed by the authority or body in accordance with Union or Member State law to which the public authority or body is subject in order to reconcile public access to official documents with the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation[19].

Despite this fact, many researches confirmed that there is some kind of a discrepancy between the GDPR regulation and the Act of 13 May 2016 on countering threats of sexual crime. The legislator first has considered the right to influence the content of the Register to the perpetrators and the courts. The principle is that the cancelation of the conviction, that is, in fact, “forgetting the act of the offender” occurs by law after the expiry of the periods provided in Article 107 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Poland, and only on demand of the convicted person.

According to this provision, the court may decide the conviction to be cancelled after the expiry of 5 years at the earliest. The convicted person should also not commit any other crimes or other violations of law during this period while, at the same time, the sentence was not more than 3 years of imprisonment[20]. This provides us with a direct discrepancy with the GDPR requirements which openly guarantee the right to erasure of information from public access straight after the demand of the person to whom this data is connected.


The topic of the public registry’s effectiveness wasn’t properly analysed in Polish academic papers and in most of the published articles it received positive feedback[21]. Often, these papers speculate on other offender registries in European countries such as VISOR in the UK or FIJAIS in France, forgetting to mention that these registries are not publicly available[22]. On the other hand, The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights claims that “a public registry is not an effective instrument against the risk of sex crimes.” The HFHR is not against introducing into Polish law a mechanism that would register sex offenders but the publicly available source is openly criticized[23].

Also, current police statistics regarding sexual crimes didn’t show significant  changes in the amount of the committed crimes (e.g., the amount of committed rapes in 2017 in the whole country was 1262; in 2019 was 1354 and in 2021 total amount of registered rapes was 1088). Simultaneously, the percentage of the solved rape crimes has been getting higher every year after the registry was enacted.  According to official data percentage of rape crimes where the offender was found rose from 82.7% in 2017 to 85% in 2019 and 88% in 2021[24]. Hence, the registry could be hardly seen as a method of crime prevention, but rather as an additional instrument for police investigation. It should be also mentioned that topics of criminological effectiveness of the registry is often complicated, due to the high stigmatization of sexual crimes.

The provided official novelization should be criticized due to the lack of preciseness. Only after two years did the High Court of the Republic of Poland actually exclude the “Lex post factum” uncertainty as regards offenders of relevant sexual crimes (e.g., the proviso whereby even those violations which were committed before the Act of 13 May 2016 on countering threats of sexual crime should be automatically included Ito the registry).

I hope that this publication will raise awareness of the current lacunae in the European legislation and will help to avoid similar deficient registries’ applications in other Member States of the Europen Union.


A. Legal acts

1. USTAWA z dnia 13 maja 2016 r. [o przeciwdziałaniu zagrożeniom przestępczością na tle seksualnym]Dru Sjodin webpage of the Public sexual offenders registry https://www.nsopw.gov/about-nsopw

2. GDPR/ General Data Protection Regulation: https://gdpr-info.eu/art-2-gdpr/1. Carpenter C, Beverlin A. The evolution of unconstitutionality in sex offender registration laws. Hastings Law Journal. 2012;63:1071-133. (In Eng.)

B. Literature

  1. Banasik, K. Istota zatarcia skazania. Wojskowy Przegląd Prawniczy, (2017). p. 36–49. (In Pol.)
  2. Grzelak. A. RODO Ogólne Rozporządzenie o Ochronie Danych Komentarz. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Wolters Kluwer. (2022). p. 1034. (in Pol.)
  3. Harris A, Levenson J, Ackerman A. Registered sex offenders in the United States. Behind the numbers, crime & delinquency. (2014). p.4-33. (In Eng.)
  4. Letourneau E. Effects of South Carolina’s sex offender registration and notification policy on deterrence of adult sex crimes. Criminal justice and behavior. (2010). p.35-52. (In Eng.)
  5. Levenson J, D’amora D, Hern A. Megan’s Law and its impact on community re-entry for sex offenders. Behavioral Sciences and the Law. (2007). p. 587-602. (In Eng.)
  6. Lussier P, Beauregard E, Criminal Justice Policies. The intended and unintended consequences of monitoring individuals convicted of sex crimes. Sexual offending. A criminological perspective. New York; (2018). p. 63-83. (In Eng.)
  7. Marshall W, Marshall L, Serran G, Fernandez Y. Treating sexual offenders. An integrated approach. New York; (2006). p. 10-27. (In Eng.)
  8. Richmond C, Richmond M. The future of sex offender courts. How expanding specialized sex offense courts can help reduce recidivism and improve victim reporting. Cardozo Journal of Law & Gender. (2015). p. 12-10. (In Eng.)
  9. Rose J. Where sex offender registration laws miss the point. Why a return to an individualized approach and a restoration of judicial discretion in sentencing will better serve the governmental goals of registration and protect individual liberties from unnecessary encroachments. Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice. (2017).p. 6-57. (In Eng.)
  10. Ryter J. Rejestr sprawców przestępstw na tle seksualnym a prawo do  prywatności i  prawo do bycia zapomnianym w świetle ogólnego rozporządzenia o ochronie danych osobowych  (RODO), Dyrektywy Parlamentu Europejskiego i  Rady (UE) 2016/680/ Probacja (2018). p.177-195. (In Eng.)
  11. Tewksbury R. Sex offender registries as a tool for public safety. Views from registered offenders. Western Criminology Abstract. (2006). P.1-8. (In Eng.)
  12. Thomas T. The registration and monitoring of sex offenders. A comparative study. Hoboken; 2012. p. 3-41. (In Eng.)
  13. Vandiver D, Braithwaite J, Stafford M. Sex crimes and sex offenders. Research and realities. New York; 2017. (In Eng.)
  14. Ключников А.Ю. Об институте реестра сексуальных преступников Lex Russica, (2020) . p. 140-150. (in Rus.)

C. Internet resources

  1. Ziobro wypowiada wojnę zboczeńcom: “Ustala się szczególne środki ochrony obywateli przed przestępczością na tle seksualnym” Polityka opublikowano: 18 grudnia 2015, URL: https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/275542-ziobro-wypowiada-wojne-zboczencom-ustala-sie-szczegolne-srodki-ochrony-obywateli-przed-przestepczoscia-na-tle-seksualnym?strona=1
  2. https://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/public-registry-of-sex-crime-offenders-in-poland/7358 https://statystyka.policja.pl/st/przestepstwa-ogolem/przestepstwa-kryminalne/zgwalcenie/122293,Zgwalcenie.html
  3. Dru Sjodin webpage of the Public sexual offenders registry,  https://www.nsopw.gov/about-nsopw


[1] Ziobro wypowiada wojnę zboczeńcom: “Ustala się szczególne środki ochrony obywateli przed przestępczością na tle seksualnym” Polityka opublikowano: 18 grudnia 2015, URL: https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/275542-ziobro-wypowiada-wojne-zboczencom-ustala-sie-szczegolne-srodki-ochrony-obywateli-przed-przestepczoscia-na-tle-seksualnym?strona=1

[2] Justyna Ryter, Erwin Ryter, Rejestr sprawców przestępstw na  tle seksualnym a prawo do  prywatności i  prawo do bycia zapomnianym w świetle ogólnego rozporządzenia o ochronie danych osobowych  (RODO), Dyrektywy Parlamentu Europejskiego i  Rady (UE) 2016/680/ Probacja 2018; 4 : 177-195

[3] Ключников А.Ю. (2020) Об институте реестра сексуальных преступников Lex Russica, № 3 (73). С. 141

[4] Thomas T. The Registration and Monitoring of Sex Offenders. A Comparative Study. Hoboken, 2012. Р. 28—29

[5] Ключников А.Ю. (2020) Об институте реестра сексуальных преступников Lex Russica, № 3 (73). С. 140-150

[6] Ключников А.Ю. (2020) Об институте реестра сексуальных преступников Lex Russica, № 3 (73). С. 141

[7] Dru Sjodin webpage of the Public sexual offenders registry, https://www.nsopw.gov/about-nsopw

[8] The act was named after one of the victims of the violent crimes, six-year old boy who was kidnapped from the a Sears department store at the Hollywood Mall in Hollywood, Florida, on July 27, 1981.

[9] Dru Sjodin webpage of the Public sexual offenders registry, https://www.nsopw.gov/about-nsopw

[10] Criminal Justice Policies. The Intended and Unintended Consequences of Monitoring Individuals Convicted of Sex Crimes / red. P. Lussier, E. Beauregard. New York, 2018. Pp. 63—83

[11] Ключников А.Ю. (2020) Об институте реестра сексуальных преступников Lex Russica, № 3 (73). С. 146

[12] Tewksbury R. Sex offender registries as a tool for public safety. Views from registered offenders // Western Criminology Review. 2006. Vol. 7. No 1. P. 2

[13] Letourneau E. Effects of South Carolina’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Policy on Deterrence of Adult Sex Crimes // Criminal Justice and Behavior. 2010. Vol. 37. P. 550.

[14] Ibidem;

[15] Levenson J., D’Amora D., Hern A. Megan’s Law and its Impact on Community Re-Entry for Sex Offenders // Behavioral Sciences and the Law. 2007. Vol. 25. No 4. P. 596

[16] Levenson J., D’Amora D., Hern A. Megan’s Law and its Impact on Community Re-Entry for Sex Offenders // Behavioral Sciences and the Law. 2007. Vol. 25. No 4. P. 596

[17] See http://www.sn.pl/sites/orzecznictwo/OrzeczeniaHTML/v%20kk%209-19.docx.html.Przedstawiona analiza prowadzi do wniosku, że ustawa z dnia 13 maja 2016 r. o przeciwdziałaniu zagrożeniom przestępczością na tle seksualnym (tj. Dz. U. z 2018 r., poz. 405 ze zm.) w zakresie, w jakim nakazuje umieszczać w Rejestrze publicznym dane o osobach, które popełniły przed wejściem w życie tego aktu prawnego określone w nim przestępstwa, nie spełnia wymogu zgodności z zasadami lex retro non agit oraz nullum crimen (nulla poena) sine lege anteriori, określonymi w art. 1 § 1 k.k. Takich wątpliwości nie nasuwa umieszczenie danych wskazanych osób w Rejestrze z dostępem ograniczonym, z uwagi na jego niepubliczny charakter, który pozwala na przyjęcie, że taki wpis nie jest równoważny ze stosowaniem środka represji karnej

[18] GDPR/General Data Protection Regulation: https://gdpr-info.eu/art-2-gdpr/

[19] Ibidem

[20] Justyna Ryter, Erwin Ryter, Rejestr sprawców przestępstw na  tle seksualnym a prawo do  prywatności i  prawo do bycia zapomnianym w świetle ogólnego rozporządzenia o ochronie danych osobowych  (RODO), Dyrektywy Parlamentu Europejskiego i  Rady (UE) 2016/680/ Probacja 2018; 4 : 177-195

[21] Justyna Ryter, Erwin Ryter, Rejestr sprawców przestępstw na  tle seksualnym a prawo do  prywatności i  prawo do bycia zapomnianym w świetle ogólnego rozporządzenia o ochronie danych osobowych  (RODO), Dyrektywy Parlamentu Europejskiego i  Rady (UE) 2016/680/ Probacja 2018; 4 : 177-195

[22] W Wielkiej Brytanii (Pobrane z: https://www.ms.gov.pl/pl/informa- cje/news,9806,ruszyl-rejestr-sprawcow-przestepstw-na-tle.html, Dnia (2018, 12, 04)) utworzono rejestr sprawców przestępstw z użyciem prze- mocy i przestępstw seksualnych (VISOR). Z kolei we Francji (Pobrane z: https://www.ms.gov.pl/pl/informa- cje/news,9806,ruszyl-rejestr-sprawcow-przestepstw-na-tle.html, Dnia (2018, 12, 04)) został utworzony tzw. zautomatyzowany rejestr sądowy sprawców przestępstw seksualnych (FIJAIS). Stanowi on osobowy rejestr sądowy, podobnie jak zautomatyzowany rejestr odcisków palców, krajowy rejestr śladów genetycznych i krajowy rejestr karny

[23] See https://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/public-registry-of-sex-crime-offenders-in-poland/7358

[24] See https://statystyka.policja.pl/st/przestepstwa-ogolem/przestepstwa-kryminalne/zgwalcenie/122293,Zgwalcenie.html