Tag Archives: bureaucracy

Emmanuel Lazega, Bureaucracy, Collegiality and Social Change. Redefining Organizations with Multilevel Relational Infrastructures (Cheltenham: E. Elgar, 2020)

Bureaucracy, Collegiality and Social Change. Redefining Organizations with Multilevel Relational Infrastructures is a topical research providing a new theoretical perspective on the socio-political aspects of organizations. Methodologically, the book presents a novelty as it is conceived starting from two structuring logics in the analysis of the contemporary organizations, namely, bureaucracy and collegiality.

A very important part in capturing the a main aspects of reform, change and transitions in relation to the agency and functioning of the contemporary organizations is redefining them and identifying the best approach to their present-day realities: their multilevel structure and their cyclical network dynamics.

The book demonstrates a profound understanding of the changes taking place as well in the body of knowledge constituted around organizations, taking into account a complex context given by the newer phenomena shaping both the socio-political realities and our perception regarding organizational characteristics and transformations. in this respect, besides the dynamics implied by the digitalization of society, researcher Emmanuel Lazega, the author of the book, approaches organizations as multilevel networks influenced by the particularities of the relation between markets and societies, the impact of new institutions in political economy, the self-segregation of the elites, or the higher competition in matters of specialized theorization and science in relation to societies, markets and government. As the author notes: „Any book on the sociology of organizations must rely on the theory of bureaucracy, its characteristics and its twentieth century critique. This theory starts with Max Weber and Taylorian industrial bureaucracy, focusing on the main features of this ideal type: routine work, hierarchy, impersonal interactions between members and many others discussed by this plethoric literature, including the fact that bureaucratic routinization of production began with deskilling craftspeople and social Darwinist ideology.” (p. 7)

The roots of this investigation are represented by the emphasis of the crucial connection between the development of bureaucracy, the rise of the modern state and the constitution of modern corporations, as well as the relations with the context of the promotion of mass production and consumption and the critique of the Weberian and Taylorian views of bureaucracy. Mainly, the criticism of workers as automatons or “atomized robots”, or that employees work better in groups (which may happen, but not necessarily), the vision of organizations as static; the idea that the leaders and managers are rational. Instead, power, participation and coalition building are fluid, or in motion, or in course of development.

Social capital may or may be not identic with the relationships capital. Reciprocity and solidarity are experienced as varied “goods” and they may be distributed in various ways. In neo-structural sociology the matters resulting from individual confrontation of collective actions, as well as social interests, social claims and social discipline, at individual and at collective levels, are also important. In this respect, workplace relationships are “mobilized processes of generalized exchange; at the boundaries that the group has established for itself, based, for example, on exclusion(s) – among other manner of relating with others, our observation – and at the norms that its members are called upon to define and apply”. (p. 23)

Along with social networks and new forms of virtual, organized collective agency, bureaucracy attains therefore new sophistication levels, and they can be parameterized and managed digitally, while they are not depersonalized, organizing the very perception of work relations in a more nuanced and organized manner (p. 35, 96, 121). The organization depends on the accurate image and management of an organizational scheme of partners, contractors, subcontractors, clients, and employees, with specific interests and needs that can be always better described and better understood. New theories of stratification and “dynamic configuring fields” are involved in the explanation of organizational structuring and functioning, leading the author toward the metaphor of the multilevel spinning top for the multilevel, superimposed forms of collective agency, combining upper and lower organizational levels in order to accomplish a kind of synchronization correction for the relative oligarchical character driven by closed and collegial elites.

This multispin uses circular movements and trajectories of members – for example, mobilities in loops and revolving doors from public responsibilities to private jobs and back to public positions – to create an informal pecking order (metaphorically: the shaft of the rotating spinning top) that enables the most central among these institutional entrepreneurs to obtain formal foothold positions. They can then act as vertical linchpins and brokers between conflicting sides with different political definitions of the institution. The main idea of this mechanism is that when such oligarchic and dynamic positions of institutional entrepreneurs moving up and down (top-down collegiality) are stabilized by a supportive inter-organizational network (hence the crucial dynamics of multilevel dimension of the process), these entrepreneurs are able to maintain their centrality and interactions long enough to surf on – if not to avoid altogether – the unpredictable and conflictual politics of an electoral process. This mechanism thus helps them succeed in their institutionalization efforts in spite of being a small collegial oligarchy (…)” (p. 97) capitalizing upon collective, interpersonal and inter-organizational types of agency.

An important consequential aspect is the expansion of the entrepreneurial and organizational network with beneficial implications on performance and innovation levels. Another aspect is the organizational culture and the importance of “weak culture”, defined as “banal, non-instrumental, non-demanding, non-exclusive” (p. 142), crucial in relating otherwise scattered individuals and social groups in a wider community, more susceptible to entertain an open attitude, shaping the attitudes  about values in a more sophisticated and democratic way.

A fascinating discussion concerns the correlation among bounded solidarity, social niches and status competition, bringing up interest for “oppositional solidarities” and “top-down collegiality” within the relational infrastructures activated by various strategies. Often, a successful business means also maintaining a good reputation, that is, social status, within the interplay between social control and conflict resolution. In France, “consular” commercial courts have exactly this role. (p. 257) Individual judicial entrepreneurs are sponsored to ensure and to exert social control. The study of the multilevel dimension of markets emphasized a related effect, namely, “the strong link between the ways in which cooperation among competitors works as a ‘forth factor’ of production and the creation/reproduction of social inequalities in contemporary capitalist societies”. (p.177) Neo-structural economic sociology opens the perspective of markets behaving like organizational “tools with a life of their own” perpetuating and increasing inequality, mainly by mechanisms of cooperation among similar level competitors and against smaller, lower lever organizations, reinforcing the power of stronger companies, building up opportunities and resources and desolidarizing smaller players.

Organizations and their bureaucracies become more and more like collegial bogies, with bottom-up collegial bureaucracy and specific understanding of collective actions, freedoms, innovation, learning and responsibility; therefore aiming to be more and more closer to the template of swarms, both vertically and horizontally organized, self-organized, highly adaptable and efficient in their collective action. These models are now brought closer by digitalization, big data and social network data. The military image of the swarm is ready to be impressed into organizational and bureaucratic life. The danger brought by the indisputable benefices found in developing artificial intelligence algorithms that will further bureaucratize agency via the reification of multilevel relational infrastructures that minimize change and contestation, while weakening the regulation of inequality, autonomy and autonomous innovation in exchange for a predictable, more profitable and truly effective collective action. The model might be undertaken to reshape public space, political regimes and entire societies. The Weberian image of the “polar night of icy darkness” seems highly appropriate.

Bureaucracy, Collegiality and Social Change. Redefining Organizations with Multilevel Relational Infrastructures is therefore a remarkable synthesis of research associated to the latest achievements of the anthropological and sociological social networks and relational data knowledge. However, first and foremost the book is a lucid vision of the sensitivity of relational data, of the necessity to regulate private exclusive access to data, social engineering and defend a public and democratic national state and international power to guarantee and enforce the principles of open science and safeguard the autonomy of social sciences and their right to investigate, to critique and to tell the truth to power from unsubordinated, autonomous positions. These crucial ideas, which are also well-founded warnings, are convincingly based on a serious and impressive social networks and relational data knowledge.

Franziska Ehnert, Climate Policy in Denmark, Germany, Estonia and Poland, Ideas, Discourses and Institutions (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2019)

The book of Franziska Ehnert, entitled Climate Policy in Denmark, Germany, Estonia and Poland, Ideas, Discourses and Institutions approaches climate change in terms of interaction of institutional, policy and discourse aspects that form the path from reality to political priority, policy and solution. This topic is part of current political debates that began in the 1980s, despite climate scepticism or climate change denial, and despite the resistance to the transformation of lifestyles and infrastructures. Environmental movements succeeded in bringing science and policy together, to sustain a climate change critique of the status quo and to promote ecologist alternative values and solutions via environmental policy.

Climate policy analyses are paramount to assess the manner in which the “ministerial administrations” implement or change a policy to answer environmental issues, redefine problems and maintain the adequacy and efficiency of climate change policy.

Considering that previous studies have shown the tension between the expert public officials and the politicians, the research conducted by Franziska Ehnert argues that “policy change will be better understood by studying the actors formulating these policies, namely ministerial administrations. It captures, not merely party politics and interest group politics, but the departmental politics of policy change. The book therefore focuses on the coordinative discourses within governmental institutions (…) among the actors participating in the construction of a policy, which stand in contrast to the communicative discourses through which politicians communicate and justify their policies vis-à-vis the public”. (p. 5)

Thus, the investigation follows the factors and aspects involved in the continuation or change of a policy; how is policy shaped, how coordinative discourses, policy frames, institutional contexts and particular identities relate and evolve; and how can one assess the reframing of values, the redefinition of interests or the reinterpretation of the guiding ideas.

Methodologically the study combines ontological, epistemological and methodological characteristics of the positivist and interpretative research paradigms in a comparative research with qualitative and quantitative dimensions based on the singularities and not on the similarities of the cases. Literature reviews, document analyses and expert interviews are also combined. Moreover, state and non-state actors are taken into consideration via expert interviews. Interpretation plays an important role as well following the data-generation stage: meaning-focused methods are used to analyse empirical data (p. 15). The investigation has as its own particularity the fact that the researchers acknowledge the characteristics of the cases only in the process of data generation, which increases objectivity. The countries compared are similar enough as regards institutional democracy, rule of law and market economy, and, as EU members, they share similar political commitments to EU climate and energy policy. Having under investigation older and younger democracies, varied indicators such as historical backgrounds, territory, economic, political, military and financial power or population size, differences in policy styles and discourses are to be expected.

The analytic framework introduced in the second chapter investigates the causes and means for the continuation of policies, provided that ideas and narratives shape and do not merely reflect the field of action. Political power has an important dimension in the power of ideas. The agents have an activity expressing the “following of the rules” and the “reproduction of the institution”, but also one that indicates the meta-level of discourse, for they think about and outside their institutions too. In terms of “ideal types”, the entrepreneurial-style bureaucrats are more likely to perform as “policy brokers”, while servant-style bureaucrats are more likely to “refrain from mediation and brokerage” and be, more likely, policy followers. (pp. 21-31)

In contrast, the following chapters approach the empirical data and associated analyses and interpretations concerning the making of climate policy in two Western European countries (Denmark and Germany) and in two Central Eastern European countries (Estonia and Poland). The researcher finds that Denmark is performing an important role in climate policy (“a small, green state”) due to a consensus-seeking policy style, a coordination apparatus among cabinet committees, and extensive specialization of the ministerial administration on climate policy. (p. 36)

These aspects, next to the policy ideals, objectives and instruments that are investigated, indicate a multitude of actors sustaining and opposing climate policy, but at the same time a resulting strong societal support for climate policy arising from this polyphonic conversation. However, Denmark is not and does not aim to be a “green Leviathan”, but a green democracy and market economy, with a policy orientation towards consensus, openness and inclusiveness. (p. 61)

The coordinative and consensus-seeking discourses are the most important in this respect. In the case of Germany, the size of the country induces different consequences to the similar reality of the multitude of actors involved in the climate policy “conversation”. Political acceptance might be the result of the “early participation of stakeholders in policy deliberation” in improving policy implementation. In this respect, even if lobbying may be seen as a risk factor, it could be also a democratic-openness enhancement factor. (p. 94) The main climate policy discourse in Germany has become that of increased “participation and transparency in policy deliberation processes”, calling more attention to institutional policy aiming at a more consensus-seeking attitude.

The “small state” discourse is central to Estonian identity, influencing both politics and policies. The EU was the agenda setter in Estonian climate policy and in Estonian energy efficiency policy. Fighting the communist heritage of authoritarian rule, a paradoxical weakness of the culture of coordination, the institutional fragmentation, the limited resources, the poor interministerial  consultations, the weak citizen participation and the low professionalization of the environmental NGOs, the situation was improved slightly by the planning for the European Structural Funds (2014-2020), by the design and continuation of the National Development Plan of the Energy Sector until 2030, and by the academic expertise, making the discourse of the technocrats and departmental politics officials prevalent, to the detriment of other actors. (pp. 120-123)

Central to Polish identity is the idea of catching up with Western development and requirements. On the one hand, the “relationships between state and society were fluid and fragmented” and, on the other, we have the communist heritage of authoritarian rule “undermining parliamentary independence” and weakening the institutionalized character of the “informal practices of interministerial and public consultations” (p. 151) Environmental NGOs are professionalized in Poland, but they remain marginalized. Their discourse attempted to sustain a core idea of ecological modernization, which has gained more adepts with the support of the Ministry of Economy, academic experts and environmental NGOs (keeping the white certificate system in the EEA).

The volume advances a very interesting methodology approaching the climate policies in the EU and it emphasizes an important and original evolving perspective in assessing climate policy. Both environment issues and political “landscapes” are changing, inducing more debate over competing ideas and ideals, values, facts and interests. As a consequence, discursiveness becomes more important in the lives of the institutions, states and societies. At the same time, interpretive analysis emphasizes potential improvement on scientific arguments and agendas as a result of the improvement of the deliberation processes on climate change.

The Paradigmatic Struggle for Legitimacy of the Danish Welfare State regarding the Provision of Welfare Services – Taking care of vulnerable children and youths as a core problem

 

 

1. The present challenges to the modern welfare state

Today, the welfare state in Denmark is a good example of the legitimate struggle of the modern welfare state. The Danish welfare state, like most other welfare states, is confronted with the following challenges in particular:

 

  • The demand for public welfare services and growth stimulus cannot be met due to the present public debts and fiscal crisis.
  • The neoliberal critique of the welfare state for being too big and too inefficient.
  • Globalization which weakens the national welfare state.  
  • Migration which threatens national labor markets.

 

These challenges confront the modern welfare state with its ideology of ‘doing good’ for its citizens. These challenges as a result create a gap between the welfare state´s ideology of ‘doing good’ for its citizens and ‘doing good’ in practice in real life. In Denmark, this gap constitutes a paradigmatic case of the struggle of modern welfare states which can be defined as a struggle to close the gap by replacing the old deployed paradigm with a new one.   

 

The Danish welfare state´s care program for vulnerable children and youths is used to point out and define the core problems, which together create the gap between the ideology of the welfare state´s ‘doing good’ for its citizens and ‘doing good’ in practical terms. Furthermore, the case illustrates why a paradigm, which can close the gap, cannot be evolved from the neoliberal vision of less state and/or more market/charity. Finally, it is shown why a hybrid mix of public management paradigms is the most appropriate strategy to close the gap.

 

It is important to emphasize that the Danish state´s care program for vulnerable children and youths does not illustrate the welfare state´s crisis of legitimacy in general caused by the four challenges listed above. The ambition in this article is only to show the core problems causing a gap between the ideology of the state and its practice regarding the provision of welfare services to a core group of citizens which is essential for the modern welfare state´s legitimacy. Besides, our case is considered a critical one (Flyvbjerg, 2006, pp. 229-230). That is, the conclusions in our case can – with caution – be generalized to other sectors in the modern welfare state, which provide citizens with public welfare services. 

 

2. The case

Our case is presented in the next three subsections. In subsection 2.1 we show why and how the Danish welfare state acquires necessary and profound legitimacy by taking care of vulnerable children and youths. The paradigm of the provision of the services to vulnerable children and youths is presented and discussed in section 2.2. Some major consequences of this paradigm are shown in section 2.3. In addition, it is shown how the consequences have opened up for neoliberal criticism of the dominant paradigm of the provision of the services.

 

2.1. Vulnerable children and youths and the legitimacy of the welfare state

The principal ideology of the Danish welfare state is that it is obliged to take care of citizens who are sick, disabled and vulnerable (for example, children, youths, single mothers, unemployed and indigent citizens) (Mogensen, 2010; Bonfils, 2010). The sicker and more disabled and vulnerable citizens are, the more public welfare services should be offered to and provided for its citizens, with the aim to (re)integrate them truly into society and its norms and institutions. The most vulnerable citizens are almost by definition children and youths who are abused or at risk of being abused by their parents or other adults, the church and care taking institutions. In other words: vulnerable children and youths constitute a key group for the welfare state and its legitimacy. This is why the welfare state´s care program for vulnerable children and youths is used here as case.

 

2.1.1. The paradigm of the provision of the services to vulnerable children and youths  

Vulnerable children and youths are provided with services from a subsector within the Danish welfare state called the Sector for Specialized Social Problems (SSSP) [Det Specialiserede Socialområde].

 

Resources – tax money – have generously been allocated to the SSSP for decades. The growth rate of public spending on services within the SSSP has historically exceeded both the growth rate of the GNP and that of the public sector’s general spending (Bengtsson, 2011). Besides, public spending on services continued to increase up until 2010, or after the emergence of the economic recession. Finally, public spending within SSSP has not been cut during the current economic crisis in contrast to almost all other public sectors. However, present austerity measures mean that the growth rate is now, generally speaking, zero (Gregersen, 2013). This indicates that vulnerable children and youths constitute a key group for the Danish welfare state.

 

The paradigm of the provision of such services to vulnerable children and youths also indicates that these citizens constitute a key group for and in the welfare state. Since a ‘wave’ of decentralization in the 1970s within the SSSP, the provision of services has been increasingly handed over to street-level bureaucrats, in efforts to ensure that services of the highest quality are seen professionally  (Pedersen & Hammer, 2012). Consequently, the norm was developed that street-level bureaucrats assess and judge the single case in accordance with their professions´ standards (norms, traditions, values and ethics) as defined, described and analyzed by Lipsky (Lipsky, 1980; 2010).

 

This approach to the provision of the services was institutionalized in 1998 by the Service Law [Serviceloven] which regulates the provision of the services to vulnerable children and youths. The law prescribes that the services offered and provided for these children and youths had to be based on an assessment and a judgment of the single case carried out by street-level bureaucrats. Besides, the assessment and the judgment had to be done by dialogue with the individual child, youth and family (if possible), because it is assumed that the services will have the highest positive impact factor if they are co-designed and co-tailored with children, youths and parents (Kirkebæk, 2010).

 

The main reason behind the approach mentioned to the provision of these services is the perception that the problems and needs of children and youths are both complex and individual. Therefore, the problems cannot be solved and the needs not met by the well-defined standardized services associated with statutory rights within a universalistic welfare state like the Danish one. The services have to be designed, produced and delivered individually by street-level bureaucrats in co-operation with the individual child, youth and family. 

 

In particular, the core of the paradigm of street-level bureaucrats is defined as the combination of de-centralized control with the provision of communal, or common, and individualized services. In other words: the more control of service provision in the hands of street-level bureaucrats, the more discretion and autonomy characterize their work-field. In addition, the more services designed, produced and delivered individually on the basis of the bureaucrats´ professions´ standards in co-operation with the individual child, youth and family, the stronger the position of the paradigm of the street-level bureaucrat is. As a result, the paradigm of street-level bureaucrats has been very dominant in the provision of services to vulnerable children and youths in Denmark since the 70´s.

 

2.2. Some consequences of the paradigm of the street-level bureaucrats

The dominant position of the paradigm of street-level bureaucrats in the provision of services to vulnerable children and youths has some major consequences.

 

First, vulnerable children and youths have no statutory rights to services if they live up to certain objective criteria in the Danish universalistic welfare state. Consequently, children and youths, by and large, are dependent on the street-level bureaucrats´ discretion in their assessments and judgment concerning the individual case. However, according to the Service Law, street-level bureaucrats must provide children and youths with what they themselves consider to be the best possible services. These are typically defined as services which truly can (re)integrate vulnerable children and youths into society, its institutions and norms.

 

Second, because street-level bureaucrats are only expected to pay little attention to the costs of these services provided up until 2012, soft budget constraint (Kornai, 1980; Kornai, Maskin & Roland, 2003) became the norm regarding public spending on services before the current economic crisis (Gregersen, 2013). Furthermore, because the services have to be provided, produced and delivered individually, like in modern service production in private service firms, the costs of the services is not easy to predict and control. In fact, the costs of the services, and accordingly the public spending on these, have been considered unmanageable (Bonfils & Berger, 2010; Svanholdt, 2013). As a result of this, huge budget deficits emerged in the municipalities in 2007, 2008 and 2009 regarding the provision of services. The municipalities in Denmark have full responsibility for the provision, production, delivery and financing of services for vulnerable children and youths. Furthermore, the church and charities have historically only played a marginal role in taking care of vulnerable children and youths. No intentions to change this have appeared in the general public for decades.

 

Third, the services provided within the SSSP are, by and large, not evidence based (Vickery, 2010). A comprehensive study of institutions for replacement of children and youths (Hansen, 2009) showed clearly that street-level bureaucrats, authorized by the welfare state to design, produce and deliver the services directly to children and youths, had developed an extreme individualistic approach to the assessment and judgment of the problems and needs of the single child and youth. Street-level bureaucrats had, and still have, a culture and tradition in which a strong institutionalized norm were, and still are, that methods are optional. In practice, this norm resulted in a situation where the individual street-level bureaucrat or a group of street-level bureaucrats at a certain institution had developed its own method how to assess and judge individual cases and how to produce and deliver the best possible services. The study showed that the individual street-level bureaucrat/group of street-level bureaucrats developed her/his/its own rules of thumb (Hansen, 2009). Consequently, the provided services were not and are still not evidence based.

 

Fourth. Let us present an example: For many decades a little more than one percent of all children and youths in Denmark – approximately 12.000 children and youths in 2012  – has not lived with their parents, but rather with foster families or institutions (Andersen, 2010, p.182; Bengtsson, 2011, p. 28). The intention of bringing children and youths to foster parents or institutions has, of course, been to give children and youths better future lives when compared to the expected future lives they would have had they remained with their parents. It is, however, impossible to conclude scientifically that children and youths in general have had better lives due to foster families and institutions (Andersen et al., 2010; Egelund et al., 2009; Hansen, 2009; Olsen et al., 2011). To put it differently: the population of replaced children and youths has been rather stable for decades; the causes of replacement have been stable for decades; and, the offered and provided services (foster families and institutions) for children and youths have been stable. In spite of this, the effects of the services have not been recorded scientifically. Furthermore, significantly positive effects of the services cannot be found in available statistics (Andersen, 2010). Consequently, the effects of the services for the children and youth are widely unknown at present (Pedersen & Hammer, 2012).

 

However, we do know that 40 percent of the replaced children and youths have experienced ‘breakdowns’ in their relocation, which means that children and youths have had to move on to other foster families and/or institutions (Egelund et al., 2010, pp. 12-13). This has, of course, to be considered as a negative side-effect of the policy of replacement.

 

Fifth, maladministration of the provision of the services to vulnerable children and youths and of the provided services has been disclosed in recent years. An example is several recent Danish cases of very severe abuse of children and youths in foster families and institutions. A document study (1) has been carried out concerning a variety of these cases covered by the media. As a response to these cases, the Ministry of Social Affairs appointed a Task Force to complete thorough investigation of the quality of case work in the affected local authorities. The Task Force concluded that the legal requirements in Danish Service Law had been insufficiently followed by the affected local authorities. This conclusion further severely threatened the legitimacy of the local authorities, in addition to the professionals (the street-level bureaucrats). An outcome of this was the further bureaucratization of social work regarding children and youths in Denmark. An example was the implementation of reform initiatives, amongst others a reform of the supervision of social care institutions named ‘Tilsynsreformen’ centralizing the supervision authority, which had previously been the responsibility of the individual local authorities, in five large units. At the level of the local authorities, further supervision steps were generally implemented, in order to regain legitimacy and secure the quality of casework. Furthermore, in some of the cases, dismissals at the management levels were carried out (Nielsena, 2014).

 

A similar tendency seems to be noticeable in England where several severe cases of child abuse have previously resulted in processes of ‘scape-goating’ and thus dismissals at the managerial level in public welfare institutions along with professionals being heavily criticized. One of the cases that resulted in extensive government initiatives was the highly debated case of “Viktoria Climbié who died when she was eight years old in 2000 due to extreme abuse. Her great aunt was later convicted. Another example was the ‘Baby P’- case which concerned a 17-month-old toddler, Peter Connelly, who died in 2007. ‘Baby P’ had been severely injured, tormented and neglected by his mother, her partner and his brother who were all later convicted. A thorough report revealed that the abuse had continued, despite more than 60 visits by police, social workers, and doctors carried out in the last eight months of Peter’s life. The cases of both Baby P and Climbié did, as was the case in regards to the Danish examples, strongly challenge the legitimacy of the services provided by the local authorities, and thus put pressure upon the professionals engaged in child protection services (Spray & Jowett, 2012).

 

The Danish cases have revealed a lack of control of foster families, public institutions and especially private institutions authorized to ‘treat’ the children and youths. Maladministration of information about abuses of children and youths in ‘ordinary’ families has also been revealed. The previously mentioned Task Force appointed by the Ministry of Social Affairs concluded that appropriate actions had not been taken in (many) cases where knowledge about the abuse of children and youths was evident. Furthermore, investigations into the administration of the provision of services to vulnerable children, youths and their parents have shown that the administration in some major cases has been unacceptable and insufficient (The Ministry of Social Affairs, 2012).

 

To summarize:

  • The ministerial investigations into the local authorities’ handling of the previously mentioned Danish cases of abuse seem to have been predominantly focused on the level of observance to existing law.
  • Efforts to re-establish the legitimacy and quality of social work as a response to the aforementioned cases seem to lead to further bureaucratization of social work, including reform initiatives and further standardization of case work.
  • It appears that a gap exists between the intention of ‘doing good’ and ‘doing good’ in practice, which is proved scientifically regarding the replacement of children and youth in Denmark.

 

Because many of the cases of abuses and maladministration have been mentioned in the mass media, the general public has become very much aware of the problems and the lack of documented positive effects of the provided services. Public awareness of the problems has led to a legitimacy crisis of the administration, provision, production and delivery of services for vulnerable children and youths. This legitimacy crisis has been reinforced by the fact that the replacement of the children and youths is expensive – especially at institutions. The price of one replacement is often 10,000 Euros or more per month. Therefore, a strong demand to document the effects of the services scientifically and to spend the resources – the tax money – cost-effectively has emerged within the last few years. However, this demand is strongly challenged, due to the prevailing culture and tradition of freedom of method and lack of recorded documentation of the effects of the services. A case study concerning a selected high priority child-case in a Danish local authority concluded that four ‘breakdowns’ in the placement of the child at institutions had taken place caused by the child running away. The study showed that the breakdowns and lack of significant improvement in the child’s well-being did not fundamentally challenge the professional logic of replacement of the child as being the optimal solution, despite no apparent positive effects over a period of several years. The study also showed that an individualistic approach to case work and an objection to efforts of standardizations seem to characterize the social workers (Nielsenb, 2014).

 

To conclude:

The dominant position of the paradigm of street-level bureaucrats in the provision of services to vulnerable children and youths has caused two major problems:

 

1. The effects of the services are not documented scientifically.

2. In many cases the public administration no longer follows the ideals of a Weberian bureaucracy.

 

Due to this, the welfare state has to struggle for the legitimacy of the provision of services for vulnerable children and youths. To better understand this struggle, the main actors regarding and principal arguments behind the replacement of vulnerable children and youths, in addition to the ethics of the replacements, will be presented and analyzed in the next section. 

 

 

3. Main actors and principal arguments

The replacement of children and youths concerns the right of the welfare state to intervene into the citizens´ right to autonomy and self-determination, dignity, integrity and vulnerability (Rendtorff, 1999; 2011). Consequently, three types of interests are confronted: the rights and interests of the parents, the rights and lives of the children and youths, and the interest of society and its responsibility for its citizens.

 

The replacement of children and youths can be defined as a matter of taking away the children and youths from the family. Already in this context, the state puts pressure on the parents and the family in order to decide the future of the children and youths in society. The replacement of a child or a youth outside the family is legitimized by reference to the future life of the child or the youth. The replacement is considered the least damaging solution to this social problem. That is, the power monopoly of the state is used to promote the interests of the child or the youth in an open confrontation with the wrongdoing of the biological parents.

 

Replacement typically includes the most vulnerable and isolated groups of society: people with low income and high un-employment; single mothers; and, people with severe social problems, including problems of alcohol and drug addiction. The risk of replacement of children and youths outside the family is high when it comes to single mothers, immigrant families, people suffering from mental illness, families with alcohol problems, drug abuse and medical problems, violence, sexual harassment and crime within the family. That is, the group of citizens which the welfare state is supposed really to help. However, this seems not to have been the case thinking of how stable the population of replaced children and youths has been for decades, as shown in section 2.

 

It is, of course, the street-level social workers and street-level bureaucrats in the daily administration who, on behalf of the welfare state and authorized by the same welfare state, provide the analyses and arguments which lead to replacement of children and youths outside their families. In other words, the type of street-level bureaucrats whom Lipsky defines as the ultimate street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 2010, p. 233). However, although the service ‘replacement’ has been provided for decades by the intention of ‘doing good’, it has not been proved scientifically that this is actually the case, as shown in section 2. How is this possible? An answer to this question can be found in the ethics of the replacement.

 

The ethics of the replacement of children and youths is based on the value of the right of the person – the child and youth – to self-development. The child or youth is considered a citizen who is different from their parents with his/her own right to develop and become himself/herself. Therefore, the main aim of replacement is this development of the human person and his/her right to have a good and happy childhood.

 

However, this ideology and policy of replacement of children and youths sometimes overshadows the dark sides of replacement. Because many of the replaced children and youth never join their biological family again and because no major positive effects of replacement have been recorded scientifically, these two questions become important: Is replacement rational? And to which degree is it acceptable that street-level bureaucrats control families by deciding over children, youths and parents?

 

The ideology and policy of replacement can be perceived as rational, because replacement prevents children and youths from having a negative confrontation with, and being influenced by, the family and biological parents. However, by using the concept of biopower from the French philosopher Michel Foucault (Foucault, 1976), it can be said that what happens is that the welfare state forces its biopower on its citizens – families – by using the street-level bureaucrats as its agents. The institutional structures of the welfare state, including the children’s and youths´ homes, schools and institutions contribute to the disciplinary power of the state.  Here, it can been observed how the institutions through the street-level bureaucrats as state agents decide over the bodies and lives of the citizens – the families – in order to ensure that they can be an integrated part of the welfare state´s institutions.

 

Furthermore, biopower is associated with the moral blindness and banality of evil of the public welfare institutions conducted by the street-level bureaucrats, administrators and managers (Foucault, 1976). The street-level bureaucrats want, generally speaking, to replace as many children and youths as possible because they, thereby, both contribute to do the work as agents of the welfare state and what they themselves consider as best for the children and youths. However, this is a problem because the street-level bureaucrats often forget that they, as employees in the welfare state´s institutions, are directly placed in a political space. As a consequence, it might provide the children and youths with services that express totalitarian power and technological interventions in the lives of both children, youth and parents, with the aim of making them fit according to the welfare state´s ideology, policies and institutions (Ewald, 1986). It is in this context that the risk exists that the street-level bureaucrats, who replace children and youths, are captured by moral blindness: they are not aware that they serve the biopower of the welfare state, because they are captured by the ideology and policy of ‘doing good’ for the children and youths by replacing them. In other words: the risk exists that the street-level bureaucrats, with support from the administrators and the managers in the welfare state, impose an unacceptable amount of state power on children, youth and parents. 

 

In this context it is relevant to refer to the German-American philosopher Hannah Arendt who developed the concept of ‘The Banality of Evil’ (Arendt, 1963). Here one is not really aware that one commits an evil act because evil is a thoughtless action that is determined by the structures and contexts that are a part of daily life and daily operations in the welfare state. There is a risk that evil becomes a part of background mentality in the institutions involved in the replacement of children and youths. That is, a risk exists that the street-level bureaucrats involved in the replacement of children and youths, in the name of ‘doing good’ and with the heartfelt intention of ‘doing good’, actually do evil meaning that they do no good for or even in some cases harm the children and youths.

 

Can this concept of moral blindness leading to banal evil be defined in more details and be related to the replacement of children in Denmark? Efforts to answer this question are made in the next section. 

 

 

 

4. Moral blindness and banal evil in Denmark?

The essential content of the concept of moral blindness leading to banal evil can be said to include the 10 dimensions listed below (Rendtorff, 2012). To which degree these 10 dimensions are integrated into the paradigm of street-level bureaucrats, and thereby into the provision of the services to vulnerable children and youth in Denmark, are stated for each dimension. The statements are based on the description, in section 2, of the dominant position of the paradigm of the street-level bureaucrats in the provision of the services to vulnerable children and youths.

 

4.1. 10 dimensions of moral blindness leading to banal evil

The 10 dimensions of moral blindness leading to banal evil are the following:

 

1. Moral blindness implies that the street-level bureaucrats have no capacity of moral thinking. This is not the case. The essence of the paradigm of the street-level bureaucrats is that the single bureaucrat must help vulnerable children and youths in the best way possible.

 

2. The street-level bureaucrats only follow orders and justify this by reference to the technical-goal-rationality of the organization. This is not the case. The street-level bureaucrats do not represent a technical-goal-rationality. Instead they – in principle – represent a fresh judgment and assessment in each individual case based on the different professions´ norms as prescribed in the Service Law.

 

3. In many cases the moral blindness strangely enough is due to role identification. This includes collaboration, i.e. children, youths and parents cooperate with the street-level bureaucrats regarding replacement and by doing this (more or less) are content with the ideology and policy of the replacement. Besides, children, youths and parents follow the rationality of the system by identifying with their roles as co-operative clients. This is motivated by obedience or efforts to minimize the (bio) power imposed by the street-level bureaucrats, as Lipsky (Lipsky, 2010, p.16) also identified. This dimension in the moral blindness is, to some degree, integrated into the paradigm of street-level bureaucrats. Besides, the integration is rather sophisticated. The street-level bureaucrats´ ambitions are, as part of the paradigm, to create an environment of trust between the client and the individual street-level bureaucrats to facilitate co-design and co-production and delivery of the services to the children, youths and parents.

 

4. Moral blindness contains dehumanization, i.e. the families feel guilt and the children and youths are treated as mere objects. They are not considered as human beings, but as elements, things or functions of the system. This dimension is definitely not an element in the paradigm of the street-level bureaucrats.

 

5. Moral blindness relies on total obedience by the street-level bureaucrats to the system. The Service Law [Serviceloven] and other relevant laws, which regulate the provision of the services to vulnerable children and youths, make this impossible. The law(s) simply prescribe(s) that street-level bureaucrats should have an extensive discretion and autonomy which makes total obedience impossible.

 

6. Each member of the organization is accomplishing a specific work function with role identification and a specific task but he or she has no general overview of the organizational system. This dimension might be an integrated part of the paradigm of the street-level bureaucracy. Due to a strong division of labor among managers, administrators and street-level bureaucrats both in the administration and in the daily operations, administrators, managers and street-level bureaucrats might in some casestoo little overview of the organizational system leading to the maladministration of the provision of services and the provided services shown in section 2.

 

7. Top-administrators and managers may act irrationally beyond common human understanding of morality in order to serve the instrumental rationality of the organizational system. Even if this should be the case, it would have no or only little impact on the provision of the services to the children and youths due to the street-level bureaucrats’ discretion and autonomy.

 

8. Street-level bureaucrats are pressured to become increasingly irrational and arbitrarily role implementing. Again, this dimension is not an integrated part of the paradigm of the street-level bureaucrats and will, therefore, be rejected.

 

9. Obedience, role identification and task commitment remain the central and ultimate virtue of the commitment of members of the organization to the organizational system. As described previously, this dimension is impossible to integrate into the paradigm of the street-level bureaucrats.

 

    10. Each member of the organizational system commits themselves to the values of the organizational goal of the system without questioning the legitimacy of the system as a whole. It can be said that this dimension has, to a high degree, been integrated into the paradigm of the street-level bureaucrats. Because of the paradigm´s dominant position in the provision of the services to vulnerable children and youths, no open discussions of the values and ethics of the provision of the services including replacement were raised for decades. Besides, because the paradigm of the street-level bureaucrats is not based on scientific accountability for the provided services, it cannot be ruled out that some banal evil to vulnerable children and youths and their parents has happened in Denmark over a very long period of time.

 

To conclude:

The paradigm of the street-level bureaucrats, and thereby the paradigm of the provision of services to citizens, might have caused banal evil, because of moral blindness due to: 1) no scientific documentation/accountability of the effects of the provided services to vulnerable children and youth; and, 2) organisations which are too complex. The question becomes: How to eliminate or minimize these negative side effects of the paradigm? Before answering this question in section 5, we shall take a step deeper into the analysis of moral blindness leading to evil.

 

 

4.2. Unmasking administrative evil!

In the book Unmasking Administrative Evil (third edition 2009), Guy B. Adams and Daniel L. Balafour give some indications of a theory of evil and of the concept of moral blindness in public administration. Adams and Balafour propose the concept of administrative evil as an interpretation of Hannah Arendt’s concept of moral blindness.

 

According to Adams and Balafour, organizational evil may become even worse than moral blindness because it implies a moral inversion where something evil suddenly is defined as a good (Adams & Balafour, 2009, p. 4). The starting point for the argument is: the modern organizations are complex to such a degree that it is impossible for street-level bureaucrats, administrators and managers to have an overview. Complex organization may result in a situation where the street-level bureaucrats, administrators and managers cannot see the consequences of particular actions in the overall organizational processes. This might lead to results far from those intended. Therefore, a technological bureaucracy may be unforeseen evil, meaning actions with the intention of ‘doing good’ might result in doing evil.

 

Adams and Balafour argue that the main reason for the risk of doing unforeseen evil in administration is the scientific analytic mindset of the technical-rational approach to social and political problems. This type of approach has a built-in risk of creating a kind of administrative evil which is masked and, therefore, creates blindness which results in public servants such as street-level bureaucrats, administrators and managers who suddenly are doing evil although they do not intend to. They are, so to say, engaged in activities that lead to evil, but they are morally blind because they do not see that they contribute to the inversion of the moral situation and thereby create blindness.

 

Sometimes even ethical codes and other rules of conduct may be inefficient to prevent this because the technological analytical mindset is so powerful that the street-level bureaucrats, administrators and managers do not see that they participate in processes that lead to doing harm. Also compartmentalization of knowledge and creation of too narrow identities of street-level bureaucrats contribute to the masking of evil (Adams & Balafour, 2009, p. 30). It is this moral inversion Adams and Balafour call the ‘Mask of Evil’. This is, of course, a complication of moral blindness and in a sense a ‘double-blindness’. Evil wears a mask in addition to our blindness. The concept of moral blindness in administrative evil may be following Plato’s idea that one cannot, with knowledge of it, do evil.

 

The important point here is not to reveal the masks of evil in details in the provision of the services to vulnerable children and youths. The important point is: it is likely that masks of evil can be revealed in the provision of the services to vulnerable children and youths and in the administrative control with the provided services. Seen in this perspective, an important question is: How to provide services to vulnerable children and youths and how to control the provided services so masks of evil can be revealed?

 

 

5.  Which paradigm can ensure legitimacy?

Whether the issue is negative side-effects of the dominant position of the paradigm of street-level bureaucrats in the provision of services to vulnerable children and youths, ‘moral blindness’ in the provision of the services resulting in banal evil or masks of evil due to the complex organizations and top-managers mind-set, the key word is ‘blind spots’.

 

The gap between the welfare state´s ideology of ‘doing good’ for vulnerable children and youths and doing this in practice is caused by the consequences of ‘blind spots’.

 

The five ‘blind spots’ in our case are the following. The paradigm of the street-level bureaucrats has ‘blind spots’ when it comes to: 1) the management of the public spending on the services; 2) the administration of the provision of services and the provided services; and, 3) scientific documentation of the effects of the provided services. Furthermore, 4) the services are based on ethics that have a ‘blind spot’ regarding the downsides of the services. This ‘blind spot’ is reinforced by the ‘blind spot’ regarding scientific documentation of the effects of the services in the paradigm of the street level bureaucrats. Finally, 5) the organizations´ complexity and the top-managers´ mind-set, based on goal-instrument rationality, have a ‘blind spot’ regarding doing unforeseen evil in the name of ‘doing good’ for the citizens of the welfare state.      

 

The first ‘blind spot’, which results in unmanageable public spending on services, is to a high degree caused by the fact that within the paradigm of street-level bureaucrats ‘…values about being economical or even efficient seldom loom large…’ (Brunsson, 2009, p. 62).

 

The second ‘blind spot’, which results in maladministration, can be explained to a high degree by the street-level bureaucrats´ positions in the bureaucracies and their role in these. The street-level bureaucrats are, by definition, not in the center of the bureaucracies (Lipsky, 2010, p.12). Besides, the street-level bureaucrats´ roles are to exercise discretion regarding the bureaucracies´ rules and norms, on the one hand, and the citizens´ problems and needs, on the other hand (Lipsky, 2010, pp. 230-231). Thereby, the roles of the street-level bureaucrats are to greater extent to advocate for the citizens´ needs in the ‘system’, rather than to support the ideals of a Weberian bureaucracy in the ‘system’.  

 

The third ‘blind spot’ resulting in a lack of scientific documentation of the effects of the services can be explained by norms and traditions. Doctors have, as an example, integrated scientific documentation into their professions´ norms and traditions, and thereby in the paradigm of their profession. Doctors are requested to operate on the basis of the ‘gold standard’ for documentation: double blind randomized controlled studies. Although the ‘gold standard’ for various reason is neither simple nor appropriate in all cases (Lipsky, 2010, p. 220), it is important that a scientific standard for documentation is established and met partly to legitimize the street-level bureaucrats´ provision of the services and partly to make them accountable for the effects of the provided services. In Denmark, due to norms and traditions, the street-level bureaucrats are, as shown in section 2, far from meeting a scientific standard regarding documentation of the effects of the services and far from being held accountable for the effects of the services.

 

The fourth ‘blind spot‘, which results in moral blindness and accordingly banal evil might be explained by the dominant position – close to monopoly – of the street-level bureaucrats in the provision of services for decades. The paradigm´s position might have blocked or even oppressed an open and free discussion of the ethics of the provision of services and the consequences of ethics in the provision of services. Besides, the lack of scientific documentation of the effects of services has properly reinforced moral blindness and the accordingly banal evil.    

 

The fifth ‘blind spot’, which results in masks of evil, has neither a simple explanation nor a simple solution. Besides, it can be questioned to which degree the top-managers have or can have a technical-rational approach to the decisions about and the management of social and political problems. Almost endless cases and analyses show that top-managers neither have, nor can have, a technical-rational approach (March, 2008; Brunsson, 2009; Røvik, 2002 amongst others). However, we accept that the ideal for most top-managers is a technical-rational approach to decision-making processes and management simply because this type of rationality is the most common way to legitimize decisions-making processes and management (March, 2008; Røvik, 2002).

 

What cannot be questioned (any more) is that organizations are complex. In Denmark, one of the many reasons for this is the numerous changes in criteria of what determines success, which confront public organizations. In Denmark, the standard public organization is confronted with more than 25 general success criteria plus some specific sector and organizational success criteria (Pedersen, 2008). In the attempts and efforts to meet all these success criteria an organization becomes complex because the organization: ‘must be efficient today, while also adapting for tomorrow; it must produce at low cost, while also innovating; it must deploy the massed resources of a large corporation, while showing the entrepreneurial flair of a small startup; it must achieve high levels of reliability and consistency, while also being flexible in adapting to change’ (Grant, 2002, p. 519).  

 

The key question now is: Is it possible to eliminate or minimize the ‘blind spots’ just discussed and the consequences of the ‘blind spots’? Because all public management paradigms with reference to Kuhn (Kuhn, 1962) by definition and in practice have ‘blind spots’ (Lerborg, 2010), the answer to this question is another question: Is it possible to create a mix – a hybrid – of paradigms, which can eliminate or minimize the ‘blind spots’ discussed and, by doing this, close the gap between the welfare state´s ideology of ‘doing good’ and doing this in practice?

 

5.1. Efforts made to eliminate ‘blind spots’ via a new mix of paradigms

One strategy to eliminate the ‘blind spots’ of the paradigm of the street-level bureaucrats would be to reduce discretion and autonomy among the street-level bureaucrats radically. This is, however, not a wise strategy because the street-level bureaucrats legitimize the provision of the services in general (Lipsky, 1980; Lipsky, 2010) and in Denmark in the SSSP in particular (Pedersen & Aagaard, 2013). A more appropriate strategy to eliminate the ‘blind spots’ and the consequences of them is to impose some restrictions on the street-level bureaucrats’ discretion and autonomy combined with new demands addressed to the street-level bureaucrats. Efforts, and attempts to do this, have already been made, especially during the current austerity, by implementing core elements from a neoliberal paradigm and the paradigm of Weberian bureaucracy in the public management of the SSSP.

 

Core elements in a neoliberal paradigm have been implemented to eliminate or minimize the ‘blind spots’ of the paradigm of the street-level bureaucrats regarding the management of public spending on services and scientific documentation of the effects of these services.

 

The ‘blind spot’ regarding public spending has been eliminated successfully. Since 2010 public spending has not increased and budgets have, generally speaking, been kept in line (Gregersen, 2013). The main reasons for this are initiatives taken by the former liberal-conservative government (2001 to 2011). The former government introduced the policy of zero growth in public spending on services in the SSSP. This has put a cap on public spending, which was a key ambition of the former liberal-conservative government (Pedersen & Löfgren, 2012). Besides, the former government introduced and implemented the policy of hard budget constraint (Kornai, 1980; Kornai, Maskin & Roland, 2003). That is, budget deficits were (and are still) met with administrative cuts in the budgets (Ministry of Finance, 2010, p. 7).

 

As a result of the fact that the public management of public spending on services is based on central elements in a neoliberal paradigm, the street-level bureaucrats can no longer necessarily provide children and youths with services which the street-level bureaucrats themselves consider as the best possible provisions. Besides, to ensure that budgets are kept, it is no longer, in many cases, the individual street-level bureaucrat who makes the final assessment and judgment concerning the individual case and, accordingly, decides which services are to be provided. During these years, the trend has been that teams, involving both street-level bureaucrats coming from different professions and managers coming from the daily administration in addition to the top level, are established to make the final assessment and judgment of the individual case and to decide which services are to be provided. By doing this, the teams try to balance the quality of services and the overall budgets (Johansen & Pedersen, 2012). In sum, the street-level bureaucrats have to apply to some restrictions.

 

Furthermore, some public management and managerial performance tools have been introduced recently to make it possible to establish scientific standards for the documentation of the effects of services. Examples of such tools are ICS (Integrated Children System – developed in the UK) and DUBU (a database tool to register verdicts, services provided, costs of the services etc.). The problem is that none of these tools at present have provided scientific documentation of the effects of services at the level of segments of the gross group of vulnerable children and youths. 

 

To sum up, the ‘blind spot’ regarding public spending has been eliminated. In contrast to this, the ‘blind spot’ regarding scientific documentation of the effects of services has not been eliminated.

 

The core elements of the paradigm of a Weberian bureaucracy have also been promoted again to eliminate the ‘blind spot’ regarding the administration of the provision of services and of the provided services to vulnerable children and youths. That is, the administration has been re-centralized, to avoid future maladministration of the provision of services and of the provided services. Some examples can illustrate this. As mentioned in section 2, a national task force has been established to check the local authorities´ administration of the services to vulnerable children and youths and to advise the local authorities on how to implement correct administration. A reform called ‘The Child´s Reform’ [Barnets Reform], which was implemented in 2011, has the goal to ensure a correct administration of the provision of services to children and youths. An evaluation in 2012 of the national-wide organizational set-up regarding the provision of the services in SSSP has, as previously mentioned, resulted in more centralized control of the provision of services to small segments within the gross group of vulnerable children and youths. Once again, the result is that the street-level bureaucrats have imposed restrictions regarding their discretion and autonomy. Once again, in spite of these restrictions, the street-level bureaucrats are still essential in the provision of services and still legitimize the provided services.  

 

In sum, the core elements in the paradigm of a Weberian bureaucracy have been deployed to eliminate the ‘blind spots’ of the paradigm of the street-level bureaucrats.

 

The overall conclusion regarding the efforts and attempts to eliminate the three ‘blind spots’ associated with the paradigm of the street-level bureaucrats must be a mix of – a hybrid – three paradigms which have been developed to manage the SSSP: the paradigm of the street-level bureaucrats, a neoliberal paradigm and a Weberian paradigm. This mix of paradigms has the potential to eliminate or minimize the two first of the three ‘blind spots’ associated with the paradigm of street-level bureaucrats. However, more research is needed to design the most appropriate mix to eliminate or minimize these two ‘blind spots’. Besides, we still have to eliminate the ‘blind spot’ of scientific documentation of the effects of the services.

 

Furthermore, we still have two more ‘blind spots’ to eliminate or minimize. The one spot is the ethics of the provision of services, which results in moral blindness and accordingly banal evil. The second spot is the combination of organizational complexity and the top-managers technical-rational approach to the solutions of social and political problems which results in masks of evil. To our knowledge, no steps have been taken to eliminate or minimize these two ‘blind spots’ and their inherent consequences.

In sum, we are left with three ‘blind spots’ remembering that the ‘blind spot’ of scientific documentation of the effects of the services reinforces moral blindness and consequently banal evil.

 

To eliminate or minimize these three ‘blind spots’ and the consequences of them, we shall propose the development of a fourth paradigm: the paradigm of scientific documentation and ethics. This paradigm has, of course, to be integrated into the mix of three paradigms already mentioned.

 

5.2. A new paradigm and a new mix of paradigms!

To eliminate the ‘blind spot’ regarding scientific documentation of the effects of services, to make the street-level bureaucrats´ more accountable for the services and to help reduce moral blindness resulting in banal evil, society must require scientific documentation of the effects of the services the street-level bureaucrats provide directly to vulnerable children and youths.

 

It is, of course, impossible to implement the ‘gold-standard’ mentioned for scientific documentation overnight. It is, however, possible to move towards the ‘gold-standard’ stepwise vis-a-vis increasing requirements to the documentation of the effects of services. By doing this, the ‘blind spot’ regarding documentation will be reduced over time. It will, however, result in a movement towards a technical-instrument rationality towards the provision of services. If this technical-instrument rationality is coupled with an economic rationality, the result will be that the provision of services is done on the basis of cost-effective analyses. That is, the provision of services will be based on objective criteria. As a consequence of this, the mind-set of a technical-economical-instrument rationality will be promoted among street-level bureaucrats, administrators and managers. This will increase the risk of double moral blindness and accordingly masks of evil as discussed previously. In other words, we are confronted with wicked problems which are well demonstrated in the Danish SSSP (Gregersen, 2013).

 

To eliminate or minimize the risk of both banal evil and masks of evil associated with moral blindness, organizational complexity and a technical-economical-instrumental rationality, we would like to propose an improvement of organizational ethics and awareness of social responsibility made transparent to the public. One idea would be to establish a system of ethical and legal review of the decision-making processes of the provision of services, the administration of the provided services and the effects of the services provided. This approach would emphasize the importance of the ethics in the provision of the services and in the services provided, as well as the ethics of the effects of the provided services. This concern can further be situated at the level of management and leadership of public organizations via value-driven management or total quality management. Besides, we will propose to emphasize the communicative dimensions by making the review of the provision of services and the effects of services more transparent. Many different stakeholders should be involved in the proposed review to ensure transparent reviews.

 

To develop this fourth paradigm of scientific documentation and ethics and to integrate this new paradigm into the mix of the three paradigms discussed previously, more research is needed.

 

 

6. Conclusion

In this article we have analyzed the Danish welfare state´s struggle for legitimacy as a paradigmatic and critical case, based on the case of the provision and the management of services to vulnerable children and youths. In particular, we have demonstrated a gap between the welfare state´s ideology of ‘doing good’ for its citizens and this in practice – in real life. Besides, we have analyzed insufficient problem solutions to the gap. Finally, we have pointed out ‘blind spots’ linked to the existing paradigms of the provision and the management of services to vulnerable children and youths, which support the creation and maintenance of the gap of the welfare state´s ideology of ‘doing good’ and doing this in real life.

 

We have argued that we need a new mix – a new hybrid – of paradigms of the provision and the management of the services to vulnerable children and youths to eliminate or minimize the ‘blind spots’ and, consequently, the gap between the welfare state´s ideology of ‘doing good’ and doing this in practice. That is, we need to introduce a new paradigm in the provision and the management of public services, based partly on the scientific documentation of the effects of the provided services and partly on a new ethics in the provision and the management of these services. Moreover, this new paradigm has to be integrated into the already existing mix – combination – of three paradigms regarding the provision and the management of services to vulnerable children and youths.

 

 

Notes

1. The included overall account of the Danish media-covered cases of abuse and maltreatment of children and youths is based on an in-depth document study of a selection of six of the most media-covered cases from 2011 to the present (Nielsena, 2014).

 

 

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Pedersen, J. S., Aagaard, P. (2013), Fra åben konflikt til symbiotisk evolution: Hvordan offentlige ledere forener fagprofessionel autonomi og hård budgetdisciplin, [From conflict to symbiotic evolution: How public managers combine professional autonomy and hard budget discipline], Økonomistyring & Informatik, Fagtidsskrift for nye ledelsesformer og ledelseskoncepter, 29. årgang, Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, Copenhagen. 

Pedersen, J. S. & Löfgren, K. (2012), Public Sector Reforms: New Public Management without Marketization? The Danish Case, International Journal of Public Administration, 35, 7.

 

Pedersen, J. S., 2008, Changing Success Criteria for Public Sector Institutions: Squaring the Circle? / The Anatomy of Change: A Neo-Institutionalist Perspective. eds. /Scheuer, S., Copenhagen Business School Press, Copenhagen.

 

Pedersen, J. S. & Hammer, S. (2012), Nogle konsekvenser af Strukturreformen for medarbejdere, ledere og borgere – Det specialiserede område [Consequences of the structural reform regarding employees, managers and citizens – the specialized social area], Tidsskrift for Arbejdsliv, 14. Årgang, nr. 4.

 

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Rendtorff, J. D., (1999), Bioetik og ret. Kroppen mellem person og ting, [Bioethics and right. The body between person and thing], Gyldendal, Copenhagen.

 

Rendtorff, J. D. (2012), Hannah Arendt and the law and ethics of administration: Bureaucratic evil, political thinking and reflective judgment, 25th IVR World Congress, Law, Science and Technology: Frankfurt am Main 15-20 August 2011. Vol. 112, Series B Frankfurt am Main: Goethe Universität, (25th IVR World Congress: Law, Science and Technology Paper Series; No.112).

 

Røvik, K. A. (2002), The Secrets of the Winners – Management Ideas that Flow, in Sahlin-Andersson, K., Engwall, L.,The Expansion of Management Knowledge, Carriers, Ideas and Sources (ed.), Stanford Business Books, Stanford University Press, Stanford.

 

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Svanholdt, A. K. (2013), Økonomistyring på handicapområdet [Public budget management of the public sector of disabilities], in eds. Bonfils, I.S., Kirkebæk, L. O., Tetler, S., Handicapforståelse mellem teori, erfaring og virkelighed, [The understanding of disability between theory, experience and reality], Akademisk Forlag, Copenhagen.

 

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Weber, M. (1968), Economy and Society, University of California Press, Berkeley.

 

Has the Competition among Professions in the Nordic Welfare States Intensified? A Danish Case

 

1. Introduction and analytical framework

Professionals such as social workers, administrators, doctors, economists, accountants, teachers, lawyers and nurses are core employees in the public sector in modern welfare states for the provision, production, delivery and management of the welfare services. By definition, professionals need to have autonomy in order to exercise discretion to provide people with the best possible services (Lipsky, 1980; 2010; Mintzberg, 1983; Winter & Nielsen, 2010). In other words, if professionals possess a sufficient amount of autonomy to exercise discretion based on their profession’s standards, norms and values, they can and will design the provision, production and delivery of the services to create the best fit possible between the services provided and the individual citizen’s needs.

 

Jespersen and Wrede (2009, pp. 155-156) define the following three types of autonomy.

 

1. Traditional professional autonomy 

With traditional professional autonomy, professionals have a monopoly on particular jobs as well as specific management positions in certain public welfare institutions (called ‘double social closure’). They also have the authority to define and solve clients’ problems. When professional autonomy exists, mono-professions are additionally the norm regarding the provision, production, delivery and management of the welfare services.

 

2. Framed autonomy

With framed autonomy, the autonomy is more limited and emphasis is put on the accountability of the professionals. There are also political and administrative demands regarding economic efficiency in the daily operations professionals perform. In framed autonomy, the various levels of management define the problems and solutions, the professions’ norms and standards are thus subordinate to the organization. Consequently, framed autonomy reflects an era of new public management (NPM).

 

3. Competitive autonomy

With the rise of competitive autonomy, monopolies dissolve. As a result professionals coming from different professions are involved in decision-making processes on the provision, production, delivery and management of welfare services to the citizens as end-users.

 

According to Jespersen and Wrede (2009, p. 173), developments in the hospital/health care sector in the Nordic countries have moved from traditional professional autonomy towards competitive autonomy via framed autonomy. From the perspective of institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1987; Meyer & Hammerschimd, 2006; Thorton et al., 2012; Thorton & Ocasio, 2008), this development reflects a shift from the logic of street-level bureaucracy (SLB) being highly dominant to a situation where there is competition between the logic of SLB and the logic of NPM, which has further evolved to the current situation, where several different logics compete.

 

Due to space limitations, this article focuses on the following four logics of management in the public sector: SLB, NPM, Weberian bureaucracy (WB) and new public governance (NPG). Table 1 presents a basic summary of what comprises these logics.

 

Table 1: Institutional logics of the public sector

Primary management logic Weberian bureaucracy (WB) Street-level bureaucracy (SLB) New public management  (NPM) New public governance (NPG)
Fundamental logic The state The profession The market The local community
Cultural symbolism Unity of the State, the public ethos, rules, obligations and rights

 

 

Vocation, professionalism, hands-on approaches, professional ethos and ethics, practice-orientated knowledge Formation of contracts and marketisation of the public sector, competition, self-interest as a significant criterion for prioritisation and decision making Reliance and competition, mutual dependency, the pluralistic state, governance networks, cooperation and competition
Materialised practice Hierarchy, top-down management, centralisation, standardisation, economics of scale, division of labour Bottom-up management, coping strategies, discretion, production and delivery of public welfare services provided in cooperation with consumers Intra- organisational management, focus on input and service output based on the preferences of the citizens, the citizen as costumer Intra-organisational governance, focus on service processes and outcomes
Theoretical origin The ideal typeof bureaucracy

 

Front-line bureaucracy Rational choice, market economy Neo-corporatism

 

Viewing Jespersen and Wrede’s (2009, p. 173) conclusions on developments in the hospital/health care sector in the Nordic countries using the theories on institutional logics as a framework means the situation being dealt with now involves several competing logics. The fact that there is competition among different institutional logics paves the way for two possible scenarios: 1) struggles and conflicts among professions; and 2) constructive co-operation among the professions. Naturally, people and society as a whole prefer the latter, which is why the political-administrative system demands that public managers do their best to promote the second scenario.

 

Consequently, two important questions must be asked:

1) Is the development from traditional professional autonomy towards competitive autonomy – from a mono logic towards multiple logics – in the hospital/ health care sector in the Nordic countries part of a more general development?

2) Can and will public managers promote the second scenario of constructive co-operation that would be of benefit to people and society?

 

The following three-step analysis addresses these two questions.

 

The first step involves a case study that examines whether or not the development from traditional professional autonomy towards competitive autonomy – from a mono logic towards multiple logics – in the hospital/health care sector in the Nordic countries also exists in other public welfare sectors. The case involves the disabled and the socially disadvantaged in Denmark. Developments involving this group of recipients of welfare services are described and analysed based on a document analysis by Pedersen and Hammer (2012), but are also examined based on data from a study comprising a national survey of managers (Pedersen, 2007). Data from 13 qualitative interviews with managers whose work involves this group were also studied (Pedersen and Aagaard, 2013).

The second step is a case study that investigates if and how public managers promote the second scenario of constructive co-operation. The same group of recipients of welfare services is looked at as in the first step, but this time the analysis is based on qualitative interviews with top managers. Finally, the third step provides a discussion that attempts to answer the two questions presented above.

 

2. The sector of disabled citizens and the socially disadvantaged

This section introduces and analyses developments concerning the field of disabled citizens and the socially disadvantaged in an attempt to frame and compare Wrede and Jespersen’s conclusions about the hospital/health care sector.

 

2. 1. Why disabled citizens and the socially disadvantaged are of interest

Professionals who work with this group of people deal with society’s most vulnerable citizens, which is why this group is of high priority for politicians, taxpayers in general and, as this article will show, the media, which often tends to focus on showing how local authorities have difficulties in providing an acceptable level of service. Managers whose work deals with this group must also cope with wicked problems that are particularly complex and involve policy issues that are not easily solvable. Strategic uncertainty is also a feature of dealing with this sector due to, as this article will show, the many actors involved and their various professions and inherent logics. This, in turn, means that problem-solving strategies can differ greatly. Another feature is the institutional uncertainty that arises due to decisions being made on multiple levels and in different places, ranging from, for example, reform initiatives implemented by the government to frontline decision making at the managerial level and/or among social workers (Klijn et al., 2003, pp. 193-194). 

 

In addition to being of high priority politically and among the Danish population in general, this group is very costly to society. A serious challenge for the semi-professionals involved in social work and the treatment of this group is that they have, as yet, failed to provide evidence-based data demonstrating the effectiveness of the services they provide. The services they provide are often viewed as expensive and as severely intervening in people’s lives (Konnerup, 2009, pp. 103-104). This situation has contributed to the emergence of a competitive relationship among the professions that involve this group.

 

This article shows how budget management difficulties and general developments in this sector influence the level of competition among professions in Denmark, which in turn, underlines the need for constructive co-operation among professions in a multi-logic environment.   

 

2. 1. 1. Disabled citizens and the socially disadvantaged in Denmark

Following the Structural Reform of 2007, local authorities in Denmark gained full responsibility for the sector concerning disabled citizens and the socially disadvantaged (Madsen, 2014, p. 40; Olsen and Rieper, 2007). As a whole, around ten percent of the Danish population belongs to this group, which means it represents the second largest welfare-oriented sector for local authorities. With DKK 40 billion being spent annually, it is the second most costly field in Denmark (Ministry of Finance, 2009, p. 6; Pedersen and Hammer, 2012, p. 49). Over the years, this sector has put a severe financial strain on public budgets, leading to a period of ever-growing central budget allocations to local authorities. In 2010, when the government finally declared that no further budget allocations would be made, it launched a plan to stabilise the budgetary control of local authorities in this area (Ministry of Finance, 2010).

 

The disabled and socially disadvantaged are generally divided into two groups:

1) Adults who are physically challenged or suffer from mental disorders and addiction, intellectual disabilities, autism, brain damage or mental disabilities. Services for this group include e.g. shelters, safe-houses and crises centres for women.

2) Children and youth who are at risk. Services for this group include e.g. foster care and care centres (Framework Agreement, 2014, p. 4).

 

2. 2. Developments in Denmark for disabled citizens and the socially disadvantaged, 1970–2014

This section looks at this sector in light of Jespersen and Wrede’s conclusions to determine whether a shift from traditional professional autonomy towards competitive autonomy in the hospital/health care sector in the Nordic countries has occurred. We will also examine whether a shift has taken place from a mono logic towards multiple logics concerning this sector. 

 

Basic societal values in the 1970s concerning the group of interest 

As part of a decentralisation strategy implemented by the Danish government in the 1970s, it was decided that the provision of the services to disabled and socially disadvantaged citizens should be based on individual assessments carried out by semi-professionals (e.g. social workers). The semi-professionals were to make use of their autonomy and discretion in the field, and in decision-making processes, combining the service outputs of the sector with citizens’ needs. As a result of this strategy, SLB logic dominated this sector for decades. Until the turn of the century, in fact for almost three decades, a mono logic was prominent for this group and remained largely intact as no appreciable initiatives influenced by the logic of NPM were implemented in the 1980s, or even in the 1990s (Aagaard and Pedersen, 2013, pp. 26-27).

 

 

 

Public sector reforms 

From the 1990s until today, more than 20 major public sector reforms were implemented in Denmark. After the 2007 Structural Reform, the area under study was constituted in a new set up, granting the current 98 municipalities in Denmark full responsibility for the provision and financing of services relevant for this group. The basic idea behind the structural reform largely represented the rationale of the NPM logic of decentralisation in the hopes of securing an efficient delivery of services by providing citizens as consumers with better and cheaper welfare services.

 

Another example of NPM logic that had a growing impact on the rationale of the reforms in the Danish welfare state at that time was the policy that people were free to choose a service provider, e.g. the hospital or school they preferred. Another example that involves this sector was the launching of the web-based Tilbudsportalen, an online catalogue of service providers that contains a description of their services and prices, which allows local authorities to select the most appropriate services given the needs of the citizens (Fakta om Tilbudsportalen). The reason for establishing Tilbudsportalen was to encourage competition among suppliers to achieve better and cheaper services for the citizens as end-users. A study by Aagaard and Petersen (2013, p. 28), however, shows that implementation of the Tilbudsportal failed to significantly increase competition or reduce costs.

 

Another recent reform initiative involving the disabled and socially disadvantaged concerns the governmental aim of increasing the inclusion of children with special needs in the municipal primary and lower secondary school in Denmark rather than special schools (Egelund et al., 2013, p. 12). This reform can be seen as a gradual “normalisation” of aspects of specialised public welfare services. It has resulted in a focus on cross-disciplinary co-operation among various professions, organisations and other players (Danish Evaluation Institute, 2011, p. 57), e.g. between teachers and parents, teachers and social workers and at the level of management. Activities resulting from the reform enforce the logic of NPG, which has an inherent focus on values such as co-operation, self-reliance and a solution-oriented use of governance networks.

 

Semi-professionals, e.g. teachers, nurses, daycare staff and social workers, are typically associated with the logic of SLB (Lipsky, 2010), whereas full-professionals, e.g. economists, lawyers and administrators, are associated with the logic of the WB (Lerborg, 2010). In Denmark, both semi-professionals and full-professionals have been hostile to the logic of NPM for decades (Pedersen and Rendtorff, 2010), which is why the overall implementation of NPM in the Danish welfare state has proven to be quite limited (Pedersen, 2010; Pedersen and Löfgren, 2012).

Full-professionals, however, have absorbed many of the performance elements of NPM, which are now widely implemented by both state and local authorities. As a result, the full-professionals have gradually turned WB into a neo-bureaucracy, which entails combining WB with modern, top-down performance management (Pedersen, 2010). Overall, the public sector reforms work as a framework for the autonomy of professionals (defined in NPM terms as server demands) on economic efficiency in the daily operations they perform. Consequently, it is possible to observe a development from traditional professional autonomy to a framed autonomy, as well as a shift from domination by a mono logic to a today’s situation, which comprises multiple logics.

 

The financial crisis

From 2007-2009, a considerable budget deficit appeared in the municipalities in general, but particularly for the sector being studied. The government saw this as unacceptable, especially because the financial crises had reached Denmark by 2009. With the overall state budget severely strained and the financial stability of the Danish welfare state threatened, tough budget constraints were implemented and top-down cuts in the public sector in general and in the group under study were carried out. There was a move from a more “gentle” budgetary control of welfare expenses in the municipalities to a much more stringent economic policy. In order to restore the economic situation as well as to be able to achieve further control of the consumption of resources by local authorities, the WB logic was further strengthened (Pedersen and Hammer, 2012). Along with the enhancement of the WB logic, more requirements arose for documenting the efficiency of the service outputs of the professional institutions. The economic challenges led to a further strengthening of the WB logic, both in its old and new form.

As a result, semi-professionals were faced with a completely different setting, where the WB logic dominated their work life much more and challenged the logic of SLB. Rationales excluded from the SLB logic, such as budget management and performance measurement, were now – and continue to be – incorporated in social work. At the same time, there was (and continues to be) on-going political demand for individually based provisions of welfare services; as such, the SLB logic remains. This has meant a shift towards a much more competitive autonomy as well as towards more multiple logics.

 

High priority cases in the mass media

In recent years several aforementioned cases of abuse of children and youth believed to be protected by local authorities and semi-professionals have been covered by the mass media, threatening the legitimacy of the welfare state, which, among other reasons, gains its legitimacy by taking care of society’s most vulnerable citizens (Esping-Andersen, 1990). A work in progress concerning the consequences of such high profile cases in the mass media concludes that a strengthening of WB continues to occur because of such cases. The study indicates that the Danish government has thus turned to reforms that involve both more legislation and more control measures in response to the cases. The study also shows that the same mechanism based on the logic of bureaucracy is found in the municipalities, which on a decentralised level implement more control measures in an effort to regain control and to ensure the re-establishment of legitimacy in the organisation. This process of bureaucratisation has intensified in recent years due to the influx of high profile cases, severely challenging the logic of SLB. Because WB logic forms the basis for the general reaction and solutions to the aforementioned, that same logic is being challenged as new cases continue to appear in spite of WB-based efforts to prevent them. As a result, these cases severely challenge the logic of WB and SLB (Nielsen, 2014).

 

Digitisation

A new era of digitisation has been introduced in the Danish welfare state in recent years. Along with Local Government Denmark and the Danish Regions, the Danish government has commenced the implementation of the “eGovernment Strategy of 2011- 2015”, which is called “The digital path to future welfare”. The digitisation reform is being proclaimed as a long-sought-after solution to future demographic issues in which the financial stability of the current level of public welfare is threatened due to demographic changes in population. There will be a much larger number of elderly citizens in need of care relative to the number of people who work and pay taxes. With the implementation of IT solutions for frontline casework involving vulnerable groups of children and young people, as well as people with disabilities, the rise of the digitisation era is also visible with regard to the area under study. Intended to improve quality and be financially beneficial, various systems have been developed and implemented widely throughout the municipalities (eGovernment Strategy, 2011). The logic of NPM and WB can be found in the efforts to reform the welfare state based on digitisation in the sense that the WB logic is present in the implementation of digitisation programmes as a means of controlling the quality of the services delivered by measuring the degree to which the practices of social workers live up to current legislation. The implementation of IT systems also serves as a means for securing and measuring the level of performance and efficiency, which reflects the logic of NPM. The combined existence of these two logics reflects the emergence of a neo-bureaucracy, a development that challenges the logic of SLB and fights against the logics of NPM and WB.

The digitization movement challenges the logic of SLB in yet another way because IT systems directed at frontline social work inevitably weakens the autonomy level of the affected professions by determining standard procedures for casework, as well as casework efficiency.

 

2. 3. Overall conclusion

In summary, we are able to conclude that developments in the 1990s and on have contributed to the current situation, where many different professions are now involved in the decision-making processes for the provision, production, delivery and management of the welfare services. Simultaneously, a shift has taken place from a mono logic towards multiple logics competing against each other. In part, this development has occurred because of:

  • The implementation of more than 20 major reforms in Denmark in the public sector as a whole which have affected the area under study
  • An increased focus on financial management in the public sector
  • The governmental and municipal response to high-profile cases of abuse and maltreatment of users, such as at-risk children and youth
  • The recent governmental focus on the implementation of digitisation-oriented reforms in the public sector

 

The shift from a mono logic to multiple logics means that many competing values, norms, standards and principles are now involved in the provision, production, delivery and management of welfare services. This has led to an intensified degree of competition among the many professions (and professionals), hence resulting in a competitive autonomy.

 

Consequently, we are able to conclude that the pattern of development in the studied sector is similar to what has occurred in the hospital/health care sector in the Nordic countries.

 

3. Public managers

A central issue now involves the exploring of the consequences that this development may have. As mentioned, in a situation with competitive autonomy the following two scenarios are likely: 1) predictable classic struggles and conflicts among professions/professionals; and 2) constructive co-operation among the professions/professionals.

 

The first scenario is the least desirable outcome, substantiated by the argument that struggles and conflicts do not contribute positively to the provision of better and/or cheaper welfare services. Research on public service motivation (PSM) indicates that a connection exists between the level of motivation among professionals and the level of performance. If there is a match between the organisational goals and employee motivation, then the employees are more likely to have a high degree of PSM, which then contributes to better service delivery (Andersen and Pedersen, 2014, pp. 56-57). 

Applying research results of this nature to the theories of institutional logics leads to the conclusion that organisational environments characterised by high levels of competition among professions may have a negative impact on PSM and thus the performance level of semi-professionals. As a result, public managers may fail to accommodate the demand for better and/or cheaper welfare services.

 

A case study conducted to answer the question of how public managers in the sector cope in a multi-logic situation shows that the managers engage in a challenging and result-oriented dialogue with social workers. This generates a situation in which the social workers are able to contribute to the fulfilment of success criteria other than what the logic of SLB covers. In this way, social workers, facilitated by managers, are able to cope with other professions (Aagaard and Pedersen, 2013, p.19). 

 

This strategy of dialogue among managers seems to resemble the well-known method of dialogue performed by Socrates, known as elenchus, which involves “examining a person with regard to a statement he has made, by putting to him questions calling for further statements, in the hope that they will determine the meaning and the truth-value of his first statement” (Robinson, 1953, p. 7). An example of this is the approval process for putting at-risk children who are unable to remain with their families in a home. In Denmark, front-level managers often have the final decision in these matters – mostly as a means of financially managing the expenses of the organisation. Often, the manager’s judgment is then based on recommendations made by the individual social worker. This approval stage in particular generates the clash of different institutional logics, which means that it is vulnerable to conflicts. In these situations, the managers must prioritise and operate in the divide between the inherent values of the SLB logic’s need for discretion and some sense of autonomy in decision making and the need for control (legal and financial) of the WB logic to end up with a legitimised decision. Accordingly, it is especially in these situations that managers can benefit from the implementation of a dialogue-based strategy, which enables them to save money while simultaneously maintaining autonomy and the use of discretion among semi-professionals. The positive impact of a dialogue-based management technique is twofold. First, it contributes to the social worker’s acceptance of criteria and values not embedded in the SLB logic. Second, management’s gradual implementation of the rhetoric used by social workers fosters constructive co-operation in a multi-logic environment (Aagaard and Pedersen, 2013, p. 33). In conclusion, this approach can work to help improve the provision of sufficient welfare services for taxpayer’s money.

 

In order to be able to understand the potential of this specific management technique we consider it necessary to discuss what constitutes the institutional setting in which modern public management takes place, and why this calls for the dialogue-based approach in order to compensate for the described divergence of logics.

 

3.2. The never-ending search for the optimal mix of institutional logics

The following section includes the presentation and discussion of the following two arguments:

1) A certain mix of logics can never be stable. If anything, it is an inevitable or natural consequence of ongoing shifts in the institutional settings of public welfare institutions that necessitates the ability of management techniques to adapt.

2) Competitive autonomy is a ‘natural’ consequence of the never-ending search for the optimal mix of institutional logics. This is regardless of whether or not the search is theoretically or ideologically driven or based on a process of trial and error.

 

3.2.1. The never-ending search for the optimal mix of logics

As this article shows, it is in fact possible for managers and social workers to navigate in a multi-logic scenario. The challenge for public managers in each individual situation is thus being able to draw on the logic most suitable in the given situation. It is important to underline the fact that the existence of a multitude of logics in the public sector can be viewed as beneficial. This is due to that fact that all logics have strengths and weaknesses (or so-called blind spots), which are briefly presented below for the two logics found to be most dominant in the area under study: the logics of WB and SLB.

 

A) Strengths

* WB supports political-administrative decisions

* SLB is sensitive towards clients’ needs.

 

B) Weaknesses

The logics of WB and SLB are characterized by having a set of individual blind spots (Lerborg, 2010). One of these blind spots exists due to the fact that WB is generally not considered as being very sensitive towards client needs. The logic of WB is not attentive towards the motivation of employees (e.g. semi-professionals) either. As this article has shown, the logic of WB has permeated the area under study as a result of, for example, reform initiatives, administrative processes in response to cases in the media, and an increase in the need for financial management. Theoretically, one could argue that a unilateral approach to institutional logics that only allowed the influence of WB logic and that ignored the inherent blind spots of this logic could severely reduce the motivation of social workers.

 

One blind spot inherent in the logic of SLB is that street level bureaucrats generally have the tendency to show little interest in economic efficiency in daily operations and oppose the implementation of new control mechanisms (Lerborg, 2010, pp. 70-71). This article shows that there is a proven need to continue to focus in the public sector on the financial management of the delivery of welfare services, and most certainly in the area under study.  

 

In summary, logics are by definition conflicting, overlapping and competing due to divergence of their inherent basic values and principles. In order to limit the inherent risks of blind spots, as well as to promote the strengths of the individual logics, a never-ending search for the ultimate perfect mix of logics will inevitable take place. Regrettably, no lasting equilibrium can be reached, as the description of continuously shifting combinations of logics and their hierarchic structures indicates, as well as due to the developments that take place within the welfare state. Accordingly, no lasting mix of logics can be maintained, which is why the perfect mix can only ever be transitory.

 

Nevertheless, the question is whether the continuous search for a better mix of logics that has taken place for decades has been successful. The answer is both yes and no.

Yes: The mix of logics has become more balanced over time; one particular logic no longer exerts extreme dominance over the others. In fact, in the search for the best mix of logics we have actually ended up with competitive autonomy.

No: One important problem still remains: logics cannot communicate; only professionals can. The question, then, is how professionals communicate within and across their professions. Within a profession, communication is based on certain mutually agreed values, standards, norms and ideologies. This makes communication perfectly possible.

 

However, professionals communicate poorly across professions because of lack of mutually agreed values, standards, norms and ideologies. This is resulting either in conflicts and a potential decrease in motivation among semi-professionals or efforts towards cooperation among the professions based on certain common values, norms and standards. In summary, this is why public managers become particularly important players and why dialogue-based management techniques may very well prove to be an important tool for public managers and society. As this article contends, however, the dialogue-based approach cannot be viewed as a static management technique but must cope with the fact that attaining equilibrium among the logics is not possible due to the ever-changing nature of the situation.

 

4. Concluding remarks

The primary aim of this article has been to determine whether the same pattern of development involving a shift from traditional professional autonomy towards competitive autonomy in the hospital/health care sector in the Nordic countries also exists more generally in the public sector. This article has drawn on research studies on the disabled and socially disadvantaged in Denmark. The second aim of this article was to discuss the potential consequences of a multi-logic environment involving competitive autonomy and furthermore what could possibly prove to be a beneficial strategy at managerial level for navigating this very environment. 

 

At this point, we are able to conclude the following. First, on a general level, a similar pattern of development is visible both in the health care sector and in the sector involving the disabled and socially disadvantaged. Various indicators show that a general development has taken place from traditional autonomy to competitive autonomy via framed autonomy. Second, public managers are able, it appears, to promote the preferred scenario of constructive co-operation, which fortunately creates the lowest level of tensions in these multi-logical organizations.

 

Our study, which examines the managerial use of a dialogue approach based on dialectical refutation, is primarily based on interviews with the managers at this stage, which means still remains to be validated by social workers. As a result, we argue that further research on this matter is necessary that, preferably, includes observation studies focusing on social workers to validate the usefulness of the dialogue-based approach used by managers. This would contribute to shedding light on issues such as whether the dialogue-based approach has in fact been implemented or not. In addition, accordingly, this would help clarify what characterises the managers with the greatest ability to make use of the dialogue-based approach. 

 

References

Aagaard, P. & Pedersen, J. S., 2013. Fra åben konflikt til symbiotisk evolution: Hvordan offentlige ledere forener fagprofessionel autonomi og hård budgetdisciplin. Økonomistyring & Informatik, Fagtidsskrift for nye ledelsesformer og ledelseskoncepter, 29. årgang, Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag. 

 

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