In December 2015, The Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation published Verso una strategia italiana per l‘artico (Towards an Italian Strategy for the Arctic). In this article, the authors explain and evaluate the document in light of Italy’s connections to and interests in the Arctic, the Kiruna rules for observers at the Arctic Council, and the Arctic policies of other observers. They conclude that the intended audience for Verso una strategia is the Arctic States. Therefore, the document emphasises relevant Italian scientific efforts and promotes Italy’s oil and gas industry while downplaying the rights of indigenous peoples and avoiding issues of controversy. Publication of the document as a work in progress indicates the ministry’s willingness to listen to feedback and adapt its approaches as it develops a more comprehensive and nuanced strategy.
Introduction
In December 2015, The Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation published its latest policy on the Arctic.[1] It is humbly entitled Towards an Italian Strategy for the Arctic (Verso una strategia italiana per l‘artico) indicating that the Ministry considers this a work in progress and not a final word on Italian-Arctic relations.
Italy was admitted as a standing observer to the Arctic Council in 2013. Perhaps unfortunately for Italy, at the same time, China, Japan, India, Singapore and South Korea were granted the same status and the ‘Asian invasion’ discourse rather side-lined discussion of Italy’s new position. Nevertheless, while the spotlight focused on the contributions and expectations of the new Asian observers, Italy has been able to work quietly on developing its latest policy document.
Verso una strategia contains no big surprises. Labelled as National Guidelines for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the implication is that this is aimed at steering internal decision-making; but like most Arctic policies, especially those of non-Arctic States, it is at least as important in positioning Italy in the broader Arctic international relations discourse.
The document consists of 6 chapters: on Italy’s historic involvement in the Arctic; the political dimension; the environmental and human dimensions; the scientific dimension; the economic dimension; and a perfunctory conclusion. In what follows, the authors will explain and evaluate each chapter in turn before providing a general analysis.
Presenting Italy’s Arctic Credentials
The first chapter presents Italy’s historic involvement in the Arctic as well as the contemporary implications of climate change.[2] This is standard fare for the Arctic strategies of non-Arctic states as they explain why they should have any strategy or policy at all towards a region thousands of kilometres away. The further one travels from the North Pole, the more effort is made to justify an Arctic interest.[3] Italy’s Arctic story is presented from 1899 (Italy itself only having been created on its unification in 1861) but connections between the Arctic and various city-states can be traced much further back. Owing to a fortuitous shipwreck, Venetians have been buying salted cod from the Lofoten islands since 1432 and it is on this trade that the classic Venetian baccalà dish is founded.[4] John Cabot (Giovanni Cabotto), sent by English King Henry VII in search of a NorthWest passage at the end of the 15th century, was a Genoese born Venetian citizen.[5]
The Political Dimension
Chapter two continues to develop the theme of Italian-Arctic linkages by presenting the political dimension with reference to the decision at Kiruna in 2013 to admit Italy as an observer to the Arctic Council. It reads rather a lot into this decision, hailing it as evidence of recognition of Italy’s interests in research, economic development, oil spill prevention, climate change adaption (rather than mitigation), environmental protection and respect for indigenous peoples.[6]
Similarly to other observer States and implicitly reflecting the Kiruna rules and expectations of observers, Verso una strategia displays the required deference to the pre-eminence of the Arctic Council as the principal discussion forum for Arctic affairs and admires it as ‘an instrument of regional stability.’[7] Nevertheless, Italy finds room for its own contributions and points to a need for a ‘common approach’ that extends beyond the Arctic to tackle current challenges such as climate change and the opening of new sea-routes.[8] This careful balance between Arctic authority and Italian relevance continues as Italy points to the sovereignty and sovereign rights of the Arctic States (with reference to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)) and interests in the Arctic governed by other global legal agreements.[9] Italy again emphasises its longstanding Arctic participation by reiterating that it was a founding party to the Spitsbergen Treaty. Italy then suggests that while respecting Arctic sovereignty, Italy can make relevant contributions to science, technology and business to promote sustainable development that respects the environment and the indigenous peoples.[10] Verso una strategia says that Italy participates at all levels of the Arctic Council, mentioning especially Task Forces and Working Groups, but its record on sending representatives to these meetings has yet to be established.[11]
Italy supports the European Union (EU) Commission’s approach to the Arctic (currently under review) and sees an increasing role for the EU, especially in its actions against climate change and in the Arctic Council (a subtle expression of support for EU’s admission as standing observer).[12] Italy also stands behind the EU, supporting the controversial hydrocarbon directive and offering its ‘expertise’ to help the Arctic States develop offshore with the highest standards of human and environmental safety.[13] The Norwegians will not be impressed.
This chapter concludes with a list of selected national activities, mostly of an academic nature, pertaining to the Arctic.[14]
The Environmental Dimension and the Human Dimension
Chapter three of Verso una strategia addresses the environmental and human dimension which mirrors the EU Commission’s proposed objective, approved by the Council, of ‘protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with its population’.[15] Bringing human and environmental security together in a single theme indicates the recognition that people are a part of the Arctic environment and not necessarily or only a threat to the Arctic environment. However, the chapter is then effectively broken down into two distinct sections (on the environment and on humans respectively), suggesting that the integration of these two concerns is not particularly deep.
It identifies some environmental priorities: biodiversity; prevention of air pollution; climate change; protection of the marine environment; management of natural resources; and risks of pollution from maritime transport, tourism, and extractive industries.[16] Verso una strategia then attempts to draw some parallels between Italian and Arctic environmental challenges. It contains three rather superficial comparisons: first of all, the vulnerability of the Alps and the Arctic to climate change and other pressures (fishing, hunting, pollution and tourism); secondly, the Adriatic and Baltic Seas as presenting similar challenges of enclosed seas (without expressing any position as to whether the Arctic Ocean is an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea); and finally shared ‘geographical, social and technological isolation’ of the Italian mountain regions and the Arctic. Yet the ‘isolation’ between Arctic villages in Northern Canada, Greenland or Russia is on an entirely different scale to that of any region of relatively compact Italy. However, this paragraph omits a rather significant commonality between the Italian mountains and the Arctic in which Italian scientists could offer relevant expertise: namely, permafrost and the problems of its thaw.[17]
On the environment, Verso una strategia returns to Italy’s priorities on the protection of the marine environment (and its aforementioned support for the EU Arctic offshore oil and gas directive), air pollution and climate change, and biodiversity.[18] Italy’s concern with air pollution and short-term climate forcers in the Arctic is evidenced in Italy’s participation in the Arctic Council’s Black Carbon and Methane Framework though perhaps owing to reasons of timing, this is not explicitly mentioned in the document.[19] Likewise, on biodiversity, whilst Italy cites its ratification of a number of relevant treaties, it does not refer to the CAFF working group’s seminal Arctic Biodiversity Assessment.[20]
The human dimension is divided into ‘urban areas’ and ‘indigenous peoples’ but neither section has any real depth. On urban areas, it commends Sweden’s approach to sustainable urban development and indicates that Italy shares this as a national priority but does not offer the Arctic Italian expertise in this area. Italy does not have indigenous peoples of its own (though it has a number of national minorities and many endangered regional languages) but it again draws a rather strained comparison between Alpine and Arctic villages.[21] In contrast to the section on environmental law which cites a number of international treaties, the human dimension does not refer to any of the numerous treaties and other instruments on the rights of indigenous peoples and human rights. It is possible that this is an oversight but if so, it is an unfortunate one as the implication is that while Italy is committed to its legal obligations to protect the environment and ready to hold other States to the same, it is not a vocal advocate for international law that protects the humans living in the Arctic.
The Scientific Dimension
The longest chapter in Verso una strategia is on the scientific dimension.[22] This is the area in which Italy can demonstrate its greatest relevance to the Arctic, its States and peoples. Two case studies are offered (the Ny-Ålesund Dirigibile research station in Svalbard and the GOS Explora Italian polar research ship) to indicate Italy’s ongoing and potential research contributions.[23] This chapter reflects international research priorities rather than focusing more narrowly on Italian scientific activities and looks to the International Council for Science, the International Arctic Science Committee and the European Polar Board.[24] Climate change is a major concern (implicitly reflecting EU research priorities) and Italy backs an internationalised approach to research for reasons of efficiency (again, reflecting the EU research agenda).[25] However, Italy also points to some specific contributions Italy can make, by virtue of its Svalbard station and the OGS Explora, to, inter alia, oceanographic research.[26] Bilateral research agreements on observation and multilateral cooperation through international research bodies are both promoted.[27] Italy also proposes forging links between its established Antarctic research programmes and Arctic activities.[28]
The Economic Dimension
Only after presenting these chapters on what Italy can give the Arctic, does Italy turn to the question of what Italy might gain from the Arctic, i.e., what are its economic or industrial interests? This is a common approach of non-Arctic States which must not present themselves as resource hungry colonialists but rather as partners who come bearing research funding. (One might contrast the Russian strategy which presents as its first national interest in the Arctic region ‘Usage of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation as a strategic resource base, allowing for the solution of problems of socio-economic development’.[29] Russia, being unquestionably an Arctic State with by far the largest Arctic territory, population and economy, has no need to justify its place at an Arctic table.)
Italy’s economic dimension (chapter five) is almost entirely devoted to oil and gas and promotes in particular Italian company Eni, a public limited company in which the Italian government has an approximately 30% stake[30]. Profits from Eni are a major contributor to the Italian national budget. Italy refers to its experience in harnessing geothermal energy and the potential for ‘synergies’ with Arctic States.[31] (Iceland is not explicitly mentioned but is the obvious candidate.)
The emphasis on Arctic oil and gas development parallels the official British Arctic policy[32] but is hard to rationalise alongside the purported concerns regarding climate change. Italy points to ongoing demand for oil and gas whilst ignoring the elephant in the room: “The resources of the Arctic could play an important role to satisfy the demand for energy resources and this is not a problem for one single State but for all global actors.”[33] Curiously, in the English version, this sentence is preceded with the phrase: ‘Along with renewable resources’. France, by contrast, is likely to emphasise mitigation over adaption.[34] President Hollande, shortly prior to the Paris climate change COP, announced to the Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavík that France’s position was that exhaustion of the already identified, commercially feasible hydrocarbon resources would be sufficient to meet demand if there is a genuine international will to meet the 2C warming climate target and hence no need ever to drill for oil in the Arctic.[35]
Nearly two full pages are then devoted to Eni (which is operating, inter alia, in the Norwegian and Russian Barents areas, Greenland and formerly the Faroe Islands.) Verso una strategia refers to Eni’s climate strategy that prioritises energy efficiency and reduction in carbon emissions; investment in renewable energy and ‘green’ products; and (a rather self-serving) promotion of natural gas in preference to coal.[36] Eni’s Arctic activities follow five principles: (i) drilling only in ice-free zones; (ii) operations only in the lower-risk periods of the year (with reference in particular to the conservation of marine mammals); (iii) the application of the best available technology for oil spill prevention; (iv) engagement with indigenous peoples; and (v) technology and processes to follow evidence from current activities to evaluate and manage social and environmental impacts.[37] These criteria are no doubt listed to promote Eni as a socially and environmentally responsible hydrocarbon firm but some doubts still arise and these reflect Italy’s ambivalence (noted above) to indigenous and human rights. The Italian phrase ‘il coinvolgimento delle popolazione indigene locali’ (fourth principle) is translated in the English version as ‘local inhabitants have to be involved and informed’ but this is a very low bar that does not reach the international legal standards of co-management, free, prior and informed consent, and benefit sharing. The fifth principle indicates that Eni will apply the latest knowledge on measuring and managing social and economic impacts; but it makes no commitment to attempting to mitigate or minimise those impacts.
Conclusion
The concluding chapter is very brief and returns to Italy’s research credentials: its ‘century’ of Arctic research and its intentions to increase its research activities within an internationally cooperative framework and in line with EU environmental and sustainable development policies.[38] Italy concludes with a commitment to sustainable development which it defines in the final sentence as ‘the compatibility and the synergetic relationship between environmental protection, economic development, and the specific needs of the indigenous peoples’.[39] This gives the document the rhetorical flourish of ending on ‘indigenous peoples’[40] notwithstanding substantively weak consideration of them (and no recognition of their legal rights) through the document. However, it is also a rather unconvincing definition of sustainable development which addresses the needs not only of indigenous peoples but all people, including future generations (intergenerational equity) and requires their active participation.[41] The Italians are not the only country to struggle with the concept of sustainable development.[42]
Analysis
Although it carries the subtitle ‘National Guidelines’, the principal intended audience for Verso una strategia appears not to be domestic but international, in particular, the Arctic States. It seeks to reassure the latter that Italy’s intentions in the North are honourable, that it does not intend to interfere where it is not wanted but nevertheless has a positive contribution to make. (By contrast, a policy document aimed at a domestic audience should be more focused on informing Italian institutions about the Arctic, rather than informing the Arctic about Italy.) Verso una strategia follows the model of European observer policy documents and statements on the Arctic and reflects the expectations of the Arctic Council regarding observers, now codified in the Arctic Council Rules of Procedure that are likely to become the benchmark against which observers will be periodically assessed.[43] It emphasises Italy’s historic ties and research contributions to justify its Arctic presence; it makes the mandatory recognition of State sovereignty and expressions of support for indigenous peoples; it respects the Arctic Council as the principal forum on many issues but indicates the need for global approaches, e.g., on shipping and climate change; and it identifies Italy’s commercial interests in the Arctic. Italy does not have anything particularly original to offer and does not try to set itself apart from the other observers.
Italy has integrated the EU Arctic approach (in contrast, for example, to a much more unilateralist British policy). This can be positively interpreted as Italian commitment to multilateral engagement and a strive for research efficiency; or it might be more critically viewed as evidence that Italy does not really have much of an Arctic strategy of its own.
European States’ focus on their historical Arctic connections is undoubtedly intended to set them apart from the Asian interlopers – a kind of State-level snobbery of ‘old money’ versus ‘new money’. Yet one might ask why historical connections are still seen as so important. The question for Arctic relations today is what a State (or other non-Arctic actor) can offer now, not what it did a century ago. Indeed, with all this focus on history, it is the ‘old’ European States that must take responsibility for climate change and yet in climate mitigation negotiations, those same States insist that only current and future emissions are relevant considerations. Further, the Kiruna observer rules require that observers ‘have demonstrated their Arctic interests and expertise relevant to the work of the Arctic Council’. This does not indicate much concern with historic exploration which in any case is reminiscent of colonial expansion and the view of the Arctic as terra nullius, awaiting appropriation by ‘civilised’ European powers.
Multiple references are made to indigenous peoples in Verso una strategia but these are all vague and weak. Perhaps Italy shies away from taking a strong position that might alienate some Arctic States and considers indigenous governance a domestic affair of the Arctic States. It is wrong to do so: the international law on indigenous peoples is as binding and internationally relevant as the international environmental instruments that Italy happily cites. Both sets of norms bind Italy as well as the Arctic States whenever its conduct can impact on either the environment or on indigenous peoples. Italy’s refusal to commit to more than ‘information and involvement’ of indigenous communities in its advertorial for Eni demonstrates either a complete lack of understanding of the state of the law on indigenous peoples today or unwillingness to uphold it.
Through the document, indigenous peoples are tied together with the environment as something to be protected, rather than subjects in their own right. For example, Italy will contribute to sustainable development ‘that respects the ecosystems and the indigenous populations.’ Such a statement neither recognises that indigenous peoples are agents of development (sometimes sustainable, sometimes not) nor that sustainable development must respect the rights and needs of all peoples, including future generations.[44] While the lives of indigenous peoples are usually more closely connected to their environments than those of their non-indigenous neighbours, they are not simply curiosities to be preserved like an ancient sculpture. Italy’s marginalisation of the agency of indigenous peoples is further illustrated in its discussion of the Arctic Council. Italy describes its composition as consisting of member states, permanent participants, observers, task forces and working groups.[45] (The task forces and working groups are in fact made up of representatives of the former three groups.) However, while Italy goes on to list each member State and observer by name, it does not offer the same consideration to the permanent participants’ organisations who have a much greater standing and influence than observers in the Arctic Council system.[46] They are: Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and Saami Council.
Italy’s concern with the environment and with climate change in particular is somewhat undermined by its focus on oil and gas and the hard sell of Eni. Yet the document omits other important industrial activities, not least the building of an ice-breaker in Riva Trigoso-Muggiano (Genova) for the Norwegian Institute of Marine Research: this project also illustrates a good bridge between industry and science.[47] It is quite possible those working on the document were simply unaware of the project.
Verso una strategia makes an oblique reference to ‘unregulated hunting and fishing’ as one of the principal risks for ‘local populations’ (within its short section on indigenous peoples). The risk of illegal and unregulated fisheries is more likely to come from pelagic fleets based far from the Arctic whereas illegal hunting is more likely to be conducted by persons, not necessarily indigenous, already in the Arctic. Nevertheless, the much bigger threat to subsistence hunting by indigenous populations is climate change.
Otherwise, the paper avoids reference to the controversies surrounding harvesting of marine mammals. Italy was one of the strongest supporters of the EU seal product ban that has caused extensive friction between the EU, some Arctic States and the permanent participants.[48] Italy formally supports the exemption in the trade ban for Inuit products that contribute to their subsistence but has been uncharacteristically vigilant about certification and enforcement.[49] Italy also votes consistently against commercial whaling, an issue for Norway and Iceland. Italy has formally objected to Iceland’s purported reservation to the Whaling Convention.[50] The omission of these issues from Verso una strategia is almost certainly deliberate as Italy does not want to draw attention to areas of potential discord.
Reading the document, one gets a sense that it is built around a selection of unrelated Italian-Arctic connections and lacks an overarching theme or themes. There is a whiff of ‘Arctic policy bingo’: a collection of buzzwords such as ’sustainable development’, ’climate change,’ ’environmental protection,’ ’indigenous peoples,’ ’Arctic council,’ ’sovereignty,’ and ‘science’ but none of these is really developed and some are poorly presented (e.g., on indigenous peoples and sustainable development). Further, its attempts to compare the Italian mountains with Arctic settlements to demonstrate some common challenges is weak and suggests a desperation to find linkages that is not really necessary (when there are sufficient genuine connections, not all of which make the document). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs could have benefited from greater consultation with other ministries (e.g., education, universities and research; environment, protection of land and sea; and economic development). Italy states an intention to reinstate its Tavolo Artico – loose network of Arctic experts from the ministry, the diplomatic corps and academia – and it will be instructive to see how the Tavolo Artico responds to Verso una strategia, if at all, and its influence on the next draft.
On the other hand, the ministry’s decision to publish Verso una strategia, a work in progress, can be interpreted as evidence of a willingness to engage in constructive discussions about its Arctic relations, to listen to the views of other States, indigenous representatives, business stakeholders and experts near and far, and to develop Arctic policies in a responsive manner. The EU Commission has to some degree taken this approach though this might be a practical consequence of the complexity of the EU’s internal workings and the number of institutions involved. Otherwise, States have developed Arctic policies and strategies in relative secrecy, publishing only a definitive version that may already be institutionally entrenched and inflexible. Publication of a draft displays a humility that is too often lacking in international relations; Italy’s foreign ministry has set out a loose framework of priorities but is prepared to listen and adapt in light of international reactions.
Endonotes
[1] Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Verso una strategia italiana per l’Artico, accessed 16 February 2016, http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/politica_estera/aree_geografiche/europa/artico . An English translation is available: An English translation is also available: Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation , Towards an Italian Strategy for the Arctic, accessed 16 February 2016, http://www.esteri.it/mae/en/politica_estera/aree_geografiche/europa/artico . All page references that follow are to the original Italian version.
[2] Ibid, 2-3.
[3] See Rachael Lorna Johnstone, “An Arctic Strategy for Scotland” 1 Arctic Yearbook 114-129 [2012], 116. Open Access: http://www.arcticyearbook.com/images/Articles_2012/Johnstone.pdf .
[4] “La Strada del baccalà nel nome di Querini”, Corriere del Veneto, 3 November 2015, accessed 18 February 2016, http://corrieredelveneto.corriere.it/veneto/notizie/cultura_e_tempolibero/2015/3-novembre-2015/via-baccala-nome-querini-2302136950488.shtml .
[5] William J Mills, Exploring Polar Frontiers: a Historical Encyclopedia Vol I (ABC-CLIO Inc 2003) 123-24.
[6] Verso una strategia, supra note 1, 3.
[7] Ibid; see See Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, as adopted by the Arctic Council at the First Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Iqaluit, Canada, Revised by the Arctic Council at the Eighth Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Kiruna Sweden, accessed 26 November 2015, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/940 .
[8] Verso una strategia, supra note 1, 3-4. ‘Nuove rotte di navigazione’ is translated in the English version as ‘Polar navigation routes’ but presumably only the Arctic is under consideration.
[9] Namely: the Convention on Biological Diversity; the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution; the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL); and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).
[10] In both Italian and English versions, ‘indigenous peoples’ is presented in the plural indicating a recognition of their collective identity as subjects of international law.
[11] Verso una strategia, supra note 1, 5.
[12] Ibid, 4.
[13] Ibid, 5 & 7. The directive is controversial as Norway, and to a lesser extent Iceland, dispute its EEA relevance, i.e., they hold that it is not binding on them as non-EU States and since the directive purportedly governs only offshore Arctic activities, of which there are none within the EU per se, the directive has no application.
[14] Ibid, 5-6.
[15] EU Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: the European Union and the Arctic Region, COM(2008) 763 final, 20 November 2008, 3; EU Council, Council Conclusions on Arctic Issues, 2985th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, December 8, 2009, preamble.
[16] Verso una strategia, supra note 1, 7.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid, 7-8.
[19] Arctic Council, Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions: an Arctic Council Framework for Action 2015, accessed 16 February 2016, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/610 ; see also Italy‘s first report, National Report by Italy – September 2015, accessed 16 February 2016, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1169/EDOCS-%232728-v1-Italy_2015_Black_Carbon_Methane_National_Report.PDF?sequence=3&isAllowed=y .
[20] CAFF (Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna), Arctic Biodiversity Assessment, accessed 16 February 2016, http://www.arcticbiodiversity.is/the-report .
[21] Verso una strategia, supra note 1, 9.
[22] Ibid, 10-14.
[23] Ibid, 10-11.
[24] Ibid, 12.
[25] It is likely that the French strategy, when released, will similarly support an internaitonal or at least European-wide approach to research: Ambassador of the Republic of France to the Republic of Iceland, personal communication to the author, January 16, 2016; this can be contrasted with the UK strategy which is rather isolationist in tone: United Kingdom, HM Government, Adapting to Change: UK policy towards the Arctic, London, The Stationery Office, Ltd., 2013; see also Rachael Lorna Johnstone, ‘Respectful Neighbourliness: the United Kingdom’s Arctic Approach’ 8 Yearbook of Polar Law (2016) (forthcoming).
[26] Verso una strategia, supra note 1, 12.
[27] Ibid, 12-13.
[28] Ibid, 13-14.
[29] Russian Federation Policy for the Arctic to 2020 (unofficial translation by Arctic Knowledge Hub) accessed 16 February 2016, http://www.arctis-search.com/Russian+Federation+Policy+for+the+Arctic+to+2020 .
[30] Eni, Qual è la quota di partecipazione del Ministero dell’economia e delle finanze? Accessed 16 February 2016, http://www.eni.com/it_IT/faq/azionisti/azionista-maggioranza-relativa/faq-azionisti4-quale-azionista-maggioranza.shtml .
[31] Verso una strategia, supra note 1, 15.
[32] United Kingdom 2013, supra note 24; Johnstone, supra note 24.
[33] Verso una strategia, supra note 1, 15.
[34] Ambassador of the Republic of France to the Republic of Iceland, supra note 24.
[35] François Hollande Speaks at Arctic Circle 2015, accessed 16 February 2016 https://vimeo.com/142735039 .
[36] Verso una strategia, supra note 1, 16.
[37] Please note the Roman numerals are added by the authors of this article for ease of reference and do not appear in the original document.
[38] Verso una strategia, supra note 1, 17-18.
[39] Ibid, 18. In the English translation, the order of ‘economic growth’ and ‘protection of the environment’ is reversed.
[40] The English translation also ends on this term.
[41] Compare, e.g., the definitions of sustainable development in the Brundtland Report: “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 42/187, Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, ‘Our Common Future,’ December 11, 1987, UN Doc. A/RES/42/187; and of the International Law Association: “The objective of sustainable development involves a comprehensive and integrated approach to economic, social and political processes, which aims at the sustainable use of natural resources of the Earth and the protection of the environment on which nature and human life as well as social and economic development depend and which seeks to realize the right of all human beings to an adequate living standard on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom, with due regard to the needs and interests of future generations.”: International Law Association, Sustainable Development: New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development, Resolution 3/2002 Annex, New Delhi, April 2002, preambular paragraph 13; and most recently of the United Nations General Assembly detailing 17 sustainable goals built upon its three dimensions: economic, social and environmental: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 70/1, Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, September 25, 2015, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1
[42] See Johnstone, supra note 24.
[43] See above at note 5.
[44] Verso una strategia, supra note 1, 4.
[45] Ibid, 3.
[46] Ibid, 3, note 9.
[47] Fincantieri, Fincantieri to Build an Oceanographic Ship for Norway, Press Release 29 November 2013, accessed 16 February 2016, https://www.fincantieri.it/cms/data/browse/news/000535.aspx .
[48] Regulation (EC) No. 1007/2009, of the European Parliament and of the Council on Trade in Seal Products, 16 September 2009, 2009 O.J. (L286) 36.
[49] “Sequestri revocati, via libera alle scarpe in pelle di foca” Quotidiano.net, 31 August 2013, accessed 18 February 2016, http://www.ilrestodelcarlino.it/civitanova_marche/cronaca/2013/08/31/942550-scarpe-pelle-foca-tribunale.shtml .
[50] International Whaling Commission, Iceland, accessed 16 February 2016, https://iwc.int/index.php?cID=119 .