Tag Archives: criminology

Digital Community Policing as a Measure to Prevent Radicalization and Extremism

Conference proceedings (multiple non-blind peer review), , , ,

Introduction: Implications of Islamist attacks for police work in Germany and Berlin after the attack on Breitscheidplatz in December 2016

The Islamist attack on the Christmas market on Breitscheidplatz in Berlin in December 2016 marked a turning point in the German security architecture and police work. The immediate and long-term consequences of this attack are manifold and have led to significant changes, particularly in the capital city of Berlin. After the attack, it became clear that closer cooperation and coordination between different security authorities would be necessary in the future. This led to the establishment and strengthening of counter-terrorism centers, in particular the Joint Counter-Terrorism Center (GTAZ) in Germany.[1] The GTAZ, a cooperation of 40 German security authorities, was already founded in 2004, but was given a stronger role and increased resources after the Breitscheidplatz attack. These centers promote the exchange of information and strategic cooperation to combat terrorist threats.[2]

As a direct result of the terrorist attack on Breitscheidplatz, the Berlin police also established a new understanding of emergency response.[3] New tactics and strategies were developed to better respond to terrorist threats. These included increased security measures at major events, the increased presence of police and security forces in public places and the introduction of special anti-terror units. In the summer of 2021, the Berlin Police’s Anti-Terror Center with a total of 1,200 officers from LKA departments 8 and 6 was housed in a central building complex strategically located in the Tempelhof district in the immediate vicinity of the Berlin city freeway and brought together to be able to act within a few minutes in ad hoc cases. Officers from the State Office of Criminal Investigation – which is responsible for combating Islamist terrorism – the Special Task Force (SEK), the Mobile Task Force (MEK), which is primarily responsible for observing suspects, as well as personal protection and searches have since been deployed there. The costs for this are said to have amounted to around 47 million euros.[4] The amount of money spent underlines the importance and new criminalistic focus in the repressive processing and prevention of the modus operandi of violent extremist acts by the Berlin police.

Department 8 of the State Office of Criminal Investigation, with its approx. 175 employees as part of the state security police of the federal capital, is therefore centrally responsible for preventing and combating politically motivated crimes in the phenomenon of Islamism. In addition, LKA 8 conducts state security-specific financial investigations in connection with money laundering and terrorist financing. LKA 8 of the Berlin Police is divided into the department management with command service and three departments with different focal points and subject areas.[5]

Department 81 – Evaluation, Financial Investigations

  • Strategic and operational evaluation
  • Phenomenon-related threat assessment
  • Processing of information
  • Financial investigations specific to state security

Department 82 – Investigation: Processing of preliminary proceedings, in particular

  • on suspicion of forming or being a member of a criminal/terrorist organization
  • on suspicion of preparing a serious act of violence to endanger the state
  • on the occasion of criminal offenses against association bans
  • on the occasion of criminal offenses under the Code of Crimes against International Law

Department 83 – Person classification Islamism

  • Centralized personal processing of individuals relevant to the case
  • Operational intelligence and support activities
  • Involvement in the review and implementation of measures related to residency law and the termination of residency by the Berlin Immigration Office[6]

In addition to the establishment of the counter-terrorism center at the Berlin State Security Agency, the establishment of a central office for the prevention of radicalization at the Berlin State Criminal Police Office – with some delay after the events – was intended as an indirect criminalistic response in autumn 2020 to the attack in December 2016.

In the run-up to the establishment of a new department at the Berlin Police, specific primary and secondary prevention measures were taken, particularly at Senate level, with the aim of reducing the radicalization of young people. These include educational and awareness-raising programs as well as initiatives aimed at identifying at-risk individuals at an early stage, assessing their needs and providing support in the implementation of measures to prevent radicalization. To this end, the Berlin Senate has launched various projects that work at a local level and involve schools, youth centers and mosques.[7]

In addition to the level of primary and secondary prevention, programs for dissociation and exit work from politically or religiously radical or extremist milieus also play a central role. These tertiary or indicated prevention programs are aimed at people who have already been radicalized and aim to help them reintegrate into society. In Berlin and other parts of Germany, special programs have been developed for this purpose that address the individual needs of participants and provide psychological, social and educational support, among other things.

 

The Central Office for Radicalization Prevention and Deradicalization at the CID

The Unit for Radicalization Prevention and Deradicalization at the Central Office of Crime Prevention within the Criminal Investigation Division of the Berlin police was initially established in a conceptual phase in October 2020 after some latency, before it finally officially began its work as an office in summer 2021. The attack highlighted the need for a centralized and coordinated response to the threat of Islamist terrorism after a lengthy critical examination of the existing police structures within the Berlin police force. The aim of establishing the department was therefore to identify radicalization processes in the area of politically motivated crime at an early stage by means of an interdisciplinary approach. Subsequently, the needs of people at risk of radicalization or already in the process of radicalization were to be identified in order to develop preventative measures and ultimately refer those affected to the responsible offices of the nationwide regulatory organizations – such as youth welfare offices, the health, social or education system – or to the existing advisory services offered by civil society actors in the prevention landscape. The Central Office for Radicalization Prevention was also designed as a point of contact for those seeking advice and help, in order to support them in matters relating to radicalization prevention and processes of dissociation and disengagement work.[8]

The Central Office for Radicalization Prevention at the CID consists of experts from various disciplines who pursue the goal of ensuring a comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach to the topic of radicalization prevention and dissociation and disengagement work. The unit currently provides expertise in the following areas, among others:

  • law enforcement officers
    • Specialized in the detection of politically motivated crimes and syndromes of group-focused enmity as indicators of hate crime radicalization.
  • psychological psychotherapy
    • Expertise in the psychological aspects of radicalization and deradicalization, as well as analysis of case-related, specific risk and protection factors.
  • political science
    • Expert knowledge of ideologies related to the areas of hate crimes, right-wing extremism and other forms of extremism and their misuse by radicalized individuals or individuals at risk of radicalization.

The Central Office for Radicalization Prevention and Deradicalization – whose name is LKA Präv 4 within the organizational unit – has a number of tasks aimed at preventing the radicalization of individuals and promoting the willingness of those affected to disengage and leave already ongoing radicalization processes. According to the Berlin police as to the information material for the handout of the Central Office for Radicalization Prevention and Deradicalization, the individual case coordination is a core element of the unit. This involves the regular analysis of data and information from various sources in order to identify potentially radicalized individuals and forms the basis for effective preventative measures. In the course of this, multi-professional intervention strategies are to be developed by LKA Präv 4 specialists in order to support affected individuals in cooperation with families, schools and communities and, at best, to take advantage of offers from civil society.[9]

In contrast to other federal states, the Central Office for Radicalization Prevention and Deradicalization is not part of the State Security Police. This was done in order to consciously separate repression and prevention and to communicate this unequivocally to the public. This means that cooperation with personal cases that are being processed by LKA Präv 4 is based on the principle of consent and that information collected from individuals is not used to conduct criminal proceedings.[10]

Another special feature is that, unlike other security authorities in the federal states, LKA Präv 4 does not carry out the dissociation and disengagement work for radicalized individuals or those at risk of radicalization itself, but instead refers those affected to suitable civil society programs. One of the reasons for this is the clear separation of tasks, which makes it possible for LKA Präv 4 to provide authentic support services in which those affected can establish a trust-based relationship with qualified civil society professionals without being involved in permanent contact with police actors. This approach has proven to be effective for the Berlin Police, particularly due to the obligatory voluntary factor, and has so far been communicated as a positive change in the way the police perform their duties, especially by civil society organizations and those close to the people affected.[11]

In addition, the Central Office for Radicalization Prevention and Deradicalization is active in the training and further education of junior police officers in Berlin.[12] LKA Präv 4 is also involved in various networks and committees. Particular mention should be made here of the advisory board on radicalization prevention and deradicalization at the Berlin Senate Department for Inner Security.

 

The upcoming role of (Digital) Community Policing

Community policing can be an extremely effective tool for preventing and countering radicalization, which can lead to violent extremism and terrorism (P/CVE – Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism) without intervention. This is particularly crucial with regard to aspects that pose a risk of radicalization among young people in order to be able to dynamically intervene at an early stage from the police side in the context of P/CVE and geopolitical events in the event of potential major incidents such as acts of amok or politically or religiously motivated violent crimes, including attack scenarios.[13]

Examples include the terrorist attacks in Christchurch, New Zealand, in March 2019, which left 51 dead[14], and the attacks on synagogues in Halle, Germany, in October 2019[15] and Hanau, Germany, in February 2020, which left a total of 11 victims. The perpetrators had previously been online on platforms such as 4chan and 8chan, where they radicalized themselves, announced some of their actions and even streamed the attacks live on platforms like Twitch. Some people actually watched the stream live as people lost their lives due to hatred and racism.[16]

People socialize online. They gather information online, they become radicalized online. They plan their attacks online. They announce their attacks online. Therefore, the relevance of digital community policing in addition to community policing has been discussed in many places for several years and was also highlighted in a conclusion paper published by the Radicalization Awareness Network in 2021. The network stated that community policing in particular is an extremely effective tool at local level for preventing and combating radicalization in order to preventively counter P/CVE. As extremist discourse is increasingly taking place online, the RAN concludes that security authorities should also address this shift in the world we live in and proactively engage with the digital space.[17]

For a better understanding of community policing and digital community policing, the following section takes a closer look at the terminology.

 

The difference between Community Policing and Digital Community Policing

There is no unanimous understanding of community policing – abbreviated to CP in the following – within academic research. Rather, CP is interpreted as a police philosophy that firstly focuses on local problems, secondly promotes the development of local crime prevention structures and thirdly extends traditional police work to new fields of work.[18]

In practice, CP approaches are often based on local police officers who are embedded in the neighborhood and who, in addition to traditional police tasks, should also keep an eye on the overall social structure of the area of operation. In this case, police officers are often assigned to a specific geographical section of the city in which they are present and accessible to members of the local community. The assigned officer should not primarily act in repressive contexts, but should mainly perform crime prevention tasks. The aim of the CP is to increase the residents’ sense of security through personal relationships, to promote civic engagement for participation in the neighborhood through the networking of various actors and to reduce crime and the accumulation of misdemeanors through presence and awareness-raising.[19]

Similar to CP, there is also no uniform definition of digital community policing – abbreviated to DCP in the following. Basically, “digital” in CP is understood as information technology or internet-based support for all police tasks and the associated work, information, communication and interaction processes.[20]

In practice, DCP often describes citizen-oriented police work in digital spaces. The field of activity ranges from “digital patrols”, to the operation of individual, official profiles in social media by police officers, to the implementation of specific prevention measures (e.g. workshops) in the digital space. Through the offer and the associated low-threshold accessibility of direct online communication, an attempt is being made to transfer the CP’s lifeworld-oriented approach to social media. As with the CP, the aim of the DCP is to increase users’ sense of security through personal relationships, to build and maintain networks and to reduce crime through digital presence.[21]

 

Best practice approaches across Europe

As mentioned before, there are some countries in Europe that have been implementing different DCP approaches for some time. In the following, the current implementations of DCP are presented in a European comparison. It should be emphasized that this is a non-exhaustive selection of European countries and that the DCP approach varies significantly from country to country.

Online community policing in Iceland

One of them is the police in Iceland, which was assembled by the Berlin police as a source of information as part of a European internship in 2023. The visiting police officer was with several units of the Icelandic police, including the Reykjavík Metropolitan Police. The later written report on the European internship included the new approach by which the Icelandic police have implemented various activities to establish more online or digital community policing. Police forces are actively recognizable and approachable as police on various platforms, including in the gaming sector. It was reported that the new approach was perceived as extremely positive and effective by both the civilian population and the Icelandic police after only a short time.[22]

Netherlands Community Police Officers

The preemptive identification of potential radicalization pathways that might culminate in violent extremism is inherently ambiguous. This uncertainty stems from the difficulty in foreseeing risk before any overt criminal behaviors manifest. In response to this challenge, local law enforcement agencies in the Netherlands are crucial to the implementation of counter-violent extremism (CVE) strategies, specifically through the proactive collection of information while individuals are yet to breach any laws. Nevertheless, there is a paucity of research on law enforcement officers’ perceptions of their responsibilities under CVE initiatives.[23] As one of the practical outcomes, each regional unit has the option of appointing one of its regular community police officers as a digital community police officer (50%). Because of this, there are currently around 50 digital police officers who have formed a network. The Dutch police have announced a nationwide training program for digital police officers.[24]

Internet Patrol Unit, Norway

All 12 regional units in Norway have an internet patrol unit. In this three-person unit, Operator One engages with individuals and groups in spaces such as Discord and Minecraft via a “blue police profile” together, rather than as an identifiable individual officer with a face and name. Operator One is supported by Operator Two, who analyzes the relevant open source information. The third member of the patrol unit is the team leader who oversees the operation.[25]

Online police patrol the Internet in Denmark

The online patrol of the police in Denmark consists of 10 police officers and was founded in April 2022. Since its establishment in April 2022, the “Politiets Online Patrulje” has opened more than 65 cases by June 2023. These include crimes such as cybergrooming[26] and other cybercrime offenses, in particular theft, insults or other attempts at harassment, primarily against young people.

Several times a month, the police officers play computer games such as CS:GO, Fifa or Fortnite. Under the names “Officer 1” to “Officer 4”, they play, observe and maintain contacts as if they were on a regular neighborhood patrol in person. They usually identify themselves openly, although on rare occasions they may operate covertly. On a typical day, the unit might join a Facebook group and say: ‘Hey, we’re from the police and if you want to talk to us or have any questions, just fire away’. Within a year, the unit has received more than 5,200 tips.[27]

 

Implementation of DCP at the Berlin police

After presenting the basic concept of digital community policing, and based on the results of other countries and the European internship of the Berlin police with the Icelandic police in 2023, a nationwide survey of all police forces in the Federal Republic of Germany on the topic of digital community policing was initiated by the Central Office of Radicalization Prevention within the Berlin police in spring 2024.[28]

This nationwide data collection by all police forces in Germany was initiated to examine the extent to which other state police forces/the federal police have introduced DCP or comparable concepts and how these are implemented in each case. The aim is to determine the extent to which the Berlin police can integrate digital community policing into existing aspects of police work in the future, in line with best practice. In the summer of 2024, the results of the survey were evaluated by the Central Office for Radicalization Prevention of the Berlin Police and prepared in the form of a synopsis for all police forces.[29]

The results of the nationwide survey of all German police forces revealed four main findings:

  • Understanding of DCP
    • Almost unified nationwide understanding of DCP as an approach to citizen-oriented digital interaction and prevention.
    • Different stages of development of the implementation and definition of DCP between the federal states.
  • DCP measures implemented and planned
    • Some federal state polices have successfully implemented specific DCP initiatives and are integrating them into their day-to-day police work.
    • Others are still in the initial or planning phase.
  • Challenges
    • Resources: The need for financial, human and technical resources is the primary challenge.
    • Standardization: Lack of a consistent approach and standards in the implementation of DCP activities.
    • Data protection: Concerns about data protection and security in digital interaction.
  • Achievements
    • Positive effects in the form of increased proximity to citizens and more effective prevention are recognizable.[30]

 

Conclusion

The implementation of DCP is not without challenges. Nevertheless, the vast majority of police forces at the federal and state level are willing to address the issue of digital community policing in Germany. As a result, the planning and implementation status varies. Despite different levels of implementation, similar challenges related to DCP were identified in the nationwide survey. Resource scarcity is a significant hurdle, as adequate financial and human resources are needed to sustain efforts. There are also data protection issues that require careful consideration of how to handle data from digital interactions in order to protect the privacy rights of citizens. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of digital technology requires continuous training for officers and constant adaptation of strategies to stay ahead of emerging trends and threats.

On the basis of these findings, an outlook on the implementation of digital citizen-oriented policing at the Berlin police force emerges. The extensive implementation of DCP in various areas of police work offers the potential for real innovation within all police forces in the Federal Republic of Germany and thus, among other things, the opportunity to modernize their services, increase efficiency and strengthen their relationship with the population. A coordinated exchange at the federal and state level will therefore help to learn from best practices in the areas covered by the DCP and thus improve efficient application.

Building on the positive experiences of other countries such as Iceland, Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark, digital community policing is to be introduced in the Berlin police force, particularly in the area of (online) radicalization prevention.

 

References

Bas-Wohlert, C. (2023). Online police patrol the internet in Denmark. Available at: https://techxplore.com/news/2023-06-online-police-patrol-internet-denmark.html, last accessed on 09.10.2024.

Berlin police (n.d.).

Berlin police (2023). Report on the European Internship 2023 at the Icelandic police.

Berlin State Program for Radicalization Prevention (2016), available at: https://www.berlin.de/lb/lkbgg/_assets/2016_11_22-digitale_version_radikalisierungspraevention_2016.pdf, (last accessed on October 7, 2024).

Central Office for Radicalization Prevention and Deradicalization at the State Office of Criminal Investigation Berlin (n.d.), available at: https://www.berlin.de/polizei/dienststellen/landeskriminalamt/lka-praevention/, (last accessed on October 7, 2024).

Deutschlandfunknova (2019). Fünf Personen schauten live bei Anschlag auf Synagoge zu. Available at: https://www.deutschlandfunknova.de/beitrag/video-von-anschlag-auf-synagoge-in-halle-fuenf-user-schauten-zu, last accessed on 10.10.2024.

Division 8 of the State Office of Criminal Investigation, Berlin police – Islamist Extremism / Counter Terrorism (n.d.), available at: https://www.berlin.de/polizei/dienststellen/landeskriminalamt/lka-8/, (last accessed on October 7, 2024).

Djemal, M. S. (2019). Joint Counter-Terrorism Center in Berlin (GTAZ): A Model for Combating Terrorism 2. European Centre for Counterterrorism and Intelligence Studies – ECCI. Available at: https://en.europarabct.com/?p=46930, (last accessed on October 7, 2024).

Federal Office for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (n.d.), available at: https://www.demokratie-leben.de/projekte-expertise/projekte-finden-1/projektdetails/ree-kurswechsel-fuer-rechtsextremistinnen-444, (last accessed on October 7, 2024).

Federal Ministry of Migration and Refugees (n.d.), available at: https://www.bamf.de/DE/Themen/Sicherheit/Sicherheitsarchitektur/sicherheitsarchitektur-node.html, (last accessed on October 7, 2024).

Fürstenau, M. (2023). Is Islamist terror a threat to Germany? Deutsche Welle. Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/is-islamist-terror-a-threat-to-germany/a-64369110, (last accessed on October 7, 2024).

Jansen, F. (2021). A House Against Fanatics: Interior Senator Hands Over New Anti-Terror Center to Berlin Police. Tagesspiegel. Available at: https://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/innensenator-ubergibt-neues-anti-terror-zentrum-an-die-berliner-polizei-5115004.html, last accessed on October 7, 2024).

Logvinov, M. (2019). Risk Assessment of Extremist Violence. Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. Available at: https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-658-25123-9, (last accessed on October 7, 2024).

Macklin, G. (2019). Combating Terrorism Center at Westpoint. Available at: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/christchurch-attacks-livestream-terror-viral-video-age/, last accessed on 10.10.2024.

Netherland Police (n.d.), available at: https://www.politie.nl/informatie/de-digitaal-wijkagent.html, last accessed on 09.10.2024.

Norwegian police (2023), available at: https://www.politiet.no/en/aktuelt-tall-og-fakta/aktuelt/news/2023/11/17/international-police-visit-norway-to-learn-about-online-policing/, last accessed on 09.10.2024.

Protection of the Constitution (2023). Brief summary 2023 Report on the Protection of the Constitution. Available at: https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/EN/reports-on-the-protection-of-the-constitution/2024-06-brief-summary-2023-report-on-the-protection-of-the-constitution.html/, (last accessed on October 7, 2024).

Radicalization Awareness Network (2021). Community police and the online dimension. Available at: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-05/ran_pol_community_police_and_the_online_dimension_05072021_en.pdf, last accessed on 08.10.2024.

State Office of Criminal Investigation Berlin. (2024). Information material on the Central Office for Radicalization Prevention and Deradicalization [Information Flyer].

Van de Weert, A., & Eijkman, Q. A. (2021). In every artery of society? How Dutch community police officers perceive their role in early detection of violent extremism among youth. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 15(2), 1144-1157.

 

Endnotes

[1]   Djemal, 2019.

[2]   Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, n.d. Available at: https://www.bamf.de/DE/Themen/Sicherheit/Sicherheitsarchitektur/sicherheitsarchitektur-node.html, last accessed on 07.10.2024

[3]   Fürstenau, 2023.

[4]   Jansen, 2021.

[5]   Division 8 of the State Office of Criminal Investigation, Berlin police – Islamist Extremism / Counter Terrorism, n.d. Available at: https://www.berlin.de/polizei/dienststellen/landeskriminalamt/lka-8/, last accessed on October 7, 2024.

[6]   Ibid.

[7]   Berlin State Program for the Prevention of Radicalization, 2016.

[8]   Central Office for Prevention, n.d. Available at https://www.berlin.de/polizei/dienststellen/landeskriminalamt/lka-praevention/, last accessed on 07.10.2024.

[9]   State Office of Criminal Investigation Berlin, 2024.

[10]  Ibid.

[11]  Ibid.

[12]   Berlin Police, 2021. Available at: https://x.com/PolizeiBerlin_P/status/1456651003642667008, last accessed on 08.10.2024.

[13]   Berlin police.

[14]   Macklin, 2019. Available at: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/christchurch-attacks-livestream-terror-viral-video-age/, last accessed on 10.10.2024.

[15]   Deutschlandfunknova, 2019. Available at: https://www.deutschlandfunknova.de/beitrag/video-von-anschlag-auf-synagoge-in-halle-fuenf-user-schauten-zu, last accessed on 10.10.2024.

[16]   Macklin, 2019.

[17]   Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN), 2021. Available at: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-05/ran_pol_community_police_and_the_online_dimension_05072021_en.pdf, last accessed on 08.10.2024.

[18]   Ibid.

[19]   Berlin police, n.d.

[20]   Ibid.

[21]   Ibid.

[22]   Berlin police, 2023.

[23]   Van de Weert & Eijkman, 2021.

[24]   Netherland police, n.d. Available at: https://www.politie.nl/informatie/de-digitaal-wijkagent.html, last accessed on 09.10.2024.

[25]   Norwegian police, 2023. Available at: https://www.politiet.no/en/aktuelt-tall-og-fakta/aktuelt/news/2023/11/17/international-police-visit-norway-to-learn-about-online-policing/, last accessed on 09.10.2024.

[26]   The term “cybergrooming” (to groom) refers to the targeted approaching of minors with the aim of sexual contact on the internet and abusing them online or offline. The term describes the targeted initiation of sexual contact with minors via the internet. In chats or online communities, the perpetrators pretend to be around the same age as children or young people or present themselves as understanding adults with similar experiences and interests. In this way, they gain the trust of their victims with the aim of manipulating them. In many cases, they get the children to send them revealing self-portraits. The photos are then sometimes used as a means of exerting pressure on the minors to perform further acts. Some perpetrators also aim to meet the underage victims “offline” and to abuse them.

[27]   Bas-Wohlert, 2023. Available at: https://techxplore.com/news/2023-06-online-police-patrol-internet-denmark.html, last accessed on 08.10.2024.

[28]   Berlin police, n.d.

[29]   Ibid.

[30]   Ibid.

The Sex Offenders Public Registry of the Republic of Poland: Problems that Require Solutions

Conference paper (multiple non-blind peer review), , , , , ,

Introduction: A history of offender registries in Europe and the USA

The last decade can be characterised by the relevance improving of the topics of data privacy protection. Problems of data flow regulation during crime prevention activities have attracted substantially bigger attention due to the current legislative novelisations in the European Union in 2016-2018. Worth mentioning here is that the Polish criminal registry of sexual offenders seems to be the only public registry of offenders not only in the European Union but in whole European region as well. Simultaneously, despite its uniqueness, it is not well-known not only internationally but even in Poland.  It seems justified to say that registry remains an inherently controversial topic in social consciousness and due to that fact, very few substantial researches have been conducted in this field. But before we will proceed to the main topic of the current paper, it seems highly beneficial to analyse the history of sexual offender registries in the world.

Undoubtedly, the longest history of publicly available registries of criminals can be found in the United States of America. So it’s not surprising that the American experience inspired the Polish government to provide similar institutions into the Polish legislative system (we can find multiple comments on that of the former minister of Justice Z. Ziobro)[1]. In academic papers, it is also often mentioned that similar institutions exist in France and Germany[2], but we would need to emphasise here that those registries don’t have public character.

Registries of sexual offenders in the United States of America began to appear in the early 1930s[3]. Initially, they were the prerogative of local legislations (cities and counties); later, they began to be available on the level of states (Florida, since 1937). Registration was conducted, as a rule, at a police station, convicts were photographed and fingerprinted. The personal data of criminals with the indication of the place of residence after release were entered into the registry. The local authorities hoped that the registration requirement would make the stay of convicts on the territory of the city or district undesirable which is supposed to positively influence the criminal situation in a state[4].

The first regional registry of sex offenders was established in 1947 in California,  and after the next 20 years, in five states (Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Nevada, Ohio). They reflected the addresses of the place of residence of persons convicted of sexual crimes, but they were not publicly disclosed and were used only by law enforcement agencies and courts[5].

Intensive development of the Institute of the Registry of Sex Offenders in the United States occurred in the 1990s[6]. After several cases of sexual crimes against children were actively discussed in the media and became the subject of high interest of the publicity. The social expectations of Americans were focused on the guarantees of the best protection of potential victims. In 1994, Washington state began community notification of its most dangerous sex offenders, making it the first state to ever make any sex offender information publicly available[7]. Prior to 1994, only a few states required convicted sex offenders to register their addresses with local law enforcement.

But those registries were either not publicly available or were provided in a restricted area of one municipality. The first publicly available federal registry appeared only in 2005 – the National Sex Offender Public Registry (NSOPR) which, due to the inaction of The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act,[8] was renamed in honor of 22-year-old college student Dru Sjodin of Grand Forks, North Dakota, a young woman who was kidnapped and murdered. The Registry introduces a system for classifying sex offenders into three groups based on the legal qualification of the committed crime:

  • First of all, coercion to have sexual intercourse under threat of violence against a person who is in a helpless state; inducement to have sexual intercourse or commit other sexual acts with a person under the age of 12:
  • Second-level criminal cases (tier II) include the production and distribution of child pornography; the involvement of minors in prostitution; sexual intercourse with a minor over 13 years old.
  • Those guilty of other “minor sexual crimes”, who face up to a year in prison, belong to the category of first-degree sex offenders (tier I) (this is possession of child pornography or committing other sexual acts with a person over the age of 13 and under the age of majority).

If a  person commits a similar act during the period of public recording, it automatically falls into a more serious category[9].

Criminological assessment of the sex offender registry system in the USA.

In the USA, the sex offender registry covers about 900 thousand convicts (0.28% of all citizens), and this figure has been consistently increasing in last several years[10].

Many researchers question the impact of the registry on reducing sexual crime in general and reducing the rate of recidivism of sex offenders in particular[11]. When comparing the level of responsibility among adults and minors in the commission of similar sexual crimes, it was found that there were no statistical differences between registered persons and those who evaded this duty.

It is often argued that similar state legislation is based on false notions, although popular in societal assumptions and presumptions regarding the nature of sexual criminality. Society has come to believe, firstly, that sex offenders are more prone to recidivism than other categories of offenders. Secondly, there is an opinion that the majority of sex offenders are strangers, unfamiliar to the victims. Thirdly, society attributes to perpetrators of sexual crimes a tendency to kill their victims, especially children.

Official statistics do not confirm these theses. The average rate of recidivism of all US criminals released from prison from 2014 to 2019 is 36%, of which only 13-14% commit a similar type of a crime. Also, statistics confirms that most of the sexual crimes are committed a first time and display no recidivism[12].

Most of the victims of sexual crimes knew the attacker earlier, and the courts found guilty mainly the victim’s friends or relatives. According to one study, only 9% of perpetrators of child sexual abuse and 28% of perpetrators of adult sexual exploitation were previously unfamiliar with the victims, especially when sexually motivated murders of adults and children occurred[13].

It is difficult to get a clearer picture, due to the inclusion in statistics of data not only of criminal cases against sexual integrity but also of crimes related to non-fulfillment of registration obligations.  Some investigators claim that this is precisely the violation of the registration responsibilities of criminals the reason why the recidivism of American sex offenders is most often statistically reduced.

The study of the effectiveness of the registry institute should be distinguished from the perception of this institution by society and practicing lawyers. Society is very supportive of the registry, considering it as an effective tool to combat sexual crime. About 4/5 of ordinary American citizens have a positive attitude towards the registry, and there is unanimity among politicians and judges[14].

A different, more critical attitude towards the registry could be found amongst those who maintain the registry, as well as amongst those who are engaged in the rehabilitation and treatment of sexual offenders[15]. Researchers who are engaged into the mandatory treatment of sex offenders, usually disapprove of the requirement to publish data on sexual offenders. In practice, 1/4 to 1/3 of adult Americans visited the resource at least once; hence, for the biggest part of society, it remains unused.

However, the usefulness of the registry for law enforcement agencies and society is substantially reduced by the incompleteness and irrelevance of the data contained in it. Most often, violations relate to the place of residence of sex offenders, that is, information that is most important from the point of view of the purposes of the registry.

The problem is based on the shortage of personnel servicing registries, underfunding, and plain mistakes, including those made by convicts themselves when they intentionally do not perform registration duties. Some of them proceed from the fact that failure to fulfill registration obligations is a minor violation compared to the consequences of prolonged use in a publicly accessible registry, which causes problems with finding a place of work or residence.

It is officially estimated that about 5-6% of the criminals included in the register have disappeared, 18.5% have been re-imprisoned, 8.9% live outside the registration state and even 0.2% of the persons died while their information is still available in the registry. An interesting fact is that the victims of sexual crimes support mandatory treatment of sex offenders, but disapprove the requirement to publish data on sex offenders16].

it can be concluded that the registry creates a false sense of security, while at the same time it increases the feeling of fear in society. It is difficult to imagine the negative emotions of a person who has discovered that a sex offender lives in their neighborhood.

The Polish public registry of the sexual offenders: General overview.

Polish sex offenders registry and GDPR regulation

The efficiency of such a method of crime prevention remains highly controversial. Still, a new registry of sex offenders came into force in 2017 in Poland. Now after we’ve discussed the experience that was taken into consideration towards the legislative novelisation in the Republic of Poland it seems to be logical to proceed with the main topic of the article.

First of all, it is worth mentioning that the Polish Sex Offenders Registry consists of two modules, whereby the first is a register with limited access, and the second one is a public register.

The register with restricted access is a database that contains information about perpetrators of sexual crimes. The basis for placing data in the Register is the act of 13 May 2016 on countering threats of sexual crime. Following Article 12 of the act, everyone has the right to find out whether his / her data is in the register.

In turn, the public register is a publicly available database, which contains information about the most dangerous perpetrators of sexual crimes. These are, above all, data on people who have committed child (minors up to 13 years old) rapes and rapes committed with particular cruelty.

Unlike the American prototype, the Polish registry also provides the sentences information to the public access (amount of the years of imprisonment, committed crime, date of the sentence, and court which stated the sentence).

Firstly it supposed that the convicted perpetrators could request their data not be included in the public Registry up until the first of October of 2017 but after the statement of the High Court of the Republic of Poland that such regulation would be non-constitutional and would violate the fundamental principle of “Lex retro non agit“, i.e., all information about the convictions before the inaction of the registry were erased in its final version[17].

The registry was supposed to be supplemented with a publicly available map of sexual crime threats, which includes the places of sexual offenses and the places of residence of offenders, but this option wasn’t included in the final version.

Access to the Public Register is unlimited. There is no fee for providing information from the Sex Offenders Register.  Also, simultaneously with the launch of the Register, the regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament on 27 of April 2016 on the protection of individuals and information privacy in the European Union (EU) and the European Economic Area (EEA).  commonly known as the GDPR, entered into force.

This regulation has been valid throughout the European Union, including the Republic of Poland, since May 25, 2018, and has revolutionized the perception of issues related to the protection of personal data. Individuals have acquired a number of new rights, the meaning of which is largely to intensify their protection, more broadly understood as the so-called right to privacy. An important innovation is the introduction in Article 17 (1) of the GDPR of the so-called “right to be forgotten”, also called the “right to delete data”, which from the very first moments of the GDPR has aroused particular interest of individuals, and therefore it can be estimated that sooner or later it will also draw the attention of convicted persons.

This leads us to the question: can the former offenders ask for the data erasure after it has been uploaded to the registry? Or, in a more simple way: does the internal Polish regulation violate the requirements of the GDPR?

First, what should be mentioned here is that, according to the GDPR Art.2 “the Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security”[18].

This clause, in our opinion, excludes any possibility of using the GDPR requirements in the topic of crime prevention activities provided by any member State of the European Union. Which also allows us to conclude that such registries could be shortly implemented in other European countries as well.  Hence, the answer for the second question should be a negative one.

This attitude is reflected by the Art. 86 of GDPR which states that personal data in official documents held by a public authority or a public body or a private body for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest may be disclosed by the authority or body in accordance with Union or Member State law to which the public authority or body is subject in order to reconcile public access to official documents with the right to the protection of personal data pursuant to this Regulation[19].

Despite this fact, many researches confirmed that there is some kind of a discrepancy between the GDPR regulation and the Act of 13 May 2016 on countering threats of sexual crime. The legislator first has considered the right to influence the content of the Register to the perpetrators and the courts. The principle is that the cancelation of the conviction, that is, in fact, “forgetting the act of the offender” occurs by law after the expiry of the periods provided in Article 107 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Poland, and only on demand of the convicted person.

According to this provision, the court may decide the conviction to be cancelled after the expiry of 5 years at the earliest. The convicted person should also not commit any other crimes or other violations of law during this period while, at the same time, the sentence was not more than 3 years of imprisonment[20]. This provides us with a direct discrepancy with the GDPR requirements which openly guarantee the right to erasure of information from public access straight after the demand of the person to whom this data is connected.

Conclusions

The topic of the public registry’s effectiveness wasn’t properly analysed in Polish academic papers and in most of the published articles it received positive feedback[21]. Often, these papers speculate on other offender registries in European countries such as VISOR in the UK or FIJAIS in France, forgetting to mention that these registries are not publicly available[22]. On the other hand, The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights claims that “a public registry is not an effective instrument against the risk of sex crimes.” The HFHR is not against introducing into Polish law a mechanism that would register sex offenders but the publicly available source is openly criticized[23].

Also, current police statistics regarding sexual crimes didn’t show significant  changes in the amount of the committed crimes (e.g., the amount of committed rapes in 2017 in the whole country was 1262; in 2019 was 1354 and in 2021 total amount of registered rapes was 1088). Simultaneously, the percentage of the solved rape crimes has been getting higher every year after the registry was enacted.  According to official data percentage of rape crimes where the offender was found rose from 82.7% in 2017 to 85% in 2019 and 88% in 2021[24]. Hence, the registry could be hardly seen as a method of crime prevention, but rather as an additional instrument for police investigation. It should be also mentioned that topics of criminological effectiveness of the registry is often complicated, due to the high stigmatization of sexual crimes.

The provided official novelization should be criticized due to the lack of preciseness. Only after two years did the High Court of the Republic of Poland actually exclude the “Lex post factum” uncertainty as regards offenders of relevant sexual crimes (e.g., the proviso whereby even those violations which were committed before the Act of 13 May 2016 on countering threats of sexual crime should be automatically included Ito the registry).

I hope that this publication will raise awareness of the current lacunae in the European legislation and will help to avoid similar deficient registries’ applications in other Member States of the Europen Union.

References

A. Legal acts

1. USTAWA z dnia 13 maja 2016 r. [o przeciwdziałaniu zagrożeniom przestępczością na tle seksualnym]Dru Sjodin webpage of the Public sexual offenders registry https://www.nsopw.gov/about-nsopw

2. GDPR/ General Data Protection Regulation: https://gdpr-info.eu/art-2-gdpr/1. Carpenter C, Beverlin A. The evolution of unconstitutionality in sex offender registration laws. Hastings Law Journal. 2012;63:1071-133. (In Eng.)

B. Literature

  1. Banasik, K. Istota zatarcia skazania. Wojskowy Przegląd Prawniczy, (2017). p. 36–49. (In Pol.)
  2. Grzelak. A. RODO Ogólne Rozporządzenie o Ochronie Danych Komentarz. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Wolters Kluwer. (2022). p. 1034. (in Pol.)
  3. Harris A, Levenson J, Ackerman A. Registered sex offenders in the United States. Behind the numbers, crime & delinquency. (2014). p.4-33. (In Eng.)
  4. Letourneau E. Effects of South Carolina’s sex offender registration and notification policy on deterrence of adult sex crimes. Criminal justice and behavior. (2010). p.35-52. (In Eng.)
  5. Levenson J, D’amora D, Hern A. Megan’s Law and its impact on community re-entry for sex offenders. Behavioral Sciences and the Law. (2007). p. 587-602. (In Eng.)
  6. Lussier P, Beauregard E, Criminal Justice Policies. The intended and unintended consequences of monitoring individuals convicted of sex crimes. Sexual offending. A criminological perspective. New York; (2018). p. 63-83. (In Eng.)
  7. Marshall W, Marshall L, Serran G, Fernandez Y. Treating sexual offenders. An integrated approach. New York; (2006). p. 10-27. (In Eng.)
  8. Richmond C, Richmond M. The future of sex offender courts. How expanding specialized sex offense courts can help reduce recidivism and improve victim reporting. Cardozo Journal of Law & Gender. (2015). p. 12-10. (In Eng.)
  9. Rose J. Where sex offender registration laws miss the point. Why a return to an individualized approach and a restoration of judicial discretion in sentencing will better serve the governmental goals of registration and protect individual liberties from unnecessary encroachments. Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice. (2017).p. 6-57. (In Eng.)
  10. Ryter J. Rejestr sprawców przestępstw na tle seksualnym a prawo do  prywatności i  prawo do bycia zapomnianym w świetle ogólnego rozporządzenia o ochronie danych osobowych  (RODO), Dyrektywy Parlamentu Europejskiego i  Rady (UE) 2016/680/ Probacja (2018). p.177-195. (In Eng.)
  11. Tewksbury R. Sex offender registries as a tool for public safety. Views from registered offenders. Western Criminology Abstract. (2006). P.1-8. (In Eng.)
  12. Thomas T. The registration and monitoring of sex offenders. A comparative study. Hoboken; 2012. p. 3-41. (In Eng.)
  13. Vandiver D, Braithwaite J, Stafford M. Sex crimes and sex offenders. Research and realities. New York; 2017. (In Eng.)
  14. Ключников А.Ю. Об институте реестра сексуальных преступников Lex Russica, (2020) . p. 140-150. (in Rus.)

C. Internet resources

  1. Ziobro wypowiada wojnę zboczeńcom: “Ustala się szczególne środki ochrony obywateli przed przestępczością na tle seksualnym” Polityka opublikowano: 18 grudnia 2015, URL: https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/275542-ziobro-wypowiada-wojne-zboczencom-ustala-sie-szczegolne-srodki-ochrony-obywateli-przed-przestepczoscia-na-tle-seksualnym?strona=1
  2. https://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/public-registry-of-sex-crime-offenders-in-poland/7358 https://statystyka.policja.pl/st/przestepstwa-ogolem/przestepstwa-kryminalne/zgwalcenie/122293,Zgwalcenie.html
  3. Dru Sjodin webpage of the Public sexual offenders registry,  https://www.nsopw.gov/about-nsopw

Endnotes

[1] Ziobro wypowiada wojnę zboczeńcom: “Ustala się szczególne środki ochrony obywateli przed przestępczością na tle seksualnym” Polityka opublikowano: 18 grudnia 2015, URL: https://wpolityce.pl/polityka/275542-ziobro-wypowiada-wojne-zboczencom-ustala-sie-szczegolne-srodki-ochrony-obywateli-przed-przestepczoscia-na-tle-seksualnym?strona=1

[2] Justyna Ryter, Erwin Ryter, Rejestr sprawców przestępstw na  tle seksualnym a prawo do  prywatności i  prawo do bycia zapomnianym w świetle ogólnego rozporządzenia o ochronie danych osobowych  (RODO), Dyrektywy Parlamentu Europejskiego i  Rady (UE) 2016/680/ Probacja 2018; 4 : 177-195

[3] Ключников А.Ю. (2020) Об институте реестра сексуальных преступников Lex Russica, № 3 (73). С. 141

[4] Thomas T. The Registration and Monitoring of Sex Offenders. A Comparative Study. Hoboken, 2012. Р. 28—29

[5] Ключников А.Ю. (2020) Об институте реестра сексуальных преступников Lex Russica, № 3 (73). С. 140-150

[6] Ключников А.Ю. (2020) Об институте реестра сексуальных преступников Lex Russica, № 3 (73). С. 141

[7] Dru Sjodin webpage of the Public sexual offenders registry, https://www.nsopw.gov/about-nsopw

[8] The act was named after one of the victims of the violent crimes, six-year old boy who was kidnapped from the a Sears department store at the Hollywood Mall in Hollywood, Florida, on July 27, 1981.

[9] Dru Sjodin webpage of the Public sexual offenders registry, https://www.nsopw.gov/about-nsopw

[10] Criminal Justice Policies. The Intended and Unintended Consequences of Monitoring Individuals Convicted of Sex Crimes / red. P. Lussier, E. Beauregard. New York, 2018. Pp. 63—83

[11] Ключников А.Ю. (2020) Об институте реестра сексуальных преступников Lex Russica, № 3 (73). С. 146

[12] Tewksbury R. Sex offender registries as a tool for public safety. Views from registered offenders // Western Criminology Review. 2006. Vol. 7. No 1. P. 2

[13] Letourneau E. Effects of South Carolina’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Policy on Deterrence of Adult Sex Crimes // Criminal Justice and Behavior. 2010. Vol. 37. P. 550.

[14] Ibidem;

[15] Levenson J., D’Amora D., Hern A. Megan’s Law and its Impact on Community Re-Entry for Sex Offenders // Behavioral Sciences and the Law. 2007. Vol. 25. No 4. P. 596

[16] Levenson J., D’Amora D., Hern A. Megan’s Law and its Impact on Community Re-Entry for Sex Offenders // Behavioral Sciences and the Law. 2007. Vol. 25. No 4. P. 596

[17] See http://www.sn.pl/sites/orzecznictwo/OrzeczeniaHTML/v%20kk%209-19.docx.html.Przedstawiona analiza prowadzi do wniosku, że ustawa z dnia 13 maja 2016 r. o przeciwdziałaniu zagrożeniom przestępczością na tle seksualnym (tj. Dz. U. z 2018 r., poz. 405 ze zm.) w zakresie, w jakim nakazuje umieszczać w Rejestrze publicznym dane o osobach, które popełniły przed wejściem w życie tego aktu prawnego określone w nim przestępstwa, nie spełnia wymogu zgodności z zasadami lex retro non agit oraz nullum crimen (nulla poena) sine lege anteriori, określonymi w art. 1 § 1 k.k. Takich wątpliwości nie nasuwa umieszczenie danych wskazanych osób w Rejestrze z dostępem ograniczonym, z uwagi na jego niepubliczny charakter, który pozwala na przyjęcie, że taki wpis nie jest równoważny ze stosowaniem środka represji karnej

[18] GDPR/General Data Protection Regulation: https://gdpr-info.eu/art-2-gdpr/

[19] Ibidem

[20] Justyna Ryter, Erwin Ryter, Rejestr sprawców przestępstw na  tle seksualnym a prawo do  prywatności i  prawo do bycia zapomnianym w świetle ogólnego rozporządzenia o ochronie danych osobowych  (RODO), Dyrektywy Parlamentu Europejskiego i  Rady (UE) 2016/680/ Probacja 2018; 4 : 177-195

[21] Justyna Ryter, Erwin Ryter, Rejestr sprawców przestępstw na  tle seksualnym a prawo do  prywatności i  prawo do bycia zapomnianym w świetle ogólnego rozporządzenia o ochronie danych osobowych  (RODO), Dyrektywy Parlamentu Europejskiego i  Rady (UE) 2016/680/ Probacja 2018; 4 : 177-195

[22] W Wielkiej Brytanii (Pobrane z: https://www.ms.gov.pl/pl/informa- cje/news,9806,ruszyl-rejestr-sprawcow-przestepstw-na-tle.html, Dnia (2018, 12, 04)) utworzono rejestr sprawców przestępstw z użyciem prze- mocy i przestępstw seksualnych (VISOR). Z kolei we Francji (Pobrane z: https://www.ms.gov.pl/pl/informa- cje/news,9806,ruszyl-rejestr-sprawcow-przestepstw-na-tle.html, Dnia (2018, 12, 04)) został utworzony tzw. zautomatyzowany rejestr sądowy sprawców przestępstw seksualnych (FIJAIS). Stanowi on osobowy rejestr sądowy, podobnie jak zautomatyzowany rejestr odcisków palców, krajowy rejestr śladów genetycznych i krajowy rejestr karny

[23] See https://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/public-registry-of-sex-crime-offenders-in-poland/7358

[24] See https://statystyka.policja.pl/st/przestepstwa-ogolem/przestepstwa-kryminalne/zgwalcenie/122293,Zgwalcenie.html

Felia Allum, Isabella Clough Marinaro and Rocco Sciarrone (eds.), Italian Mafias Today. Territory, Business and Politics (Cheltenham: E. Elgar, 2019)

Book review (editorial review), , , ,

As an Italian academic who has lived and worked in North America and Northern Europe, I am frequently saddened, but by no means surprised, by the cavalier references that my non-Italians colleagues frequently make to the mafia. On the one hand, they somehow assume it to be a rather prosaic and obvious aspect of daily life throughout Italy, and Italy alone. On the other hand, perhaps conditioned by “TV series such as Gomorrah, the US ‘reality’ TV show Mob Wives” (1) or by Francis Ford Coppola’s Godfather movie trilogy, they talk of it as though the mafia were something cool, glamorous, almost enviable: the magic union of Svengali and Giorgio Armani.

In their book, Allum, Clough Marinaro and Sciarrone have competently collected an instructive introduction and, above all, fourteen original essays in criminology and the social sciences at large that, at the very least, can easily and immediately dispel such facile yet persistent conceptions of the mafia. For one, as all the essays patently exhibit, there are many mafias, not one, i.e., the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, the Campanian Camorra, the Calabrian ’Ndrangheta, and the little-known Apulian Sacra Corona Unita. Indeed, as Luciano Brancaccio and Vittorio Martone explain in the second original essay in the book, even the Neapolitan and Campanian Camorra should be understood in the plural, i.e., as “Camorras”, given their “multiplicity of groups, their internal variations and their high conflict rates.” (31)

Secondly, as many essays concurrently indicate, all such mafias are more than capable of reining in their immediately profitable and inevitably violent activities in the short run, so as to seek prolonged and diffuse influence in the communities that they infiltrate, or manage secure revenue-streams via complacent white-collar experts and professionals, whether all of this happens in Italy or abroad. This quiet modus operandi is designed not to arise suspicion among the local law-and-order institutions, already-established criminal groups, and/or the populations at large. Thus, for example, the reader can reflect on the low-profile presence of the Italian mafias in the City of London, in select cantons of the Swiss Confederation and in Luxembourg, as capably discussed in the twelfth original essay of the book, “Italian mafias across Europe”, penned by Joselle Dagnes, Davide Donatello and Luca Storti (191–207). If anything, the reduced visibility of these criminal organisations is, ironically, made transparent by the more and more secretive character of the mafias compared to what they were like in the 19th century and, possibly, up to the 1950s or 1960s, at least in southern Italy. This increased secrecy has also affected the ‘Ndrangheta’s old and quietly tolerant “[r]elationships with the Catholic Church” (56), which are discussed in the third original essay in the book, “’Ndrangheta: A (post-)modern mafia with ancient roots”, written by Enzo Ciconte.

Thirdly, there is nothing cool, glamorous or enviable in suffering the consequences of mafia-related activities, whether in southern Italy, central and northern Italy (see the ninth, tenth and eleventh original essays, dealing with, respectively, Lombardy, Emilia Romagna and Rome), or abroad, meaning primarily in the Americas, Oceania and Europe (e.g., “Germany, France, the United Kingdom (UK), Spain, Switzerland, the Benelux countries and Romania” (Dagnes et al., 193)). Any half-sane reader of this book is unlikely to find anything inspiring in the mafias’ very long list of crimes against: police officers and magistrates (e.g., “Giovanni Falcone, his wife and three bodyguards” (Alessandra Dino, 17) in 1992); innocent civilians; urban and rural landscapes and environments (e.g., the so-called “Sack of Palermo”, ibid., 14); Italian immigrants abroad (e.g., the sorry plight of the Calabrian community in Australia, tackled in Felia Allum’s and David Bright’s penultimate original essay in the book); honest entrepreneurs (e.g., corrupt “public officials” favouring mafia-related clients over the genuinely deserving economic competitors (Salvatore Sberna and Alberto Vannucci, 94)); and ordinary tax-paying Italian citizens, who cannot receive adequate healthcare and/or use viable garbage-disposal facilities because of the mafias’ grip on local “public services” (Alessandro Colletti, 122).

Finally, the book concludes with a highly instructive chapter on the history and main characteristics of the “anti-mafia policies” developed in Italy since the 1960s (La Spina, 225). While avoiding the intricacies and details of the legal instruments and institutions created over the past six decades in order to tackle specifically the mafias, so as to reduce and prevent their diffusion and activities, the reader can grasp and appreciate the extent of the work done by both public authorities and civil society in order to counter the nefarious influence of organised crime in many parts of Italy.

The book is not a history of the Sicilian mafia or of southern mafias. For that kind of work, the reader will have to rely on a very different literature, of which there is certainly no dearth. Instead, this relatively compact volume (x + 291 pp.) gives a thorough account of:

(A) the scrutable trends of mafia-type criminality in Italy over the past twenty years; and of

(B) the latest known developments in their inner organisational structures and criminogenic relations with productive and political agents in the so-called “grey area” of non-affiliated enablers and facilitators of mafia-type activities (e.g., lawyers, accountants, bankers, etc.), in Italy as well as abroad.

As such, this book should appeal, in primis, to criminologists and social scientists. However, I would strongly recommend it to anyone who may have an academic or personal interest in understanding recent Italian history. Above all, I would recommend it to law- and policy-makers internationally, for Italy’s long tug-of-war with the mafias has many useful lessons to teach to countries and communities that have not yet experienced the scourge of criminal power syndicates operating in their midst, or that collude with such syndicates by offering far-from-transparent financial services—hence contributing to the enormous human suffering and grave social devastation that the mafias have been causing since the 19th century.

Jacob Dahl Rendtorff, Moral Blindness in Business. A Social Theory of Evil in Organizations (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020)

Book review (editorial review), , , , , , , , , ,

The market as an organization of economic interactions and as an idea governing our thoughts about the economy is both more complex than is usually accepted, and more limited. In this century, and in the last, economists and other theoreticians developed the market as an idea capable of explaining human interactions in general rather than just economic interactions. This has had unfortunate effects in our thinking.

One is that some started believing that homo economicus was a real person, not realizing that actual human beings are more complex than theoretical constructions assuming full information and perfect rationality. Another is that the easy presumption gradually gained widespread recognition whereby the State was the problem in the economy, while the free market was the solution to practically everything. Both these effects have turned out to be wildly misleading. On the one hand, human beings are more unpredictable and complex than theoretical constructions. On the other hand, in many instances, the State is the solution to social and economic problems, not the free market.

Jacob Dahl Rendtorff has written three interesting books on business ethics. The latest one, reviewed here, is on moral blindness in business. The idea, it seems to me, is to construct a narrative explaining moral evil in business. The way he goes about it is by taking his cue from Hannah Arendt and her analysis of moral blindness in her discussion of the Eichmann trials in Jerusalem in 1961. Arendt is one of the most influential political philosophers from the middle of the last century. She was a German, a Jew, who fled the Nazi State in Germany and ultimately made it to the USA. She was an early theorist about totalitarianism, but probably she is most famous for her description and analysis of Eichmann at his trial.

She originally wrote articles for the New Yorker about the criminal process that, later on, became a famous book. One of the things that struck her was how ordinary Eichmann was. He was not a moral monster, like Gorgias or Thrasymachus, or a racist, like a white supremacist. Yet, he believed that he was an ordinary man, doing his duty, following legitimate orders, and putting them into practice as best as he could. He was not an official who followed through his commands himself, but he left it to others to do what he had told them to do. Even though he went to the concentration camps, it is not clear if he ever saw what happened to the Jewish victims whose transportation to them he had made possible.

The moral blindness that Arendt detected in Eichmann was his inability to put himself into another’s shoes and the inability to think for himself about the moral legitimacy of the aims of the systems that he too put into operation. He organized the transport system from all over Germany, and from other countries as well, that moved the Jews to the concentration camps. He organized and was present at the Wannsee conference when this “Endlösung” for the Jews was conceived, and he knew from the beginning what all his work was about (p. 62).

What is remarkable about him is his ordinariness, how he seems to be a typical faceless bureaucrat, skilled at putting orders into practice but not worrying about the effects on those who had to suffer the consequences. It seems to me that this is the essence of moral evil as it is understood in this book. This analysis has a number of logical consequences that Arendt pursued, such as that moral disasters, even those of the magnitude of the “Endlösung” of the Nazi regime, could happen to anyone of us, or that the Nazi campaign was not a unique event that was nearly unfathomable because of its evil, but a result of human weaknesses that all of us might be subject to.

Rendtorff uses this analysis of Arendt’s and applies it thoroughly to modern businesses. He argues that modern organizations are subject to the same temptations and human frailties that operated in the Nazi system. Modern corporations that solely aim at securing profit for the owners can easily succumb to the same temptations as the Nazi bureaucracy did. You do not have to be a specialist in modern business ethics to know instances of moral weakness and moral evil. Just think of businesses that are run in such a way that, once or twice a year, a member of their staff is ostentatiously fired in order to keep the others in the staff on their toes. This is an example of moral evil in practice. The interests and dedication of the staff are irrelevant, if you can put fear into their souls; so, they do not object to anything that is asked of them and stick to their work.

Rendtorff is very knowledgeable about Arendt’s political philosophy and he discusses various issues that are relevant to what he wants to say, such as the modern understanding of evil. But it is puzzling to me that he does not discuss the difference between a totalitarian state and a democratic state incorporating a free market, in which the modern corporations operate. There is a major difference between the domination by the State of the whole society, as in a totalitarian system, and the limited government that can be observed in modern states. It is only when you assume that modern corporations do not understand that the very notion of the free market is a moral notion, that you get the weakness and immorality typical of a totalitarian bureaucracy. The important difference between modern democracies and the Nazi State is that the workers, in modern democracies, always have the option of leaving and looking for work elsewhere, however hard as this step may be in practice. This is morally important. Also, there are infelicities of language on nearly every page of the book. The publisher should have made sure of a good proof-reading.

These imperfections aside, this is an interesting book and a serious contribution to a real problem in the running of modern corporations.