Tag Archives: Small states

Studying Small States: The role of security and strategy as concepts

New article (double blind peer review), , , ,

The first comprehensive work on small states in international relations was published in 1959, emphasizing the limited capacity of small and weak military states to resist the pressure of the great powers. Scholars have since debated what a small state is or does and what sets apart small states from bigger states or great powers. Variables such as population size, limited diplomatic resources, vulnerability and a lack of military capacity, size of economy (GDP) and territory, power, perception and image are used to formulate the definition of a small state and to describe its functions, “modern” definitions portray small states as global actors with an international voice, focusing on how a small state can influence international organizations. With these variables and methods, as of today, thirty-four states can be defined as small in Europe, for example, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Austria, the Netherlands, Latvia, Slovakia and Iceland. The problem with modern small state studies is that they overlook how important the concept of security is for small states and their policy. International security and strategy are central for small state studies because the principles of security include equal rights for all nations, safeguards in the military, political, economic, health and humanitarian areas, respect for sovereign rights and a just political settlement of international crises and regional conflicts. If these principles are universal, small states can develop a strategy in cooperation with other states. Here it is argued that the “old” methods of defining small states are neither obsolete nor outdated. For small states, the importance of being small depends not only on the notion of size but also on the asymmetrical relationship with the powerful states. In this paper, the focus is on international security and strategy, the concept of smallness, power relation and binary oppositions in small state studies using Iceland as an example, in the period from 1945 to 2007. The hypothesis is that a small state responds to change in the international system to achieve security. This paper recognizes the limited capability of small states and the power asymmetry of international relations. I argue that binary oppositions and the inherent vulnerability in small state studies explain the security policy and strategy of a small state.

  

 

Small states

In the Cold War quantitative definitions of small states were first used to study “smallness” in the international system, the variables used were military strength, population size, the geographic mass of countries and the gross domestic product (GDP). A more qualitative approach studied small states from the role and influence small states have or don’t have in the international system: their relations with greater powers, in military alliances and within world politics, forced to make decisions based on information supplied by bigger states (Baker Fox 1959; Vital 1966, 1971; Rothstein 1968; Keohane 1969; Handel 1981). In the post-Cold War era, the research has focused on international organisations and the influence “small states” could exercise in cooperation with other states and international organisations and how the political elite in a small state used to define their state. A psychological definition assumes that states define themselves as they see themselves. If a state perceives itself to be small, so shall it be (Goetschel 1998; Wivel 2005; Mouritzen & Wivel 2005; Rickli 2008; Hey 2003; Frímannsson 2018; Johnston & Ágústsson 2018; Thorhallsson 2006; 2018).

Still, others have researched small states based on the notion of ‘niche diplomacy’. This framework demonstrates how small states became smart states, focus on a few foreign policy issues and specialize to become successful internationally (Wivel 2010; Rickli 2008). “This involves focusing on matters that are recognized and viewed in positive light by the international community in order to earn influence” (Baruchello, Kristjánsson, Jóhannsdóttir, & Ingimarsson 2018, p. 2).

Thorhallsson‘s (2018) important small state and shelter theory in general terms analyzes the identity and the behavior of small states in world politics. The gist of shelter theory is that small states seek economic, political and societal shelter in order to prosper. This means that the small states depend on the shelter provided by larger states, superpowers and international organizations, even on military alliances.  This definition is both material and psychological. In this way, a small state is: “not defined by any specific qualities that it possesses (or lacks) but rather by the position it occupies in its own and other’s eyes” (Rothstein 1968, p. 127).

One can, therefore, view shelter theory at least implicitly as a realist understanding of the international challenges small states are faced with. However, the assumption that small states must rely on shelter (aid) from other states and organizations follows in the footsteps of the liberal institutionalist assumption embedded in the text and stresses the advantage of international organizations for small states. Finally does the constructivist focus on identity and norms highlight domestic politics and the preferences of the political elite. Constructivism is, however, not a theory of international relations but a meta-theory concentrating on human society and interestingly, constructivism has little to say about security (Booth 2009).

The focus of this paper is, somewhat, different.  It aims at framing international security and strategy in small state studies. It is worth noting that small state studies began in earnest early in the Cold War period. At that time Classical realism (or political realism) was the most “popular” international relations theory. The theory established in the post-World War II era, explains international politics as a result of human nature. Classical realists’ main argument is that order is fragile and created through constant tensions between nation-states. Thus, paraphrasing, state security and interests should have priority for all states. The main signpost of political realism is the concept of interest defined in terms of power (Rösch 2014).  It is no coincidence that the first comprehensive small state studies focused on the limited capability and vulnerability of small states and the power asymmetry in international relations. The research used realism to explain the behavior of small states in the international system and created the power relation and binary oppositions in small state studies. However, though binary oppositions are implied in small state studies and used to study international relations, gender, race and in colonial/postcolonial studies, binary oppositions have not been used directly to study small states.

 

The binary oppositions in small state studies are:

Big state vs. Small state

Security vs. Insecurity (vulnerability)

Them vs. Us

Power vs. Weakness

Inside vs. Outside (international institutions, international organisations, military alliance’s)

 

These variables (oppositions) explain the status and vulnerability of small states in the international system. The premise is studying small states from the perspective of what small states are not or lack. Therefore, if binary oppositions are used as concepts to study small states a clear picture emerges of the international and security relationship small (weaker) states engage in.

 

 

Security and Strategy

This author argues that when studying small states, it is important to research international security and strategy. Security is vital for small states in their relations with “powerful states” as the absence of security means that states must help themselves. I use both broad and narrow definitions of security to examine the behavior (strategy) of small states in international relations. The security definitions are military security, economic security, social security, environmental security and human security. To understand small states and their security policy, it is necessary to research the ‘grand strategy’ during the Cold War (1948-1989) and international security at the end of it (from 1990 to the present).

In this paper, a strategy is defined as a set of consistent actions designed to achieve a specific goal. For small states, the strategy is all about gaining a position and exploiting emerging possibilities to the very best. They acknowledge that there is always an element of uncertainty about the future and that future strategy is about a set of options (strategic choices) that protects national interests as: “[N]ational security always comes first” (Sheehan 2005, p. 11). Of course, this is a realist view of the world, and many would say that this approach is not as important as identity politics and the modern holistic methodology in small state studies. I disagree and argue that, in essence, all small states are predominantly “realist states” because of their smallness, and the binary oppositions in small state studies.

It can, however, be difficult for small states to choose when and how it is best to protect their own interests as few small states have the political power and resources to predict what might occur in the future (Rothstein 1968, p. 29). There is still truth in what Thucydides [2006] wrote a long time ago: “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” (Crane  1998, p. 63: Rostoks 2010, p. 88).  Even though Thucydides (c.  460 – c.  400 BC) statement is from the past, history is full of examples that demonstrate the insecurity of small (weaker) states. That small states are influenced by more powerful states and react to change in the international system and accept what they have to accept.

 

 

Binary oppositions

In international relations and its subfield of small state studies language is an important factor when creating ideas, discussing certain actors, concepts, events and the preservation of a situation. “According to Jacques Derrida, logocentric thought not only produces binary oppositions, but also sets up a hierarchical relation between the two terms. It assumes the priority of the first term and conceives the second in relation to it, as a complication, a negation, a manifestation, a disruption of the first” (Culler, 1982, p. 93; Calkivik 2017, p. 7). In small states, binary oppositions (for example, big versus small, security versus vulnerability or inside versus outside) are used by both political elites and academics to create a specific meaning out of certain events, and to explain state actions, policy, theory and political thought. In small state studies, the logocentric constructs dualities (big/small, inside/outside) and opposing themes are used in the language to frame an argument.

One of the most important and common binary oppositions in small state studies is to establish different international organizations, groups or states in terms of ‘them’ versus ‘us’. According to it, small states must rely on other states for protection or partnership, participate internationally, join military alliances or international organisations to prosper (security/shelter). In this author’s opinion, this assumption is rooted in realism and historical memory. Titles of books and papers about small states demonstrate this:

 “The survival of small states; Small states in the global system; Small states in Europe; Weak states in the international system; Small states inside and outside the European Union interests and policies; Small states in world politics explaining foreign policy behavior; The National security of small states in a changing world; Small states in international relations: Alliances and small power; The size of states in the European Union theoretical and conceptual perspectives; The inequality of states a study of the small in international relations; Small states in the European Union what do we know and what would we like to know; Small States and Shelter Theory: Iceland’s External Affairs; The Tyranny of Doctrine and Modern Strategy: Small (and Large) States in a Double Bind; The Survival Strategies of Small Nations; Small states: Survival and proliferation; Iceland: a Small State Learning the Intelligence Ropes”.

The underlining meaning of all titles is ‘binary’ using the comparison between small and big states, them and us, comparing power with weakness, security with vulnerability and inside with outside.

The inherent vulnerability and the binary opposition(s) in small state studies mean that political prudence and the distribution of power [influence] among states within the international system is important for small states and the key to the “determinant of state behaviour” (Waltz 1979). States tend to balance, i.e., strategic balancing is induced by the system. “[E]ach state plots the course it thinks will serve its best interests” (Waltz 1979, p. 113). The perfect example of this strategy is Iceland in the Cold War, it plotted and used its strategic location in the North-Atlantic to secure a national interest, the extension of its fishing zone.

 

 

Iceland as a case study

A scholar from a small state is almost always analyzing his state in comparison with bigger states, comparing them and us; this is also the case with this paper. I assume that all states, big or small, strive to influence the international system. The principal argument is that all states are equal at least in theory (Rothstein 1968; Thorhallsson et al 2006). That all states have equal opportunities, but in reality, small states are not as influential on the international scene as some bigger states are. The binary oppositions in the argument above are thus not only small and big states, but also them and us and power and weakness. From the perspective of the state (big or small), power can be measured as influence or control over outcomes, others, events and issues; as a goal for state or leaders; control over resources and capabilities; as the attainment of security or as a reflection of victory in a conflict. Finally power can be measured as status, which some states and actors have, and others do not (Paul 1994, p. 185; see also: Maoz 1989, pp. 239-266; Hart 1976, pp 289-305).

Samuel Huntington (1993; 2002) wrote that power enables states to shape their interests, protect their security and defend against threats. Small states do just that when building alliances and participating in international organisations. For the sake of argument, we can say that Iceland has less power than Denmark that has less power than Germany. Iceland in nearly all terms is the smallest of the three countries and is more likely to compare itself historically, socially, politically and even economically with Denmark than Germany. Denmark, however, would look to Germany for comparison economically, historically and politically. I assume that Germany, historically, first and foremost compares itself with France or the United Kingdom or the other G12 states. Relationship with other like-minded states is always important for a small state, and of course, the two small states, Iceland and Denmark have international security interests that are Nordic and both Trans- Atlantic and European. The case of Iceland demonstrates how important the security relationship with the U.S. was (is) for Iceland’s position, status, and strategy in international affairs.

After the end of the Second World War and during the Cold War traditional realism focused on state security as the priority for all states. Security was seen in military terms linked to states and alliances. The definition of security “narrowed down to a largely military focus under the pressure of nuclear arms race” (Buzan 1997, p. 6). The state was the main actor, and the principal aim of a small state was survival in a bipolar world dominated by the two nuclear superpowers. When the two superpowers began to compete on the international scene both militarily and economically in the late 1940s, Iceland had to react to change in the international system.  The majority in the Icelandic parliament had learned the lesson from WWII that Iceland could not defend its territory alone, neutrality was not an option against an aggressor. The role of ‘size of state’ and debate about hard security, military alliance (power) and protection, security, and vulnerability (binary opposition) in security matters centered on economic security and the decision to join NATO. The Icelandic government believed that the world system in the late 1940s was dangerous for the small state. “Icelanders are a small and unarmed and peaceful nation – the North Atlantic Treaty brings more security” (Bendiktsson 1949, p. 98; 290; 291). The language (logocentrism) they versus us was used to speak against NATO or to rationalize and explain membership to the Icelandic nation in a hierarchical relation (Alþingi 1949).

In the Cold War, Iceland was important for defense and security in the North-Atlantic and used its geographical position to secure national interests. The Icelandic strategy in the Cold War had one specific goal: to establish full control over the fishing zone around the island. The small state was able to exploit the possibilities of the bipolar system of the Cold War period, acting as a ‘free rider’ state or a ‘reluctant ally’ yet basing its security policy on military and economic protection from a great power, the United States, ‘at little extra cost’ to itself. During the Cold War, the strategic location of Iceland in the North-Atlantic helped to develop a special relationship with the US and NATO. This allowed securing Iceland’s national economic interests in a series of Icelandic-British conflicts over fishing grounds in Icelandic territorial waters in 1958, 1972 and 1976, also known as the Cod Wars (Ingimundarson 1996, 2001, 2011; Thorhallsson 2018; Kristjánsson 2016; Johannesson 2004). The main security threat in Iceland was unhindered fishing by foreign ships in Icelandic waters. Icelandic politicians willingly risked the relationship with NATO and the United Kingdom to secure its interests. The outcomes of the Cod Wars were vital for Iceland’s economic security and a continuation of Iceland’s struggle for independence (Grimsson 2020; Johannsson 2008). In hindsight, Iceland was more threatened by Soviet military might in the Cold War than by UK actions. The case of the Cod Wars (in the context of geopolitical tension of the two superstates during the Cold War) demonstrates that small states have influence, even bargain power, if in a political and geographical important location.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the concept of security was broadened out. Problems connected to migration, human rights, ethnic violence, social security, human security, economic and environmental matters became urgent and a more likely threat to international peace than a potential armed conflict. The concept of security, ‘politicized’ at that time, started to incorporate more and more issues. The need to distinguish between traditional and non-traditional security gained increased attention (Fierke 2007). At the same time did the strategic importance of Iceland diminish after the breakup of the Soviet Union when the era of free-rider state strategy became obsolete.

For a small state like Iceland, a broader security definition means an opportunity to actively engage in international affairs. Iceland faced considerable outside pressure from the international community to contribute more to international aid, development programs and peacekeeping operations after the Cold War. The pressure came in part from the United States, pointing out that Iceland had to participate as a NATO member state. Icelandic politicians agreed and used this opportunity to continue and strengthen the “good security” relationship with the United States. Thus, Iceland took part in operations in former Yugoslavia to help heal the wounds of the civil wars in Bosnia and Kosovo after the NATO military operation against the Serbs in 1999. The new Icelandic strategy was based on a broad security perspective because international circumstances in the 1990s were fundamental in shaping how states evaluated their security and defense matters. The second reason for a new strategy was that security, politics, and economic affairs linked like never before. Thus, European political and economic policy became more significant for Icelandic security. Iceland joined the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1994. Perhaps the biggest step internationally was when Iceland applied for the first time for a seat on the UN Security Council. Politicians in Iceland cited the broadening out of the security concept to justify this new and more active international security policy (Hannibalsson, 1993; Asgrimsson 1999, 2001, 2004; Kristjánsson 2010; Thorhallsson 2012; Ingimundarson 2007).

The strategy in the 1990s and the new millennium was designed to achieve a specific goal, protect Icelandic interests by strengthening economic security ties with the EU, building security cooperation with Europe, and signing the Schengen Agreement. Iceland started to engage more in conventional security matters by partaking in UN peace-keeping missions and NATO operations, for example, in Kabul in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Finally, in 2007 Iceland fully took over responsibility for the defense of its territory. The strategy was about a set of options (strategic choices) to protect national interests and achieve security (including military security) and about Iceland as a more active small state in the [binary] relations with powerful states (Report on Security and Defence at the Turn of the Century 1999; Asgrimsson 2004; Sverrisdottir 2007).

The Icelandic case (strategy) demonstrates how important security is for the role of small states in the international system. In “modern” small state studies, sometimes, excluding the notion of security, rooted in constructivism, perception and identity politics, small states (defined as they see themselves) deliberately act as “norm entrepreneurs” to gain influence. These factors contradict the traditional IR theories that focus on power, military and economic security but confirm the binary oppositions in small state studies. The assumption is: firstly, international law and sovereign rights have gained more recognition and authority since the establishment of the UNO and this has strengthened the position of small states internationally. Consequently, in the era of globalisation, the great powers are no longer in the position to dictate the rules disregarding the international community. Secondly, international cooperation is more important for small states than powerful states. This discourse is popular in the small Nordic countries (including Iceland) explaining small states outside or inside the EU (binary opposition). The focus is on the power (influence) state exercise that a state can be weak (small) in one relation but at the same time powerful in another. The point is small states outside (them and us) the EU are weaker (power and weakness), but small states inside the EU are more effective and benefit from the economic shelter (security) (Ingebritsen 2002; Thorhallsson 2012, 2008; 2018; Thorhallsson & Wivel 2006; Thürer 1998; Hey 2003; Rickli 2008; Mouritzen & Wivel 2005).

Even though small state studies treat small and big states as equals in the post-Cold War era, the great powers can choose to change their policy alone or in international organizations, whereas small states have limited influence on the international political environment if the great powers decide to change their policy  (Thorhallsson & Wivel, 2006; Wiberg 1987; Goetschel 1998). The way small states achieve security has not changed in the new millennium. In exchange for protection, security (shelter), the small state does align itself with the greater power. Both Denmark and Iceland did just that when they joined NATO in the late 1940s. In the new century, both countries supported military action in Afghanistan and Iraq for international security reasons and military protection. For example, Denmark chose to advance its international status and security through active military participation in Afghanistan and Iraq with “high alliance loyalty to the US” (Archer 2014).

Even though Iceland was ready to participate more internationally, in Iceland, the military partnership with the American super-power continued to be central for the small state and the core of the Icelandic security policy (Report on Security and Defence at the Turn of the Century 1999; Policy Statement 2003). This relationship was so important that when the Icelandic government learned that the American fighter jets would leave the Keflavik airbase, the Icelandic government took the step to join the “coalition of the willing” in the war against Iraq in March 2003, hoping to stop the departure of the fighter jets from Iceland. The American government decided to delay its decision after pressure from the Icelandic authorities, who continued to see NATO and the defense agreement between Iceland and the US from 1951 as the central point of Iceland’s security policy (Kristjánsson 2016; Ingimundarson 2007). But in the end, the Icelandic high alliance loyalty to the US did not prevent the departure of the foreign defense force from the island in 2006. The powerful partner in the security relationship did what it had the power to do, whereas, the small (weak) state, Iceland, had to accept the decision made by the greater power.

 

 

Conclusions

Small states are studied together with bigger and more powerful states. The term smallness is, however, not easily defined. Quantitative and qualitative approaches in this study demonstrated this. This paper highlights binary oppositions in small state studies and explains how they can be used to understand the security policy and strategy of a small state. The binary oppositions demonstrate that small states, the weaker party in an asymmetric relationship, navigate the international security landscape in partnership with other states, organizations, and institutions. In this author’s opinion, power and influence are two of the four main variables that explain and define a small state. The other two are international security and strategy. This is important because the relationship small states have with powerful states and the international security environment influences the security policy and strategy of a small state. The example of Iceland demonstrates how a small state used its security relationship with the great power United States to form a strategy, protect its interests and limit the consequences of international transformations to achieve security. The closure of the U.S. military base in Iceland does, however, confirm that the relationship small states have with great powers can be one-sided. The Icelandic example does also show how Iceland reacted to change in the international security landscape after WWII, after the Cold War and in the new millennium to protect its interests and become more active internationally. The gist here is that the binary opposition in small state studies/theory is power-related. In this paper, the main idea is that the security policy and strategy of small states are rooted in the notion of binary opposition in small state studies. In essence, the logocentrism of small state studies identifies their security policy and strategy. The Icelandic example confirms when studying small state(s) one can, methodologically, focus on the concepts of security and strategy, smallness and vulnerability and the binary opposition in small state studies.

 

 

Bibliography

 

Alþingi. (1949). Alþingistíðindi 1948 – 1949 Sextugasta og áttunda löggjafarþing fundur í Sameinuðu Alþingi. 29. Mars, Umræða um aðildarsamning um Norður Atlantshafsbandalagið, pp. 1 – 949. Prentsmiðja Austurlands H/F Reykjavík 1951.

Archer, C. (2014). The Nordic States and Security. (In) Bailes, A.J.,Wivel, A., Clive, ed. Small States and International Security: Europe and Beyond, pp. 95-112. Routledge.

Asgrimsson, H. (1999). Defence and security in a changing world: Icelandic viewpoints by Halldor Asgrimsson, UPI, Stockholm. 25 November 1998. Retrieved 18.03. 2012 from: http://www.mfa.is/news-andpublications/nr/1857

Asgrimsson, H. (2004). Ræða utanríkisráðherra um utanríkismál. 130. Löggjafarþing. 2003-2004. [Foreign Policy Report]. Retrieved 18.03.2012 from: http://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/frettaefni/raedurHA/nr/2204

Asgrimsson, H. (2001). Ísland og öryggi á Norður-Atlantshafi í fortíð, nútíð og framtíð. Ræða utanríkisráðherra í tilefni 50 ára afmælis varnarsamnings Íslands og Bandaríkjana. Retrieved 18.03. 2012 from: https://www.stjornarradid.is/raduneyti/utanrikisraduneytid/fyrri-radherrar/stok-raeda-fyrrum-radherra/2001/05/04/Raeda-utanrikisradherra-i-tilefni-50-ara-afmaelis-varnarsamnings-Islands-og-Bandarikjanna/

Baker Fox, A. (1959). The power of small states: diplomacy in World War II. Chicago, IL:  University of Chicago Press.

Baruchello, G., Kristjánsson J. T., Jóhannsdóttir, M., Ingimarsson, S. (2018). ‘Introduction’, (in) No one is an island: an Icelandic perspective. (ed.), G. Baruchello., J. T. Kristjánsson., M. Jóhannsdóttir., S. Ingimarsson. pp. 1-9. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Booth, K. (2007). Theory of World Security. Cambridge University Press.

Calkivi, A. (2017). Poststructuralism and Postmodernism in International Relations. ‘Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies Subject: International Relations Theory’. DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.102

Crane, G. (1998). Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity: The Limits of Political Realism. University of California Press.

Culler, J. D. (1982). On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism After Structuralism. Cornell University Press.

Fierke, K. M. (2007). Critical Approaches to International Security. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Frímannsson, G. H. (2018). ‘Epilogue’, (in) No one is an island: an Icelandic perspective. (ed.), G. Baruchello., J. T. Kristjánsson., M. Jóhannsdóttir., S. Ingimarsson. pp. 135-145. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Goetschel, L. (1998). ‘The Foreign and Security Policy Interests of Small states in Today’s Europe’, (in) Small States inside and outside the European Union Interests and Policies (ed.), L. Goetschel. Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht.

Grimsson, O. R. (2020).  Ísland hefði orðið gjaldþrota. Hringbraut. Retrieved 10. 12. 2011 from: https://hringbraut.frettabladid.is/frettir-pistlar/olafur-ragnar-island-hefdi-ordid-gjaldthrota/

Handel, M. (1981). Weak States in the International System. Frank Cass: London.

Hannibalsson, J. B. (1993). Skýrsla utanríkisráðherra um utanríkismál. 116. löggjafarþing. 570. mál. [Foreign Policy Report] Retrieved 10. 12. 2011 from: http://www.althingi.is/altext/116/04/r16104054.sgml

Hart, J. (1976). Three approaches to the measurement of power in international relations. International Organization Vol. 30, Issue 2. pp. 289-305. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300018282. (Published online by Cambridge University Press: 2009).

Hey, J. A. K. (2003). Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Huntington, S. P. (1993). The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs; 72, 3; ABI/INFORM Global pp. 22 – 49.

Huntington, S. P. (2002). The Clash of Civilizations: And the remaking of World order.London: The Free Press.

Ingebritsen, C. (2002). Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics. Cooperation and Conflict; 37, 1; pp. 11-23.

Ingimundarson, V. (1996). Í eldlínu kalda stríðsins: samskipti Íslands og Bandaríkjanna, 1945-1960. Reykjavik: Vaka- Helgafell.

Ingimundarson, V. (2001). ‘The Role of NATO and US Military Bases in Icelandic Domestic Politics’, (in) History of NATO the first fifty years, (ed.) Gustav Schmidt, pp. 285 – 305.

Ingimundarson, V. (2011). The Rebellious Ally: Iceland, the United States, and the Politics of Empire 1945-2006, Republic of Letters Dordrecht, Vol. 17.

Ingimundarson, V. (2007). ‘The End of a U.S. Military Presence: Iceland’s Security        Identity Dilemma’. The Fletcher
Forum of
 World Affairs, vol. 31 (1) pp. 25-40.

Johannesson, G. Th. (2004). ‘To the edge of nowhere? U.S.-Icelandic Defense Relations during and after the Cold War’, Naval War College Review. Vol. 57, no. 3, pp. 115- 137.

Johannesson, G. Th. (2008). „Þorskastríðin: Barátta við erlenda fjandmenn og innlendar goðsagnir.“ Skírnir haust 2008, pp. 456–471.

Johnston, R. L., Ágústsson, H. Ó. (2018). ‘Little fish, Big Pond: Icelandic Interests and Influence in Arctic Governance’, (in) No one is an island: an Icelandic perspective. (ed.), G. Baruchello., J. T. Kristjánsson., M. Jóhannsdóttir., S.   Ingimarsson. pp. 59-83. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Keohane, R. O. (1969). Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics. International Organization, vol. 23, pp. 291-310. doi:10.1017/S002081830003160X

Kristjánsson, J. T. (2016). Iceland: A Small State Learning the Intelligence Ropes. (in) European Intelligence Cultures, (ed.) Bob de Graaff and James M. Nyce, pp, 171–183. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Kristjánsson J. Þ. (2010). State security or human security and the security debate in international relations: An Icelandic perspective, (ed.) Silja Bára Ómarsdóttir (in) Þjóðarspegillinn 2010, Rannsóknir í félagsvísindum XI. pp. 51-59.

Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian. (2018). ‘Political Realism in International Relations’. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. N. Zalta (ed.), Retrieved February 19, 2019, from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/realismintl-relations.

Maoz, Z. (1989). Power, Capabilities and Paradoxical Conflict Outcomes. World Politics. Vol. 41, no 2. pp. 239-266. DOI: 10.2307/2010410

Morgenthau, H. J. (1978). Politics among Nations. New York: Knopf.  [1948].

Mouritzen, H. and Wivel, A. (2005). The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration. New York: Routledge.

Paul, T.V. (1994). Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge University Press.

Policy Statement (2003). Stjórnarsáttmáli 2003, “Stefnuyfirlýsing ríkisstjórnar Sjálfstæðisflokks og Framsóknarflokks 2003” [Policy Statement of the Coalition Government of the Independence Party and Progressive Party 2003] Retrieved 10.08. 2007 from: http://eng.forsaetisraduneyti.is/newsand-articles/nr/286                              

Iceland’s Security and Defence. Report of Committee Appointed by the Government. (1993). [Öryggis-og varnarmál Íslands: Skýrsla nefndar á vegum ríkisstjórnarinnar mars 1993] Reykjavik: Author.

Report on security and defense at the turn of the century. (1999). [Öryggis og Varnarmál Íslands við Aldamót.] Retrieved 18.09. 2019 from: https://www.stjornarradid.is/media/utanrikisraduneytimedia/media/varnarmal/ryggis-_og_varnarmal_islands_1999.pdf Utanríkisráðuneyti. Reykjavik: Author.

Rickli, J. M. (2008). European Small States: Military Politics after the Cold War: From Territorial to Niche Strategies. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 307-327. doi.10.1080/09557570802253435

Rothstein, R. L. (1968). Alliances and Small Powers. New York: Columbia University Press.

Rostoks, T. (2010). ‘Small States, Power, International Change and the Impact of Uncertainty’, (in) Small States in Europe Challenges and Opportunities (ed.) Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel, pp. 87-103. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

Rösch, F. (2014). Pouvoir, puissance, and politics: Hans Morgenthau’s dualistic concept of power? Review of International Studies. 40 (2): pp. 349–365. doi:10.1017/S0260210513000065.

Sheehan, M. (2005). International Security. London: Lynne Rienner.

Sverrisdottir, V. (2007). Ræða utanríkisráðherra um öryggis- og varnarmál. Retrieved 18.09. 2019 from: http://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/frettaefni/RaedurVS/nr/3372

Thorhallsson, B., Wivel, A. (2006). Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know? Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4): pp. 651-668. doi.10.1080/09557570601003502

Thorhallsson, B. (2006). The Size of States in the European Union: Theoretical and Conceptual Perspectives. Journal of European Integration, Vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 7-31. doi.10.1080/07036330500480490

Thorhallsson, B. (2012). ‘Small States in the UN Security Council: Means of Influence’? Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 135 – 160.

Thorhallsson, B. (2018). A small state in world politics: Iceland’s search for shelter. Icelandic Review of Politics and Administration. Special issue on power and democracy in Iceland. Vol. 14, Issue 1. pp. 61-82.

Thorhallsson, B. (2018). Small States and Shelter Theory. Iceland’s External Affairs. London: Routledge.

Thucydides. (2006). History of the Peloponnesian War. New York: Barnes & Noble Classic.

Thürer, D. (1998). ‘The Perception of Small States: Myth and Reality’ (in) Small States inside and outside the European Union Interests and Policies (ed.), Laurent Goetschel, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Vital, D. (1967). The Inequality of States. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Vital, D. (1971). The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/great Power Conflict. Oxford: University Press.

Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc. London.

Wiberg, H. (1987). The Security of Small Nations: Challenges and Defences. Journal of Peace Research, 24(4), pp. 339-363. Retrieved February 21, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/424427

Wivel, A. (2005). Between Paradise and Power: Denmark’s Transatlantic Dilemma. Security Dialogue, Vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 417-21. doi:10.1177/0967010605057974.

Wivel, A. (2010). ‘From small state to smart state: Devising a strategy for influence in the European Union’, (in) Small states in Europe: Challenges and opportunities. (ed.) R. Steinmetz, and A. Wivel, pp. 15–30. Farnham, England: Ashgate.

How Can Small States Like Iceland Work Effectively With International Financial Institutions?

Article (double non-blind peer review), , , , ,

 

Note: The term “emerging markets” is used in this article to refer to countries with low or middle income according to the World Bank (see, e.g., International Finance Corporation, 2006). This article thus uses a broad definition of emerging markets. Several other definitions of the term can be found in popular textbooks on international business (see, e.g.,: Czinkota, Ronkainen and Moffet, 2005; Rugman and Collinson, 2006; Wild, Wild and Han, 2008, and Daniels, Radebaugh  and Sullivan, 2007).

Small states, multilateralism and international financial institutions (IFIs)

Multilateralism is the international governance of the many. It opens up the possibility for small states along with larger states to participate in international decision making.

According to Thorhallsson, the small states literature generally claims that it is beneficial for small states to concentrate on multilateral relations within international organizations (Thorhallsson 2005). Keohane argues that a major function of international organizations – perceived by many small and middle powers – is to allow these states acting collectively to help shape developing international attitudes, dogmas, and codes of proper behaviour (Keohane 1969). When discussing multilateralism Kahler states that “Smaller, weaker states were believed to be disadvantaged by bilateralism…” and “In their formal institutional design at least, most postwar multilateral institutions incorporated a larger role in decision making for states that were not great powers and could not aspire to be.” (Kahler 1992, p 681). When discussing small states as aid donors Hoadley predicts high levels of participation of small states in multilateral agencies (Hoadley 1980).

This article will focus on the case of Iceland and the discussion will be limited to international financial institutions[1] that are engaged in international development cooperation with emerging market economies and developing countries. Does the case of Iceland demonstrate high levels of participation within IFIs? Has Iceland been pro-active or reactive within IFIs? How would the participation of Iceland be classified according to Keohane system role of states: i.e. systems determining, systems influencing, system affecting, system-ineffectual (Keohane 1969). Could Iceland as a small state be more influential within IFIs? How can small states best contribute to international development cooperation given the recent developments in this area of international development cooperation?

One could argue that it could be feasible for a small country like Iceland to work more in partnership with IFIs in emerging markets, for example: (i) when assisting the governments in those countries on a project basis, (ii) when engaging in economic policy reform dialogue with their governments, and (iii) when its private sector engages in business and investment operations in those countries. This is important both for Iceland’s multilateral development cooperation when Iceland as a small country works with, and through, IFI´s and its bilateral development cooperation if Iceland partners with IFIs and other donors e.g. by cofinancing budget support operations. The article will thus both focus on cooperation and coordination with IFIs on the multilateral and bilateral fronts. It will also discuss private sector cooperation with IFIs since those institutions increasingly emphasize the importance of international business and investment to boost growth in emerging market economies.

In addition to official development assistance to governments, cooperation with IFIs may become increasingly important for Icelandic firms if they expand their business activities and investments in emerging markets that sometimes have risky investment environments, including in the energy sector. Also, the current global financial crisis and the banking crisis in Iceland could make it feasible for Icelandic firms to work in partnership with IFIs and more actively seek access to some of their financial products, including equity participation, loans, guarantees, advisory services, etc.

Iceland’s development cooperation and IFIs

In the case of Iceland the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) is formally responsible for it’s bilateral and multilateral development cooperation in emerging market economies (including in developing countries). Part of this responsibility is the conduct of Iceland’s relationship with international financial institutions (IFIs). IFIs operate in emerging market economies and support both government projects (e.g. infrastructure projects) and economic policy reforms, where they often provide loans upon the successful implementation of agreed policy actions. IFIs also increasingly recognize the importance of the private sector as a source of funding economic reconstruction in emerging markets, e.g. via foreign direct investment and business activities that contribute to economic growth, and have separate departments and/or agencies that specialize in private sector cooperation and services.

The MFA handles the relationship with the World Bank Group[2] while the Ministry for Commerce deals with EBRD. [3] Both institutions work with governments of emerging market economies and increasingly emphasize promotion of private sector activities.[4] Iceland is not a member of the regional development banks: The Asian Development Bank (AsDB), The African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). All the other Nordic countries, that Iceland likes to compare itself with, are members of those regional institutions that all play an important role in economic reconstruction in their regions.

On the bilateral side Iceland has a development agency, the Icelandic International Development Agency (ICEIDA), which is formally under the MFA, but has traditionally functioned rather independently. Until recently ICEIDA had its own law, originating from 1981, and an independent board of directors with seven members, of which six members were elected by the parliament (Alþingi) and one appointed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who also served as a chair (Alþingi 1981). Given the fact that the Minister for Foreign Affairs appointed only one member of the board limited his/her power over ICEIDA’s operations and in practice ICEIDA has conducted Iceland’s  bilateral development cooperation with limited involvement and coordination from the MFA.

A new legislation and organizational structure

In September 2008 the Icelandic parliament passed a new law on Icelandic International Development Cooperation (Alþingi 2008). Unlike the previous law from 1981, this new legislation covers both bilateral and multilateral development cooperation.[5] One consequence of this new law is a new institutional structure both within, and outside, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Alþingi 2008). It remains to be seen how the new legislation and structure will affect the conduct of Iceland’s development cooperation in the coming years and decades, and its relations with international financial institutions.

Recently the Ministry for Foreign Affairs also established a separate Directorate of International Development Cooperation[6] see figure 1 (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2010) which is an attempt to strengthen MFA’s coordination capacity in this area. According to the new law the parliament elects seven members of a Development Cooperation Committee whose main purpose is to secure the role of the parliament in policy and decision making with regards to international development cooperation in the long-term (ICEIDA 2008b). The members of the committee also take a seat in the Council on International Development Cooperation[7] with 17 members on its board. The Minister for Foreign Affairs appoints representatives to the Council on International Development Cooperation, the chairman without nomination, but in addition to the members of the parliamentary Development Cooperation Committee, the board consists of five members from Icelandic aid agencies, the chair appointed by the Minister, two members from the academia and two from the labor market side (ICEIDA 2008b). Members of the Council on International Development have been appointed and its first meeting took place in March 2009 (ICEIDA 2009a and 2009b).

There is also a Steering Group on Development Cooperation,[8] whose role for some reason is not specified in the new law, but which seems to be meant to be an internal management body for the Minister for Foreign Affairs, see figure 1. The thinking seems to be to have this committee manage Iceland’s Development cooperation in the short-term while the Council on International Development Cooperation seems to be like an advisory body for long-term policy making, and according to the new law is to meet at least twice a year.

Figure 1. The current structure of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Iceland

021510_1050_HOWCANSMALL1

Source: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2010

IFIs are important for Iceland both as a formal mechanism to channel its multilateral contributions to developing countries and emerging market economies and as a venue to participate in the international policy dialogue with these countries. IFIs can also be a key partner in the field where Iceland’s bilateral development agency, ICEIDA, is operational.[9] MFA’s capacity to conduct Iceland’s relationship with IFIs has, however, always been weak and its structure is fragmented. On the multilateral front the Ministry for Foreign Affairs does not handle the relationship with the few multilateral organizations that Iceland is a member of.[10] MFA has also not sought, or even considered, membership in some key IFIs like the regional development banks.[11]

Why has Iceland shown so little interest in IFIs?

The low priority attached to cooperation with IFIs[12] by the Icelandic government is unusual given the fact that Iceland is a Nordic country.[13] The Nordic countries, who all are usually considered to be small states, have for a long time been among the most active countries in the world in development cooperation and in engaging with IFIs.

Iceland is a founding member of the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Iceland has also been involved in international development cooperation bilaterally since 1971 (Alþingi 1971) and its bilateral development agency, ICEIDA, was established by law in 1981 (Alþingi 1981). More recently Iceland has also become active in private sector activities and shown interest in cooperation with the private sector arms of the IFIs. This is especially true for the energy sector. Several Icelandic companies have been internationalizing their operations and investing abroad, including in emerging market economies where IFIs are active. In spite of this, Iceland has kept a very low profile within the IFIs and has not sought membership in the regional development banks.

As small states the Nordic countries, especially Denmark, Norway and Sweden have taken a very different approach vis-à-vis international financial institutions. They have always regarded themselves as being fully capable of participating and sometimes leading the policy dialogue within the international community. They have also considered it important as part of their foreign policy to take part in contributing to economic development and world order. Their financial contributions to international development cooperation are among the highest in the world and they are among a few countries to meet the UN target of contributing 0.7 percent of  gross national income (GNI) to international development cooperation. In the case of the World Bank´s International Development Association (IDA), whose main role is to assist the poorest countries in the world, the Nordic countries have often contributed more than their economic size would require them to do.

According to Thorhallsson  the limited interest in the work of the World Bank is a clear reflection of Iceland´s international approach.  Direct economic benefits for Iceland seem to have for a long time been a prerequisite for its international co-operation (Thorhallsson 2005). The special bilateral relationship with the United States, that Iceland benefited from both economically and on security is also important when explaining the conduct of Iceland´s foreign policy. This relationship may help explain why Iceland has for so long favored bilateralism. This emphasis on bilateralism in Iceland contradicts the small-state literature concerning the importance small states are assumed to attach to working within multilateral organizations as discussed earlier in this article.

However, the recent increase in Iceland´s contributions to development cooperation before the current economic crisis, the new legislation on Iceland´s International Development Cooperation, as well as its bid for a seat at the UN Security Council shows that the government was becoming more committed to participating in, and contributing to, international cooperation. As Thorhallsson puts it “…an interesting shift of prioritization has occurred since the mid-1990s which can be attributed mainly to changed perceptions and preferences of a large part of the political elite and external pressure reflecting greater demands made of a small affluent state in the international system.” (Thorhallsson 2006, p. 202).

A seat in the UN Security Council was unrealistic given the limited resources that Iceland has[14] and the global financial crisis, that hit the Icelandic economy hard, has already resulted in cuts in its development budget.  However, according to Thorhallsson “There has been a shift of priorities from a narrow focus on direct benefits from overseas relations to more broadly-defined interests in terms of importance of contributing to the work of the international community.” (Thorhallsson 2006, p. 218-219). Iceland is in a transition phase and had prior to the current crisis shown an interest to become more active within international organizations including the UN and the World Bank.

Recent trends in international development cooperation

Given their size, and multilateral nature, the IFIs have an important coordination role to play in the world and provide a venue for and leadership in the dialogue on development policy and development effectiveness. This is especially the case with the World Bank Group which is by far the largest of the IFIs and whose membership includes most countries in the world.

Many countries that contribute to development cooperation choose to take part in a policy dialogue with their partner countries and are concerned about how economic policy is being formulated and implemented in emerging markets. In 1980 the World Bank introduced its first structural adjustment loan which marked a shift from project aid to program based approach, where policy conditionality played an important role. Since then there has been a substantial shift in the international institutional environment for development cooperation and a number of important donor meetings have taken place, and declarations issued on aid effectiveness. Among those are: the Copenhagen Summit in 1995, the Millennium Development Goals from 2000,[15] the Monterrey Consensus 2002, the Rome and Paris Declarations on Aid Efficiency from 2003 and 2005, and the Roundtables on Managing for Development Results.[16] World Bank´s Comprehensive Development framework launched in 1999 is a notable change in the World Bank’s development approach and the OECD DAC guidelines are also important. As a result, the key words in the current development paradigm are: ownership, alignment, harmonization, and results- orientation. This has also resulted in increased emphasis on budget support to recipient countries and in creating an overall policy environment conducive to long-term growth.

Project approach, sector wide approach and budget support. Which way to go?

In spite of the international trend, Iceland’s engagement in policy dialogue with developing countries through its membership in international organizations has been quite limited. Iceland may though have made an effort to be more active on a case by case basis, for example, when an Icelandic official has occupied the Executive Director position at the Nordic-Baltic World Bank Office in Washington DC and when an Icelandic Minister represented the Nordic and the Baltic states on the World Bank’s Development Committee.

At the bilateral level, when Iceland engages directly with partner countries, it has always used, and still uses, the so called project based approach when planning and implementing projects. The project based approach means that ICEIDA defines small sector specific projects, with an agreed timetable, in cooperation with the receiving country, but the financial administration of the project is maintained within ICEIDA. This is out of line with the mainstream approach in development cooperation  as it is conducted today, emphasizing country ownership and using the planning, budgetary and procurement systems of the receiving/partner country. Furthermore the projects supported by ICEIDA have a narrow focus. Initially only small fisheries projects where thought to be feasible and small ad hoc social sector projects were included. Since 1997, however, Iceland has increasingly become involved in supporting education projects and health projects, but those still use the narrow project approach. More recently Iceland is getting involved in energy projects, which is one area where the private sector is also exploring opportunities in providing technical assistance and investment.

The small projects currently in ICEIDA’s portfolio are time consuming to prepare, costly to implement and monitor, and their link with the overall policy of the receiving country, and within the sector supported, is often unclear. In addition to this the project based approach often makes aid coordination time consuming and cumbersome.

Recently the government of Iceland had planned a substantial increase in its contributions to international development cooperation with the ambition to reach 0.35 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2009. This was spelled out in Iceland’s Policy on Development Co-operation 2005 to 2009 issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 2005 (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2005). The long-term ambition was to reach the UN target of 0.7 percent of Gross National Income as stated in the Ministers speech at the UN General Assembly in 2006. In the speech the minister said: “Beyond 2009, our assistance should increase even further, with the ambition of reaching the UN target of zero point 7 per cent (0.7%) of GNI (Gross National Income)” (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2006). However, there was no timetable in the speech on the 0.7 % of GNI goal. In fact, Iceland committed itself to reach this with its first legislation on development cooperation in 1971, but was never able to live up to that commitment (Alþingi 1971). The Minister was thus repeating a 35 years old promise at the UN in 2006.

The current financial crisis has already resulted in cuts in Iceland’s development budget and it already seems clear that Iceland did not reach 0.35 of Gross Domestic Product in 2009.[17] However, at the time of this writing the numbers for 2009 were still not confirmed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Given the recent trends in international development cooperation one may ask the question whether or not the time has come for Iceland to engage in policy dialogue with developing countries and support sector wide operations in its development cooperation or perhaps provide a direct budget support[18] in partnership with other donors, including small states, along with technical assistance and advisory services that often accompanies such assistance.

In the case of the sector wide approach Iceland would work with other donors and direct its funds to a specific sector. Iceland would then participate in a dialogue with the receiving country, in partnership with the other contributing donors, about the overall development of that sector.  In the case of budget support Iceland would along with other donors provide funds directly to the receiving countries budget and engage in an overall policy dialogue with the receiving countries again in partnership with other contributing donors.

Among the problems with the project based approach currently used by ICEIDA is, that it is often to a large extent managed and controlled by the donor, in this case Iceland. Therefore many donor countries, including the other Nordic Countries, are increasingly getting involved in budget support and use it as means to engage in policy dialogue with the developing country and to help the government of the receiving country to take the lead and ownership of the overall policy reform in the country.  Many donor countries, including the Nordic Countries, also provide technical assistance to help the governments of developing countries prepare and implement policy reforms.

Good policy environment, economic growth and poverty reduction

If the government of Iceland, like many other donor countries have already done, decides to change its approach and get involved in budget support operations, in addition to the project approach, there needs to be some certainty, or at least a reasonable likelihood, that good economic policy and good governance leads to stronger economic growth, which in turn provides the basis for poverty reduction in the developing world. The war against poverty in the world will not be won in the long-term without economic growth.

The so called Washington consensus attempted to summarize the outcome of the debate on what policy stances are conducive to economic development. In its original formulation, the Washington consensus prescribed a policy that could be summarized in ten propositions as follows: (i) fiscal discipline, (ii) a redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary health care, primary education, and infrastructure, (iii) tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base), (iv) interest rate liberalization, (v) a competitive exchange rate, (vi) trade liberalization, (vii) liberalization of FDI inflows, (viii) privatization, (ix) deregulation (in the sense of abolishing barriers to entry and exit), (x) secure property rights (Williamson 2000, Center for International Development, Harvard University 2003).

Although there is empirical evidence to support many of these policies the IFIs were heavily criticised during the 1980s and the early 1990s for interpreting the policy prescription too literally, without country specific circumstances, institutional conditions, or effects on poverty.

There continues to be a debate about the relationship between good policy environment and economic growth. David Dollar and Craig Burnside published a famous article almost a decade ago where the case was made that aid had positive impact on economic growth in countries with good economic policies (Burnside and Dollar 2000). They concluded that making aid more systematically conditional on the quality of policies would likely increase its impact on developing countries’ growth. Other authors have been more cautious in concluding that aid promotes growth in countries with sound policies (see for example Easterly, Levine and Roodman 2004) and emphasize that the seminal paper of Burnside and Dollar does not provide the final answer on this critical issue.

The debate on the relationship between economic policies and growth is likely to go on for a very long time, and it is safe to say that we do not know with any certainty which policies are most conducive for economic growth and poverty alleviation.  However, while no one has found a “magic bullet” for growth there are some things that seem important, including sensible macroeconomic management[19]; laws and policies that create an environment conducive to private sector activity with low transaction costs;  and an economy open for international trade (see for example Rajan 2005). Investment in health and education also ought to be encouraged. In fact, the emphasis on macroeconomic stability and outward orientation in the Washington consensus, have been and still remain, important components of sustainable development strategies.

Small states and the policy dialogue – What impact can a small state like Iceland  have?

What role can a small state like Iceland play if engaging in policy dialogue with developing countries and what impact could its participation have? Keohane suggests that we focus on the systemic role states´ leaders see their countries playing and their impact on the international community. Those are the following: System-determining when a state plays a critical role in shaping the international system, System-influencing are states that cannot expect individually to dominate the international system but may be able to influence it, System-affecting states are those that cannot affect the international system alone but can exert significant impact on the system working through small groups or regional international organizations, and finally, System-ineffectual states that can do little to influence the system-wide forces that affect them, except in groups which are so large that each state has minimal influence. (Keohane 1969) What category does Iceland fall under with respect of international financial institutions?

The most important groups that Iceland has associated it with internationally are the Nordic countries and more recently also the Baltic States. This cooperation also extends to IFIs. For example, at the World Bank Group, Iceland shares an Executive Director’s Office with the Nordic and the Baltic Countries. Iceland also shares an office with Estonia and Sweden at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Iceland’s cooperation with the other Nordic states and, since the early 1990s, the Baltic States in the World Bank Group has given Iceland a more significant role within the Bank Group. If Iceland engages alone in policy dialogue with developing countries bilaterally, or in partnership with an IFI with a very large number of other countries, it is likely that it will have a limited impact and would probably be classified as system-ineffectual, i.e. it could probably in most cases do little to influence the system-wide forces. However if it works in partnership with a small group of donors like the Nordic and the Baltic group it could become system-affecting. The Nordic countries, especially Denmark, Norway and Sweden are global leaders in international development cooperation and can, as a group, have significant impact on the system worldwide.

Iceland’s financial contributions to international development efforts will in most cases be quite small in a global context. This should however not discourage a small country like Iceland to take part, share its experience and provide advisory services sand technical assistance when possible. Iceland’s experience, successes as well as failures, can be of interest to developing countries, especially the smaller states. Its public administration is very small compared to the public administrations of larger nations and specialisation is subject to limitations. Prioritization in such circumstances is key.

Iceland’s experience in development since the World War II is unique and could provide valuable lessons, especially for small developing countries, and countries in transition. In spite of its limited capital and human resources, Iceland successfully went through a transition from a colony to full independence in 1944. The current financial crisis has hit its economy hard but remains a high income economy. Its experience could be of value to small less developed nations and demonstrate to them what is possible, and what to avoid.

Iceland should not only share its success stories. One can also learn from mistakes that have been made. The recent banking crisis also shows how vulnerable a small state can be if the business community fails and the government  does not take action in time to protect the economy from an economic crash. This raises questions on how a small country like Iceland relates to the international community and on the role of the state.

One should also not underestimate the value of a well informed and prepared policy dialogue with developing countries and the technical assistance often provided to support such reform efforts. In fact, many development experts would argue that in the end good policy environment is the key to achieve sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction. Foreign aid alone cannot buy growth.

Iceland has been surprisingly hesitant to offer its assistance to other countries based on this experience and success in handling many of it’s issues. It has also hesitated to use its experts to provide advice and technical assistance to developing and transition countries, limiting this assistance to the fishery sector and with small projects in health and education sectors. This seems rather narrow given Iceland’s experience.

When the Baltic States announced their independence from the Soviet Union, Iceland was the first country to recognize them. Iceland did however not offer assistance during their transition. As a small state, its experience could have been just as relevant as the experience of the other Nordic countries, all of which became active in assisting the Baltic States following their independence.

The Baltic States have all been initiating their international development cooperation. Estonia is already a high income country and Latvia and Lithuania are upper middle income countries (World Bank 2008).  Priority countries for Estonian development cooperation are: Afghanistan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Estonia 2010). Latvia has chosen Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as its development cooperation priority countries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Latvia 2009) and Lithuania selected Afghanistan, Iraq, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, and Armenia for its development cooperation and democracy promotion projects (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lithuania 2009).

While initially those countries may use project approach, sharing their transition experience through policy dialogue with less developed countries, especially countries further to the south and to the east, may be the most valuable assistance they can offer to their partner countries. They should both share their successes as well as lessons from mistakes that have been made. The Baltic States should avoid the fragmented institutional structure that Iceland has chosen, dividing the IFIs between ministries, and delegating the bilateral development cooperation to an independent agency with limited accountability vis-à-vis the central government. The result in Iceland has been that no single institution has a full overview of Iceland’s relations with IFIs. Its development cooperation practices are out of line with international best practice and its private sector is exposed to unnecessary risks when investing in emerging market economies.

The private sector and economic reconstruction in emerging markets

The private sector plays an important role in the economic reconstruction of emerging markets through business activities and foreign direct investment. However, there are risks involved. Recently Icelandic energy companies like Reykjavík Energy Invest (REI)[20] (http://www.rei.is/) and Geysir Green Energy (http://www.geysirgreenenergy.com/) have been getting involved in energy projects in Asia and Africa.  Reykjavík Energy Invest provides information on its website on projects that are at various stages of development in Djibouti and Indonesia (Reykjavík Energy Invest, 2008) and  Geysir Green Energy is involved, e.g., in projects in the Philippines and in China (Geysir Green Energy, 2008).

The World Bank Group issues a Doing Business report yearly that evaluates the business and investment climate in most countries in the world and the 2009 report for example ranked 181 countries on the ease of doing business. The countries that Icelandic energy companies are planning investments in are ranked in the following way on the overall ease of doing business: Djibouti 153, Indonesia 129 and the Philippines 140. According to this ranking, those are note exactly ideal places for firms seeking a favourable business and investment climate. More specifically on protecting investors Djibouti is ranked number 177. On starting a business Indonesia is ranked number 171 and the Philippines number 155 (World Bank 2008). On a Corruption Perception Index those countries rank in the following way out of 180 countries: Djibouti 102, Indonesia 126 and Philippines 141 (Transparency International 2009).

While there certainly are energy resources to be utilized in those countries and investment opportunities that could potentially be profitable and mutually beneficial for Icelandic companies and the host country, there are also pitfalls to avoid, and risks that need to properly be taken into account, and risk mitigation sought when possible and feasible. This is especially important for firms from small states.

Risks from cross border investments

There are specific risks that investors must consider when investing in projects overseas. When business transactions occur across national borders, they carry risks that are not present in domestic transactions. These additional risks are called country risks. For an analysis of the country risk associated with cross-border investment, see, for example, Meldrum (Meldrum, 2000). According to Meldrum, analysts have tended to separate country risk into six main categories: (i) economic risk, (ii) transfer risk, (iii) exchange rate risk, (iv) location or neighborhood risk, (v) sovereign risk, (vi) political risk.

(i) Economic risk refers to a significant change in the economic structure or growth rate in the host country that may result in a major change in the expected return of an investment.  (ii) Transfer risk is the risk arising from a decision by a foreign government to restrict capital movements. (iii) Exchange Rate risk is an unexpected adverse movement in the exchange rate of the host country’s currency. (iv) Location or neighborhood risk includes spillover effects caused by problems in the region, in a country’s trading partner, or in countries with similar perceived characteristics. (v) Sovereign risk involves whether a government will be unwilling or unable to meet its loan obligations, or is likely to renege on loan guarantees. Finally (vi) Political risk concerns risk of a change in political institutions stemming from a change in government control, the social fabric, or other non-economic factors (for more detail, see Meldrum 2000). Those risks also need to be considered by private sector investors and IFIs, for example, offer guarantees against political risk.

International financial institutions and their instruments

Given the important role of the private sector in the development and economic reconstruction in emerging market economies, international financial institutions increasingly focus on private sector partnerships to boost economic growth and reduce poverty in the developing world. Those are the same institutions that support government projects and engage in economic policy dialogue with emerging market economies, i.e: (i) The World Bank Group, (ii) The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, (iii) The Asian Development Bank, (iv) The Inter-American Development Bank, and (v) The African Development Bank.

While several Icelandic energy companies have technical expertise to engage in emerging markets they can hardly afford taking excessive risks. Balance sheets of many Icelandic companies are weaker now than they were prior to the current economic crisis and all the largest banks in Iceland have collapsed. The crisis is also not limited to Iceland and many international investment banks are also going through difficulties and supply only limited capital for investments in emerging markets. One way that Icelandic companies could ensure appropriate risk mitigation and access funding is to work in partnership with the private sector arms of those international financial institutions.

Among the financial products and services that the IFIs offer their private sector partners are: (i) equity financing and/or loans for private sector projects, (ii) guarantee/insurance against political risk (non-commercial risk), (iii) technical assistance and, (iv) information and advisory services.  Access to the financial products and services of IFIs and partnership with them could be an option that Icelandic firms increasingly need to consider.[21]

Potential benefits from cooperation with IFIs for a small state like Iceland

IFIs play an important role, not just by lending to projects and through equity investments, but also by mobilizing additional private sector funding.  They can also access host country governments at the highest level in the event of a political dispute. There is a variety of guarantee instruments developed by IFIs to reduce political risks further and encourage the private sector to engage in emerging market economies. The World Bank for example consists of five institutions: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), (iv) The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, MIGA and (v) The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID. Emerging market economy countries would hesitate to take measures that would negatively affect projects that the MIGA is involved in because of the concern that it could adversely affect their relationship with the IDA and/or the IBRD and possible credit or a loan (West 1999). If disputes do arise, the MIGA’s leverage with host governments frequently enables it to resolve differences to the mutual satisfaction of all parties.

The services that IFIs offer in managing risks in emerging markets might be more relevant for Icelandic investors now than they were prior to the international financial crisis and the banking crisis in Iceland. This is especially the case with investments in the energy sector where projects are often large and tend to have long repayment periods. If an Icelandic company invests in the energy sector in an emerging market economy, it must consider a long-term horizon to receive sufficient return on its investment. The investment contains a higher degree of risk, simply because the company remains exposed to risk for a long period of time. In addition to this, geothermal energy is often located in developing countries which tend to be more risky for investors than developed countries. The profitability of such investments can be influenced by the decisions of the host governments during the lifetime of the projects. This is one important reason for Icelandic companies to work in partnership with IFIs as part of their risk-management strategy.

A small state like Iceland needs strong partners when engaging in long-term capital intensive investments in risky markets. In some cases, the Icelandic government has weak diplomatic ties with emerging markets economies in which Icelandic companies are planning to invest, and in many cases it does not have embassies in those countries. In the event of a dispute, a small country like Iceland does not have the same leverage as large states and partnership with IFIs could therefore be of advantage. Partnership with IFIs could reduce risks both for the private sector and the government of Iceland. After the collapse of the largest commercial banks in Iceland there is also a need to rebuild trust, domestically as well as internationally, and cooperation with reputable IFIs could help in that process.

The government has devoted limited funding and few human resources towards its relationship with IFIs and Iceland is not a member of key IFIs. Through partnership with IFIs Icelandic firms could potentially learn valuable lessons on project preparation and management in emerging markets and improve their risk management. The government of Iceland could consider devoting more funds to provide technical assistance and know-how transfer to emerging markets. This could be done through trust funds administered by IFIs, as well as bilateral funds. Greater use could thus be made of Icelandic experts to cooperate with the IFIs as consultants and for Icelandic firms to prepare cross border investments.

The services of IFIs are not a free lunch and therefore costs of their financial products and services (loans, advisory services, guarantees, etc) must be weighed against the potential benefits.

Conclusions

So far Iceland has been inactive in its cooperation with international financial institutions and has favored bilateralism over multilateralism. Iceland’s international cooperation has to a large extent been driven by concreting on its own benefits and self interest.  This contradicts the small-state literature that often assumes that small states attach high importance to working within multilateral organizations. The special relationship with the United States may have contributed to Iceland’s favour for bilateralism.

Iceland needs to consider providing assistance to developing countries and emerging market economies beyond small projects that use the project based approach only. Iceland could engage in policy dialogue with developing countries in selected policy areas agreed to with the receiving countries. This is probably best done in partnership with international financial institutions and other bilateral donors. This would provide Iceland with an opportunity to try new approaches and better share its own experience in development and reconstruction with partner countries.

When Iceland acts alone it must be classified as system-ineffectual, i.e. a state which adjusts to the international system but cannot change it. However Iceland could become system affecting and exert significant impact on the international system when working with a small group of countries like the Nordic and the Baltic states as it does at the World Bank Group. However, Iceland has only been active when it has held the position of Executive Director or chaired committees like the Development Committee.

The government needs to make sure that Icelandic companies investing in emerging market economies have the same access to international financial institutions as do companies from other developed countries. Through partnership with IFIs Icelandic firms could potentially learn valuable lessons on project preparation and management in emerging markets.

Iceland´s contribution to international development cooperation is made less effective than it could possibly be by the government’s negligence in properly conducting its relationship with those IFIs that Iceland is member of, and not seeking membership in other IFIs, including the regional development banks. This can also expose its private sector to unnecessary and excessive risks when investing in emerging market economies. Iceland can ill afford such government negligence in the aftermath of a banking crisis. Careful investments and appropriate risk management measures are key lessons that the Icelandic private sector should learn from its current banking crisis. The Icelandic government should also by now have learned, unfortunately the hard way, that excessive debts and risks taken by the private sector abroad can have serious consequences for the Icelandic national economy and jeopardize its stability.

One consequence of the fragmented institutional structure used in Iceland’s international development cooperation is that no single ministry or institution has a full overview of Iceland´s relations with IFIs and Iceland´s development cooperation practices are increasingly out of line with international best practices.

A small state like Iceland needs strong partners when engaging in large long- term investments in risky markets. In some cases, the Icelandic government has weak diplomatic ties with emerging markets economies and in many cases it does not have embassies in those countries. In the event of a dispute, a small country like Iceland does not have the same leverage as large states and partnership with IFIs could therefore be of advantage.

The government has devoted limited funding and few human resources towards its relationship with IFIs and Iceland is not a member of certain key institutions. More funds are needed to build a stronger relationship with IFIs.

References

Alþingi (2008). Lög um alþjóðlega þróunarsamvinnu Íslands nr. 121/2008, available

at: http://www.althingi.is/altext/stjt/2008.121.html (Accessed on December 20,        2009).

Alþingi (1981). Lög um Þróunarsamvinnustofnun Íslands nr. 43/1981.

Alþingi (1971).  Lög um aðstoð Íslands við þróunarlöndin nr. 20/1971.

Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar. (2000). Aid, Policies, and Growth. American

Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 4, pp. 847-68.

Center for International Development, Harvard University (2003). Washington

Consensus, available at: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html (Accessed on January 8, 2010).

Czinkota, Michael R., Ilkka A. Ronkainen and Michael H. Moffett. (2005).

International Business 7th edition. USA: Thomson South-Western. 782 p.

Daniels, John D, and Lee H. Radebaugh and Daniel P. Sullivan. (2007). International

Business –  Environment and Operations 11th Edition. NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. 792 p.

Easterly, William, Ross Levine, and David Roodman. (2004). Aid Policies and Growth:

Comment. American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 3, pp.  774-80.

Geysir Green Energy (2008). Projects, available at:

http://www.geysirgreenenergy.com/(Accessed on June 8, 2009).

Hoadley, J. Stephen, (1980). Small states as aid donors, International International Organizations 31,1, Winter 1980, pp. 121-137.

Icelandic International Development Agency (2008a). Lagt til að fjárframlög til

þróunarsamvinnu verði skert um tæpar 1700 milljónir, available at:

http://www.iceida.is/frettir/nr/961 (Accessed on March 30, 2009).

Icelandic International Development Agency (2008b). Committee on International

Development Cooperation, available at: http://www.iceida.is/english/iceida/Committee/ (Accessed on March 28, 2009).

Icelandic International Development Agency (2009a). Samstarfsráð um

þróunarsamvinnu: Vilji til að koma saman oftar en tvisvar á ári, available at:

http://archive.constantcontact.com/fs049/1102056362425/archive/1102522535529.html (Accessed on April 7, 2009).

Icelandic International Development Agency (2009b). Fyrsti fundur samstarfsráðs um

þróunarsamvinnu, available at:

http://archive.constantcontact.com/fs049/1102056362425/archive/1102510499049.html (Accessed on March 31, 2009).

http://archive.constantcontact.com/fs049/1102056362425/archive/1102522535529.html(Accessed on March 31, 2009).

Icelandic International Development Agency (2009c). Sendiskrifstofum lokað í

Níkaragva og Srí Lanka, available      at:  http://visir.is/article/20090319/FRETTIR01/397673986/-1

(Accessed on March 30, 2009).

International Finance Corporation (2008). IFC and Reykjavík Energy Launch

Infrastructure Fund for Developing Countries, with First Investment in Djibouti, available at:

http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/media.nsf/content/SelectedPressRelease?OpenDocument&UNID=16385EB890EFF860852574790051DABB (Accessed on January 2, 2010).

International Finance Corporation (2006). Financing electrical equipment worldwide,

available at:

http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/gms.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/Electrical_Equip_Brochure/$FILE/Electrical+Equip+Broch.pdf (Accessed on January 20, 2010).

International Monetary Fund (2008). Iceland: Request for Stand-By Arrangement-Staff

Report; Staff Supplement; Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Iceland. November 2008. IMF Country Report No. 08/362, available at:  http://www.sedlabanki.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?itemid=6606

(Accessed on December 28, 2009).

Kahler, Miles. (1992), Multilateralism with small and large numbers. International

Organizations, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Summer, 1992), pp. 681-708.

Keohane, Robert O. (1969), Lilliputians´Dilemmas: Small States in International

Politics. International Organizations, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring, 1969), pp. 291-310.

Meldrum, Duncan  H. (2000). Country Risk and Foreign Direct  Investment. Business             

Economics,  35 (1), 33-40, available at: http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=12&did=49837719&SrchMode=1&sid=2&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1177081310&clientId=58032 (Accessed on February 9, 2010).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Estonia (2010). Priority countries of Estonian development

co-operation, available at: http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/taxonomy/term/55

(Accessed on January 20, 2010).

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Iceland (2010). Skipurit, available at:

http://www.mfa.is/ministry/organization/ (Accessed on February 11, 2010).

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Iceland (2008). Sparnaður og hagræðing í rekstri

utanríkisráðuneytisins available at: http://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/frettaefni/frettatilkynningar/nr/4628 (Accessed on March 29, 2009).

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Iceland. (2006). Ávarp utanríkisráðherra Íslands á 61.

Allsherjarþingi Sameinuðu þjóðanna 2006, available at:

http://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/frettaefni/RaedurVS/nr/3187

(Accessed on January 2, 2010).

Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2005). Stefnumið Íslands í þróunarsamvinnu 2005 –

2009,  available at:

http://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/Utgafa/Stefnumid_ISL.pdf

(Accessed on November 25, 2009).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Latvia (2009).  Development co-operation priority

countries, available at: http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/DevelopmentCo-operation/info/ (Accessed on March 20, 2009).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lithuania (2009), Development Cooperation and

Democracy Promotion, available at: http://www.urm.lt./index.php?1097662841

(Accessed on March 28, 2009).

Rajan, Raghuram. (2005). Aid and Growth: The Policy Challenge. Finance &

Development, December 2005; 42, 4. 53-55.

Reykjavík Energy Invest (2008). Projects, available at:

http://www.rei.is/Projects/ (Accessed on September 20, 2009)

Rugman, Alan M. and Simon Collinson (2006). International Business 4th edition.

Harlow England:  Prentice Hall – Financial Times. 664 p.

Thorhallsson, Baldur. (2005) What features determine small states’ activities in the

international arena? Iceland’s approach to foreign relations until the mid-1990s. Stjórnmál og stjornsýsla – Veftímarit, Stofnun stjornmála og stjórnsýslu, Háskóli Íslands. 1:1, 107-140, available at: http://stjornmalogstjornsysla.is/images/stories/fg2005/baldur.pdf (Accessed on January 1, 2010).

Thorhallsson, Baldur. (2006) Iceland´s involvement in global affairs since the mid-

1990s. What features determine the size of a state. Stjórnmál og stjornsýsla – Veftímarit, Stofnun stjornmála og stjórnsýslu, Háskóli Íslands. 2:2, 197 – 223, available at: http://stjornmalogstjornsysla.is/images/stories/fg2006h/baldur.pdf

(Accessed on December 1, 2009).

Transparency International (2008). 2008 Corruption Perception Index, available at:

http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table

(Accessed on December 1, 2009).

West, Gerald  T. (1999). Political Risk Investment Insurance: A  Renaissance.

Journal of Project Finance, 5(2), 27-36, available at:

http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=2294975&site=ehost-live (Accessed on January 28, 2010).

Wild, John J., Kenneth L. Wild, and Jerry C.Y. Han. (2008). International Business 4th

edition. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall. 506 p.

Williamson, John. (2000). What Should the World Bank Think about the Washington

Consensus?Available at: http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/print.cfm?doc=pub&ResearchID=351

(Accessed on November 8, 2009).

World Bank (2008). Doing Business 2009, available at:

http://www.doingbusiness.org/Documents/FullReport/2009/DB_2009_English.pdf (Accessed on November 28, 2009).

[1]The IFIs discussed in this article are the following: (i) The World Bank Group (http://www.worldbank.org/), (ii) The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, EBRD (http://www.ebrd.org/), (iii) The Asian Development Bank, AsDB (http://www.adb.org/)

(iv) The Inter-American Development Bank, IDB  (http://www.iadb.org/) and (v) The African Development Bank, AfDB (http://www.afdb.org).

[2] The World Bank Group consists of five institutions: (i) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IBRD, established in 1944 to rebuild Europe after the destruction of the Second World War, (ii) The International Development Association, IDA, established in 1960, (iii) The International Finance Corporation, IFC, established in 1956, (iv) The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, MIGA, established in 1988, and (v) The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID, established in 1966. The IBRD and IDA support the governments of emerging markets and developing countries  and require government guarantees on their loans, while IFC and MIGA support the private sector in those countries without accepting government guarantees.

[3] The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development was established in 1991 when communism was crumbling in central and eastern Europe and ex-soviet countries needed help during the transition to a market economy. This transition was to a large extent driven by a new private sector.

[4] The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has delegated its responsibility to conduct the relationship with the private sector arms of the World Bank Group, i.e. IFC and MIGA, to the Trade Council of Iceland. This weakens the MFA’s ability to coordinate its relationship with IFIs.

[5] The new law “Lög um alþjóðlega þróunarsamvinnu Íslands” was passed by the parliament on September 11, 2008.

[6] This Directorate is according the Ministry for Foreign Affairs responsible for Iceland Crisis Response Unit, the Department of International Development and the relations with ICEIDA (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2009).

[7] ICEIDA has referred to this committee as the Consultative Committee on International Development Cooperation whereas the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has referred to this same body as the International Development Policy Council. The new law on International Development Cooperation refers to this council as Council on International Development Cooperation.

[8] The Steering Group constitutes the Director General of the Directorate for International Development Cooperation, the Director of the Department for International Development, the Head of the Iceland Crisis Response Unit, the Director General of ICEIDA and the Permanent Secretary of State who also chairs the steering group.

[9] ICEIDA operated in six countries until recently: Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, and Uganda.  ICEIDA thus operated in three continents that can hardly be cost efficient for such a small agency. In 2009 the agency decided to close its offices in Sri Lanka and Nicaragua (ICEIDA 2009c). Those offices have now been closed and the office in Namibia will be closed at the end of 2010.

[10] The Ministry of Commerce, for example, handles the relationship with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). EBRD is engaged in the emerging markets in Europe and now also in Central Asia.

http://www.adb.org/), (ii) The Inter-American Development Bank, (IDB)  (http://www.iadb.org/) and (iii) The African Development Bank, (AfDB) (http://www.afdb.org).

[12] A notable exception to his is the recent request for Stand-by Arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2008).

[13] In addition to Iceland the Nordic countries are Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.

[14] ICEIDA – Country selection  remains unclear and may have been influenced by a wish to get a seat at the UN Security Council. ICEIDA has now closed  it’s offices in Nicaragua and Sri Lanka. The office in Namibia will be closed by the end of 2010.

[15] The Millennium Development Goals were established at the United Nations Millennium Summit in September 2000.

[16] These roundtables were organized by the World Bank and took place in Washington DC 2002, in Marrakesh in 2004, and in Hanoi 2007.

[17] When issuing goals for Iceland´s contributions to development cooperation the Ministry for Foreign Affairs sometimes refers to this contribution as share of Gross Domestic Product and at other times as a share of Gross National Income, etc. There is no consistency on how these different terms are used by the ministry.

[18] When discussing project based approach, sector wide approach or budget support, one should avoid pitching the issue in either/or terms. It is not being argued here, for example, that possible Icelandic involvement in budget support to a given developing country would mean that Iceland would abandon project based approach entirely. Some small projects supported by ICEIDA in the past have been successful and it is well known internationally that investment projects can complement budget support operations.

Another issue regards the decision whether Iceland should go for sector wide approach rather than budget support. In the case of sector wide approach the funds provided by Iceland would be directed to a specific sector instead of being contributed to the general budget of the developing country in question. In this context one needs to keep in mind that the ultimate decision on what to do with the funds rests with the receiving government. So, if there is more aid funding for sector X, the government can redirect its own resources to other sectors. Thus increasing resources to one sector only can be an illusion and from this perspective, it could be better to provide funds directly to the developing countries general budget.

[19] This would for example include: Fiscal discipline, moderate inflation, and a reasonable competitive exchange rate.

[20] Recently the IFC and Reykjavík Energy Invest signed an agreement for joint exploration and development of geothermal resources in Djibouti in Africa that will help address the country’s power shortage and reduce carbon emissions (International Finance Corporation 2008). However, Reykjavík Energy Invest in not a typical private sector company. REI is the international business development and investment arm of Reykjavík Energy.

[21] In addition those services IFIs often engage in a policy dialogue with the governments of emerging market economies to improve economic policy and management. This includes reforms to improve the business and investment climate for the private sector, to promote business activities, and to encourage foreign direct investment. IFIs also provide loans and credits to various government-led projects in developing countries and emerging markets that are subject to international competitive bidding. This allows private sector firms to participate in the bidding process and potentially to benefit from those public sector projects supported by the IFIs.