Tag Archives: Epistemology

The Role of Imagination and Fäerie in Education as a Response to the Crisis in the Anthropocene

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Introduction

The current challenges in the so-called Anthropocene[1] age seems insurmountable and has led to disastrous problems. These challenges are brought on by the exploitation of nature for the benefit of our comfort and economy. To counter this, various measures such as UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), reforms in schools, green policies, measures to electrify more of the industry and so on have been put into effect to combat the negative consequences. Here in Norway, there has currently been a school reform that, among other things, has put a central focus on sustainability together with employability. A key factor in the reform is the development of problem-solving skills, and a strengthening of the paradigm from the STEM-courses, with more focus on quantifiability, problem-solving and measurement. Nevertheless, we almost daily hear about climate feedback loops, tipping points, and overshoot day. It seems that nothing we do is enough.

The reason for this, is that the measures and attempts at meeting the problems in these Anthropocene times are working within the framework of an epistemology that sees nature as a measurable object that we can manipulate for our benefit. Albeit it seems the manipulation now should be “gentler”. A brief analysis of the school reform in Norway and the intentions behind it, will show how this reform contributes to a further strengthening of the view of nature as an object. The reform is an example of how such a focus is not enough for dealing fundamentally with the problems we are faced with today. For this we need an approach where nature is not merely seen as an object, and the subject as something unreal. This point will be clarified through a presentation of the Norwegian philosopher, Hjalmar Hegge’s analysis in his book Mennesket og naturen (1978).

The background for Hegge’s analysis is his critique in his 1957 book Erkjennelse og virkelighet of the theory of subjective sense-qualities. This theory undermines our experience of the world as being somehow not really real. The really real world is here defined as that which is mechanic, that we can measure in waves and pressure. Due to this theory, an unbridgeable polarity between human consciousness and nature has been created, where these are seen and understood as dual opposites. It is not the polarity itself that is the problem; the problem is that the two poles, human consciousness and nature, are seen as separate realities – so they seem a duality. However, polarity does not mean duality, instead it signifies a tension between to opposite poles creating a “third” (symbols, artworks, concepts a.s.o.), such as we can see in Goethe’s theory of colors, where the polarity between light and dark is what brings forth colors.

Hegge writes in the context of the “positivism-strife” that happened in Norway in the middle of the 20th century[2]. However, despite his critique of basic positivist and sense-empirical standpoints, Hegge himself is affected by these tendencies. This is part of the reason why he himself does not really find a proper response to the unbridgeable polarity, since he analyzes it too rationalistically leading it to be get a dualistic slant. Even though he discusses Goethe and Schelling as two examples of a counter-position to the scientism of their age, where the polarity of man and nature is bridged through their epistemologies, he does not bring these into a solution by the end of his book. His solution is a rather unsatisfactory call for an “inner” reflection across subjects and sectors about nature and our relation to nature (Hegge, 1978, p. 153). One aspect of Goethe’s and Schelling’s philosophies that could be explored, is their theories of the imagination. In these theories, nature and human consciousness are “fused” through the workings of the imagination to create a concept, symbol, or an artwork – thereby bridging the gap.

In this article, however, I have not chosen Goethe or Schelling, but instead the English poet-philosopher Samuel Taylor Coleridge and the modern fantasy-writer John Ronald Reuel Tolkien and their analysis and discussions of imagination and the realm of Fäerie. These two writers are good representatives to look at how a different epistemological understanding can bridge the gap in the polarity between human and nature. In these theories, the creative force of nature and of humans shows itself to be the same force, and by nurturing imagination the created artworks can point us to more universal truths and a different understanding of nature and our relationship with nature altogether. The reason I chose Coleridge and Tolkien, and not Goethe and Schelling, for example, is that Coleridge and Tolkien allow more easily for a reflection around pedagogical approaches usable in school and classroom settings, which will be vital in bringing up young people to maturity with a different view and relation to nature than the dominant one today[3]. We will therefore begin with looking at the school reform to show how, despite some good intentions, it is ultimately lacking in dealing properly with the current environmental and climate problems.

The short-comings of the Norwegian education-system in facing the problems in the Anthropocene

The recent reform in the Norwegian education-system has slowly been implemented since 2020. Before the reform was initiated, work was done to analyze both the current situation of the education system and future needs for a sustainable Norwegian society. One of the earliest documents laying the grounds for the reform came with the official report named The School of the Future. Renewal of Subjects and Competences, in 2015. Early in this document we are presented with what the authors of the document has deemed the main important goal of education: to “produce” employable students “for the development of the economy and competitiveness of Norwegian business and industry” (MOE, 2015, p. 8). From a sustainability-perspective it is a fair point to highlight the importance of a healthy economy, since economy is one of the three pillars of sustainable development (the two others being the social and environmental pillars).

An important and foundational concept guiding the work in the various subjects in the school is “competences”. Competences are, and should be, an important part of education. The problem is that these become the sole focus, and they are limited to merely solving tasks and challenges: “Competence means being able to master challenges and solve tasks in different contexts” (MOE, 2015, p. 19). This is not negative as such. We need these competences for a well-functioning society. However, these competences are predetermined by the needs of the market and industries for a profitable society. Therefore, the students merely need to acquire them, meaning that the change a student is to go through, is to adapt to “fixed demands set for development – to become competent” (Hilt and Riese, 2022, p. 107).

This is further strengthened with the focus on problem-solving skills, and especially how concepts such as creativity and innovation are defined. For example, the report defines creativity in the following way: “creativity is understood as being inquisitive, persevering, and willing to be imaginative when solving problems” (MOE, 2015, p. 10 – my italics). In this way creativity and possibility for “newness” is severely restricted and geared towards a certain skillset for a competitive Norway needing. The needed skillset is often defined as a technological one falling within the STEM-courses, where developing green technologies seem to be the answer and solution to our current problems. One could argue that this is a scientifical-technological approach that mainly develops students into passive receptacles of problems to which their competences, creativity and innovative thinking is then applied to[4].

This has consequences for how the education-system thinks and teaches sustainability. When the basic focus is to develop and acquire pre-determined competences that are based on problem-solving skills defined by the industry and the requirement for a “profitable Norway”, it seems we merely end up symptom-treating the problems, if even that. To deal fundamentally with the current problems, we cannot have a one-sided focus on problem-solving skills or competences geared towards business and technology. Furthermore, this technological view, is a view that treats nature as an “it”, something we can manipulate, and through this manipulation solve the problems we are faced with today. This is not to say that technology is bad overall. However, one should ask if the necessary “green” technologies will fundamentally do much to deal with the problems we are facing at its root. If developing competences and problem-solving skills are mainly to develop green technologies or changes in industries, do we then really solve the problem or just treat symptoms?

As we saw above, the possibility and potential for transformation that can eventually lead to a change of perception and relation to nature is severely restricted. The pupils are shaped into pre-determined competences for the sake of developing skills for a profitable (and green) Norway. There is increasingly less room for approaches that challenge the current frame of mind, since so much is geared towards technology and employability. To put it polemically: students become more like employable automatons ready to solve problems when problems occur.

Hjalmar Hegge and the limits of the current epistemology in solving our current crisis

Hegge expresses concern about the way we humans are beginning to view ourselves as automatons as a result of viewing nature as a measurable object. We ourselves have become a human type that not only thinks in technological, mechanistic ways, but a type that experiences the world like this. We more and more view ourselves as Descartes viewed animal: as complicated machines. This can also be seen in the we talk about how certain behaviors or characteristics are “programmed into the genes”, and how the brain “is like a computer” – we are becoming automatons ourselves. As he says: by having mechanized nature, we have mechanized ourselves (Hegge, p. 150-51). I think this is also the reason we fear that AI will develop consciousness and become human. Only an amputated and mechanized view of humans can give soil for such an idea and fear.

In Mennesket og naturen, Hegge gives an ideal-typical presentation of one aspect of the development of the Western consciousness and our relation to nature from prehistory till modern times. The basic tenet of his book is a critique of the theory of the subjectivity of sense-qualities that he had earlier presented in Erkjennelse og virkelighet. In Mennesket og naturen he applies the epistemological analysis and shows how the theory of the subjectivity of the sense-qualities has serious consequence for nature, mainly because it reduces nature to be of a mechanistic character, where the primary qualities are what can be measured as waves or force, and the secondary qualities, such as tone, color, smell and so on are seen as merely subjective and not really real (cf. Hegge, 2003/1957, foreword). His presentation is therefore not a full picture of the development of Western history of ideas, but a small aspect, that despite this limited focus does highlight an important challenge in the current Western mindset and relation to nature. In this article there is no room to enter into the details of his presentation of this development. I will here only focus on the last part of his book, which deals with early modern to modern time.

Hegge pinpoints three main tendencies in our current relation to nature:
1. External oriented subjugation and exploitation of nature
2. A mechanistic view of nature
3. A natural scientific developed technology

These tendencies are based on a view of nature, where nature is seen as something “out there”, that is different from the nature we experience. The view can be summed up by the following quote:

Nature (the world) is in reality just a barren compilation of swirling atoms, with no purpose or meaning, and the human is merely a random product of a biological development explained in physical-chemical terms. (Hegge, 1978, p. 133)[5]

An important phrase in this quote is “in reality”. The reason Hegge is concerned with this phrase, is because it signifies a relation to the world with a strong polarity between human consciousness and the nature “out there”. This is most clearly seen in his explanation of how qualities such as color, heat, lights, sound has been reduced to abstract quantifiable concepts. To be able to measure these, they had to be explained in terms of an extension-and-movement language, such as waves and push. Furthermore, these quantifiable properties are now deemed the only true ways to attain knowledge of nature. The red we see is not really what we think it is, it is actually just waves. The really real world is understood as being toneless, colorless, tasteless and with no heat nor cold (Hegge, 1978, p. 128).

According to Hegge, such a view does not give us knowledge of nature as a whole. All we can know with such an epistemology is its mechanistic, quantifiable side, and this is how we view nature as the really real nature. In other words, we have created a “conceptual screen” that establishes a split with ourselves being “inside”, and nature, matter, being “outside”. The consequence of this conceptual screen is that we view nature and matter only on its surface, we never catch their depth (cf. Sugerman, 2008, p. 192). Thereby, the polarity seems as if it is a duality with two separate realities. What we can see, measure and touch are only an outside, and in these measurable quantities we can manipulate nature and secure our grasp (cf. Ibid, p. 193). This has, in a sense, made us see nature as a dead, mechanic world. And with such a view, nature is reduced to an object that we can manipulate for our benefit.

Hegge contends that this is the view that is spread through TV, radio, magazines, and in education and has therefore become a sort of “common property” (No: allemannseie) more or less consciously adopted. The image of nature often given here is one of a dead mechanism, which is something that we as humans cannot identify or feel at home in, and we thereby lose our connection with nature. This mechanistic view of nature is the decisive cause for the crisis we are facing today. Because, as we saw above, when nature is viewed as a dead mechanism it is easy to exploit it for our own benefits (Hegge, 1978, p. 133) And the more we know and understand of nature as a mechanism, the more we can manipulate it.

The practical consequences of this can be seen in the technological development, which the mechanized worldview goes hand in hand with. Here the main point is to manipulate and control nature to exploit it for our benefits (Hegge, 1978, p. 139). With the industrial revolution, this has reached a climax today, where manipulation is also seen as the only way to save us from the consequences of the Anthropocene.

However, it is vain to attempt solving the problems within this frame. We need to “break” with the epistemology where human consciousness and nature are seen as two dual realities, but instead see them as two poles of a polarity. This is the root of the problem with which we need to deal, if we are to make fundamental changes in our relation to nature, and not merely symptom-treat the problems. As Hegge shows, the fundamental problem is a relation of a polarity that has become so strong, that it seems unbridgeable, and where subject and object, human and nature, are seen as two different worlds – as a duality. What is needed is something that can reweave the self and the world around us, where our subjective experiences are not viewed as less real or unreal, but as real as the measurable world around us, and is experienced as a co-creative force with nature and the world; fusing subject and nature together in its creativity. In other words, we need an epistemology where the knowing human and the known world is reweaved, and thereby pave the way for a new relation to, and living in, nature and the world.

Imagination: bridging the gap in polarity

With imagination Coleridge felt he had found a way to “knit together again” subject and object, human and nature, and bridge the gap between the two; a gap that was strengthened with the mechanized worldview (Engell, 1981, p. 7).

To bridge the gap there needs, however, to be a congruence between the I and the other. This happens through self-consciousness. Here we have the identity of subject and object, where, as Sugerman says: “by virtue of the free act of the will of the self or subject “constructing itself objectively to itself”” (Sugerman, 2008, p. 197). This conception of self-consciousness can then be elevated up to the “eternal I AM”, where being and knowledge are absolutely identical (Ibid). On this basis we have the important foundation for seeing how imagination works in bridging the gap between the two polar opposites.

We will therefore now look more closely at Coleridge’s definition of imagination, and his distinction between the primary and the secondary imagination. The most famous expression of the difference between these two comes in chapter XIII of the Biographia Literaria:

I consider [imagination] either as primary, or secondary. The primary imagination I hold to be the living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. The secondary I consider as an echo of the former, coexisting with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead. (Coleridge, 2008/1817, p. 313).

On the one hand, the primary imagination is here described as a necessary “foundation” for our operation in life. It is the “faculty” through which we perceive the world around us. In this way it is passive. However, it is also a “power” of human perception – being a repetition of the “act of creation in the infinite I AM”. Therefore, it is also a generative and creative power, where the same law that created and is creative in nature is the same law with which we are created and being creative. Cheney describes the primary imagination as a “mostly involuntary productivity” – being that in which we are conscious of things (Cheney, 2020, p. 109). Engell interprets this as being basically a process of education, where one forms knowledge of nature and the symbols, terms, concepts etc. used in the world around one, which then become part of us, and our expressions and actions (Cf. Engell, 1981, p. 344-45). This process rests on a correspondence between the “inner” and the “outer”. For Coleridge, knowledge depends on noumenal forces that work within us as well as in all life (Sugerman, 2008, p. 200).

Coleridge defines the secondary imagination as an esemplastic power, that which shapes into one (coined by Coleridge from the Greek eis en plattein) (Coleridge, 2008/1817, p. 239). The secondary imagination is that through which a person, with their own volition, forms and fuses together the sense-impressions with (a universal) “truth” into one to create what he calls the third, the tertium aliquid. This, then, is the symbol where self and world interpenetrate (another word Coleridge coined). In other words, the secondary imagination is where we operate as individuals on a volitional level. As we can see in the quote above, this is where we not merely co-create, but re-create by dissolving, dissipating, and diffusing, to then put together again.

However, this does not mean that one should seek to express one’s personality. To confuse an individual’s personality with “the register of what is human” must be avoided (Engell, 1981, p. 348). The symbols are not to express a particular truth; instead, the symbols should point to universal truths. To achieve this is the sign of high poetry. This is something which Shakespeare is praised for by Coleridge. The ideal of unity is seen in Shakespeare’s characters where all genera are “intensely individualized” (Engell, 1981, p. 356).

A key in Coleridge’s philosophy lies in the definition of the primary imagination being a “living power and prime agent of human perception” and “repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation”. Since the secondary imagination springs from this, the sense-perceptions are important. Imagination should therefore be seen as both an active and a passive power that joins the world of self and world of nature. Hence, the poet creates symbols, which gives concrete form to ideas and passions, and connects these with the objects of nature – in other words: imagination elaborates essence into existence (Cheyne, 2020, p. 117) – as can also be seen in the last sentence of the long quote above: “It [secondary imagination] is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead” (Coleridge, 2008/1817, p. 313 – my italics). Coleridge hoped that imagination could be the cause of “a human reunion with nature and the source of the principles of the universe” (Cheyne, 2010, p. 41). In this way it would be the force that could bridge the gap between the world of nature and the world of consciousness.

According to this, artistic creativity would stem from inward movement, through the mode of operation of the imagination that fuses together subject and object. Through imagination the subjective pole of being and the objective pole of natural phenomena interpenetrate (Engell, 1981, p. 339), and the creative force of nature is experienced as the same as the creative impulse of man, creating an artwork pointing to universal truth. Art is here understood in a broad sense of “language, poetry, painting and the like, which are bridges thrown out toward an invisible shore and which bring new worlds into being”; as such art and creativity is a revelation (Sugerman, 2008, 200) – and not just something with which we solve problems. As Coleridge says:

Art itself might be defined, as of a middle nature between a Thought and a Thing, or, as before, the union and reconciliation of that which is Nature with that which is exclusively Human. (Coleridge, quoted in Cheney, 2022, p. 123)

An artwork created through the workings of imagination can therefore have a powerful effect on the experiencer of the artwork. Tolkien explores the effects of one type of created artwork, the literary genre of fantasy, the realm of Fäerie, which we will now investigate, to strengthen why we would need a focus on these in our educational system today, to counter the current trend towards increased unbalance in the polarity, and more thoroughly deal with the environmental and climate problems we face today.

Tolkien’s realm of Fäerie: renewing our relation to nature

The realm of Fäerie is created through a process of Sub-Creation, which is akin to imagination. Sub-Creation starts with our experiences of the world and through our senses. This Tolkien explains by looking at the importance of the “invention” of the adjective. If we take the adjective “green”, for example, coupled with the noun “grass”, then instead of seeing a thing which is “green-grass” we became, with the adjective, aware of green grass. This gives us the enchanter’s power to separate green from grass, yellow from sun, and instead produce a green sun, as the famous example from Tolkien goes (Tolkien, p. 41).

What is important to Tolkien, is that in making a green sun, one needs to make a world where a green sun is a believable reality. If not, one merely creates “fanciful” decoration (Tolkien, 2014/1947, p. 61 – he himself uses the term fanciful here). What is needed is to create a Secondary World that will command Secondary Belief in the reader – only in this way will one truly be a sub-creator. Making Sub-Creation is something that requires skills and labor (Ibid). Fantasy is the highest expression of Sub-Creation since it creates an “inner consistency of reality” in the work, which is the realm of Fäerie where this comes alive (Ibid, p. 59).

In a similar vein as Coleridge’s definition of imagination, we can also see in Tolkien a definition of Sub-Creation as a way of creating by the power which we are created. Of course, both being Christian thinkers, this is equated to God (Flieger, 2002, p. 41). However, this does not mean we have to be Christian thinkers ourselves to see the significance of the Sub-Creative act. What is important here is that we ourselves are part of a force with which we create, not only a product of it.

Fäerie, then, as much as being a creative artwork of a sub-creator, is also something which will have an effect in the readers of the Fäerie-story, and in such a way makes the readers themselves co-creators. These effects will according to Tolkien create a healthier relation to nature. The effects Tolkien discusses are fantasy, recovery, escape and consolation. Fantasy has already been mentioned, and good Fäerie creates good fantasy, that will lay the foundation for the other effects.

If we begin with recovery, we can read the following from his essay to his story The Smith of Wootton Major:

Faery represents at its weakest a breaking out (at least in mind) from the iron ring of the familiar, still more from the adamantine ring of belief that is known, possessed, controlled, and so all that is worth being considered […] More strongly it represents love: that is, a love and respect for all things, ‘inanimate’ and ‘animate’, an unpossessive love of them as ‘other’ … Things in this light will be respected, and they will also appear delightful, beautiful, wonderful even glorious. (Tolkien, 2015/1967, pp. 143-144).

The effect of recovery redirects our attention back to the Primary world. Through recovery from the secondary world of Fäerie we gain a renewed way of seeing and sensing this world here. This is “seeing things as we are meant to see them” – a way of seeing that purifies things from their “drab blur of triteness or familiarity – from possessiveness” (Tolkien, 2014/1947, p. 67). An important phrase here, is: “an unpossessive love of them [all things animate and inanimate] as ‘other’”. Not only is the unpossessive love important, but it is especially the word “other” that strikes us. The love for all things involves a change of view of them as not “its”, but “others”. This will then bring about respect, delight, beauty a.s.o in how they appear to us, and, I will add, in how we act and relate to them.

Recovery comes hand in hand with the escape from the “triteness of familiarity”. For Tolkien, escapism is not to be viewed as a negative thing. Like a prisoner wants to escape prison, so we would most likely want to escape the strait-jacket of modern industrial life, which he deems as ugly, empty and transitory. In comparison to this Fäerie is much realer in many ways. He argues against the notion of “real life” that this world and life we are currently living in is often defined in opposition to “escapist” fantasy. Furthermore, what Tolkien speaks of here, is an escape from separation from other creatures and nature as such. For Tolkien, that Fäerie consists of speaking trees and animals, is an expression of a desire to regain a connection once lost. The severance from nature he expresses as being a strange fate and guilt on us. Being a Christian thinker, he ties this to a desire to connect to life before the Fall (Tolkien, 2014/1947, p. 74)

The ephemeral nature of the modern, technological world, where items are replaceable and empty – soon new, much sooner obsolete on behalf of another item or upgrade – is therefore something one should try to escape from, in order to gain a deeper insight into eternal truths. The “eternalities of myth and Faerie, unreal though they may seem have outlasted, and will outlast improvements and artifacts of ever-changing technology” (Flieger, 2002, p. 26). This is how I interpret the effect of consolation; as we saw in the quote above; one sees nature and the world as an “other”, not an “it”. Something which we need to respect and not just manipulate. In this way we recover our relation to nature again, to a more healthy and equal relation.

However, a limitation of Tolkien is that the realm of Fäerie must be read; it has to be a literary, or narrative, artwork. For example, he argues against Drama as a literary genre, and as especially unfit for Fantasy (Tolkien, 2014/1947, p. 61). Despite the advancement of special effects that can dazzle the viewer in today’s movie theaters, the problem for Tolkien is that this will always just be beheld, not imagined. It is only when we imagine that the effects of Fäerie can be achieved. To imagine is to connect the specific with the general. Only when the readers themselves take part in the imaginative process, do they become co-creators. An example he gives is that when we read about a piece of bread, we add our own image to the text. The bread as concept and the particular bread we picture is, then, a fusion of the universal with the particular. When we behold a work of fantasy redone as a movie, we will see a particular bread on the screen, and not add anything ourselves. This mundane example shows the power and importance of nurturing imagination and fantasy as a reader and, hence, co-creator (Tolkien, 2014/1947, p. 63).

For Tolkien, then, language has the “power” to create a fantasy realm, Fäerie, and words can “modify perception, thus stimulating the imagination that uses it” (Flieger, 2002, p. 40). Therefore, language has enchanting powers in the right hands, and can therefore have powerful effects on the reader of a fantastic piece of literature.

One can analyze forth a similar power in the purpose of poetic activity and the creation of the symbol that we saw above with Coleridge, where universal truths are communicated, elaborated, into the created work. One could say, with inspiration from Sugerman’s essay on Coleridge and the imagination, that through these artworks one establishes an equal existence of another, the object, as an “other”. With this is meant, according to her, a recognizing of the “independent existence of another by rejecting sameness and affirming equality” (Sugerman, 2008, p. 196). Thereby some of the effects of artworks in general are present also in artworks beheld, not just read.

From this, we can point out some important paths for educational settings in response to the crisis of the Anthropocene. Instead of nurturing automatons and skilled laborers, we can also balance this out with nurturing co-creative humans where manipulation of nature as an object has been transformed to a creative activity in relation to an other.

Imagination and Fäerie in education

The intention here is not to reduce the importance and necessities of the STEM-courses. The intention is to show why we need a balance in the educational setting, that will give room for nurturing faculties that will eventually make possible a different relation to nature altogether. The focus on sustainability and STEM-courses can go a long way in reducing the speed of escalation of the problems. The problem, though, is that the epistemological framework this focus functions within reduces nature to an “it”; being something for our benefit, and therefore it can be questioned if working within this framework will fundamentally be enough.

Although it can seem as if one needs to have a high level of poetic talent to be able to experience the workings of imaginations, we can, first of all, be reminded that we do not all of us have to create a realm of Fäerie. As we saw with Tolkien, reading it is enough to gain the effects. Furthermore, it is possible for all people, not only poets, to experience the creative process, at least as co-creators, even in what Coleridge calls secondary imagination. This is because the process of creation itself is of importance. Here on can experience the creative force within oneself, although one does not necessarily have high poetic skills. Instead of performing a mere utilitarian, mechanistic manipulation of nature, we need to develop an attitude of aesthetic shaping of nature, nurtured by respect due to an awareness of us and nature being part of the same creative force.

Therefore, the theory of Imagination as analyzed through Coleridge and Tolkien gives an interesting alternative to reconsider and develop our relation to nature and the world in an educational setting. Consequentially, it is important to have a more balanced focus on the different courses. In the last many years, artistic courses like arts and handicraft have been prioritized away. Furthermore, the aspect of literature and artworks in courses like English and Norwegian has been reduced for the sake of more skills-focused education. If we remember the public Norwegian document, the focus and intention behind the reform was to create employable workers for a competitive Norway. In this document, creativity is also reduced to being merely about solving problems. This is not unnecessary or unimportant, but the focus severely limits our potential for creative development of human-nature relations.

If the school is to be an arena to develop full human beings, and not just workers or resources, and properly answer to the crisis facing us today, it is necessary to have courses and elements in where students can develop their imaginative faculties. This should be prioritized as much as STEM-courses and problem-solving skills. Giving room for students both to read literature of the fantasy-genre, poetry, but also to experience the process of creating other types of artworks, or even to delve into RPGs like Paulsen and Mosberg encourages, will nurture their imaginative faculties, and open up for an experience of creativity larger than the mere particular self-expression. In this way creativity is seen as something much more than merely solving problems – it is a way to co-create with and as nature, and through this create a newness through the artwork. And through this, we can experience, as Tolkien says of the effects of Fäerie: a breaking out of the strait-jacket of the modern, ephemeral technological life and see deeper truths, which will reconnect us, as subjects, with nature again – where both we and nature are seen as equally real, and equally important.

Conclusion

This article has hoped to show that the current focus in education, with Norway as an example, is not enough to fundamentally deal with the problems facing us today. An alternative approach to the current educational focus is of the essence if we are to respond to the problems we face at a more fundamental level. Considering the depth and width of both Coleridge and Tolkien, this has merely been a “teaser” for how such an approach may look.

As much as the educational reform has good intentions in meeting these issues, we see how its focus severely limits human potential and creativity to be merely about solving problems and working. The reason for this is a limited epistemological framework, that reduces nature to the surface-values of measurability and quantifiability, completely ignoring the reality of the subjective experiences of nature and the world, which was shown through Hegge’s diagnosis. Fundamentally, the problem is that one pole in the polarity has dominated, rendering the nature out there as an objective “it”. Not an other.

A response to this can lie in imagination as a working, creative force through human consciousness, where subject and object are fused together through a creative act, creating a symbol that discloses a deep co-existence between the two – where self and other are seen as equal and of equal importance in the experience of reality. Both the created artwork and the process shows us how it is possible to nurture this in students (and people in general), and that one does not necessarily need poetic or creative talent to change one’s relation to nature and its creative force. This, then, can hopefully lead to a change in consciousness through changing epistemological framework, that will make us not manipulate nature, but nurture nature and our relation to it as an other in aesthetic co-creative and re-creative shaping of nature.

To give room to nurture this in schools is essential if we are fundamentally to respond to the issues we are facing in the Anthropocene age. To continue with a view of nature as an “it” that we can manipulate with, however “gentle” form this takes, will not ultimately change much, it will just be treating the symptoms. What is needed is a renewed view of human-nature relation that the theories of imagination as analyzed above can provide.

Endnotes

[1] I refer you to Friberg’s article in the current volume for a discussion of the problems of using this term.

[2] Other representatives taking a critical stand towards positivism in this strife was Hegge’s teacher, the famous eco-sophist Arne Næss, and the philosopher Hans Skjervheim. The latter wrote from a more social-oriented philosophy, whereas Næss and Hegge are more environmental-philosophers.

[3] The concept of imagination is a wide and complicated concept with a long history of ideas. It should therefore be known that I here only explore one minor aspect of it, relevant for the focus of this article. Other important writers just from the romantic period alone could be Schelling, Goethe, Shelley, Keats and so on. As important as these are these will all need their own articles at another time. Furthermore, as much as imagination here is discussed as a positive faculty, it must not be forgotten that almost all the writers on the imagination also warns about the dangers of imagination (cf. Engell, 1981, pp. 282-283). Imagination is a massive force, that can, if not nurtured properly, be overwhelming and destructive. A most prime example here would be the writings of Edgar Allan Poe, who shows how imagination driven by dark forces can lead to madness and downfall.

[4] These are just some examples of how the ideology of reform restrict the possibility for the development of full human beings, and a necessary change in relation to nature. There are other examples of this, also in the documents that followed this first one from 2015. However, these examples are representative of the basic thrust the reform takes us in. For a further discussion of these issues and a more thorough analysis I refer you to the article “The Purpose of Education and the Future of Bildung” by Hanne Riese and Line Hilt (2022).

[5] Norwegian: “Naturen (verden) er i virkeligheten en blott og bar ansamling av hvirvlende atomer, uten mål og mening, og mennesket i siste instans et tilfeldig produkt av en biologisk utvikling, forklart fysisk-kjemisk”

Literature

Cheyne, P. (2010). “The Coleridgean Imagination: its Role in Thought and its Relation to Reason”. In Comparative culture, the journal of Miyazaki International College, vol. 15, pp. 39-62. Miyazaki International College. Retrieved, 17.5, 2024 from: https://meilib.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/116

Cheyne, P. (2020). Coleridge’s Contemplative Philosophy. Oxford University Press.

Coleridge, S. T. (2008/1815-17). Biographia Literaria. In “Samuel Taylor Coleridge: The Major Works including Biographia Literaria”, pp. 155-482. Oxford University Press.

Engell, J. (1981). The Creative Imagination: Enlightenment to Romanticism. Harvard University press.

Flieger, V. (2002). Splintered Lights: Logos and Language in Tolkien’s World. The Kent State University Press.

Hegge, H. (2003/1957). Erkjennelse og virkelighet: Et bidrag til kritikk av teorien om sansekvalitetenes subjektivitet; Ny utgave med et tillegg om reduksjonisme og atomisme i vår tids vitenskap. Antropos.

Hegge, H. (1978). Mennesket og naturen: Naturforståelsen gjennom tidene – med særlig henblikk på vår tids miljøkrise. Universitetsforlaget.

MOE (2015). Fremtidens skole. Fornyelse av fag og kompetanser. Ludvigsenutvalget (2015:8) [The School of the Future. Renewal of Subjects and Competences]. Oslo: Ministry of Education and Research.

Riese, H. and Hilt, L. (2022). “The purpose of education and the future of Bildung”, in Karen Bjerg Petersen et al. (eds) Rethinking Education in Light of Global Challenges: Scandinavian Perspectives on Culture, Society and the Anthropocene, pp. 97-111. Routledge

Sugerman, S. (2008). “An “Essay” on Coleridge on Imagination”. In Shirley Sugerman (ed.) Evolution of Consciousness: Studies in Polarity, pp. 191-201. The Barfield Press.

Tolkien, J. R. R. (2014/1947). On Fairy-Stories. Harper Collins Publishers.

Tolkien, J. R. R. (2015/1967). The Smith of Wootton Major. Harper Collins Publishers.

Deweyan Democracy: The Epistemic Context

Conference proceedings (double non-blind peer review), , , ,

Dewey’s characterizations of democratic conduct show that he thinks of it as involving a give and take. One’s contribution (according to ability) creates a claim (according to need). The individual has duty to his or her community (or society) and society has corresponding duties toward him or her. The mutual dependence of individual and society is the dynamic that generates values. Intellectual freedom, cultural and intellectual diversity, growth and participation are examples of central values made possible by the democratic dynamic. Democracy for Dewey is thus primary: It is an ideal because of the conditions for value formation that it creates. Other values are then (or can be) derived from the democratic ideal.

It is in this complex sense that Deweyan democracy is a “way of life.” The claim is not that democracy is just one of many possible choices of a way to organize society or a way to live. It is in Dewey’s view the only possible framework for the ever-increasing intricacies of the modern world.

There are two ways to explore the conception of democracy sketched here. One is a thorough exegesis of Dewey’s works to investigate whether this characterization of his view makes sense – to check its correctness. Another is to look beyond Dewey and see whether the approach to democracy so inspired by his philosophy is a good approach to democratic theory, if the goal is to seek a useful justification of democracy. In this paper I am interested in doing the latter. In what follows I will attempt to show that “Deweyan democracy”—i.e. the idea of democracy as a way of life—offers interpretive possibilities that help understand how we can both have a substantive notion of democracy and put it in a justificatory framework where rejecting it is certainly possible, but fails to make sense unless, before rejecting it, one is prepared to accept it, in which case rejection, of course, does not make sense.

 

I

The democratic ideal—democracy as a way of life—looks like a moral concept. It has, obviously, a moral side to it in the sense of presenting a morally superior way of organizing social life (to use Deweyan vocabulary) to other available ways of doing so. But it is a mistake to overemphasize this moral side of the concept (although a frequently to be seen in comments on Dewey’s philosophy). The moral side in my view is less important than the epistemic side of Deweyan democracy. Democracy as a way of life provides the environment that protects and fosters science or, more generally, inquiry. The reason is proximity in method: In a democratic arrangement moral and political problems get a treatment similar or even analogous to what scientific method would dictate for inquiry. One must be careful not to take the analogy too far however. It does not mean that the method of science should be used to solve moral issues, but it is a recipe for moral cognitivism. Moral as well as political problems should be approached by reason and argument: Democracy is the intellectual environment that fosters reason and argument.

One should also follow Dewey in drawing a distinction between the idea of democracy and the manifestations of democracy (Dewey 1954, p. 143-144). The forms of power associated with democracy, such as representative government, majority rule, parliaments, elections etc. are no necessary features of democracy. Democracy is thus characterized by its ends rather than by the specific means that have traditionally been used to reach them.

Deweyan democracy has evoked considerable discussion in recent years. Many philosophers, who are generally sympathetic to Dewey, have been skeptical about his democratic theory and some have rejected it outright. Robert Talisse has argued that if democracy is a moral ideal it must be treated as other (possibly competing) ideals and values, from the point of view of value pluralism. Talisse correctly points out that from this perspective one cannot think of it as a shared or basic value, it would only amount to a moral value which could certainly be chosen or desired by any reasonable person, but could equally well be “reasonable rejected” by anyone adhering to different values (Talisse 2012, p. 109). For Talisse, Deweyan democracy fails the “pluralism test.” He argues that Deweyan democracy is simply one version of perfectionism because of the emphasis on human flourishing that it entails. In other words, if we read Deweyan democracy from the point of view of a Rawlsian conception of liberalism, the democratic ideal turns out to be just one more “comprehensive doctrine” which can never serve as a basis for a political organization acceptable to all reasonable persons (Talisse 2012, p. 112-114).

Matthew Festenstein points out—contra Talisse—that the notion of reasonable rejectability is not the kind of constraint that the pragmatist (i.e. the Deweyan) could accept. Since it only proposes a fixed standard to adopt or reject basic values it amounts to an a priori evaluation, which is not very useful from a pragmatist point of view. While Festenstein recognizes that one can reasonably reject the democratic ideal that, in his view, does not exclude it from being a possible “basis for the justification of state power.” It is difficult to see, however, what is gained by his result, since relativizing the democratic ideal does not remove Talisse’s objection, it only refocuses the difficulty (Festenstein 2010, p. 42).

Eric MacGilvray picks a useful element out of Deweyan democracy when he argues that it provides a kind of a test, similar to the pragmatic maxim, to determine whether one or another belief is fit for public discussion. It means that holding—and promoting—a belief about how to justify state power e.g., requires willingness to present it in experimental terms. The threshold for access to discussion about basic values for the social contract need in his view not be higher than that. If a belief can be tested and discussed experimentally—it would not have to be experimentally tested—and its meaning (conceivable consequences) for society can thus be assessed and discussed, there is no way to say that it is unfit for providing a justification of state power (MacGilvray 2004, p. 163-167; see also Festenstein 2010, p. 33). While MacGilvray provides a more interesting way of filtering issues fit for public (and political) discussion, his argument is no direct counterargument to Talisse’s. He carves out a role for Deweyan democracy, i.e. to offer a framework for determining the democratic meaningfulness of beliefs. While I think this is an interesting and in fact very useful and practical way of using the idea of Deweyan democracy, it limits it to a methodological tool.

Other authors such as Elizabeth Anderson have praised Dewey’s experimentalist account of democracy and yet other, such as Cheryl Misak, suggest that by using the more rigorous Peircean approach to inquiry as a model for understanding Deweyan democracy, one can exploit the inquiry/democracy analogy and apply methods of inquiry to the search for common solutions to social, political and even moral problems (Anderson 2006, p. 14-15; Misak 2000, see p. 45-47).

II

The question still remains whether and why Deweyan democracy should be chosen as an ideal, what kind of choice that would be, and what one has so chosen. I think this choice must be seen as a result of two related beliefs:

  1. Value articulation: The choice of democracy as a way of life implies accepting the claim that democracy is a necessary condition for articulating central activities, goods and values in community such as freedom and equality, education, public discussion, openness and opportunity.
  2. Opportunity creation: Democracy is a better way to create opportunities for inquiry, experimentation and in general solve problems using best available means and methods than other models of social organization.

If these beliefs can be sustained, one could see democracy as a prism through which certain values become articulated rather than itself a simple or core value. To reject democracy is therefore to refocus or rearrange social or moral values. If a democratic approach is not seen as basic, values such as the ones already mentioned, as well as many other central values of modern society such as pluralism, toleration and participation loose the meaning that democracy as a way of life gives them. Democracy thus should be chosen as “a way of life” in the sense of a principle of articulation and arrangement.

I depart from the authors I have mentioned in this paper since I want to show that the best argument for democracy comes neither from the independent standard that a Peircean model might create, nor from the experimentalist vision that it entails. The public action test does not per se provide an argument for democracy it only explains how we can make a useful distinction between issues that properly belong to public discussion and those that don’t. One might simply argue, of course, that there is no alternative. In a very practical way democracy is accepted as the only viable kind of social and political arrangement in modern society. The superficial acceptance of democracy does not mean that democracy is ideally practiced (or even practiced at all) in every case. It only reveals the dominance of the discourse of democracy.

There are however alternatives to democracy, some of them quite powerful. Sometimes these alternatives are presented as the necessary basis of democracy and there are social forces that promote them as necessary restrictions of democracy, since without certain restrictions democracy could lead to undesirable results.

As Bo Rothstein has shown, the correlation between democracy and good life is not always in democracy’s favor (Rothstein 2013, p. 15). Many surveys show it to be negative over a range of accepted indicators measuring quality of life. Good governance seems, on the other hand, to be strongly correlated to success in improving the lives of citizens, and increased democracy may lead to deterioration in governance. The alternative to democracy might thus be efficiency and justice in the design of institutions, as well as basic liberties that promote equality and individual freedom in accordance with liberal principles. It is clear in any case that if increased democracy is shown to go against improving the quality of life for citizens that indeed would deliver a strong argument against democracy.[1]

My contention is that by “choosing democracy” one is not choosing a particular method or procedure for a specific kind of decision-making but rather a general framework for public choice and deliberation. One could see such democratic commitment as a moral commitment. In such a case one would argue that the fairness of democratic approaches should commit one to them, even in cases when certain problems might seem better solved using a different approach. But the commitment is clearly epistemic as well: If there is an approach to problem solving best described as democratic to which one is committed, then one is also committed to the limitations of the approach. While Dewey seems not very keen on providing a moral justification for choosing democracy, he seriously attempts to provide an epistemic justification, i.e. argue that democracy will, in the long run, provide a better environment, better tools and on the whole better approaches to problem solving than other conceivable (or available) approaches.

From the Deweyan point of view the epistemic commitment must therefore be seen as prior to the moral commitment. It means that democracy should be seen as a way of dealing with and solving problems. It would not do to argue simply that democracy somehow ensures that the best methods are used or that solving problems democratically will always yield the best solutions. What it does mean is to take seriously the duty to seek not only solutions that can be had by majority decision or solutions that can be forged by negotiation and compromise but to seek the best solutions. If “real” democracy often (even most of the time) falls short of the democratic ideal, this does not make the idea of democracy any less clear. Quite the contrary, since it is the idea by which political decisions should be elucidated and criticized.

 

III

In the last part of the paper I want to sketch how I think that the idea of Deweyan democracy should be used to discuss and judge political and administrative practice. The objective is on the one hand to see how democratic practice falls short of an ideal of democracy (or not), on the other to provide a healthy angle of democratic criticism. Dewey’s emphasis on experimentation in connection with democracy, i.e. seeing democracy as the free exchange and discussion of ideas where the point is to have a generation and selection process based on making full use of “intelligence” is key to understanding this conception of democracy (Dewey 1985, p. 362). This means that in democracy as a way of life, individual contribution to decision and policy-making is matched with (conceivable) individual influence on decisions and policy.

In addition to the two basic democratic beliefs—that it is a framework for value articulation and opportunity creation—one should think of two central conditions of democracy:

  1. The efficiency condition: For each participating individual success does not necessarily entail being able to convince others of one’s point of view or being in the majority but on the efficiency of democratic process. Success is to be a part of a conclusion based on discussion, fact-finding, deliberation, debate and eventually (perhaps) voting that harvests the input of the participants.
  2. The integrity condition: A decision made, or policy adopted, must be a result of what has been democratically concluded. If the logical space of decision-making is different from the logical space of reason-giving, the procedure used is meaningless.

The efficiency condition deals with the ability of a group to come to a conclusion and the integrity condition with the relation between that conclusion and an eventual decision or action. Democratic failures may appear in both parts undermining either grounds for policies or legitimacy of decisions. The work of parliaments often evokes suspicion about the integrity of the democratic process when the connection between arguments and information revealed in deliberation and the eventual decision seems vague or absent; when positions are known in advance, more or less, and the debate carries only a symbolic function.

The give and take mentioned earlier need not be understood as individual willingness or commitment to participate in public debates or policy-making and therefore the efficiency condition does not depend on actual participation. Instead of seeking a standard to determine the content of public reason, one should seek a framework to connect participation and policy. The point should be access rather than inclusion, where the possibility of participating, not only in exercising free speech, but in actually providing input into policy, is at stake. The problem with participatory approaches taken by governments is often their reluctance to acknowledge the importance of public participation seeing it rather as a possible hurdle in successful governing. Therefore there is tendency to both limit the power of extra-institutional participation and place all kinds of security valves on the possible decisions to be reached by such extra-institutional participants. To illustrate this and at the same time probe the conditions of democracy and the basic democratic beliefs, I want to discuss four recent examples from Icelandic politics:

  1. National assemblies 2009 and 2010
  2. Annulment of the elections to the constitutional assembly 2011
  3. The first Icesave referendum 2011
  4. National referendum on the constitutional bill 2012

After the financial collapse in Iceland in 2008 there was considerable pressure on the government to use unorthodox methods to change the course in Icelandic politics and promote democracy. The first attempt to create a public voice in order to influence policy systematically was made by an independent group of people who formed an NGO called “The Anthill”. The Anthill organized a so-called National Assembly (Icel. Þjóðfundur) whose purpose was to articulate basic values and general policy goals for Icelandic society (Gunnar Hersveinn 2010). The National Assembly consisted of over one thousand people, a random sample from the general population, who were asked to participate in a meeting held in one day, 14 November 2009. The Anthill then planned to have the government accept the results of the assembly as guiding principles in the political renewal ahead.[2] Although it turned out to be problematic to simply adopt the results of the National Assembly and include them in the various tasks of the government, these results were taken seriously. The government adopted the methodology used in organizing National assemblies for public consultation regionally and nationally. In 2010 the Constitutional commission, whose task was to prepare for the Constitutional assembly, held a second National assembly elected in 2010 in order to revise or rewrite the Icelandic constitution.

There were several problems in the selection of participants for the National assemblies, which strictly speaking make it difficult to talk of participants as random samples of the population. Some other organizational problems have also reduced value of the results, but here I will focus on something else.

The task of the first National assembly was to articulate core values to guide governmental policy. The task of the second was to identify the core values to guide the revision of the constitution.[3] In both cases a number of general policy statements were also generated by participants to further identify policy goals. The problem with these results was their generality. The meetings neither provided priority rankings for goals nor any interpretation of value commitments and therefore policy-makers could hardly use them to plan policy. Therefore, even if the meetings were admirable exercises of public participation and engaged all kinds of people in thinking and talking about political issues—many had perhaps never been consulted except by occasional opinion polls—their overall usefulness was difficult to see. These meetings may have carried some meaning for participants who saw certain general value commitments articulated in a dramatic way as a result of the one-day meeting. They could however hardly have seen it as an opportunity for inquiry since the meeting was not deliberative. Its purpose was to express rather than critically engage the views of the participants. The assembly also fails both the efficiency and the integrity condition. The lack of systematic discussion created a gap between whatever was said during the meeting and the results published after the meeting. No problem was dealt with during the meeting and therefore nothing can be said about efficiency in doing so. Worse since the results were overly vague, it was difficult to see how the integrity condition could be fulfilled either. The relation between these results and eventual decision-making could not be spelled out. From the perspective of Deweyan democracy one could then say that the meetings were democratically meaningless, since while it allowed symbolic participation, it could not effect policy- or decision-making in any meaningful way.

Elections to the Constitutional assembly were held 25 November 2010. A large number of candidates ran for a place in the assembly – 525 competed for 25 seats. The elections were unusual in many ways. The government was criticized during and after the elections for many flaws in how the elections were conducted. There were certain problems with the design of the ballot, the ballot boxes, the voting booths and some of the procedures used. After the elections a group of citizens complained to the Supreme Court who then reviewed the elections and found it to be flawed in six respects. Although the flaws were technical and gave no reason to conclude that the elections had been rigged or the vote misrepresented, the Supreme court used its authority to annul the elections.

One might argue that a decision, made by a judicial body such as the Supreme Court, should not be evaluated in terms of democracy since it is based on the law and on judicial authority. It was clear however, that having pointed out certain flaws in the way the elections were conducted, the Supreme Court had a choice to annul or not annul the elections. Since the results were not in dispute, the Court had no democratic reason to annul, i.e. doing so did not serve to ensure that the democratic will of the electorate was protected, in fact the will of the voters was in this respect not considered to be the most important issue. The decision was thus undemocratic and one could even argue that it was anti-democratic, or, in other words, an attempt to put an end to a democratic process, rather than facilitate it.

From the point of view of Deweyan democracy one should argue that the Supreme Court had a duty to point out the flaws in the elections but also to base its decision on a commitment to serve democracy. As was later pointed out by critics of the decision, it is not in accordance with the rule of law that a judicial body may decide to annul a democratic election conducted legally, without significant failures and whose results clearly express the will of the electorate.[4] Here a commitment to democracy should have guided the Supreme Court. It is an epistemic commitment in the sense that the will of the people was known, it is also a moral commitment since serving democracy will then be seen as a more important value than technical perfection in the conduct of elections.

One of the bitterest issues debated in Iceland after the collapse of Iceland’s international banks, was the so-called Icesave case. Landsbankinn, one of the three big banks that collapsed in October 2008, had in 2007 started individual savings accounts in Britain and Holland that were quite lucrative for private savers. When Landsbankinn’s foreign operations were separated from its Icelandic operations and declared bankrupt, thousands of people lost their savings but were partially compensated by the British and Dutch governments in accordance with the European banking insurance policy. The British and the Dutch claimed that the Icelandic government was liable to pay the compensation and so they demanded to get back the amount paid to the individual savers. The Icelandic government to begin with accepted its responsibility and an agreement was negotiated. When the agreement was put to the parliament for ratification, a huge controversy ensued. Although the agreement was passed in the parliament it was clear that it created much anger among voters, who felt the Icelandic nation was being forced to pay debts created by irresponsible bank managers. The Icelandic president intervened by refusing to sign into law the bill on the agreement passed by the parliament, after having received petitions to do so from thousands of Icelandic citizens.

The Icelandic constitution stipulates that if the president refuses to sign a law, it must be put to a national referendum. As the referendum was being prepared, however, the government entered into new negotiations with the British and the Dutch. When the referendum on whether to accept the agreement passed by the parliament or reject it was conducted, the agreement was no longer relevant. It made therefore no difference whether the voters accepted or rejected the agreement since the government already had an offer that was clearly better for the Icelanders than the one they were voting on, even if not a formal signed offer or agreement. The referendum was therefore meaningless, and no democratic purpose in conducting it. One might argue that from some formalistic perspective it was unavoidable to conduct the referendum since it had already been scheduled. Parliament could however also have revoked the bill. The question here should be what would be more democratic to hold the referendum or abandon it. From the perspective of Deweyan democracy a referendum that fails to give a meaningful result—whatever the result—is not democratic. Other approaches might yield positions such as that holding the referendum is harmless; anyone who fails to see the point in participating could refrain from doing so, and so on. But it seems to me that if there is no problem–solving purpose in holding the referendum, and the whole point of doing it has become secondary, i.e. declaring support for (or opposition to) the government it has lost its democratic legitimacy. Whatever purpose there may be in participating (or not participating) it is different from the question being voted on.

Finally I want to discuss the national referendum on the constitutional bill submitted by the Constitutional Council.[5] The bill was submitted in the summer of 2011 and was meant to be passed before the end of the term in the spring of 2013. In October 2012 a consultatory referendum was held on the bill and at the same time participants were asked to express their view on six key questions on the content of the new constitution. While expressing support or opposition to the bill itself was relatively straightforward and yielded clear results (around two thirds were in favor of the bill, 50% of the electorate participated), the questions were vague and the results therefore begged the question. I will not go into detail in describing the various questions or the problems the evoked. It will suffice to take one example. One of the questions had to do with the national church. Iceland has not taken the step to separate the national church from the state. The current Icelandic constitution says that the state must “support and protect” the Evangelical Lutheran Church.[6] The question in the referendum was whether the voter thought that the new constitution should have a clause dealing with the national church. It did not ask what (if anything) the voter thought the constitution should say about the National church. Since (to many people’s surprise) the result was that the majority wanted there to be something on the church in the constitution, it was unclear how to interpret the will of the voters in that respect.

Again, from the point of view of some democratic theories this flaw in the referendum might not be taken to mean that it was undemocratic, but from a Deweyan perspective one would be able to conclude that since the result was democratically meaningless the referendum did not fulfill the epistemic conditions of democracy. The answer to the question made problem-solving more, rather than less, difficult, and the referendum therefore was meaningless for democratic problem solving.

Conclusion

Dewey’s discussion of democracy and the framework referred to as Deweyan democracy makes sense of a democratic commitment according to which we can assess democratic initiatives and results from an epistemic and moral point of view. The epistemic commitment is prior to the moral commitment since in many cases the moral commitment is a result of the epistemic commitment. Once democracy as a way of life is understood in this context, there is no need to fear that a democratic commitment amounts to committing oneself to a comprehensive doctrine such as an ideology or a religious belief. It is simply to make demands not only about democratic procedure, participation or deliberation but also in regard to the results of democratic decision- and policy-making.

References

Anderson, Elizabeth. “The Epistemology of Democracy.” Episteme (2006).

Dewey, John. Democracy and Education. New York: Free Press, 1966.

—. Reconstruction in Philosophy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957.

—. The Public and Its Problems. Athens: Swallow Press – Ohio University Press, 1954.

Festenstein, Matthew. “Pragmatism, Inquiry and Political Liberalism.” Contemporary Political Theory 9.1 (2010): 25–44.

MacGilvray, Eric A. Reconstructing Public Reason. Harvard University Press, 2004.

Misak, Cheryl J. Truth, Politics, Morality. Routledge, 2000.

Talisse, Robert B. “Can Democracy Be a Way of Life? Deweyan Democracy and the Problem of Pluralism.” Transactions of the Charles Peirce Society XXXIX.1-21 (2003).

—. Pluralism and Liberal Politics. New York: Routledge, 2012.

Endnotes


1 The terms democracy and governance are sometimes conflated. In his introduction to a collection of papers on democracy, Giorgio Agamben maintains that “the word democracy is used in most cases to refer to a technique of governing” (Agamben 2011, p. 1). While it is probably true that the term democracy is often used inaccurately, the distinction between governance and democracy is quite clear. Agamben probably overstates the confusion. There is however a tendency to describe administrative restrictions of democracy as part of a democratic framework.

2 The website created for the 2009 National assembly only has information in Icelandic. See thjodfundur2009.is. In the Q and A section of the page it is stated that the goal of the assembly is to create “a strong common vision” for the nation which will help “solve difficult and complicated problems”. In another section the intention to present them to the government with, as well as to institutions and associations whose role it will be to contribute to the recovery of the country after the crisis.

3 The National assembly (also referred to as National forum and National gathering) is described on its website, also available in English. See http://www.thjodfundur2010.is/english/ n.d.)

4 Reynir Axelsson, Athugasemdir við ákvörðun Hæstaréttar um ógildingu kosningar til stjórnlagaþings. Published 23 February 2011 at stjornarskrarfelagid.is.

5 The Constitutional Council was appointed by parliament after the nullification of the elections to the Constitutional Assembly. All 25 elected Assembly members were appointed except on who decided not to participate in the appointed body.

6 Constitution of the Republic of Iceland, Article 62. See: http://www.government.is/constitution/.

Francesco Giacomantonio, Minima cura. Lunario del filosofo sociale (Rome: Aracne, 2008)

Book review (editorial review), , , ,

Modernity has never been easy. In its early stages, it had to fight gruesome battles against the feudal order. In its successive stages, it has had to fight against itself. Liberty—the elusive aim and defining character of modernity—liberated an array of novel individual and collective dimensions of existence, many of which have proved to be rather unpleasant. Scores of Western intellectuals have acknowledged modernity’s unpleasantness by scores of different names: anomie, alienation, absence of recognition, ennui, blasé attitude, inauthentic life, relativism, ejection, meaninglessness, etc. Giacomantonio dubs it “existential uneasiness” (15).

By demolishing the mythical totems of all previous systems and augmenting the individual’s perceived opportunities for choice and self-definition, the modern person has had to face a greater degree of uncertainty and responsibility vis-à-vis her life. At the same time, the modern person has felt threatened and even dwarfed by the broader, cosmopolitan reality of the new global order unleashed by countless and never fully successful revolutions: English, French, Russian, industrial, sexual, dot com. In other terms, modernity has advanced in two contradictory directions. On the one hand, it has increased the felt scope of individual self-determination. On the other hand, it has diminished the actual importance of the choices we make. Ironically, as Giacomantonio states, “the factors whereby individualisation is accomplished produce standardisation” (23).

Post- or late-modern consumer society is, in this sense, most representative and unsettling. Then, it is exactly the section of modern Western history that Giacomantonio focuses upon in the first part of the book. Specifically, by means of a comprehensive overview of philosophical and sociological critiques of modernity as well as of post- or late-modernity, Giacomantonio endeavours to show how “the I and personhood” are seen no longer as expressions of “linearity, univocity, precise identity, autonomy” (18). Rather, “the individual… perceives her own identity as pulverised, fragmented, troubled, isolated” (18) and condemned to bleak “anonymity” by the affirmation of the impersonal structures of “bureaucracy” (20) and “technological production” (21) in “all the traditionally most relevant sectors of social existence: work, education, communication, emotional ties” (21). The modern person is claimed to be forced by “the society of risk” (24) to strive endlessly for an eventually ungraspable “control” over her own “disenfranchised” and “disenchanted” condition (24). Frustration and a quasi- yet not always pathological “existential uneasiness” cannot but be commonplace.

Nevertheless, Giacomantonio wishes to cure the modern malaise, even if only to a limited extent, as the title of his book suggests. The medicine he decides to employ is a mixture of Wissenssoziologie, critical theory and post-structuralism. The first ingredient should help the modern individual to realise that the social and ideological structures that surround her are not at all natural and inevitable. The second ingredient should lead the modern individual to “act”, whether to accept or deny her “collocation” within society, the contingency of which she now recognises (31). The third ingredient should make the modern individual understand that her self-perception qua individual is itself part of the problem, insofar as modern society has created a certain type of individuality, which is said to be free while is in fact “enslaved to one’s own desires” (39). Eventually, if the medicine takes effect, “social philosophy” should enable the modern individual “to find herself and deal with the world, even the post-modern, unequal, pulverising and precarious world of the 21st century” (49).

In this perspective, the second part of Giacomantonio’s book offers a rich, diverse array of applications of his proposed medicine. Fields of individual and collective existence as mutually remote as religious belief, football, international law, welfare policies, fast love and spoiled teenagers are discussed in the light of explanatory and hermeneutical criteria derived from the three “ingredients” mentioned above. The outcome of these applications should be a deeper, wiser, healthier understanding of contemporary society and of one’s own place within it. And this is probably the outcome that the author must have experienced himself when confronting post- or late-modern phenomena with his armoury of socio-theoretical notions. Will the same outcome be available to anyone reading Giacomantonio’s book? This is an empirical question, to which each individual reader is bound to answer for herself.