{"id":48,"date":"2010-02-28T23:57:13","date_gmt":"2010-02-28T23:57:13","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/?p=48"},"modified":"2016-03-30T10:44:30","modified_gmt":"2016-03-30T10:44:30","slug":"the-transcendental-character-of-money-an-exposition-of-marxs-argument-in-the-grundrisse","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/05-1\/reflection-on-the-economic-crisis\/the-transcendental-character-of-money-an-exposition-of-marxs-argument-in-the-grundrisse\/","title":{"rendered":"The Transcendental Character of Money: An Exposition of Marx’s Argument in the Grundrisse"},"content":{"rendered":"\n\n\n\t
\n\n\t\t<\/i><\/span> <\/a>\n\n\t<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n

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Introduction<\/h3>\n
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The recent economic crisis has certainly raised a number of questions about the conception of free markets and the neoconservative economic theories on which the capitalist nations have relied. Free marketeers like former Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, have acknowledged that unregulated markets have enormous costs and in the end could be damaging to the welfare of our citizens, the financial health of our economic institutions, and to the fiscal strength of our nation states.[1]<\/a> In a National Public Radio interview, Greenspan even went so far as to call this crisis a \u201ccredit tsunami,\u201d admitting that \u201cthe free market ideology may be flawed.\u201d[2]<\/a> Still, despite this painful admission, Greenspan had very few suggestions for regulating or correcting the failures of the free-market system.[3]<\/a> Other observers of global capitalism have been concerned for some time about the boding dangers of the free market system. John McMurtry, for example, who locates the origins of capitalism in the work of John Locke and Adam Smith reminds us that both of these thinkers developed their economic theories out of their ethical philosophies. But how has economic thought moved so far from ethical and moral considerations? Presumably, the free market was justified because it led to human happiness. As Mary Rawson states in her review of McMurtry\u2019s Unequal Freedoms: The Global Market as an Ethical System<\/em>, the question is: \u201cIf the market system was to bring a better life to all, why can we find everywhere armaments, killing fields, malnutrition, brown water, and the disappearance of species? Why do we find, not life, but death?\u201d[4]<\/a> Citing Robert Lane\u2019s The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies<\/em>, McMurtry argues that, although most current economic theory would not agree, \u201chuman satisfaction actually declines as income and commodity consumption rise beyond need.\u201d[5]<\/a> Furthermore, since our government leaders are tied to large corporate interests, the public interest is completely ignored.<\/p>\n

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As Governments decline into \u2018the best democracies that money can buy\u2019 there is no public authority left to protect the common interest. Our political leaders assume market growth is essential to society\u2019s development. So public welfare is sacrificed to \u2018more global market competiveness\u2019 \u2013 and more life-system depredation. To name the causal links remains taboo.[6]<\/a><\/p>\n

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Additionally, recent economic theory has claimed that the market is \u201cobjective,\u201d \u201cvalue-free.\u201d Some have complained that we have made the market into a god. As George Soros argues, however, \u201cby claiming to be value free, market fundamentalism has actually undermined moral values.\u201d[7]<\/a><\/p>\n

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In February, 2009, George Soros, founder of Soros Fund Management LLC and a philanthropist, claimed that the current global economic problems, sparked by the mortgage crisis, have \u201cdamaged the financial system itself.\u201d[8]<\/a> Extremely pessimistic about the success of the Obama administration\u2019s attempts to respond to the crisis, by October, 2009, he cautioned his audience that the recovery from the current crisis \u201cmay run out of steam\u201d; and he feared a \u201cdouble-dip\u201d in 2010 or 2011.[9]<\/a> While he distinguishes the current crisis from the collapse of the Japanese economy because the current problems are not confined to one country, Soros distinguishes it from the \u201cGreat Depression\u201d because the world economic system has not been allowed to collapse completely; it has been propped up by various national governments. Soros predicts that a \u201cnew world order \u2026 will eventually emerge\u201d and it \u201cwill not be dominated by the United States to the same extent as the old one.\u201d[10]<\/a> Summing up his position, Soros maintains that \u201ca global economy demands global regulations. \u2026 Regulations must be global in scope.\u201d Echoing these concerns, Joseph Stiglitz asserts that \u201cthe truth is, most of the individual mistakes boil down to just one: a belief that markets are self-adjusting and that the role of government should be minimal.\u201d[11]<\/a><\/p>\n

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Obviously, those who have suffered from this crisis are angry; many want to know: Who is going to jail? For how long? And when? While those who have been personally affected by this recession have suffered loss of jobs and homes with foreclosures, taxpayers have been bailing out the large Western banks that, according to John Lanchester, have been allowed to become \u201cToo Big to Fail.\u201d[12]<\/a> Indeed, this was \u201cthe most important lesson\u201d of the failure of Lehman Brothers \u2013 these institutions are \u201cToo Big to Fail.\u201d Truly, we are living with a \u201cmonstrous hybrid,\u201d Lanchester continues, \u201cin which bank profits are privately owned, but are made possible thanks to an unlimited guarantee against losses, provided by the taxpayer.\u201d He agrees with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, \u201cNo bank should be allowed to become so big that it can blackmail governments.\u201d[13]<\/a> If capitalism is about assuming risk, i.e., \u201cabout \u2018creative destruction,\u2019 and the freedom to fail,\u201d then we no longer have free market capitalism, but an economy dominated by the \u201cbanksters\u201d; or, to speak precisely, Lanchester concludes \u201cthe most accurate term would be \u2018bankocracy.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n

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Others argue that the recent crisis is not an exception to the rule, but that these kinds of crises are endemic to the nature of capitalism; they belong to the logic of the capitalist system because once a means of exchange, money, when it becomes capital, becomes an end in itself. In other words, the economic system no longer serves to produce various products required to make human beings happy, but the system serves to produce one commodity, i.e., capital, and the problem for the corporations and the banks is how to produce, control, and accumulate capital. There are two questions here. The first is the historical question: when in the development of the capitalist economic system was there a concentration of production and the emergence of monopolies that led to the enormous accumulation of capital in the hands of a few large banking concerns? Citing the German economist, Otto Jeidels\u2019 Relation of the German Big Banks to Industry with Special Reference to the Iron Industry<\/em>, (Leipzig, 1905), V. I. Lenin answers this question: \u201cThus, the twentieth century marks the turning-point from the old capitalism to the new, from the domination of capital in general to the domination of finance capital.\u201d[14]<\/a> Clearly others would answer this question differently; most would probably go back to the beginning of the twentieth century, but would look more specifically to contemporary problems relevant to the current capitalist system. This paper, however, is not concerned with these historical questions; rather, this essay is concerned with a second question: how, according to the logic of capitalism did money which served as a means of exchange become capital? My paper will address this question by examining Karl Marx\u2019 argument in the Grundrisse<\/em>.<\/p>\n

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Written during the winter of 1857-58, the Grundrisse<\/em>[15]<\/a> was authored by Karl Marx between the 1848 publication of the Manifesto of the Communist Party<\/em> and the 1867 publication of the first volume of Capital<\/em>. The text is a series of seven notebooks in which Marx strives to gain conceptual clarity on a number of fundamental economic concepts, including production, distribution, exchange, consumption, and money. Although the Grundrisse<\/em> was not published during his own lifetime ? indeed, the work was not even published in the nineteenth century[16]<\/a> ? this work is essential for our understanding of the nineteenth century, because in it Marx articulates one of the most important transitions for modern bourgeois capitalism, namely, the transition from money as a medium of exchange to money as a commodity. In this paper, I shall examine Marx\u2019s argument for this transition under the heading of the transcendental character of money. To achieve this end, I have divided my discussion into three parts. The first part is a brief consideration of what Marx calls \u201cthe scientifically correct method\u201d of political economy (Grundrisse<\/em> 100). Before exploring the concept of production in general, I shall consider how Marx justifies beginning his reflection with this concept. Then, I shall reconstruct the way in which Marx understands the concepts of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption in his \u201cIntroduction\u201d to the Grundrisse<\/em>.[17]<\/a> Finally, I intend to identify the conceptual moments of money as it moves from a mere medium of exchange to a commodity necessary for the productive process.<\/p>\n

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\u201cThe Method of Political Economy\u201d[18]<\/strong><\/a><\/h3>\n
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Reflecting on the method of political economy, Marx distinguishes two approaches to this science: the historical method of the seventeenth century political economists and \u201cthe scientifically correct method,\u201d i.e., \u201cthe theoretical method.\u201d Marx criticizes seventeenth century political economists for beginning scientific reflection with an indeterminate abstraction like \u201cpopulation.\u201d For if we begin with population, we must \u201cmove analytically towards ever more simple concepts [Begriff<\/em>], from the imagined concrete towards ever thinner abstractions until [we reach] the simplest determinations.\u201d In other words, if we begin with population, we shall have to consider the classes that constitute the given population. But according to Marx, the concept of \u201cclasses\u201d has no content unless we understand \u201cthe elements on which they rest\u201d such as \u201cwage, labor, capital, etc.\u201d And since \u201cthese concepts in turn presuppose exchange, division of labor, prices, etc.,\u201d those political economists who start with the concept of \u201cpopulation,\u201d make the mistake of beginning with \u201ca chaotic conception [Vorstellung<\/em>]<\/span> of the whole.\u201d<\/p>\n

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Rejecting this confused approach, Marx claims that \u201cthe scientifically correct method\u201d of political economy is one that begins by sorting out \u201ca small number of determinant, abstract, general relations\u201d ? and here Marx is thinking of \u201clabor, money, value, etc.\u201d ? which he calls \u201cthe simplest determinations\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 100 and 101). These determinations, however, are not yet concrete. Once \u201cthese individual moments [have] been more or less firmly established and abstracted,\u201d Marx writes, \u201cthere [begin] the economic systems, which [ascend] from the simple relations, such as labor, division of labor, need, exchange value, to the level of the state, exchange between nations and the world market\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 100-01). This is not the mistaken historical method of the seventeenth century political economists that begins with the \u201cimagined concrete<\/em>\u201d (e.g., population); rather, according to the scientifically correct method, the concrete is something to be attained. \u201cThe concrete,\u201d Marx argues,<\/p>\n

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is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse. It appears in the process of thinking, therefore, as a process of concentration, as a result, not as a point of departure, even though it is the point of departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for observation [Anshauung<\/em>] and conception.[19]<\/a><\/p>\n

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Reality is not transparent to the understanding; it is not immediately accessible to political economists. To attempt to comprehend reality in terms of the most immediate determinations only serves to confuse; reality is over-determined, i.e., as having so many determinations that we cannot sort them all out in theoretical discourse. Instead, reality must be understood. Beginning with the simplest determinations, the political economist brings to conceptual clarity chaotic conceptions by identifying \u201ca small number of determinant, abstract, general relations\u201d which \u201clead towards a reproduction of the concrete by way of thought\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 100 and 101). Hence, political economists do not produce reality as the product of thought; rather, they proceed correctly by conceptualizing reality in thought.<\/p>\n

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Reconstruction of Production, Distribution, Exchange, and Consumption<\/h3>\n
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Production in General<\/h4>\n
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Marx employs this scientifically correct method in his own work when he takes up the concept of \u201cproduction\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 85-88). In any reflection on production, we always refer to \u201cproduction at a definite stage of social development — production by social individuals\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 85). Because of this, Marx argues, there would seem to be two possible ways to speak of production. If we are to \u201ctalk about production at all we must either pursue the process of historic development through its different phases, or declare beforehand that we are dealing with a specific historic epoch such as[,] e.g.[,] modern bourgeois production.\u201d But to start in this manner would once again lead us down the thorny path of the historical method; beginning with \u201cthe chaotic conception of the whole,\u201d we would have to search for the simplest determinations that constitute production.<\/p>\n

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Alternatively, Marx suggests that we can begin with \u201ca rational abstraction,\u201d i.e., \u201cproduction in general<\/em>\u201d because \u201call epochs of production have certain common traits, common characteristics.\u201d The difficulty, however, is that production as it appears has many determinations. In fact, it could be characterized in its specificity as being over-determined. Furthermore, not all of these determinations belong to every epoch as identifiable moments. \u201cSome determinations belong to all epochs, others only to a few. [Some] determinations will be shared by the most modern epoch and the most ancient.\u201d If we are to develop this kind of theoretical discourse, Marx argues, we must allow certain determinations to be stripped away and removed from this process of abstraction, the residuum, albeit an abstraction will not be an indeterminate<\/em> abstraction; rather, it will be a concrete<\/em> abstraction. And the scientifically correct method demands that we begin our theoretical reflection with a concrete abstraction, i.e., a concept of production which includes just those clearly articulated, essential moments that all specific instances of production have in common. Consequently, we shall begin the present discussion with the concrete abstraction of production in general.<\/p>\n

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If we simply consider the concept of production in general, it appears in the first instance to be the making of products. In production, human beings appropriate nature \u201cwithin and through a specific form of society\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 87).[20]<\/a> Production in its immediacy, however, assumes the three following moments: 1) human activity, i.e., work; 2) the subject of the work, i.e., the material worked on, and 3) the instruments through which the work is accomplished, i.e., the instruments of production.[21]<\/a> Moreover, the products of production belong to someone; they are property which fulfill human needs. \u201cAn appropriation which does not make something into property,\u201d Marx writes, \u201cis a contradictio in subjecto<\/em>\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 88).[22]<\/a> \u201cIn production the members of society appropriate (create, shape) the products of nature in accord with human needs\u201d; Marx calls this \u201cthe obvious\u201d or \u201ctrite notion\u201d of production. Furthermore, \u201cproduction, distribution, exchange, and consumption,\u201d according to Marx, \u201cform a regular syllogism: production is the generality, distribution and exchange the particularity, and consumption the singularity in which the whole is joined together\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 89). However, this does not mean that \u201cproduction, distribution, exchange, and consumption are identical, but that they all form the members of a totality, distinctions within a unity. Production predominates not only over itself, in the antithetical definition of production, but over the other moments as well\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 99). What then is the relationship of each of these determinations ? distribution, exchange, and consumption ? to production?<\/p>\n

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\u201cConsumption and Production\u201d[23]<\/strong><\/a><\/h4>\n
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Marx distinguishes three \u201cidentities between consumption and production\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 92): (1) \u201cProduction is consumption, consumption is production.\u201d And he calls this first identity \u201cimmediate identity<\/em>\u201d;[24]<\/a> (2) Production \u201cappears as a means for\u201d consumption and consumption \u201cappears as a means for\u201d production. [25]<\/a> (3) \u201cEach of them \u2026 creates the other in completing itself, and creates itself as the other.\u201d [26]<\/a> Marx does not name the last two mentioned identities. In keeping with the Hegelian vocabulary he employs here, however, I shall refer to the second and third identities as mediate identity<\/em> and self-mediated identity<\/em>, respectively. Let us consider each of these identities in turn.<\/p>\n

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The Immediate Identity of Production and Consumption<\/h5>\n
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\u201c(1) Immediate identity<\/em>: Production is consumption, consumption is production.\u201d[27]<\/a> Production which appears immediately as consumption, Marx maintains, is \u201ctwofold consumption\u201d; it is both \u201csubjective and objective\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 90). It is subjective because the producer \u201cdevelops his abilities in production\u201d; it is objective because the producer also \u201cexpends\u201d these abilities ? \u201cuses them up in the act of production.\u201d In producing the product, \u201cthe means of production\u201d are consumed; they \u201cbecome worn out through use\u201d in the productive process. To illustrate his point, Marx appeals to the image of combustion. While fire and heat are produced in combustion, the material that supports combustion is consumed. Similarly, in production \u201cthe raw material\u201d surrenders \u201cits natural form and composition by being used up.\u201d \u201cThe act of production,\u201d Marx argues, \u201cis therefore in all its moments also an act of consumption. Production as directly identical with consumption, and consumption as directly coincident with production, is termed \u2026 productive consumption<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n

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At the same time, \u201cconsumption is also immediately production.\u201d Drawing an image from nature, Marx argues that just as a plant produces itself by consuming certain nutriments, so too a \u201chuman being produces his [or her] own body\u201d by consuming nourishment. And this, Marx continues, \u201cis true of every kind of consumption which in one way or another produces human beings in some particular aspect\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 90-91). Consumption that is immediately production, according to Marx, is \u201cconsumptive production<\/em>\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 91). Consumptive production, however, is \u201csecondary\u201d because it involves the \u201cdestruction of the prior product\u201d in the productive process. In production, \u201cthe producer objectified himself\u201d; in consumption \u201cthe object he created personifies itself.\u201d Hence, productive consumption is to be distinguished from \u201cproduction proper.\u201d For although production is immediately consumption and consumption is immediately production, their \u201cimmediate duality\u201d remains unaltered; each process retains its unique character and is independent of the other.<\/p>\n

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The Mediate Identity of Production and Consumption<\/h5>\n
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\u201c(2) [In the sense] that one appears as a means for the other, is mediated by the other.\u201d[28]<\/a> According to Marx, a \u201cmediating movement\u201d occurs between the two processes ? production and consumption. These two processes are \u201crelated to\u201d and \u201cindispensable to one another\u201d; Marx insists on \u201ctheir mutual dependence\u201d that \u201cstill leaves them external to each other\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 93). Each process is \u201ca means for the other\u201d ? each \u201cis mediated by the other.\u201d \u201cConsumption,\u201d Marx argues, \u201cmediates production\u201d because \u201cit alone creates for the products the subject for whom they are products\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 91). \u201cWithout production, no consumption; but also, without consumption, no production; since production would then be purposeless.\u201d Indeed, \u201cconsumption,\u201d Marx argues, produces production in two ways. First, consumption produces production because it is only by being consumed that a product \u201cbecomes a real product.\u201d A product achieves its \u201c\u2018last finish\u2019 in consumption.\u201d A product that is not consumed is not actually<\/em> a product at all; it is only potentially<\/em> a product. For example, \u201ca railway on which no trains run, hence which is not used up, not consumed,\u201d Marx insists, \u201cis a railway only ???????<\/em> [potentially], and not in reality.\u201d This means that a product is quite different from a natural object. While a natural object simply is what it is, the product \u201cbecomes<\/em> a product only through consumption.\u201d \u201cOnly by decomposing the product,\u201d Marx maintains, \u201cdoes consumption give the product the finishing touch; for the product is production not as objectified activity, but rather only as object for the active subject.\u201d<\/p>\n

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Second, consumption produces production \u201cbecause consumption creates the need for new production, that is it creates the ideal, internally impelling cause for production which is its presupposition.\u201d In other words, consumption produces production by creating \u201cneed\u201d that will be satisfied by production. As the object of production, however, need is not external to the productive process; rather, need is understood \u201cas internal object of production, as aim\u201d; the goal of production is to fulfill need created by consumption. Hence, according to Marx, consumption is understood as \u201cthe aim of production\u201d; consumption motivates production by creating \u201cthe object which is active in production as its determinant aim\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 93 and 91). If it is true that production \u201coffers consumption its external object,\u201d then it is equally true, Marx contends<\/p>\n

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that consumption ideally<\/em> posits the object of production as an internal image, as a need, as drive and as purpose. It creates the objects of production in a still subjective form. No production without a need. But consumption reproduces the need (Grundrisse<\/em> 92).<\/p>\n

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At the same time, Marx identifies three ways that production mediates the process of consumption. First, production \u201cproduces the object of consumption.\u201d In production, products are produced for no other reason than to be consumed; \u201cproduction creates the material, as external object, for consumption\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 93). Without an object to be consumed, consumption would not be consumption at all. It is by supplying the material to be consumed that \u201cproduction produces consumption\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 92).<\/p>\n

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Second, production produces \u201cthe manner of consumption.\u201d Previously, we observed that only in consumption does the product achieve its final finish. Similarly, production does not merely create a product for consumption; rather, it \u201calso gives consumption its specificity, its character, its finish.\u201d Production does not create any object or \u201can object in general.\u201d In the productive process, specific objects are produced. Because production produces the product, and because the product is the product that it is, i.e., a specific product, production also produces the way in which the product is to be consumed. Hence, \u201cthe object,\u201d Marx argues, \u201cis not an object in general, but a specific object which must be consumed in a specific manner.\u201d Marx appeals to an example of satisfying one\u2019s hunger. The need to gratify our hunger is the same in any context. After all, \u201chunger is hunger.\u201d But there is a difference between our \u201cbolt[ing] down raw meat with the aid of hand, nail, and tooth,\u201d and our satisfying our hunger \u201cby cooked meat eaten with a knife and fork.\u201d Since production produces a specific product, and since production produces the manner in which the product is to be consumed, Marx argues that \u201cproduction thus creates the consumer.\u201d<\/p>\n

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Finally, production produces \u201cthe motive of consumption.\u201d Motivated by need, production creates the material to satisfy need. But production also \u201csupplies a need for the material.\u201d As it first appears, consumption exists in its immediacy ? \u201ca state of natural crudity.\u201d However, consumption is \u201cmediated as a need for the object\u201d produced by production. Hence, production not only creates the material object<\/em> for consumption, and it not only creates the manner in which the material object is to be consumed<\/em>, but it also creates the need<\/em> for the material object. In other words, production creates \u201cthe perception\u201d of need. Borrowing an example from the arts, Marx maintains that in this there is no difference between an \u201cobject of art\u201d and any other product. For just as an artifact produces \u201ca public which is sensitive to art and enjoys beauty,\u201d so too, in the creation of every other product, production produces a perceived need. \u201cProduction thus not only creates an object for the subject, but also a subject for the object,\u201d i.e., the consumer.<\/p>\n

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The Self-Mediating Identity of Production and Consumption<\/h5>\n
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In addition to the two previous identities ? the immediate identity<\/em> of production and consumption and the mediate identity<\/em> of production and consumption ? production produces consumption and consumption produces production, and in so doing \u201ceach of them \u2026 creates the other in completing itself as other\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 93). For its part, consumption creates production because in consumption the product is consumed. If the product were not consumed, it would not be what it is, namely, a product. In the activity of the product being consumed, consumption not only brings the product to completion, but it also produces the need for production and re-production. Insofar as the process of consumption brings the product to completion, and insofar as the process of consumption produces the inclination for production and reproduction, consumption completes the process of production by producing the producer. \u201cConsumption,\u201d Marx argues,<\/p>\n

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accomplishes the act of production only in completing the product as product by dissolving it, by consuming its independently material form, by raising the inclination developed in the first act of production, through the need for repetition, to its finished form; it is thus not only the concluding act which the product becomes product, but also that in which the producer becomes producer (Grundrisse<\/em> 93).<\/p>\n

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Hence, consumption creates production by bringing itself to completion; and in this way consumption is distinguished from production.<\/p>\n

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For its part, production completes the productive process by producing consumption. Insofar as production produces both \u201can object for the subject\u201d and \u201ca subject for the object,\u201d production creates consumption<\/p>\n

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(1) by creating the material for it; (2) by determining the manner of consumption; and (3) by creating the products initially posited by it as objects, in the form of a need felt by the consumer. It thus produces the object of consumption, the manner of consumption and the motive of consumption (Grundrisse<\/em> 92).<\/p>\n

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Furthermore, besides producing the material or object, the manner, and the motive for consumption, \u201cproduction produces consumption \u2026 by creating the stimulus of consumption, the ability to consume, as a need\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 93). In other words, when Marx writes that production produces the subject for the object of consumption (Grundrisse<\/em> 92), he means that production not only produces the product that is to be consumed, but it also produces the consumer that needs the product (Grundrisse<\/em> 92 and 93). Production thus creates consumption by bringing itself to completion; and in this way production is distinguished from consumption.<\/p>\n

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Marx, however, stresses that while each of these moments ? production and consumption ? \u201ccreates the other in completing itself, and creates itself as the other,\u201d still the moments articulated here belong to production in general<\/em>. Production and consumption \u201cappear as moments of a single act\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 94). In other words, production must be understood as \u201cone process\u201d to which all of the identities and the moments constituting them belong. Hence, production in general is the \u201cpredominant moment.\u201d<\/p>\n

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With a single subject, production and consumption appear as moments of a single act. The important thing to emphasize here is only that \u2026 they [production and consumption] appear in any case as moments of one process, in which production is the real point of departure and hence also the predominant moment. Consumption as urgency, as need, is itself an intrinsic moment of productive activity. But the latter is the point of departure for realization and hence also its predominant moment: it is the act through which the whole process again runs its course. The individual produces an object and, by consuming it, returns to himself, but returns as a productive and self-reproducing individual. Consumption thus appears as a moment of production. (Grundrisse<\/em>, 94)<\/p>\n

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\u201cDistribution and Production\u201d[29]<\/strong><\/a><\/h4>\n
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Marx begins his discussion of distribution with the following question: \u201cDoes distribution stand at the side of and outside production as an autonomous sphere?\u201d Although he will answer this question in the negative, by arguing that production does indeed include distribution, there are a number of reasons to think that distribution does not belong to the sphere of production. From the standpoint of the individual, distribution seems to be prior to production because it establishes his or her place in the process of production. According to this point of view, Marx writes, \u201cdistribution appears as a social law\u201d because it fixes the individual\u2019s place in the social system, i.e., \u201cthe system of production\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 96). Since the individual\u2019s place within this system is determined prior to his or her participation in the process of production, it would stand to reason that distribution does not belong to the sphere of production; rather, distribution would seem to precede production. \u201cTo the single individual,\u201d Marx argues,<\/p>\n

<\/div>\n

distribution appears as a social law which determines his [or her] position within the system of production within which he [or she] produces, and which therefore precedes production. The individual comes into the world possessing neither capital nor land. Social distribution assigns him [or her] at birth to wage labor. But this situation of being assigned is itself a consequence of the existence of capital and landed property as independent agents of production (Grundrisse<\/em> 96).<\/p>\n

<\/div>\n

The individual comes into this world without capital or land; he or she possesses only his or her own body which may be sold in the form of the individual\u2019s labor power for wages. But Marx emphasizes that it is the mode of production that determines the individual\u2019s place in the system of production. Hence, distribution is not an autonomous sphere existing outside of production; rather, distribution belongs to the sphere of production.<\/p>\n

<\/div>\n

From the standpoint of whole societies, Marx mentions four historical examples that provide reasons to think that distribution precedes production, i.e., \u201cthat distribution is not structured and determined by production, but rather the opposite, production by distribution.\u201d When one nation or people, for example, conquers another and divides the land among themselves, they force a certain mode of \u201cdistribution and form of property in land\u201d on those who have been defeated; thus, production would seem to be determined by distribution. Again, if a conquering nation enslaves those it has defeated, and if, as a result, production were founded on slave labor, distribution would appear to be both prior to production and to determine the mode of production. Or, in the case of a revolution when a people revolts against the land owners or the landed gentry and redistributes the land by dividing their holdings into smaller tracts of land, distribution would appear to change the features of production. Similarly, in a caste system in which a legal system distributes, as a result of \u201ca hereditary privilege,\u201d property to some, land to others, and still others are restricted to the caste of laborers, distribution would seem to be prior to production, to determine production, and, hence, to stand outside of production as an entirely autonomous sphere.<\/p>\n

<\/div>\n

Marx, however, rejects the notion that distribution belongs to an autonomous sphere; rather, he argues that \u201cin all cases, the mode of production \u2026 is decisive\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 97). While the process of production involves appropriation, i.e., involves making something into property, \u201cthe producer\u2019s relation to the product, once the latter is finished, is an external one\u201d; in other words, the producer does not take possession of the product immediately (Grundrisse<\/em> 94). In production, the producer does not intend the immediate appropriation of the products; the producer does not produce products for his or her own personal consumption. Rather, the producer can only take possession of the product insofar as the product is distributed to others. Distribution depends on the producer\u2019s relation to other individuals. Hence, distribution, Marx argues, like consumption, belongs to the sphere of production.<\/p>\n

<\/div>\n

Distribution<\/em> steps between the producers and the products, hence between production and consumption, to determine in accordance with social laws what the producers share will be in the world of products (Grundrisse<\/em> 94).<\/p>\n

<\/div>\n

At the most immediate level distribution and production appear independently of one another. Distribution seems to be the mere distribution of products according to certain social laws which first appear as natural laws. However, \u201cthis distribution of products\u201d is a moment in production realized as:<\/p>\n

\n
    \n
  1. \u201cthe distribution of the instruments of production, and \u2026<\/li>\n
  2. \u201cthe distribution of members of society among the different kinds of production\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 96).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/div>\n

    For its part, production produces distribution, and different modes of production require different forms of distribution. \u201cThe structure [Gliederung<\/em>] of distribution,\u201d Marx writes,<\/p>\n

    <\/div>\n

    is completely determined by the structure of production. Distribution is itself a product of production, not only in its object, in that only the results of production can be distributed, but also in its form, in that the specific kind of participation in production determines specific forms of distribution, i.e., the pattern of participation in distribution (Grundrisse<\/em> 95).<\/p>\n

    <\/div>\n

    In other words, while the structure of distribution appears as the naturally determined distribution of products, actually, the distribution of products is the result of this structure of distribution which is in turn the result of production as it changes the natural determinants to \u201chistoric determinants.\u201d \u201cAt the very beginning,\u201d Marx continues,<\/p>\n

    <\/div>\n

    these may appear as spontaneous, natural. But by the process of production itself they are transformed from natural into historic determinants, and if they appear to one epoch as natural presuppositions of production, they were its historic product for another (Grundrisse<\/em> 97).<\/p>\n

    <\/div>\n

    Thus, distribution, belongs to the sphere of production and Marx calls it \u201cproduction-determined distribution\u201d; as production-determined distribution, distribution appears as one moment of production.<\/p>\n

    <\/div>\n

    \u201cExchange and Production\u201d [30]<\/strong><\/a><\/h4>\n
    <\/div>\n

    Exchange appears as a moment mediating \u201cproduction with its production-determined distribution on one side and consumption on the other \u2026\u201d (Grundrisse <\/em>99). Because of this mediation, exchange makes a threefold appearance, each level of which is either determined by or appears in the sphere of production:<\/p>\n

    \n
      \n
    1. It is within production \u201cthat exchange of activities and abilities [division of labour] takes place\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 99]. This moment of exchange is the essential constitutive moment of production.<\/li>\n
    2. Exchange as the \u201cmeans\u201d of bringing a product to its concrete reality, i.e., exchange preparing the product for consumption, is also determined by production. It is exchange that brings the product to consumption wherein the product is completed. In other words, production determines the way in which consumption receives its object by means of exchange (Grundrisse<\/em> 99).<\/li>\n
    3. The form of exchange, i.e., the way in which exchange is organized \u201cbetween dealers and dealers \u2026,\u201d is \u201citself a producing activity\u201d while at the same time being \u201centirely determined by production \u2026,\u201d i.e., the mode of production (Grundrisse<\/em> 99). In other words, the organization of exchange which is determined by production determines the intensity and extensity of exchange. And, only in this last instance \u201cwhere the product is exchanged directly for consumption\u201d does exchange begin to appear separately from production (Grundrisse<\/em> 99).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/div>\n

      Thus, exchange, like distribution and consumption, appears not as an autonomous activity, but \u201cas either directly comprised in production or determined by it.\u201d Each of these concepts: production, distribution, exchange, and consumption, exists as moments within a complex whole where each mediates and is mediated by the others, but the determinate concept is that of production in general. Thus, distribution, exchange, and consumption always return us to production.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      The Transition of Money as Exchange to Money as Commodity<\/h3>\n
      <\/div>\n

      Thus far, I have sketched out the concepts Marx presents in the \u201cIntroduction\u201d to the Grundrisse<\/em> (85-100). The question that must now be answered is: what are the conceptual moments of money as it moves from a mere medium of exchange to a commodity necessary for the productive process? Marx provides us with a clue to answer this question when he writes \u201ccirculation itself [is] merely a specific moment of exchange, or [it is] also exchange regarded in its totality\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em>, 98). One of the specific moments of circulation, however, is money that in turn exists in its concreteness in so far as it is seen in its determinate nature, i.e., as having certain specifiable determinations. Money can be understood to have the four following moments:<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      The properties of money as (1) measure of commodity exchange; (2) medium of exchange; (3) representative of commodities (hence object of contracts); (4) general commodity alongside the particular commodities, all simply follow from its character as exchange value separated from commodities themselves and objectified (Grundrisse<\/em> 146).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      Money as the \u201cmeasure of commodity exchange.\u201d If commodity A and commodity B are to be exchanged, then there must be an existent measure or standard to which both A and B may be related or compared in order to determine the feasibility of exchanging A for B. This process of quantification takes place in thought as \u201cboth commodities to be exchanged are transformed \u2026 into exchange values and are thus reciprocally compared\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 144).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      Money as the \u201cmedium of exchange\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 146). Money takes on a character of its own independent of the products to be exchanged. In other words, in order to obtain commodity B, we no longer need to exchange commodity A for commodity B. All that need be done is to exchange a socially determined representation, i.e., exchange value, which, as it is attached to commodities A and B, appears as the price of these commodities, for commodity B. This socially determined representation, i.e., symbol (money as it appears as coin or paper) of the price of commodity B, may be obtained by exchanging commodity A for money. Thus, at this moment money mediates exchange because money may be exchanged for commodities, or commodities may be exchanged for money.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      Money as the \u201crepresentative of commodities.\u201d Money comes to represent commodities as it attains a character of its own. When this happens it is no longer necessary to think in terms of exchanging one commodity for another, i.e., exchanging commodity A for commodity B. At this moment it is simply possible to purchase either commodity A or commodity B, or both commodities A and B for that matter, with a socially determined amount of money. Or looking at this purchasing process from another point of view, it is possible to sell commodities A and B for a certain amount of money. Hence, commodities are said to have an exchange value that appears as a price in terms of a specific quantity of money. At the same time, money has an exchange value that appears as a price in terms of commodities. In short, a commodity is said to have a price that is attached to the commodity in terms of money.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      Money as a \u201cgeneral commodity along side particular commodities\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 146). Thus, as money takes on a character of its own, it becomes an object, i.e., a thing-in-itself. It becomes completely separated from specific commodities while taking on the characteristics of a commodity. It is in its commodity character that money is borrowed and lent, and generates interest. Hence, money has the capacity to produce money and money qua<\/em> commodity takes on the character of capital.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      By virtue of its property as the general commodity in relation to all others, as the embodiment of the exchange value of the other commodities, money at the same time becomes the realized and always realizable form of capital; the form of capital\u2019s appearance which is always valid (Grundrisse<\/em> 146).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      Therefore, money in its four moments appears as a process in which the exchange value of a product qua<\/em> commodity \u201cobtains a material existence separate from the commodity\u201d and in so doing becomes a commodity itself (Grundrisse<\/em> 145); money is produced not for its use value, but for its exchange value.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      At the same time, certain contradictions corresponding to this fourfold development arise.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      Firstly<\/em>: The simple fact that the commodity exists doubly, in one aspect as a specific product whose natural form of existence ideally contains (latently contains) its exchange value, and in the other aspect as manifest exchange value (money), in which all connection with the natural form of the product is stripped away again \u2013 this double, differentiated<\/em> existence must develop into a difference<\/em>, and the difference into antithesis<\/em> and contraction<\/em>. The same contradiction between the particular nature of the commodity as product and its general nature as exchange value, which created the necessity of positing it doubly, as this particular commodity on one side and as money on the other \u2013 this contradiction between the commodity\u2019s particular natural qualities and its general social qualities contains from the beginning the possibility that these two separated forms in which the commodity exists are not convertible into one another (Grundrisse<\/em> 147).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      In other words, the commodity exists qua<\/em> commodity and qua<\/em> money. In that money has now attained a character of its own, it exists independently of the commodity. At the same time the commodity exists independently of money. As money comes to exist independently of the commodity, the commodity is no longer necessarily<\/em> exchangeable for money because, as Marx writes, \u201cthe exchangeability \u2026 is abandoned to the mercy of external conditions \u2026 which may or may not be present.\u201d Thus, exchangeability becomes \u201csomething different from and alien to the commodity, with which it first has to be brought into equation, to which it is therefore at the beginning unequal; while the equation itself becomes dependent on external conditions, hence a matter of chance\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 148).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      Secondly<\/em>: Just as the exchange value of the commodity leads a double existence, as the particular commodity and as money, so does the act of exchange split into two mutually independent acts: exchange of commodities for money, exchange of money for commodities: purchase and sale (Grundrisse<\/em> 148).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      There is no necessary correspondence between purchase and sale which often appear \u201ctemporally and spatially separate\u201d and for this reason their \u201cimmediate identity ceases.\u201d<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      Thirdly<\/em>: With the separation of purchase and sale, with the splitting of exchange into two spatially and temporally independent acts there further emerges another new relation.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      Just as exchange itself splits apart into two mutually independent cts, so does the overall movement of exchange itself become separate from the exchanges, the producers of commodities. Exchange for the sake of exchange separates off from exchange for the sake of commodities (Grundrisse<\/em> 148).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      Exchange for the sake of exchange, according to Marx, is commerce. The purpose of exchange is the object for which the exchange exists, but \u201cthe purpose of commerce is not consumption, directly, but the gaining of money, of exchange values\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em>, 149).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      Fourthly<\/em>: Just as exchange value, in the form of money, takes its place as the general commodity<\/em> alongside all particular commodities, so does exchange value as money therefore at the same time take its place as a particular commodity<\/em> (since it has a particular existence) alongside all other commodities (Grundrisse<\/em> 150).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      In other words, money, as it comes to exist independently of commodities, becomes a commodity itself. On the one hand, money is a commodity just like any other commodity. But on the other hand, it is different from other commodities: \u201cit is not only the general exchange value, but at the same time a particular exchange value alongside other exchange values\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 151). Therefore, money exists in contradiction with itself. But \u201cmoney does not create these antitheses and contradictions; it is, rather, the development of these contradictions and antitheses which creates the seemingly transcendental power of money\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 146).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      In conclusion, money is a specific moment of circulation which in turn is \u201ca specific moment of exchange, or \u2026 exchange regarded in its totality\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 98). From the point of view of production, we see that production no longer produces products for consumption, i.e., products that are to be complete in consumption, but rather, production produces exchange values. Consumption seems to slide out of the picture. Production comes to be determined by exchange values as money which first appeared as a means of exchange comes to be the end of exchange (Grundrisse<\/em> 146 and 151).<\/p>\n


      <\/strong><\/p>\n

      <\/h4>\n

      <\/p>\n
      \n

      [1]<\/a>See, for example, Edmund L. Andrews, \u201cGreenspan Concedes Error on Regulation,\u201d New York Times, , October 23, 2008 (http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2008\/10\/24\/business\/economy\/24panel.html<\/a>).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      Almost three years after stepping down as chairman of the Federal Reserve, a humbled Mr. Greenspan admitted that he had put too much faith in the self-correcting power of free markets and had failed to anticipate the self-destructive power of wanton mortgage lending.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      \u201cThose of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholders\u2019 equity, myself included, are in a state of shocked disbelief,\u201d he [Greenspan] told the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n

      [2]<\/a> See Brian Naylor\u2019s October 24, 2008 interview with Alan Greenspan, \u201cGreenspan Admits Free Market Ideology Flawed,\u201d in which Greenspan said, \u201cWe are in the midst of a once-in-century credit tsunami. Central banks and governments are being required to take unprecedented measures.\u201d (Transcript at http:\/\/www.npr.org\/templates\/story\/story.php?storyId=96070766<\/a>).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [3]<\/a> Edmund L. Andrews, notes \u201cdespite his [Greenspan\u2019s] chagrin over the mortgage mess, the former Fed chairman proposed only one specific regulation: that companies selling mortgage-backed securities be required to hold a significant number themselves.\u201d At the same time in the same article, Greenspan expresses his continued belief in the market: \u201cWhatever regulatory changes are made, they will pale in comparison to the change already evident in today\u2019s markets \u2026 . Those markets for an indefinite future will be far more restrained than would any currently contemplated new regulatory regime.\u201d \u201cGreenspan Concedes Error on Regulation,\u201d New York Times<\/em>, October 23, 2008 (http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2008\/10\/24\/business\/economy\/24panel.html<\/a>). \u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [4]<\/a> Mary Rawson. \u201cReview of Unequal Freedoms: The Global Market as an Ethical System<\/em>, by John McMurtry, Toronto: Garamond Press, (1998). Peace Magazine<\/em> 15, 3, p. 31 (http:\/\/www.peacemagazine.org\/archive\/v15n3;31.htm<\/a>).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [5]<\/a> John McMurtry. \u201cMyths of the Global Market.\u201d New Internationalist<\/em>, issue 301 (June 2007) (http:\/\/www.newint.org\/columns\/essays\/2007\/06\/01\/essay\/<\/a>).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [6]<\/a> John McMurtry. \u201cMyths of the Global Market.\u201d New Internationalist<\/em>, issue 301 (June 2007) (http:\/\/www.newint.org\/columns\/essays\/2007\/06\/01\/essay\/<\/a>). One cannot help thinking of the recent United State Supreme Court ruling that gave corporations the right to contribute unlimited funds to political campaigns; thus the pseudo-democracy has officially become a plutocracy.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [7]<\/a> George Soros. \u201cThe Way Forward,\u201d Financial Times<\/em>. October 30, 2009. (http:\/\/www.ft.com\/cms\/668e074a-bf24-11de-a696-00144feab49a.html?_i_referralObject=11135588&fromSearch=n<\/a>).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [8]<\/a> Walid el-Gabry. \u201cSoros Says Crisis Signals End of a Free-Market Model (Update 2),\u201d Bloomberg.com<\/em>, (February 23, 2009). (http:\/\/www.bloomber.com\/apps\/news?pid=20670001&sid=aI1pruXkjr0s<\/a>).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [9]<\/a> George Soros. \u201cThe Way Forward,\u201d Financial Times<\/em>. October 30, 2009. (http:\/\/www.ft.com\/cms\/668e074a-bf24-11de-a696-00144feab49a.html?_i_referralObject=11135588&fromSearch=n<\/a>). \u201cI regret to tell you that the recovery is liable to run out of steam and may even be followed by a \u2018double-dip\u2019 although I am not sure whether it will occur in 2010 or 2011.\u201d<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [10]<\/a> George Soros. \u201cThe Way Forward,\u201d Financial Times<\/em>. October 30, 2009. (http:\/\/www.ft.com\/cms\/668e074a-bf24-11de-a696-00144feab49a.html?_i_referralObject=11135588&fromSearch=n<\/a>).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [11]<\/a> Sean O\u2019Grady. \u201cThe Money Man: Super-economist Joseph Stiglitz on How to Fix the Recession,\u201d The Independent<\/em>, (February 9, 2010) (Http:\/\/license.icopyright.net\/user\/viewFreeUse.act?fuid-NzA3MDM4NQ%3D%3D<\/a>).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [12]<\/a> John Lanchester, \u201cBankocracy,\u201d London Review of Books<\/em>, 31, 21 (November 5, 2009): 35-36. (http:\/\/www.lrb.co.uk\/v31\/n21\/john-lanchester\/bankocracy\/print<\/a>).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [13]<\/a> John Lanchester, \u201cBankocracy,\u201d London Review of Books<\/em>, 31, 21 (November 5, 2009): 35-36. (http:\/\/www.lrb.co.uk\/v31\/n21\/john-lanchester\/bankocracy\/print<\/a>). Lanchester cites Merkel comments after her fall, 2009, meeting with the French president Nicolas Sarkozy.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [14]<\/a> V. I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism<\/em> in: Selected Works<\/em>, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1963. (http:\/\/www.marxists.org\/archive\/lenin\/works\/1916\/imp-hsc\/<\/a>).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [15]<\/a>Karl Marx, 1973. Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy<\/em>, translated with a forward by Martin Nicolaus, New York: Vintage Books. For the particulars regarding the writing and publication of the Grundrisse<\/em>, see Martin Nicolaus, \u201cForward,\u201d 7-66.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [16]<\/a>Martin Nicolaus, 1973. \u201cForward,\u201d in: Karl Marx, Grundrisse<\/em>, n. 1, p. 7. Nicolaus reports that a limited edition consisting of two volumes (one published in 1939, the other, in 1941) was published in the twentieth century.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [17]<\/a>Marx, 1973. The General Relation of Production to Distribution, Exchange, Consumption<\/em>. In Grundrisse<\/em>, 88-100.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [18]<\/a>Marx, 1973. The Method of Political Economy<\/em>. In Grundrisse<\/em>, 100?08.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [19]<\/a>Marx, 1973. Grundrisse<\/em>, 101.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [20]<\/a>Marx, 1973. Grundrisse<\/em>, 87. Compare Capital<\/em>, I, pp. 177-78.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [21]<\/a>Marx, 1973. Grundrisse<\/em>, 87. In Capital<\/em>, I, Marx calls these \u201cthe elementary factors of the labour process\u201d (Capital<\/em>, I, p. 178).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [22]<\/a>Since production (i.e. bourgeois production) involves property, since property assumes a distinction between \u201cmine\u201d and \u201cthine,\u201d and since there is a need for a mechanism whereby \u201cmine\u201d can be made \u201cthine,\u201d according to Marx, bourgeois economists have assumed that the introduction of property demands certain specific legislative and juridical frameworks to protect private property. But \u201chistory,\u201d Marx notes, \u201cshows common property<\/em> (e.g.[,] in India, among the Slavs, the early Celts, etc.) to be the more original form, a form which long continues to play a significant role in the shape of communal property\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em>, 88; italics added.) Furthermore, Marx argues, \u201cevery form of production creates its own legal relations, form of government, etc.\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em>, 88). \u201cAll the bourgeois economists are aware of,\u201d he writes,<\/p>\n

      is that production can be carried on better under the modern police than[,] e.g.[,] on the principle of might makes right. They forget only that his principle is also a legal relation, and that the right of the stronger prevails in their \u201cconstitutional republics\u201d as well, only in another form (Grundrisse<\/em>, 88).<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [23]<\/a>Marx, 1973. Grundrisse<\/em>, 90-94.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n

      [24]<\/a>Marx, 1973. Grundrisse<\/em>, 93.<\/p>\n

      (1) Immediate identity<\/em>: Production is consumption, consumption is production. Consumptive production. Productive consumption. The political economists call both productive consumption. But then make a further distinction. The first figures as reproduction, the second as productive consumption. All investigations into the first concern productive or unproductive labour; investigations into the second concern productive or non-productive consumption.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [25]<\/a>Marx, 1973. Grundrisse<\/em>, 93.<\/p>\n

      (2) [In the sense] that one appears as a means for the other, is mediated by the other: this is expressed as their mutual dependence; a movement which relates them to one another, makes them appear indispensable to one another, but still leaves them external to each other. Production creates the material, as external object, for consumption; consumption creates the need, as internal object, as aim, for production. Without production not consumption; without consumption no production. [This identity] figures in economics in many different forms.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [26]<\/a>Marx, 1973. Grundrisse<\/em>, 93.<\/p>\n

      (3) Not only is production immediately consumption and consumption immediately production, not only is production a means for consumption and consumption the aim of production, i.e. each supplies the other its object (production supplying the external object of consumption, consumption the conceived object of production); but also , each of them, apart from being immediately the other, and apart from mediating the other, in addition to this creates the other in completing itself, and creates itself as the other. Consumption accomplishes the act of production only in completing the product as product by dissolving it, by consuming its independently material form, by raising the inclination developed in the first act of production, through the need for repetition, to its finished form; it is thus not only the concluding act in which the product becomes product, but also production produces consumption by creating the specific manner of consumption; and, further, by creating the stimulus of consumption, the ability to consume, as a need. This last identity, as determined under (3), [is] frequently cited in economics in the relation of demand and supply, of objects and needs, of socially created and natural needs.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [27]<\/a>Marx, 1973. Grundrisse<\/em>, 93.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n
      <\/div>\n

      [28]<\/a>Marx, 1973. Grundrisse<\/em>, 93.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n

      [29]<\/a>Marx, 1973. Grundrisse<\/em>, 94-98.<\/p>\n

      <\/div>\n
      \n
      <\/div>\n

      [30]<\/a>Marx, 1973. Grundrisse<\/em>, 98-100.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

      <\/div>\n

      An exposition of Karl Marx\u2019s argument in the Grundrisse<\/em> for the logical development of money, this essay is divided into three parts. Since Marx is concerned to distinguish himself and his method from that of the seventeenth century political economists, I begin my paper with a brief reflection on \u201cthe scientifically correct method\u201d or the \u201ctheoretical method\u201d (Grundrisse<\/em> 101 and 102). The second part of this paper considers how Marx justifies beginning his reflection with the concept of production in general. To understand the importance that Marx attributes to production, one must also appreciate the way in which distribution, exchange, and consumption belong to the sphere of production. In the remaining pages of this section of my paper, then, I attempt to reconstruct Marx\u2019s argument for the way in which these concepts (distribution, exchange, and consumption) are to be understood in relation to the sphere of production.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":267,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_exactmetrics_skip_tracking":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_active":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_note":"","_exactmetrics_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[7],"tags":[156,157,155,158,159,160,161,162,163],"coauthors":[1162],"class_list":["post-48","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-reflection-on-the-economic-crisis","tag-banks","tag-capital","tag-distribution","tag-exchange","tag-finance","tag-grundrisse","tag-marx","tag-money","tag-production"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/48","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/267"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=48"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/48\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1113,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/48\/revisions\/1113"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=48"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=48"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=48"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=48"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}