{"id":4742,"date":"2018-01-10T14:01:04","date_gmt":"2018-01-10T14:01:04","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/?p=4742"},"modified":"2023-01-24T15:24:19","modified_gmt":"2023-01-24T15:24:19","slug":"populism-as-an-essentially-contested-concept-or-on-the-dangers-of-centrism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/volume-15-no-1-2020\/other-contribution-volume-15-no-1-2020\/populism-as-an-essentially-contested-concept-or-on-the-dangers-of-centrism\/","title":{"rendered":"Populism as an Essentially Contested Concept or: On the Dangers of Centrism"},"content":{"rendered":"\n\n\n\t
\n\n\t\t<\/i><\/span> <\/a>\n\n\t<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n

Three years into his term, hardly anyone would call the French president successful, I guess.* Back in 2017, however, Emmanuel Macron\u2019s election was met with great expectations, bordering on enthusiasm, by many commentators. It was perceived as a token of hope, because it was said to prove that it was possible to defeat populism. I found this rather puzzling. As many others, I was relieved that Marine Le Pen was unable to rally more than a third of the electorate behind her chauvinist programme, but was it really an achievement to beat her? Could not virtually anyone have done?\u00a0 Moreover, what was it supposed to mean, that Macron defeated populism?<\/p>\n

Of course, Le Pen exemplifies what is commonly known as \u201cpopulist rhetoric\u201d. Typical elements easily recognized are: The promise to change the game of ordinary party politics; staging as the leader of a movement, and as the voice of the common sense of ordinary people; exploiting prejudice; and not least, standing up against what is described as imminent dangers to the national interest and wellbeing of the people.[1] <\/a>Now, the obvious differences between their programmes should not make us blind for the striking similarities between the contestants. Macron, as well, promised a new beginning; staged himself as leader of a movement, and as the voice of common sense; he too exploited prejudice and purported to stand up against an imminent danger to the interests and well-being of the nation. The difference, of course, is that the \u201ccommon sense\u201d that he appealed to, was the general worldview of the educated, urban middle classes, whose most deep-rooted prejudice is the belief that they themselves are unprejudiced. Of course, the imminent danger to the nation, as perceived by the followers of Macron, was not immigrants or Muslims, but the populists \u2013 and notably, not only on the right wing.<\/p>\n

Populism as a polemical concept<\/strong><\/p>\n

The term \u201cpopulism\u201d is most often used polemically, and notably as a pejorative term, denoting an actual or potential threat to democracy. Projecting all problems and challenges to democracy into the image of the populist danger, is a key feature of \u201ccentrism\u201d as a mirror image of populism. On the other hand, blaming the liberal mainstream for all problems and frustrations is a key feature of \u201cpopulism\u201d as a mirror image of centrism. In this way, politics seems like a house of mirrors \u2013 where, as we know, it may be difficult to tell left from right.[2]<\/a><\/p>\n

Preliminary, we may distinguish between \u201cpopulist rhetoric\u201d and \u201cthe rhetoric of populism\u201d: On the level of \u201cpopulist rhetoric\u201d, we have the polemical use of (positive) references to \u201cthe people\u201d \u2013 as in speaking for the people, in the name of common sense, defending the people, mobilizing the people, and so on. What I call \u201cthe rhetoric of populism\u201d, work on a different level, where we encounter the polemical use of (negative) references to \u201cpopulism\u201d \u2013 as in attacking \u201cpopulists\u201d and \u201cpopulist rhetoric\u201d in the name of reason. \u201cPopulism\u201d is sometimes regarded as a symptom, sometimes as the illness itself \u2013 but in any case as a problem. This is why the widespread and recurring \u201crhetoric of populism\u201d is so problematic, in my view.<\/p>\n

My concern here is not with strategic communication, so I restrict myself to few words on why I would not recommend the \u201crhetoric of populism\u201d as an important ingredient in political communication. Most obviously, it is merely reactive \u2013 the opponent will keep the initiative; it is negative \u2013 your own virtues stand out only in contrast the vices of your opponent; it stays on the surface \u2013substantial debate over programmes are avoided.(Of course, this gamble may work, sometimes: Macron\u2019s greatest asset in the second round of the 2017 elections was the fact that he was not Le Pen.)\u00a0Last, not least, the rhetoric of populism has an unmistakable tinge of paternalism, of talking down to people. At the end of the day, this will only strengthen the appeal of straightforward populist rhetoric. Bluntly put, you will not enlighten anyone by calling him or her stupid. If someone, in your honest opinion, is prejudiced, misguided or in illusion, you should rather appeal to their capacity for thinking, and provide them with reasons and occasion for revising their opinions. However, the problem with the rhetoric of populism is more profound than the \u2013 very real \u2013 possibility of alienating voters by offending their intelligence.<\/p>\n

There are, of course, good reason to be sceptical towards anyone proclaiming to be the \u201cvoice of the people\u201d \u2013 but the rhetoric of populism tend to delegitimize any <\/em>positive reference to \u201cthe people\u201d. If speaking of \u201cthe people\u201d, or even worse, for <\/em>\u201cthe people\u201d, becomes suspect in itself, it affects any attempt to give voice to popular concerns: The rhetoric of populism tend to discredit any <\/em>defence of \u201cthe people\u201d and any <\/em>political mobilization in the name of \u201cthe people\u201d. This is a profound problem, I think, for (at least) two, interrelated reasons: Firstly, important conceptual resources for the understanding of social and political dynamics are lost. Secondly, and even more severe, the concept of democracy itself becomes obscure. After all, the literal meaning of \u201cdemocracy\u201d is \u201crule of the people\u201d. The term \u201cpopulism\u201d derive from \u201cpopulus\u201d, which is but the Latin word for \u201cdemos\u201d.<\/p>\n

Towards an analytic concept of populism<\/strong><\/p>\n

To address the first of these problems, I will give a very brief sketch of the concept of \u201cpopulism\u201d in recent theories of \u201cradical democracy\u201d. My main reference is the book On Populist Reason<\/em>, published in 2005 by Argentinian-born political theorist Ernesto Laclau.[3]<\/a> As I read it, the author attempt to establish \u201cpopulism\u201d as an analytical concept, intended to clarify the dynamics of social, cultural and political conflict. A basic assumption is that these aspects are always interrelated, or, in Laclau\u2019s own usage, \u2018articulated\u2019 on each other. What we get, is a framework for interpreting movements that challenge domination. If applied in a value-neutral, descriptive manner, this works somewhat like a Weberian \u201cideal type\u201d. In addition, and in accordance with his own political commitments, the author attempt to do something more. Laclau is not presenting a political programme, but an enquiry into the conditions of possibility for left-wing populism. (On Populist Reason <\/em>is thus a sequel to Laclau and Mouffe\u2019s earlier work on Hegemony and Socialist Strategy<\/em>.[4]<\/a>) For the present purposes, I restrict myself to paraphrasing the image of the dynamics of political mobilization offered, and notably in a different vocabulary. Here, the point of interest is not Laclau\u2019s theoretical approach as such, but the socio-political phenomena that it highlights; my argument is inspired by, but does not rest on Laclau\u2019s writings.<\/p>\n

From time to time, everyone experience suffering, injustice, dissatisfaction \u2013 and most of the time, we endure; blame ourselves, bad luck, the way things are; or we cling to the belief that things will work out, eventually. Every now and then, patience reach its limit, however. We complain; demand something done, that something change. If this happen, life goes on. If not, our grievances may turn into frustrations of a second order; we blame those obstructing our attempts at relieving our situation. Our disappointment (or anger) may fuel demands for greater changes; we may question the competence or good will of the people in charge, or even institutions and power structures. We want to hold something or someone responsible \u2013 and most of the time, we leave it there, maybe clenching our fist in the pocket.<\/p>\n

Sometimes, however, we become aware that we are not alone; others share our experiences, and we voice our claims together. As I understand Laclau, this is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a social movement to begin. The crucial point is when a group constituted by a common demand becomes aware of groups with similar, but not identical, experiences and claims. Somehow, we come to perceive our claims as being of the same kind, directed at the same kind of adversaries. Different claims are linked, in what Laclau terms a \u201cchain of equivalence\u201d. Taken together, these may challenge the legitimacy of the socio-political order, by questioning \u201chegemony\u201d, that is, the collective imagery (\u201cculture\u201d or \u201cideology\u201d) that provide legitimacy to the prevailing order.<\/p>\n

Some of the motivation for the notion of \u201cpopulist reason\u201d is that such challenges to the power structures are typically expressed in terms of a conflict between \u201cthe people\u201d and \u201cthose in power\u201d. In Laclau’s words:<\/p>\n

“A plurality of demands which, through their equivalential articulation, constitute a broader social subjectivity we will call <\/em>popular demands\u2013 they start, at a very incipient level, to constitute the \u2018people\u2019 as a potential historical actor. We have already two clear preconditions for populism: (1) the formation of an internal antagonistic frontier separating the \u2018people\u2019 from power; and (2) an equivalential articulation of demands making the emergence of the \u2018people\u2019 possible. There is a third precondition which does not really arise until the political mobilization has reached a higher level: the unification of these various demands \u2013 whose equivalence, up to that point, had not gone beyond a feeling of vague solidarity \u2013 into a stable system of signification.”<\/em>[5]<\/a><\/p>\n

Now, the stability of a system of signification is always relative and precarious, and the vagueness and indeterminacy of the notions involved is necessary, and indeed an essential part of political dynamic, as Laclau describes it: \u201c[V]agueness and indeterminacy are not shortcomings of a discourse about <\/em>social reality, but, in some circumstances, inscribed in social reality as such\u201d.[6]<\/a> Neither individuals nor groups exist as self-contained entities that enter into <\/em>relations; rather, they become what they are by and <\/em>through <\/em>their relations. (This is what Laclau means by \u2018articulation\u2019). To ascribe e.g. \u2018interests\u2019, \u2018identities\u2019, \u2018values\u2019 or \u2018aims\u2019 to individuals or groups is part and parcel of the process of signification through which these individuals and groups come to be at all.<\/p>\n

Such processes are altogether rhetorical. The words and imagery that shape the perception and presentation of the parties, are part of the conflict, and shaped by the conflict. At the incipient level, even the definition of the situation is at stake: Are we dealing with disagreement within a given framework, or questioning the framework as such? In the first case, we encounter contended issues, or problems, approachable one by one, in the second, about conflict proper, where a number of different claims, taken together, come to signify social division. A series of different demands become a \u201cchain\u201d when some of them becomes placeholders for them all; this is how protesting groups become a movement.<\/p>\n

An example from the history of the labour movement may be how the eight-hour working day became a slogan and a rallying point: Immediately, it was about conditions of work, but per implication, it was also about the conditions for political participation, family life, culture etc. More generally, the heyday of labour movements has been when they were genuinely populist \u2013 in the positive sense \u2013 that is, at times and places where \u201cthe working class\u201d and its organisations \u2013 unions and parties \u2013 was widely perceived as the legitimate placeholder of \u201cthe people\u201d \u2013 over against \u201cthe ruling classes\u201d.<\/p>\n

Of course, you cannot conjure up constellations like that. However, we may draw some lessons.<\/p>\n

(1) Popular discontent will sometimes inspire social movements; as political movements, they will typically take populist form. Under given circumstances they may effect profound changes to society.<\/p>\n

(2) Populist movements \u2013 i.e. broad, socio-political and cultural mobilizations in the name of \u201cthe people\u201d against \u201cthose in power\u201d \u2013 are vital to democracy, past and present. Without them, no processes of democratization in the past, and no productive confrontations on vital issues now and in the future.<\/p>\n

(3) Political movements aiming at social change should be assessed on their political practice, i.e. what they aim at, and the means they employ. Bluntly put, the problem with right-wing populists is their right-wing policies, not their populism per se<\/em>.<\/p>\n

(4) The programmes and practices of some <\/em>populist movements are indeed threatening the \u201cagonistic pluralism\u201d that is essential to democracy; however, this should not make us blind to other threats, notably those associated with the discrediting of any populist agenda.<\/p>\n

Populism (and democracy) as contested concepts<\/strong><\/p>\n

My title allude to the notion of \u201cEssentially Contested Concepts\u201d, which was introduced by the British philosopher W B Gallie in a talk at The Aristotelian Society <\/em>in London in 1956 \u2013 quite far from current poststructuralist theories of \u201cradical democracy\u201d.[7]<\/a> In my view, however, it makes sense even in our context. His starting point is the observation that it is much easier to come to terms about questions of, say, the size and materials of a painting, than to agree on whether or not it should be regarded as a piece of art. That we do have different and even conflicting interpretations of it, is, according to Gallie, an essential feature of the concept of art itself. Furthermore, the elaboration of such conflicts, will indeed further our understanding \u2013 both of the concept and of art. His other examples of such essentially contested concepts include \u201cchristian doctrine\u201d, \u201csocial justice\u201d and, most notably for our topic: \u201cDemocracy\u201d.<\/p>\n

One of the features that make a notion belong to the class of essentially contested concepts, is that it denotes a complex phenomenon; one that may be described in different ways, highlighting different aspects as the most important ones. However, Gallie insist that the contestant conceptions is somehow perceived to refer to the same basic ideas \u2013 otherwise, we are simply dealing with ambiguity or \u201cessentially confused <\/em>concepts\u201d. Furthermore, these ideas seem to be \u201cideals\u201d of sorts, or, as Gallie puts it, essentially contested concepts are \u201cappreciative\u201d. Democracy is a contested concept because and as long as those who disagree over the interpretation of the concept and of what institutions, policies and practices deserve the name, at some level share the idea that democracy is something that should be pursued.<\/p>\n

What then with \u201cpopulism\u201d? Maybe it is simply an essentially confused concept. Most certainly, it is not an \u201cappreciative\u201d concept, given the fact that it is often used pejoratively, denoting something negative, even dangerous. It is nevertheless, and this gets me to my conclusion \u2013 albeit a preliminary one \u2013 a concept that is essential to the conception of \u201cDemocracy\u201d that I endorse. (Of course, I recognize that competing conceptions of democracy are possible.)<\/p>\n

An essential feature of \u201cdemocracy\u201d, as I understand the concept, is that \u201cthe people\u201d \u2013 the \u201cdemos\u201d \u2013 is the basis of legitimacy for institutions and policies. This, however, does not imply that \u201cdemocracy\u201d has solved the problem of legitimacy. On the contrary, democracy imply that questions of legitimacy in principle are kept open to public contestation. Of course, some degree of institutional stability is generally desirable \u2013 but mainly as a framework for productive conflict and disagreement. Sometimes decisions have to be made and carried out, but legitimate policies should always be open to revision.<\/p>\n

The word \u201cdemocracy\u201d involves a reference to \u201cthe people\u201d. Moreover, the idea of democratic legitimacy refer to \u201cthe people\u201d \u2013 and thus depend on the symbolic representation of \u201cthe people\u201d, that is, on the words, images and social practices that shape the presentation and perception of \u201cthe people\u201d and the relation between \u201cthe people\u201d and \u201cthose in power\u201d. According to the ideals of democracy, those in power should be representatives of the people. The reality of this is often questionable, however. Maybe we should question it, even more often and more profoundly than the usual business of politics allow. In times of crises, when the legitimacy of institutions and policies are at stake, profound conflicts over the symbolic representation of \u201cthe people\u201d is bound to occur, in some form or another: What is a people? Who are the people? Who can legitimately claim to speak for the people? Whose claims, which attitudes and what commitments count \u2013 in fact and in principle \u2013 when we quarrel, fight and try to make decisions about the common good?<\/p>\n

The mirror-house where \u201cpopulist rhetoric\u201d confront \u201cthe rhetoric of populism\u201d is not the place to answer, or even pose these questions \u2013 because neither party recognize the problem. On the one hand, we have those who purport to have the answer \u2013 to know the identity of the people and of the enemy. On the other hand, we have those who dismiss the question \u2013 and thereby dissolve the democratic people, insisting that we are all individuals, that is, consumers and voters. In the realm of politics, voters are treated as consumers: Competition replace productive conflict and contestation. Spin and branding replace movements and parties.<\/p>\n

*\u00a0 This paper originates from a talk given at the University of Akureyri in April 2019.<\/p>\n

Endnotes<\/strong><\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> Cf Alberto Giordano: \u201cPopulism, Prejudice and the Rhetoric of Privilege\u201d, in Nordicum-Meditarraneum<\/em>, vol 12, no. 3 https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/volume-12-no-3-2017\/conference-proceeding-volume-12-no-3-2017\/populism-prejudice-rhetoric-privilege\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> For a critical discussion of recent approaches to populism\u2019 in political theory, cf Yannis Stavrakakis and Anton J\u00e4ger: \u00abAccomplishmens and limitations of the \u2018new\u2019 mainstream in contemporary populism studies\u00bb, in: European Journal of Social Theory<\/em>, 2018, vol 21(4) pp 547-565. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1177%2F1368431017723337<\/a><\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> Ernesto Laclau:On Populist Reason<\/em>, London\/New York: Verso 2005.<\/p>\n

[4] <\/a>Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe: Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics <\/em>[1985], second edition, London\/New York: Verso 2001.<\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> Laclau 2005, p 74.<\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> Ibid, p 67.<\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> Gallie, W. B. \u201cEssentially Contested Concepts.\u201d\u00a0Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society<\/em>, vol. 56, 1955, pp. 167\u2013198.\u00a0JSTOR, www.jstor.org\/stable\/4544562<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The term \u00abpopulism\u00bb is most often used polemically, and notably as a pejorative term, denoting an actual or potential threat to democracy. If, however, all problems and challenges to democracy are projected into an image of the populist danger, we encounter nothing but \u00abcentrism\u00bb as a mirror-image of \u00abpopulism\u00bb.\u00a0Theories of \u00abradical democracy\u00bb propose a more analytical concept of \u00abpopulism\u00bb, denoting the political dynamics of social conflict, i.e. how popular frustrations, claims and demands are articulated. In this perspective, political \u00abagonism\u00bb is vital to democracy.\u00a0My own take on these questions: \u00abDemocracy\u00bb is an essentially contested concept, but if we a central feature is that the \u00abpeople\u00bb (\u00abdemos\u00bb) is the basis for the legitimacy of its institutions and policies, we must recognize that conflicts over the symbolic representation of \u00abthe people\u00bb are fundamental. To dismiss the problem is as dangerous as to claim that it is solved.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":585,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_exactmetrics_skip_tracking":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_active":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_note":"","_exactmetrics_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1729],"tags":[198,566,1766,1767,1526,247],"coauthors":[1768],"class_list":["post-4742","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-other-contribution-volume-15-no-1-2020","tag-democracy","tag-laclau","tag-lepen","tag-macron","tag-populism","tag-rhetoric"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4742","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/585"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4742"}],"version-history":[{"count":13,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4742\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":18610,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4742\/revisions\/18610"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4742"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4742"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4742"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=4742"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}