{"id":350,"date":"2014-09-19T20:41:31","date_gmt":"2014-09-19T20:41:31","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/?p=350"},"modified":"2016-03-30T22:26:42","modified_gmt":"2016-03-30T22:26:42","slug":"an-apology-for-philosophy-on-the-contested-relationship-between-truth-and-politics","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/09-4\/c75-conference-paper\/an-apology-for-philosophy-on-the-contested-relationship-between-truth-and-politics\/","title":{"rendered":"An Apology for Philosophy: On the contested relationship between truth and politics"},"content":{"rendered":"\n\n\n\t
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Introduction<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

In The Government of Self and Others, <\/i>Michel Foucault positions himself against the view that the interlinkage of politics and truth in ancient Athens\u2014most notably in Plato\u2019s The Republic<\/i>\u2014was the birth of a totalitarian conception of politics; an argument that most thoroughly and elegantly has been presented by Hannah Arendt.[1]<\/span><\/a> According to Arendt, the introduction of an \u201cabsolute\u201d\u2014such as truth; something indisputable, incontestable and \u201cabove the senses\u201d\u2014reduces politics to chains of command and obedience. Hence the realization of truth in politics is only possible in a tyrannical or totalitarian society. Furthermore, Arendt argues, when the idea of an absolute standard for politics is introduced into the shared world of men, anything can serve as \u201cthe truth\u201d\u2014race or the classless society\u2014even \u201cthe craciest theory that some charlatan might come up with\u201d (2005:3); anything goes and everything is possible. \u201cIn other words,\u201d Arendt concludes \u201cthe realization of philosophy abolishes philosophy, the realization of the \u2018absolute\u2019 indeed abolishes the absolute from the world\u201d (Ibid.).<\/span><\/p>\n

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In contrast to this gloomy picture of the relationship between philosophy and politics stands Foucault\u2019s analysis of the ancient practices of parr?sia, <\/i>\u201ctruth-telling,\u201d <\/i>as a political life of resistance, critique and contestation. This life of \u201ctruth-telling\u201d is not the political life of a statesman but modes of being which constantly, though in different ways, constitute their meaning in relation to politics. What ties all the manifestations of parr?sia <\/i>together is, however, that none of them, according to Foucault, are concerned with \u201cdoctrines,\u201d that is, none of them are concerned with laying out the \u201ccontent\u201d of politics. Though philosophy becomes meaningful in its relationship to politics, they are not identical to one another: politics and philosophy correlate but they do not coincide: \u201cIt is not for philosophy to say what should be done in politics\u201d (Foucault 2010:354).<\/span><\/p>\n

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It is my ambition with this paper to argue that the stark difference between Foucault and Arendt does not reflect as deep a disagreement between the two thinkers. On the contrary, I argue that Foucault and Arendt in their late works and lectures[2]<\/span><\/a> (which none of them lived long enough to complete) reflect a shared interest in understanding how an intellectual life can relate itself to the shared world of a public sphere. This shared interest in \u201ccritical thinking\u201d is maybe best expressed in both thinkers\u2019 \u201cobsession\u201d with the political writings of Immanuel Kant. Kant\u2019s political writings play a pivotal role not only in Arendt\u2019s Lectures on Kant\u2019s Political Philosophy<\/i> but also in The Government of Self and Others, <\/i>epigraphed by Kant\u2019s short text \u201cAn Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?\u201d\u00a0 The shared theme in Arendt\u2019s and Foucault\u2019s late works, I argue, is the relationship between critical thinking and politics.<\/span><\/p>\n

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To argue this point, I have analysed and critically assessed the relationship between politics and philosophy, which Foucault sees manifest in the practice of parr?sia <\/i>in the Athenian city state.\u00a0 To understand how and in what ways, according to Foucault, the parr?siastic practices of \u201ctruth-telling\u201d relate to and\/or engage with politics and political life, I have looked at four \u201cmoments\u201d of parr?sia <\/i>manifested in four figures which all in different ways present important perspectives on the relationship between politics and philosophy: Pericles (\u201cpolitical\u201d parr?sia<\/i>), Plato (\u201cphilosophical\u201d parr?sia<\/i>), Socrates (\u201cphilosophico-ethical\u201d parr?sia<\/i>) and Diogenes (\u201cethical\u201d parr?sia<\/i>). <\/span><\/p>\n

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\u201cPolitical\u201d parr?sia<\/i><\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

Though the idea of truth is central to parr?sia<\/i>, it is important to understand that the practice of parr?sia <\/i>is resolutely distinct from a life centred on the contemplation of the truth; the form of life generally associated with Arendt\u2019s conception of the bios teor?tik?s <\/i>or vita contemplativa. <\/i>Though philosophy and parr?sia, <\/i>according to Foucault, <\/i>become intertwined in ancient Athens, parr?sia <\/i>is always distinct from contemplation for Foucault. The life of contemplation is that of \u201cthe sage,\u201d or, \u201cthe wise person\u201d (2011:16ff). The pivotal difference between the sage and the parr?siast <\/i>is, according to Foucault, that the sage keeps his wisdom to himself: \u201cthe sage is wise in and for himself, and does not need to speak\u201d (2011:17). <\/span><\/p>\n

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In contrast hereto, parr?sia <\/i>is exactly truth-telling <\/i>(dire-vrai<\/i>) or free-spokeness <\/i>(franc-parler<\/i>) (Foucault 2010:42-43): the emphasis is thus on language and speech. Parr?sia <\/i>is not so much about the content of the truth; it is a particular way, or particular ways, of telling the truth (2010:52,192). In contrast to the truth of the Platonic ideas which could be contemplated alone by the philosopher, parr?sia <\/i>cannot exist without language and speech. Thus, parr?sia <\/i>is an activity that involves more than one person. It is, in some way or another, a public activity which takes place in a constituted political space (2010:192). The nature of this activity and the people involved do, however, take many different forms in Foucault\u2019s sketch of a genealogy of parr?sia. <\/i><\/span><\/p>\n

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The practice of parr?sia <\/i>has, according to Foucault, its origins in politics and \u201cpolitical\u201d parr?sia <\/i>is therefore historically prior to \u201cphilosophical\u201d parr?sia<\/i>. The practice of parr?sia <\/i>was, according to Foucault, one of the core principles of Athenian democracy together with\u2014but sharply distinguished from\u2014isonomia <\/i>and is?goria<\/i>; principles that are roughly translatable as equality before the law and the equal right to address the assembly for all citizens of Athens (2010:150). Though all Athenian citizens have an equal right to speak (is?goria<\/i>), <\/i>only a small elite, those who are in the foremost rank (pr?ton zugon<\/i>) and of extraordinary personal and moral qualities, claim their right\u2014and are meant to claim their right(!)\u2014to address the assembly (2010:188, 300, 318). Where is?goria <\/i>(at least formally) is for everyone, parr?sia <\/i>is for the few. These few are those who aspire to ascend in the ranks of society through the agonistic game of recognition in order to take charge of the city through their parr?siatic practice (2010:156). The game of truth-telling is the institutional framework designed in order to select the genuine elite among the competitors. <\/span><\/p>\n

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Thus, ancient democracy has an ambivalent relationship to political elitism: on the one hand, the right to speak is equally distributed (is?goria<\/i>), on the other hand, not everyone can speak (parr?sia<\/i>) (2010:183). Democracy and parr?sia <\/i>therefore relate to each other in a paradoxical way: parr?sia <\/i>is only possible within the formally equal democratic agonistic game of truth-telling, but at the same time parr?sia <\/i>introduces elitism into democracy completely different from the egalitarian structure of democracy (2010:184). Parr?sia <\/i>is therefore a threat to democracy. However, at the same time, democracy cannot do without parr?sia<\/i> since it is the core of the democratic form of government.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Though paradoxical, the game of parr?sia, <\/i>Foucault argues, is necessary for the survival of democracy. Parr?sia <\/i>is the institutional framework that allows the political elite to ascend in a legitimate manner in order to take charge of the city (2010:158, 178). Where the institutional framework of modern democracy makes it possible for the political elite to be selected by elections, the institutional framework of ancient democracy had the political elite selected by the agonistic game of parr?sia. <\/i>This game of truth-telling, which allows for the genuine political elite to take charge of the city through their practice of parr?sia, <\/i>is what Foucault presents as the core of ancient democracy (2010:180-1). Foucault\u2019s ideal typical example of \u201cpolitical\u201d parr?sia <\/i>is Pericles as he is represented in his famous speech in Thucydides\u2019 The Peloponnesian Wars <\/i>(Foucault 2010:179).<\/span><\/p>\n

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In order only to have the genuine political elite ascend in the democratic game of truth telling, the parrh?siast speaks at a very high but uncertain risk which might include ostracism or death penalty. The parrh?siast should therefore find what he wants to say so important that he is willing to risk his life in order to frankly say what he finds to be the truth; an institutional check that one would think discourages most people from addressing the assembly. This is why courage is needed in order to engage in the practice of truth-telling.<\/span><\/p>\n

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The problem is, however, that after the death of Pericles the institutional check of the risk of truth-telling no longer was perceived as successful (Foucault 2010:181). The core of the critique of the fourth and fifth century B.C, but also more generally of the ancient democratic institutional framework characterized by parr?sia, <\/i>is, according to Foucault, that it cannot discriminate between \u201cgood\u201d and \u201cbad\u201d parr?sia. <\/i>That is, the political practice of parr?sia <\/i>can be misused by the good rhetorician or the demagogue through flattery or \u201cfalse truth-telling\u201d (2010:180ff). The problem is that the institutional framework of democracy, constituted in order to have the elite ascend, allows all good speakers to ascend; also those who do not have the extraordinary qualities of Pericles. The game of truth-telling can therefore not distinguish between the rhetorician and the parr?siast<\/i>. At least, Foucault points out, this seems to have appeared as a problem for the Greeks after the death of Pericles (Foucault 2010:181). A more contemporary formulation of the problem is that of populism: those who have the ability to charm the assembly will be able to take charge of the city. <\/span><\/p>\n

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The problem of the inherent danger of \u201cbad\u201d parr?sia<\/i> in a democracy is according to Foucault of serious nature for the Athenian democracy because parr?sia<\/i> is the governmentality of the polis<\/i>: \u201cIf democracy can be governed, it is because there is true discourse\u201d (2010:184). The relationship between democracy and parr?sia <\/i>is thus paradoxical in yet another way: on the one hand, democracy cannot exist without parr?sia<\/i>, but on the other hand, the equality of democracy gives birth to the \u201cbad\u201d parr?sia <\/i>that is a constant threat to the survival of parr?sia <\/i>within democracy. Thus democracy and parr?sia, <\/i>though mutually constitutive, present inherent threats to one another. In light of Foucault\u2019s narrative, \u201cpolitical\u201d parr?sia <\/i>seems doomed to fail. <\/span><\/p>\n

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The myth of the ideal city<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

One question seems to have been of particular importance in context of the problematic relationship between democracy and parr?sia<\/i>: the question of whether an ideal city exists in which the truth can appear without the dangerous game of parr?sia<\/i> (Foucault 2010:195)? This question is of course extensively dealt with in Plato\u2019s the Republic, <\/i>which concluded that the best city is that in which the philosophers rule; the conception of politics in which Arendt sees the birth of Western totalitarian thought manifested.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Interestingly enough, however, Foucault argues that Plato\u2019s understanding of the relationship between truth and politics should neither be found in the Republic <\/i>nor in the Laws.<\/i> These <\/i>works were, according to Foucault, not \u201cserious\u201d philosophical works and they should \u201cbe handled as cautiously as a myth\u201d (Foucault 2010: <\/i>253). Though it is a quite astounding thesis that the Republic <\/i>and the Laws<\/i> are \u201cunserious\u201d works, it is even more curious that Arendt, though for different reasons, presents the same argument in her Lectures on Kant\u2019s Political Philosophy. <\/i>Arendt sites Pascal\u2019s words as a possible exaggeration that however does not \u201cmiss the mark\u201d:<\/i><\/span><\/p>\n

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\u201cWe can only think of Plato and Aristotle in grand academic robes. They were honest men, like others, laughing with their friends, and when they wanted to divert themselves, they wrote the Laws or the Republic, to amuse themselves. That part of their life was the least philosophic and the least serious. The most philosophical [thing] was to live simply and quietly. If they wrote on politics, it was like laying down rules for a lunatic asylum; if they presented the appearance of speaking of great matters, it was because they knew that the madmen, to whom they spoke, thought they were kings and emperors. They entered into their principles in order to make their madness as little harmful as possible<\/i>\u201d (Arendt 1992:22). <\/i>\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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According to Arendt, Plato wrote the Republic,<\/i> in order to justify that the philosophers became kings, not because they would enjoy to rule, but in order that they should not be ruled by worse men than themselves that would interfere with the quiet and absolute peace that constituted the best conditions for the philosophical<\/i> life <\/i>(1992:21). Even for Aristotle, Arendt argues, the bios politicos <\/i>was there for the sake of the bios the?retik?s<\/i> (Ibid.). The purpose of politics was thus not<\/i> to realize a philosophical doctrine but to create a possibility for, or merely not intervene in, the life of the philosophers: the birth of totalitarianism in the Republic <\/i>must therefore be understood, not as a realization of philosophy, but as a problematic means to the philosophical life.<\/span><\/p>\n

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What Foucault and Arendt seem to agree on is that the core of philosophy for the Greeks was not doctrine (math?sis<\/i>); a set of principles that could be learned and applied. For this reason, as Foucault points out, Plato stressed that philosophy could not be written down (2010: <\/i>252); philosophy was an activity or a way of life. It is not, and ought not to be, the task of philosophy to prescribe the content of politics. This is why the Republic <\/i>and the Laws, <\/i>according to Foucault, <\/i>should be dealt with as cautiously as the myth: \u201cSo what philosophy has to say will certainly be said through this nomothetic game, as it is through the mythic game, but in order to say something else\u201d (2010: <\/i>253). Philosophy can thus not give an answer to the question: \u201cwhat is to be done?\u201d This does, however, not mean that philosophy does not relate to politics, according to Foucault. On the contrary, Foucault argues, the test of philosophy\u2019s reality, in the case of Plato, is whether philosophy \u201cescapes the danger of being no more than logos<\/i>\u201d (2010: <\/i>255).<\/span><\/p>\n

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\u201cPhilosophical\u201d parr?sia<\/i><\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

The seriousness of the Platonic philosophy is, according to Foucault, to be found in Plato\u2019s Letters <\/i>(Foucault 2010: <\/i>254-5). The letters are important in order to understand how philosophy was perceived not merely as a reflection upon politics but also an intervention into politics (2010: <\/i>210); something \u201cmore\u201d than logos.<\/i> Foucault is especially interested in letter VII, in which Plato narrates his journey and s\u00e9jour <\/i>at the court of the Syracusian tyrant Dionysius. Letter VII is, according to Foucault, a part of a general shift of the political scene from the agora <\/i>and the ?kkl?sia <\/i>towards the court of the sovereign (the prince\u2019s soul) (Ibid.). Parr?sia, <\/i>therefore, cannot be understood as praxis peculiar to the democratic form of government; \u201cthe problem of parr?sia <\/i>arises under any form of government\u201d (Foucault 2010: <\/i>212). <\/span><\/p>\n

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This shift away from the \u201cpolitical\u201d parr?sia <\/i>of democracy is explained by Plato (or whoever is the author) in letter V: bad parr?sia <\/i>has corrupted the Athenian population to such an extent that they are beyond the scope of reform (2010: <\/i>213). According to Foucault\u2019s reading of letter VII, the shift is, however, not merely away from democracy but also from political action as such. In light of Plato\u2019s negative experiences both with oligarchy and democracy (exemplified by the unjust treatment of Socrates both by the thirty tyrants and by the ekkl?sia<\/i>), Plato realized that political action and parr?sia <\/i>no longer were possible (Foucault 2010: <\/i>216-7). <\/span><\/p>\n

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Plato, Foucault argues, therefore turns to a new parrh?siastic praxis; the education of the prince\u2019s soul by the philosopher in the role of the counsellor. The philosophical ergon <\/i>thus become that of the educator or counsellor in order to make the king into a philosopher (Foucault 2010: <\/i>218): \u201cthere will be no cessation of evils for the sons of men,\u201d it is stated in letter VII \u201ctill either those who are pursuing a right and true philosophy receive sovereign power in the States, or those in power in the States by some dispensation of providence become true philosophers.\u201d[3]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

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It is here important to clarify that the role of the philosopher as a parr?siastic <\/i>advisor does not consist in stating what the content of politics should be; the philosopher is not a \u201cpolitical expert.\u201d The education of the Prince\u2019 soul, the philosophical ergon, <\/i>is the education, not primarily in math?sis <\/i>(content of knowledge, or a philosophical doctrine) but in ask?sis <\/i>(a mode of life, the philosophical life): \u201cthe reality of philosophy is its practice\u201d (Foucault 2010:219,242,247).This practice is however not primarily philosophy as discourse (logos<\/i>) but the work on oneself, or a relationship of self to self: \u201cThe reality of philosophy is the work of self on self\u201c (2010:242).The role of the philosopher is, so to speak, not to teach the prince what he has to do, but who he has to be (Ibid.). <\/span><\/p>\n

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Philosophical parr?sia<\/i> is the education of the prince\u2019s soul in the philosophical mode of life, ask?sis, <\/i>which is a government of oneself in order make the prince become a philosopher (Foucault 2010:219). In this way, philosophy and politics correlate in the education of the prince\u2019s soul. Philosophy and politics ought not to coincide in a doctrine (Arendt\u2019s fear): \u201cI think that the misfortune and ambiguity of the relations between philosophy and politics,\u201d Foucault writes \u201cstems from and are no doubt due to the fact that philosophical veridiction has sometimes wanted to think of itself in terms of (\u2026) philosophical doctrine [\u2026] Philosophy and politics must exist in relation, in a correlation; they must never coincide. This, if you like, is the general theme that we can extract from Plato\u2019s text\u201d (2010:289).The only place where philosophy and politics coincide is in the soul of the well-educated prince (2010:293). This is, according to Foucault, the genuine Platonic meaning of the \u201cphilosopher king\u201d and the true meaning of the \u201cmythical game\u201d of the Republic.<\/i>\u00a0 <\/span><\/p>\n

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\u201cPhilosophico-ethical\u201d parr?sia <\/i><\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

In his discussion of Socrates as a parrhesiast, Foucault develops the conception of philosophical parr?sia <\/i>as a mode of being, a relation of the self to the self, in more detail. One important aspect of the philosophical selfhood, according to Foucault, is expressed in how the conflict between philosophy and rhetoric is portrayed in Plato\u2019s the Apology <\/i>(Foucault 2010:310).<\/i> This conflict is important for Foucault because he argues that a fight over the monopoly of parr?sia <\/i>took place between philosophy and rhetoric (2010:304). Where rhetoric is a skill (tekhn?<\/i>) which allows the speaker to persuade his audience independently of the rhetorician\u2019s own beliefs, the philosophical speech <\/i>takes its meaning, not from a relationship to the audience, but a relationship to the speaker himself. For this reason, Socrates describes himself as a truth-telling man without tekhn? <\/i>(Foucault 2010:312).<\/i> This non-technical form of speech is characterized by a harmony of truth (al?theia<\/i>) and the belief (pistis<\/i>) of the speaker. Where the rhetorical language is crafted to produce effects in the audience, the philosophical parr?sia <\/i>is a frank statement of what the speaker believes to be the truth (Foucault 2010:314-315). <\/i>Philosophical parr?sia <\/i>is thus characterized by an authentic relationship to the self; a care for the self. It is characterized by a harmony between speaking and living; a life in harmony with virtue (Foucault 2011:169).<\/span><\/p>\n

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It is this care for the self that makes Socrates refuse to commit injustice, which he argues, that he has been asked to do both under the rule of the thirty tyrants and in the Athenian democracy (Foucault 2010:318). In both cases Socrates resists; a resistance that has become the ideal typical example of individual philosophical resistance hereafter (Foucault 2010:216). This refusal to comply is, according to Foucault, a manifestation of Socratic parr?sia <\/i>(2010:319). <\/i>The Socratic parr?sia <\/i>is negative in the sense that it is a refusal to act and speak in the political field (as Pericles did). Socratic parr?sia <\/i>nevertheless receives its meaning in relation to politics; in a refusal to commit an injustice. With Socrates, \u201cphilosophical\u201d parr?sia <\/i>shifts towards a manifestation of \u201cethical\u201d parr?sia<\/i>; Socratic parr?sia <\/i>is \u201cphilosophico-ethical.\u201d[4]<\/span><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

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Socratic parr?sia<\/i> is, as Foucault notes, a quite \u201cdiscrete\u201d form of parr?sia <\/i>because it exactly is an abstention from action (2010:319). Socratic parr?sia <\/i>is an act of what we today know as civic disobedience: when ordered to arrest a man, Socrates does not comply and returns home openly and publicly (Foucault 2010:320). What is at stake is thus not discourse (logos<\/i>) but action (ergos<\/i>): \u201cAfter all, parr?sia <\/i>may appear in the things themselves,\u201d Foucault writes, \u201cit may appear in ways of doing things, it may appear in ways of being\u201d (2010:320).<\/span><\/p>\n

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\u201cPhilosophico-ethical\u201d parr?sia <\/i>is, however, for Socrates more than the refusal of becoming a subject of an unjust political action. The philosophical parr?sia <\/i>which Socrates lives\u2014\u201cthe task he had decided to pursue until his last breath, the task to which he had bound his life, and for which he refuses any payment or reward\u201d (Foucault 2010:326)\u2014is to listen <\/i>to anyone, rich as poor, and help them understand that they should not care about wealth or glory, but about themselves. And, that caring about themselves primarily consists in \u201cknowing whether or not one knows what one knows\u201d (Ibid.). That is, philosophical parr?sia <\/i>is for Socrates to cure people of the common and false opinion that corrupt their souls and have them think for themselves (Foucault 2011:105ff). A true life is a life free of prejudice. The site of philosophical parr?sia <\/i>has thus shifted from the prince\u2019 soul to the lives and souls of all the people Socrates met. <\/i>Socratic parr?sia <\/i>is thus practicing philosophy itself, caring for oneself and telling others to care for themselves (Foucault 2011:111-112). <\/i><\/span><\/p>\n

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The core of Socratic parr?sia<\/i>, as for the Platonic parr?sia, <\/i>is not the question of the content of politics but the question of the political subject: \u201cPhilosophy\u2019s question is not the question of politics,\u201d Foucault writes \u201cit is the question of the subject in politics\u201d (2010:319). <\/i>What is at stake in Socratic parr?sia <\/i>is not the safety of the city (as in the Periclesian parr?sia <\/i>at the dawn of the Peloponnesian Wars). What is at stake is the integrity of the philosophical life as true life. With Socrates\u2019 refusal to commit an injustice and his commitment to listen to anyone and help them to live a true life, parr?sia <\/i>is no longer a particular way of speaking the truth; parr?sia <\/i>is a way of living the truth through practices on the self by the self: \u201cBeing an agent of the truth,\u201d Foucault writes, \u201cand as a philosopher claiming for oneself the monopoly of parr?sia, <\/i>will not just mean claiming that one can state the truth in teaching, in the advice one gives, and in the speeches one makes, but that one really is in fact, in one\u2019s life, an agent of the truth\u201d (2010:320).<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n

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\u201cEthical\u201d parr?sia <\/i><\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

The understanding of philosophical parr?sia <\/i>as a true life, or beautiful life, is even more thoroughly manifested in the life of the Cynics with Diogenes (most often referred to as \u201cDiogenes the Cynic\u201d or \u201cDiogenes in the Barrel\u201d) as the prime example.\u00a0 To underline this, Foucault refers to a description by Diogenes Laertius of Diogenes the Cynic: when Diogenes is asked what the most beautiful in men is, he answers: parr?sia <\/i>(Foucault 2011:166).<\/i> For Diogenes, the true life is the exercise of parr?sia. <\/i>The Cynics\u2019 parr?sia <\/i>is the full manifestation of \u201cethical\u201d parr?sia <\/i>because they barely have a \u201cdoctrine,\u201d that is, the theoretical framework of the cynics is rudimentary and that is exactly something they take pride in (Foucault 2011:165,204). What is at stake in Cynic philosophy is not math?sis <\/i>but ask?sis<\/i>; what is at stake is the true and beautiful life.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Though the life of the Cynics can be understood as closely related to Socratic parr?sia <\/i>as living and speaking in accordance with a conception of the true life (Socrates\u2019 refusal to become an unjust man), the Cynics mode of life is more than a harmonic life in accordance with certain virtues such as temperance, courage or wisdom (Foucault 2011:169). The cynic life is a highly codified life; a true and beautiful life. The core of this life is that one practice the \u201cscandal\u201d of truth by words and deeds. <\/span><\/p>\n

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The cynic life is a life of renunciation of material wealth: \u201cThe Cynic is the man with the staff, the beggar\u2019s pouch, the cloak, the man with the sandals or bare feet, the man with the long beards, the dirty man\u201d (Foucault 2011:170). The Cynic has no family, no household, and most astonishingly, no country (Ibid.). This renunciation of everything that for the Greeks signified a dignified life makes the Cynic independent and free. Since the Cynic does not depend on anyone his is \u201csovereign\u201d of his own life (Foucault 2011:271, 307ff). No one can take his property because he does not own anything; no one can ostracise him from his fatherland because he has none. <\/span><\/p>\n

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This extreme renunciation of material wealth gives the Cynic the freedom to speak the truth to anyone: the life of the Cynic is the precondition for the exercise of parr?sia <\/i>(Foucault 2011:171).<\/i> The scene of parr?sia <\/i>shifts with the Cynic away from the ?kkl?sia <\/i>(Pericles), the soul of the prince (Plato), the people of Athens (Socrates) to \u201chumanity\u201d (Cynics). The Cynic is the \u201cscout\u201d or \u201cspy\u201d for humanity: \u201cif one wishes to be humanity\u2019s spy,\u201d Foucault writes \u201c[and] tell humanity frankly and courageously all the danger it might face and where its true enemies are to be found, then one must have no attachments\u201d (2011:170) .The cynic life is a manifestation of what life is in its independence. For the Cynics, true life is therefore not merely life in accordance with principles; for the Cynics, bios <\/i>as such becomes a manifestation of truth (Foucault 2011:172). For the Cynics, parr?sia <\/i>is therefore more truth-living <\/i>than truth-telling. <\/i>Truth is manifested in ask?sis,<\/i> discipline, and \u201cthe bareness of life\u201d (Foucault 2011:173).<\/span><\/p>\n

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Since math?sis <\/i>plays next to no role in Cynic parr?sia<\/i>, the only way to learn Cynic philosophy is by living a cynic life. For the Cynics, teaching philosophy did not consist in passing on knowledge but in moral training (Foucault 2011:204). Foucault gives an example hereupon by referring to the way in which Diogenes taught the children of Xeniander: Diogenes taught the children to wait on themselves without calling upon servants or slaves, he taught them to wear simple clothes and walking without shoes, he taught them to walk on the streets and keep their eyes low, he taught them to hunt their own food etc. (Foucault 2011:204-5) In this way, the children went through an \u201capprenticeship in independence\u201d (Ibid.). The Cynics are for this reason, according to Foucault, one of the first manifestations of philosophical \u201cheroism\u201d: the Cynic is one to follow and imitate if one desires to live a true life; a genuinely sovereign life. The cynic life is true life as the government of oneself.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Parr?sia <\/span><\/i><\/b>as ontology of the present<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

Though Foucault spends the vast majority of the two last lectures he gave at the Coll\u00e8ge de France<\/i> on the topic of ethics in ancient Athens, it seems to me that these lectures should be read, not primarily as a contribution to the history of ancient philosophy, but as a part of Foucault\u2019s general project of writing an ontology of the present or an ontology of ourselves (Foucault 1984). This question of the present\u2014the \u201cwhat is happing today?\u201d or \u201cwhat is the meaning of our present reality?\u201d\u2014is according to Foucault the historically new question which Kant as the first thinker raised in \u201cWhat is Enlightenment?\u201d; the text that Foucault chose as the epigraph of The Government of Self and Others <\/i>(2010:11ff).<\/i><\/span><\/p>\n

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The epigraph is at first glance peculiar: how can we understand the significance of \u201cWhat is Enlightenment?\u201d and the question of the ontology of the present as the epigraph to a lecture series on the praxis of parr?sia <\/i>in ancient Athens? I think the answer can be found towards the end of The Government of Self and Others <\/i>where Foucault returns to modern philosophy and Kant\u2019s philosophy in particular: \u201cif I began this year\u2019s lectures with Kant,\u201d Foucault writes \u201cit is inasmuch as Kant\u2019s text on the Aufkl\u00e4rung <\/i>is a certain way for philosophy, through the critique of the Aufkl\u00e4rung<\/i>, to become aware of problems which were traditionally problems of parr?sia <\/i>in antiquity\u201d (Foucault 2010:350). <\/span><\/p>\n

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In modern philosophy, and especially, in Kant\u2019s writings on the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, Foucault sees a reclamation of the praxis of parr?sia <\/i>by philosophy in the form of critique (Foucault 2010:353-4). There is however, according to Foucault, two openings of philosophical parr?sia <\/i>as critique in Kant\u2019s writings, which according to Foucault are mutually exclusive. Firstly, there is the critical form of thinking which according to Foucault is opened with the three Critiques, <\/i>but first and foremost by the first Critique<\/i>; a critical form of thinking that asks to the conditions for the possibilities of true knowledge (Foucault 2010:20). This, according to Foucault, is the opening of what we today call analytical philosophy (Ibid.) Secondly, there is a critical form of thinking, opened by Kant in his so-called \u201cpolitical writings\u201d on the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, which, according to Foucault asks to the question of the ontology of the present or the ontology of ourselves (Ibid.).<\/span><\/p>\n

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It is this second form of critical thinking which Foucault wants to associate himself with. According to Foucault, philosophy in the form of critical thinking of the ontology of the present is a parr?siastic <\/i>praxis by way of its reinterpretation of three pivotal aspects of the parr?sia <\/i>of ancient Athens: the relationship between philosophy and politics in critique, the frankness of critique with regard to prejudice and illusion, and critical thinking as a mode of being.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Firstly, philosophy as critique is, as the ancient praxis of parr?sia,<\/i> not a prescription of the content of politics. However, as in the case of ancient philosophy, critique constitutes its reality in relation to politics: \u201cIt is not for philosophy to say what should be done in politics,\u201d Foucault writes \u201c[philosophy] has to exist in a permanent and restive exteriority with regard to politics, and it is in this that it is real\u201d (2010:354). Philosophy consists in questioning the significance of events, as Kant did with regard to the French Revolution. Secondly, the role of critique is \u201cconstantly [to] practice its criticism with regard to deception, trickery, and illusion\u201d (2010:354). As for the Socratic praxis of parr?sia, <\/i>it is the role of philosophy as critique to ask to the prejudices that haunt \u201ccommon opinion,\u201d that is, to make us reflect upon whether we really know what we think that we know. Thirdly, philosophy as critique is always a way of life, ask?sis, <\/i>which implies the possibility of the transformation of the subject. Critique is always also self-critique, care of self and government of self. Critique following the Socratic manifestation of parr?sia <\/i>always and constantly implies the possibility that I, myself, might be wrong.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Thinking and public life<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

In addition to the reasons stated above, I think that Foucault chose Kant\u2019s \u201cWhat is Enlightenment?\u201d because it opens the question of the public: \u201cOne of the interesting things about this text [\u2026] is that it puts the notion of the public, to which the publication is addressed, at the very heart of its analysis\u201d (Foucault 2010:11ff). The reason this is an important question is that it points to another pivotal theme of parr?sia, <\/i>namely, that philosophy as critique can never be a solitary praxis. The ultimate meaning of philosophy as critique persists in the relationship of the self to others and thereby a critical relationship to oneself. Critical thinking as parr?sia <\/i>has to be a transformative praxis both with regard to self and others. This, I think, is part of what is meant by Foucault\u2019s famous last cryptic words in The Courage of Truth<\/i>: \u201cthere is no establishment of the truth without an essential position of otherness\u201d (2011:326).<\/span><\/p>\n

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This idea of the inherent otherness of critical thinking is a pivotal theme for Arendt in her late works. Though most of her writings are on politics and political life, and though she is well-known for a rigid distinction between the bios politikos <\/i>and the bios the?r?tikos,<\/i> several of her most famous works on politics address the relationship between thinking and politics in a quite different way.\u00a0 If Arendt ever believed that \u201cthe life of the mind\u201d was a passive mode of being (which I however doubt), she definitely changed her mind before <\/i>writing The Human Condition<\/i>; her work on the vita activa. <\/i>In the final chapter, Arendt addresses the possibilities of action as political freedom in our contemporary world, and surprisingly she concludes that the possibility of action in our contemporary world is to think<\/i>: \u201cThought, finally\u2014which we, following the premodern as well as the modern tradition, omitted from our reconsideration of the vita active\u2014<\/i>is still possible, and no doubt actual, wherever men live under conditions of political freedom\u201d (Arendt 1998:324).<\/span><\/p>\n

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Another notable example for the interconnection of thinking and politics is Arendt\u2019s judgment that the reason that Adolf Eichmann could commit the atrocities that he did was that he lacked the ability to think (Arendt 1971:4). Although Eichmann could recite the categorical imperative he did not have the ability to think; he did not have a critical relationship to himself and his actions (Arendt 2006:123). Thinking then, for Arendt as for Foucault, always receives its reality in relation to something different from itself. As for Foucault, thinking is for Arendt a praxis that involves an inherent otherness, which she famously describes with reference to Socrates as \u201cthe soundless dialogue between me and myself\u201d (1971:185). Thinking as well as the government of self imply an internalization of otherness, which becomes visible in our communication of what we do or what we think: \u201cI <\/i>govern myself,<\/i>\u201d \u201cI <\/i>know myself<\/i>\u201d or \u201cI<\/i> care for myself.<\/i>\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

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For this reason, I argue that if one\u2014on the basis Arendt\u2019s argument about the totalitarian aspect of the introduction of truth into politics\u2014would conclude that a radical disagreement exists between Arendt and Foucault, one might miss what I see to be their shared project: the political potentialities of critique and self-critique as parr?sia <\/i>(Foucault) or thinking <\/i>(Arendt). What is shared by their writings on these matters is the quite astonishing idea that what we do when we think or even write is something secondary<\/i> to a dialogue with someone else; it is an internalization of spoken language which always implies a listener. Philosophy and thinking are therefore inherently forms of shared and collective work which receives its meaning in relation to a community of other human beings; whether we call that politics (Foucault) or the public sphere (Arendt) is of less importance.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Foucault and Arendt are both Kantians in the sense that they belong to a tradition of thinkers that ask to the ontology of the present; to whom we are and what the significance of our present moment is. I therefore find it fitting to let Kant be the one to sign this essay with a statement taken from his political writings on the inherent public nature of what we do when we think: <\/span><\/p>\n

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\u201cIt is said: the freedom to speak or to write can be taken away from us by the power-that-be, but the freedom to think cannot be taken from us through them at all. However, how much and how correctly would we think if we did not think in community with others to whom we communicate our thoughts and who communicate theirs to us! Hence, we may safely state that the external power which deprives man of the freedom to communicate his thoughts publicly also takes away his freedom to think, the only treasure left to us in our civic life and through which alone there may be a remedy against all evils of the present state of affairs<\/i>\u201d (Arendt 1992:40-41).<\/span><\/p>\n

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Bibliography<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

Arendt, Hannah. Between Past and Future. <\/i>(New York: Viking Press, 1961).<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014The Life of the Mind One\/Thinking. <\/span><\/i>(New York: Hartcourt Brace Jovanovich. 1971). <\/i><\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014Lectures on Kant\u2019s Political Philosophy. <\/span><\/i>(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014The Human Condition. <\/span><\/i>(Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1998).<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014The Promise of Politics. <\/span><\/i>(New York: Schocken Books, 2005).<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014Eichmann in Jerusalem\u2014A Report on the Banality of Evil. <\/span><\/i>(London: Penguin Books, 2006).<\/span><\/p>\n

Foucault, Michel: \u201cWhat is Enlightenment?” in The Foucault Reader<\/i>, edited by Paul<\/span><\/p>\n

Rabinow, pp. 32-50. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984).<\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014The Government of Self and Others\u2014Lectures at the Coll\u00e8ge de France, 1982-1983. <\/span><\/i>(<\/span>New York: Picador, 2010)\u00a0 <\/span><\/p>\n

\u2014The Courage of Truth\u2014Lectures at the Coll\u00e8ge de France, 1983-1984. <\/span><\/i>(New York: Picador, 2011).<\/span><\/p>\n

Plato, letter VII: http:\/\/classics.mit.edu\/Plato\/seventh_letter.<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

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[1]<\/span><\/span><\/a> See Hannah Arendt: \u201dWhat is Authority?\u201d, in Between Past and Future. <\/i>New York: Viking Press, 1961, but even more clearly the except from Hannah Arendt\u2019s Denktagebuch, <\/i>September 1951 in The Promise of Politics. <\/i>New York: Schocken Books. 2005, <\/i>p. 3<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[2]<\/span><\/span><\/a> Arendt\u2019s and Foucault\u2019s lectures which later have been collected and published with respectively the titles Lectures on Kant\u2019s Political Philosophy <\/i>and The Government of Self and Others I-II<\/i>, were held respectively at the University of Chicago 1964 and then again at The New School for Social Research 1965-66, and, the at Coll\u00e8ge de France 1982-84<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[3]<\/span><\/span><\/a> See Plato, letter VII: http:\/\/classics.mit.edu\/Plato\/seventh_letter.html<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[4]<\/span><\/span><\/a> In The Government of Self and Others, <\/i>Foucault mainly describes Socratic parr?sia <\/i>as \u201cphilosophical\u201d, <\/i>but in The Courage of Truth, <\/i>where his focus seems to have shifted a bit, he mainly describes Socratic parr?sia <\/i>as \u201cethical.\u201d In my reading I hold that Socratic parr?sia <\/i>are both \u201cphilosophical\u201d and \u201cethical.\u201d For that reason I describe it as \u201cphilosophico-ethical\u201d; a term Foucault does not use himself.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The starting point of this paper is Hannah Arendt\u2019s diagnosis that the introduction of philosophical truth into politics leads to tyrannical or totalitarian outcomes. A critique of this diagnosis is offered on the basis of Michel Foucault\u2019s last lectures at the Coll\u00e8ge de France<\/i> where he discussed the practices of parr?sia, <\/i>\u201ctruth-telling,\u201d as multiple forms of political life of resistance, critique, and contestation. The common denominator of all parrh?siastic <\/i>practices is that none of them are concerned with \u201cdoctrines.\u201d That is, none of them are concerned with laying out the \u201ccontent\u201d of politics. After the paper has identified and expounded four different manifestations of parr?sia<\/i>\u2014\u201cpolitical\u201d <\/i>(Pericles), \u201cphilosophical\u201d <\/i>(Plato), \u201cphilosophical-ethical\u201d <\/i>(Socrates) and \u201cethical\u201d <\/i>(Diogenes the Cynic)\u2014an argument is presented for a kinship, instead of a difference, between Foucault and Arendt as parrh?siastic or critical thinkers within the same tradition of political Kantianism.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":321,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_exactmetrics_skip_tracking":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_active":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_note":"","_exactmetrics_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[76],"tags":[862,861,860,859,863],"coauthors":[1114],"class_list":["post-350","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-c75-conference-paper","tag-cynicism","tag-hannah-arendt","tag-michel-foucault","tag-parrsia","tag-political-kantianism"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/350","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/321"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=350"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/350\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1319,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/350\/revisions\/1319"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=350"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=350"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=350"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=350"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}