{"id":1430,"date":"2016-09-24T09:06:03","date_gmt":"2016-09-24T09:06:03","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/?p=1430"},"modified":"2016-11-05T14:46:17","modified_gmt":"2016-11-05T14:46:17","slug":"the-economic-ethics-of-arthur-fridolin-utz","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/volume-11-no-3-2016\/conference-proceeding-volume-11-no-3-2016\/the-economic-ethics-of-arthur-fridolin-utz\/","title":{"rendered":"The Economic Ethics of Arthur Fridolin Utz"},"content":{"rendered":"\n\n\n\t
\n\n\t\t<\/i><\/span> <\/a>\n\n\t<\/div>\n\n\n\n\n\n

Introductory remarks<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

The present essay offers a detailed, reasoned synopsis and a brief discussion of the 1994 book Economic Ethics<\/em>,[1]<\/u><\/a> written by the German-Swiss[2]<\/u><\/a> social philosopher Arthur Fridolin Utz (1908-2001).[3]<\/u><\/a> Utz is known chiefly in German-speaking theological circles and in Catholic ones in particular. He is also known in those of southern Europe where, to date, only a few of his many books have been translated into Spanish, French and Italian.[4]<\/u><\/a> Utz\u2019s research deserves attention, both for its inherent value and in connection with Peter Koslowski\u2019s reflections on economic ethics, about which Jacob Dahl Rendtorff has recently reported to our NSU research group.[5]<\/u><\/a> Thus, this essay is a spin-off of Jacob\u2019s own foray into economic ethics and an integration of the same, for it deals with a different, well-established approach. Equally, it is an attempt at bringing to the attention of Nordic scholars, especially in the human and social sciences, the work of a thinker that is still hardly known in my adoptive country, Iceland, as well as in Scandinavia. Finally, given the absence of English-language translations and comprehensive studies of Utz\u2019s books, it is also a useful reference work for Anglophone academia at large.[6]<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n

For almost thirty years, Utz taught social and moral philosophy, economic ethics and legal theory at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland, where he also directed the International Institute for Social and Political Sciences of the Union of Fribourg.[7]<\/u><\/a> Together with Austria\u2019s Johannes Messner (1891-1984),[8]<\/u><\/a> Utz was a key-member of the German-speaking Catholic school of thought that, in post-war Europe, exercised considerable influence in the development of both the Social Doctrine of the Church[9]<\/u><\/a> (also known as Catholic Social Teaching; hereafter SDC) and the social market economy, which was promoted by Christian-democratic parties both at a national level (especially in former Western Germany[10]<\/u><\/a>, Austria[11]<\/u><\/a> and Switzerland) and at a continental one (i.e. in what we call today the European Union).[12]<\/u><\/a> Among Utz\u2019s interlocutors on economic matters were the World-famous Canadian-born liberal economist John Kenneth Galbraith (1908-2006) and the Czech socialist economist Ota \u0160ik (1919-2004), who is best remembered as the architect of the economic section of Dub\u010dek\u2019s Action Programme in the Prague Spring of 1968.<\/p>\n

The book is the fourth instalment in the author\u2019s monumental Social Ethics<\/em>, which comprises five volumes in total: (1) Principles of the Social Doctrine <\/em>(1958; 2nd<\/sup> ed.1964); (2); Philosophy of Law<\/em> (1963); (3) The Social Order <\/em>(1986); (4) Economic Ethics <\/em>(1994); and (5) Political Ethics<\/em> (2000).[13]<\/u><\/a> None of these volumes has been translated into English yet. I myself, being far from fluent in German, owe my acquaintance with Utz to the Italian translations of volumes 4 (1999) and 5 (2008) of his Social Ethics<\/em>, both published by San Paolo, and to the 1997 French translation of his 1975 book Zwischen Neoliberalismus und Neomarxismus: <\/em>die Philosophie des dritten Weges<\/em> (K\u00f6ln: P. Hanstein).[14]<\/u><\/a> Before engaging in the detailed, reasoned synopsis of the book, I summarise here its main elements.<\/p>\n

In his Economic Ethics<\/em>, Utz applies a Thomistic ethics to the domain of economics. Economic life is thus seen as a sub-domain of human and, as such, of social life\u2014for we are essentially social animals. Henceforth, economic life can be deemed good or bad on the basis of whether it assists coherently in the realisation of the inherent ends of the human person, who is essentially social.[15]<\/u><\/a> Thomistic ethics is a teleological ethics: human actions have a defining material object\u2014for example eating has the acquisition of nourishment as its proper object\u2014and also a defining human end\u2014for example eating aims at sustaining the person towards her achievement of happiness.[16]<\/u><\/a> Human reason, albeit imperfect, is considered capable of abstracting from experience the fundamental principles of organisation of reality, including the aims that are natural and therefore truly positive for creatures, their societies and creation itself to have.[17]<\/u><\/a> Articulate, logical reasoning upon experience can produce knowledge of the deepest layers of reality, while empirical science stays closer to the surface of observable, quantifiable facts.[18]<\/u><\/a> As Utz writes: \u201cThe philosopher moves at the level of inherently immutable essences\u201d, provided that she starts her \u201cabstraction\u201d from concrete \u201cempirical-ontological data\u201d (1.2.3).[19]<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n

Humanists be optimists.[20]<\/u><\/a> Our natural faculties, albeit imperfect, are still capable of identifying what \u201cnatura humana<\/em>\u201d consists in, especially if they make use of the body of intelligent reflection on human experience provided by centuries of philosophical and theological study, rather than rejecting it as archaic or unscientific (1.2.4).[21]<\/u><\/a> Building on tradition, intuition, observation (including the scientific one) and reflection, human intelligence can dig deep.[22]<\/u><\/a> This is the specific contribution that philosophy, in its Thomistic understanding, can make to human knowledge. This is what, according to Utz, metaphysicians and ethicists can do that is unique to their profession. In the field of economics too, the philosopher can ascertain deeper and more essential aims of economic agency, which the economist would not consider, for she would limit her investigation to the \u201ctechnical questions\u201d of economics (1.2.6.2).[23]<\/u><\/a> For example, a philosopher can assess as negative a booming national or international economy, which grants unprecedented wealth to the members of today\u2019s society and yet imperils the wellbeing of tomorrow\u2019s society because of the overexploitation of natural resources.[24]<\/u><\/a> Empirical data are the beginning of reflective wisdom, not its end.<\/p>\n

Utz discusses the deeper and more essential aims of personal and social life, of which economic life is but a part, in the first instalment of his five-volume-strong Social Ethics<\/em>. In the present volume, he merely hints at some of them. In addition to expressing general agreement vis-\u00e0-vis <\/em>Ota \u0160ik\u2019s list of universal human needs (4.1), Utz speaks recurrently of bodily sustenance (e.g. 1.1), meaningful and dignified self-direction (e.g. 1.2.3), family life (e.g. 1.2.4), acculturation (e.g. 1.1) and religious life (e.g. 1.2.6).[25]<\/u><\/a> In typical Thomistic fashion, \u201cGod\u201d is defined as \u201cthe ultimate and integral end of the human being\u201d, i.e. the true attainment of \u201chappiness\u201d or \u201cperfection\u201d (1.2.6). Having such an ultimate end in the next life means that, in this life, we ought to pursue the penultimate ends of virtuous behaviour (i.e. prudence, temperance, justice, etc.), all of which can be sought only by way of consistent, responsible, personal agency under particular social circumstances (1.2.6). The good life, i.e. the road to human fulfilment, consists in the harmony of coherent natural aims that self-instantiate in each person\u2019s actions within society.[26]<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n

Plurality of aims is generally the case and is often good, i.e. consonant with natura humana<\/em>. Sometimes, however, the opposite is good too. First of all, not any aim is equally good: some can be better; some can be bad. Secondly, some aims can be good for everyone. Examples of coherent aims that are valuable and common to all humankind are \u201cuniversal human rights\u201d, which Utz mentions as the most obvious and glaring negation of individualistic and cultural relativism (1.2.4).[27]<\/u><\/a> Though differences among individuals and cultures do exist and may contribute to the proper functioning of human societies, there exists a fundamental shared ground, which the Thomistic tradition would dub rational or natural. It is, in essence, the life-enabling ground identified by the Thomistic \u201cnatural law\u201d tradition, upon which human rights jurisprudence was developed over the centuries (1.2.4).[28]<\/u><\/a> Similarly, there may be differences among national economies, their laws, business environments and specific arrangements, but only economic organisations consistent with the nature of the human person can be good, as they succeed in establishing the specifically economic conditions facilitating each person\u2019s pursuit of happiness, or \u201cperfection\u201d (1.1). Thus, after examining the various natural needs of humankind and the main varieties of economic order experimented with during the 20th<\/sup> century, the book concludes that \u201cthe only real\u201d definition of an ethical economy, i.e. one \u201ccorrespond[ing] to the integral economic ends of man\u201d, is the following: \u201cthe competition economy, founded on the universal right to private property, both for production and consumption, with the greatest possible diffusion of productive property, with stability of price levels and full employment<\/em>.\u201d (7.8.6; emphasis in the original).[29]<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n

Detailed, reasoned synopsis of the book<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

The Overall Structure<\/strong><\/p>\n

Utz\u2019s Economic Ethics<\/em> comprises twelve chapters, which are conceptually ordered like a Gothic arch. After the preface, the first chapter articulates a lengthy introduction to possible definitions and studies of the economy, including an ethical study of it. The ensuing five chapters address, in light of Thomistic ethics, seven fundamental categories that apply to any economy: (i) \u201corder\u201d or \u201csystem\u201d; (ii) \u201crationality\u201d; (iii) \u201cneed\u201d; (iv-vi) \u201cfactors of production\u201d (i.e. land, labour and capital); and (vii) \u201cproperty\u201d. Other basic economic categories\u2014such as efficiency, growth, want and gain\u2014are also addressed, but as corollaries of these seven. The seventh chapter, which constitutes a sort of apex within the volume, evaluates the main modern economic systems and significant varieties thereof. The successive short five chapters apply the critical wisdom produced in the previous ones to specific issues of modern market economies, e.g. inflation, currency speculation, structural unemployment. A vast, thematically structured bibliography and two alphabetically organised critical indexes of, respectively, cited persons and cited topics, conclude the 379-page-long book.[30]<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n

The Preface<\/strong><\/p>\n

The book\u2019s preface, unlike most, contains some very important statements. Utz\u2014he too unlike most thinkers\u2014shows his philosophical cards from the very start. Instead of feigning neutrality or assuming uncritically theoretical presuppositions that may be shared by his audience and therefore taken as obvious, he states that the \u201cethics\u201d to be applied in his book is a specific one, namely \u201cthe teleological ethics of Thomas Aquinas\u201d (p.5). The reason for this choice is that, after \u201csixty-five years\u201d of keen philosophical scholarship, \u201cno other ethics\u201d has proven to be nearly as \u201cadequate in order to find the logical path leading from universally valid human norms to the correct solution of concrete practical problems\u201d (id.). According to Utz, Aquinas\u2019 \u201cnatural law\u201d, which lies at the heart of the \u201cuniversal human rights\u201d (1.2.4) cherished by most political and legal thinkers, is also the best theoretical framework to understand and defend them, leaving aside the \u201csuperficiality\u201d and \u201cdreadful ignorance\u201d (p.5) of many intellectuals, who discarded Aquinas\u2019 wealth of knowledge without truly studying it, e.g. Hans Kelsen (cf. p.5n). If Utz\u2019s audience will listen to what he has to say, then it is good and well. If they will not, then Utz states that he is bound to sound like \u201cthe doctor of a patient suffering from addiction\u201d: correct, but unheeded (p.7).<\/p>\n

What does it mean to apply the teleological ethics of Thomas Aquinas to the field of economic phenomena? It means \u201cto investigate more deeply than those who have a merely empirical viewpoint\u201d (p.6). First of all, insofar as we, by studying economics, study cases of voluntary human agency, then we must acknowledge that economics has always and inescapably \u201ca moral background, even when the immediate object [of economic agency] is not of a moral nature\u201d (id.). All voluntary human agency, whether directly or indirectly, has origins (e.g. intentions) and repercussions (e.g. social effects) that are ethically laden.[31]<\/u><\/a> Secondly, following Aristotle\u2019s and Aquinas\u2019 understanding of human agency, there exist universal ends inscribed in nature, including human nature, which ethical reflection can identify. Knowing what these ends are, i.e. grasping \u201cthe meaning of creation and of the human being\u201d and how economic agency can help us fulfil these ends, means that \u201cthe integral good of the human being\u201d can be served, instead of a partial or a false one (pp.6-7). For instance, economists and businesspeople would be likely to welcome \u201cthe pure material success of capitalisation\u201d, as this is shown by a national economy\u2019s conspicuous growth, even if \u201cone third of the persons seeking employment is left out of the labour process.\u201d (p.7) A Thomistic assessment of the same \u201cmaterial success\u201d would not, for capitalisation of this ilk harms both materially and spiritually the unemployed, their families and their communities, and therefore works against integral human goodness by causing, inter alia<\/em>, \u201cmoral degradation\u2026 crime [and] addiction to narcotics\u201d (id.).<\/p>\n

Chapter One<\/strong><\/p>\n

In the first chapter, entitled \u201cThe scientific study of the economy\u201d, Utz defines the economy as \u201cthe activity whereby the human being\u201d qua <\/em>\u201ccorporeal being\u2026 meets the need for material goods in view of her own perfection\u201d, which, following Aristotle, is understood as the realisation of \u201cher many potentialities\u201d (1.1). Albeit each individual is free, \u201cin general she is already inclined by nature towards her final end\u201d i.e. \u201cperfection\u201d or \u201chappiness\u201d (1.1). Were a person to \u201cseek perfection outside her own nature\u201d, she would find none (1.1). Error is possible, in other words, for our nature is not perfect to begin with, nor is freedom a guarantee of its own good use. For instance, were a healthy person to choose freely to seek perfection without consideration of the interpersonal fellowship or of the rational mind characterising our species, she would find none, as both loneliness and irrationality are pernicious to wellbeing, survival and, a fortiori<\/em>, happiness. Happiness is the end towards which we are naturally inclined, but from which many men and women distance themselves in real life because of a plethora of deficiencies (e.g. lack of self-control, mistaken conceptions of the good, obtuse selfishness). Natural inclination is not natural determination. Health, knowledge and understanding are needed, among other things, in order to increase the chances of recognising, accepting and pursuing genuine, natural happiness as our key existential goal. Utz\u2019s initial definition of the economy is then refined as follows: \u201cthe totality of those actions whereby the human being utilises the material goods in order to meet her vital and cultural needs\u201d (1.1).<\/p>\n

Given our social nature and the fact that we share \u201cone and only one World\u201d, any real economy is bound to be \u201ca social economy\u201d, i.e. \u201cthe cooperative utilisation of the material goods to meet the vital and cultural needs of all<\/em>\u201d, as implied by commonplace phrases such as \u201ccommon good, national wellbeing or shared interest\u201d (1.1; emphasis added). Whether this end is better served by a \u201ccommunist or capitalist\u2026 form of organisation of the social economy\u201d is yet to be seen at this stage of Utz\u2019s argument, but one important substantial conclusion is already reached. \u201cSince humankind\u201d is de facto <\/em>\u201cwithout temporal limits\u201d and the \u201cWorld\u201d that we share is one and limited, \u201cevery economic community is duty-bound to use it with parsimony\u201d (1.1). The textbook distinction between \u201cscarce\u201d and \u201cnon-scarce\u201d goods is merely contingent (1.1). In absolute terms: \u201cAll goods are limited as concerns the needs of the entire humankind\u201d (1.1). Most \u201ceconomic science\u201d is myopic in this respect, for it focuses upon limited time-frames, despite being traditionally keen on the notion of \u201cscarcity\u201d (cf. textbook definitions of economics such as Paul A. Samuelson\u2019s; 1.1).<\/p>\n

The more an \u201ceconomic good\u201d does in fact \u201ccontribute to the fully human wellbeing of all\u201d, the higher is its \u201cvalue\u201d, which must not be confused with its \u201cprice\u201d (1.1). By \u201call\u201d Utz means all: not only those who are presently \u201ceconomically active\u201d, but also the inactive members of society (e.g. the infants, the elderly, the ill) and the \u201cgenerations\u201d to come (1.1). Their \u201cvital and cultural needs\u201d must be computed too, which implies that a \u201crational\u201d economy would not imperil the chances for a healthy and \u201csocially ordered\u201d existence of the human beings that will come after us (1.1). Their future cooperative efforts to attain \u201chuman perfection, i.e. the common good\u201d must be served too, even when this service may involve restrictions over present \u201cliberty\u201d (1.1). Within any well-ordered society, norms that qualify and, at times, restrict freedom are necessary in order to pursue the common good. Liberty is a pivotal human aim, but Utz does not prioritise it above all others, unlike many liberals.[32]<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n

Another point of contention with liberalism is the claim whereby the \u201cclassic theory of the national economy\u201d is allegedly \u201cvalue-neutral\u201d (1.2.1). According to Utz, this liberal theory does in fact \u201cposit surreptitiously determined axiological premises\u201d, as these are captured in Alfred Marshall\u2019s iconic definition of \u201chomo oeconomicus<\/em>\u2026 who is under no ethical influences and who pursues pecuniary gain warily and energetically, but mechanically and selfishly\u201d whilst enjoying \u201cformal liberty\u201d (1.2.1 & 1.2.1n). Albeit \u201cunreal\u201d and unpalatable, this free yet \u201cmorally perverted human being\u201d helps us understand \u201csocio-economic processes\u201d in a \u201cmarket economy\u201d, which is one of several possible economic orders that aim at serving the material needs of humankind (1.2.1). It suffices to say that, given such premises, classic economic theory can and does reveal important aspects of human agency in market economies, but misses out far too much to be able \u201cto offer universally valid advice for concrete political economy\u201d (i.e. policy-making), including significant aims of market agents that go beyond \u201cthe desire for profit\u201d, such as the \u201centrepreneurial drive\u201d studied by Schumpeter (1.2.1). Not to mention some of the major \u201ccontradictions\u201d of unfettered market economies that Marx himself had correctly identified in the 19th<\/sup> century, such as \u201csocial misery\u201d, \u201cparalysis of labour\u201d, \u201cmoral[,]\u2026 social[,]\u2026 [and] economic collapse\u201d, \u201ccorruption\u201d and, as Utz adds on his part, the devastation of \u201cthe ecological pre-conditions for life\u201d (1.2.4).<\/p>\n

Political economy too, whether \u201cphilosophical\u201d (e.g. Marx) or \u201cempirical\u201d (i.e. the study and \u201ccomputation of costs and benefits resulting from different alternatives\u201d open to political decision-makers under specific \u201csocial and political circumstances\u201d), claims to be \u201cvalue-neutral\u201d (1.2.2). However, as Utz argues, political economy does in fact \u201ctake stock of the many possible aims and therefore also of the values\u201d at issue in any and every \u201ceconomic computation\u201d (1.2.2). An axiology is present, then. This is even more visible as the economic computations are performed in the name of \u201cefficiency\u201d, i.e. the actual chief aim of political economists, who prioritise it above all other aims, passing ipso facto <\/em>an implicit \u201cvalue judgment\u201d (1.2.2). Besides, this implicit value judgment is ethically \u201cdebatable\u201d, not least because of its consequences for \u201cdistributive justice\u201d[33]<\/u><\/a> (e.g. wider wealth disparity is deemed acceptable for the sake of increased efficiency, despite its negative moral and social impact; 1.2.2).[34]<\/u><\/a> Even though implicitly biased in its axiological presuppositions, political economy remains primarily a descriptive science and, per se<\/em>, \u201cempirical data cannot produce ethical norms\u201d (1.2.3). The determination of a \u201chierarchy\u201d of \u201caims\u201d within society is the province of philosophy, and ethics in particular, for such a hierarchy \u201ccan be known only via <\/em>a[n explicit] moral judgment\u201d (1.2.2).<\/p>\n

\u201cOntological reflection\u201d on economic phenomena can limit itself to studying \u201chuman behaviour vis-\u00e0-vis<\/em> goods serving their survival and development\u201d, as many branches in the social sciences have been doing for generations (1.2.3). \u201cPhilosophical\u201d ontological reflection, i.e. \u201ceconomic ethics\u201d (1.2.5.1), must dig deeper, however, so as to unearth \u201cwhich behaviour[s] can be defined \u2018according to nature\u2019\u2026 in the sense of classic natural law theory\u201d (1.2.3). It is at this level of reflection, for instance, that we can grasp the socio-economic implications of \u201cthe catalogue of human rights emanated by the United Nations\u201d, which is not a mere list of \u201cindividual rights\u201d, but rather an articulate expression \u201cof the collective duty to create the preconditions for the realisation of everyone\u2019s fundamental rights\u201d (1.2.4). Besides, understanding the quintessentially \u201csocial nature\u201d of the human being can lead us to appreciate as natural, for example, the human \u201cdesire to self-realise and develop by one\u2019s own agency and initiative, the search for a global juridical order\u2026 [and] solidarity\u201d (1.2.3). More generally, the same understanding can help us realise how any ethics, including an economic ethics, cannot but be a social ethics too. Abstracting towards broader generality is not a move away from reality, but one into a more profound layer of the same\u2014beneath, beyond and above data gathering, from which one must start, though, to avoid empty speculation.<\/p>\n

Utz distinguishes three logical levels of reflection in economic ethics. The first one, \u201cvalue theory\u201d, deals with \u201cthe supreme, most general and still very abstract norms of any economic activity\u201d (1.2.5.1). It is an Aristotelian \u201cmetaphysics of economics\u201d focused upon the most fundamental personal and social aspects of natura humana<\/em> (1.2.5.1). It is at this level, for example, that we can retrieve \u201cthe imperative commanding that the common good be higher than the private\u201d good, which is in fact ordinarily justified on the basis of its beneficial social outcomes (e.g. eminent domain\/compulsory purchase\/resumption legislation; Adam Smith\u2019s assumption of a socially beneficial invisible hand; 1.2.5.1). The second level deals with the \u201cactual inclinations and modalities of human behaviour in its relationship with economic goods\u201d (1.2.5.2). Characteristically economic implications of natura humana<\/em> are considered at this level, e.g. the paramount \u201corganisational principle of economic planning\u201d known as \u201cprivate property\u201d, the \u201csocially just economic order (or system)\u201d (1.2.5.2), and the inability of centralised \u201cState authority to capture the productive potential and willingness [to contribute] of the members of society\u201d (1.2.5.3).[35]<\/u><\/a> The third level deals with \u201cproblems\u201d affecting specific economic orders, such as \u201ccontractual autonomy[,]\u2026 just price formation[,]\u2026 credit, etc.\u201d, i.e. the typical issues of \u201cbusiness ethics\u201d in Anglo-American academia (1.2.5.3). Utz underlines how crucial it is to set in place a rational economic order, which prevents problems from arising (e.g. the conflict between the common good and \u201cthe desire for profit of the individual manager\u201d), and a fortiori<\/em> how it is up to \u201cthe politician\u2026not\u2026 [t]he entrepreneur\u201d to establish constructively rational \u201csocial conditions for the competitive economy\u201d (1.2.5.3).<\/p>\n

The first chapter continues and concludes with an overview and discussion of significant 19th<\/sup>– and 20th<\/sup>-century theological views on economics, both Catholic (Taparelli, Messner, John Paul II, liberation theology) and Protestant (Weisser, Rich, Katterle, Thielicke, Herms, the German Lutheran Church). In a positively Thomistic perspective, Utz explains how \u201cthe harmony of reason and faith\u201d can be established, arguing that the conclusions on economic ethics to be reached by a philosophical ontological investigation are bound to be consistent with those reached by a theological one, as long as the latter is conducted under the guidance of the Revelation in all of its forms (1.2.6.2). Citing Augustine, he states: \u201canima humana naturaliter christiana<\/em>\u201d (1.2.6.2). Moreover, thanks to the wealth of wisdom offered by a Christian social ethics, Utz derives further normative elements conditioning the proper functioning of a sensibly designed market economy, i.e. one that works for and not against natura humana<\/em> (e.g. Sunday rest, human dignity). According to Utz, a religious inquirer can grasp aspects that a purely technical approach to economic affairs would miss: \u201cThe pure market mechanism, which liberals invoke under the guise of a complete deregulation, is a failure with regard to social problems, especially unemployment. The person that is inspired by faith and oriented towards the afterlife has naturally, because of her conception of life, a different attitude vis-\u00e0-vis<\/em> development and productivity than the one who thinks in purely economic terms.\u201d (1.2.6.3).[36]<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n

Chapter Two<\/strong><\/p>\n

In general, the existing literature about economic ethics assumes the existence and motivated \u201crational\u201d agency of \u201cindividual[s]\u201d, who pursue their \u201cself-interest\u201d by way of cooperative behaviour, or \u201csolidarity\u201d, in the economic sphere (2.1). Liberals would like to reduce all relevant economic considerations to this level, i.e. \u201ccontractual\u201d interactions among assumedly free individuals (2.1; e.g. Hayek, 2.2). All the justice they seek is commutative. Socialists, on the contrary, typically subsume the existence and motivated rational agency of individuals under the higher level of social processes and collective values, which individuals are meant to serve in a more or less self-less manner. All the justice they seek is social (aka general or legal). Utz, in a consistent Thomistic fashion, stands between these two poles, for he assumes, in addition to \u201cindividualism\u201d, the notion of \u201ca common good to be realised through economic actions\u201d undertaken willingly and responsibly by the individuals (2.2). Justice, as Aristotle and Aquinas had already argued, is both general and particular, and as the latter is concerned, it is not only commutative, but also distributive.<\/p>\n

Pace <\/em>today\u2019s dominant liberalism, before contracts among assumedly free individuals are considered, one must determine whether the \u201ceconomic order\u201d allowing for such contracts is morally justified (2.3). Whilst current business ethics presupposes \u201cas obvious\u2026 the capitalist system\u201d or \u201cmarket economy\u201d, Utz\u2019s economic ethics does not. According to him, if we wish to pursue a genuine ethical investigation of economic phenomena, rather than engage in mere \u201capologetics\u201d, we cannot presuppose the legitimacy of any existing economic order, but rather consider \u201cthe philosophical-anthropological premises determining the supreme norms of every systematic construction\u201d (2.3). The structure of the analysis to follow in the rest of the book is announced in 2.3: \u201cI shall focus upon the problem of the economic order, starting with the issue of the common good, e.g. by wondering whether the [centrally] planned economy or the market economy correspond to the a priori<\/em> principle of the common good, then which institutions may be essential in a market economy as demanded by the principle of the common good, and under which ethical conditions they must operate.\u201d Utz speaks of \u201ctwo stages\u201d of analysis: \u201cthe general principles and the application to the concrete situation.\u201d (2.4). First of all, one must determine which abstract rules pertain to \u201chuman nature, in view of the universal common good\u201d; then it will be possible to proceed to their application to specific national and international contexts, with due consideration for the \u201cempirical data\u201d that can be gathered (2.4). If insufficient caution is exercised with regard to national and international specificities, then \u201cunrealistic and excessive expectations\u201d can be forced upon \u201ca nation\u201d, as exemplified by the one-size-fits-all approach of international financial organisations operating in the developing World (2.4).[37]<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n

Chapter Three<\/strong><\/p>\n

Given the glaring and multifarious social failures of 18th<\/sup>– and 19th<\/sup>-century classical liberalism, constructive reforms have been sought repeatedly, including Eucken\u2019s \u201cmarket social economy\u201d, which proved very influential in 20th<\/sup>-century German-speaking Europe (3). According to this conception of the economic order, next to the \u201cpurely economic rationality\u201d \u00e0 la<\/em> Marshall (cf. 1.2.1) that liberal \u201ceconomists far too easily overestimate\u201d, \u201cthe life norms of a society\u201d are also to be considered, for they are bound to qualify, condition and even conflict with rational economic activities, hence co-determining their fate (3). Utz suggests that these \u201clife norms\u201d, often exquisitely ethical in character (e.g. fairness, dignity, trust and duty in all domains of social life, business included), should be studied from a Thomistic \u201crational-teleological\u201d perspective, which would then allow to \u201charmonise\u201d socio-ethical rationality and \u201ceconomic rationality\u201d in view of \u201ca single definition of well-being\u201d (3). Thus, and thus only do we attain a rich, deep and true understanding of economic categories qua <\/em>essentially \u201csocio-economic\u201d\u2014indeed socio-ethico-economic\u2014categories (3).<\/p>\n

For example, \u201cproductivity\u201d should not be merely the entrepreneur\u2019s or planner\u2019s efficient use of available resources to meet existing demand, but also and above all the economy\u2019s ability to meet \u201cthe integral needs of all members of society\u2026 for example health[,]\u2026 culture[,]\u2026 future ecological needs[,]… labour rights[,]\u2026 Sunday rest\u201d (3-3.1). Similarly, a sound socio-economic \u201cmarket order\u201d would not simply tolerate and accept \u201cjust social requirements\u201d because of their inevitability, but actually \u201cstimulate\u2026 personal initiative and responsibility via-\u00e0-vis<\/em> the establishment of [good\/rational\/natural] values\u201d (3.1).[38]<\/u><\/a> On an analogous note, proper economic \u201cgain\u201d should not be the satisfaction of whatever selfish pursuit the individual market actor may opt for, including \u201csheer speculation\u201d, but rather the deserved \u201cremuneration for a rendered service contributing to the common good\u201d (3.3.2). It is on the basis of, and in proportion to, the ability of an economy to be productive and just as per<\/em> the examples above that the legitimacy of any actual economic order can be gauged.[39]<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n

Failures, in this connection, abound, for allegedly rational economic behaviour can actually be nothing short of insanity. On the one hand, an unfettered \u201cmarket economy\u201d can lead to \u201cthe danger of the economicisation of society\u201d, as witnessed already in the early days of liberalism (3). Human beings are then attributed value solely as means to a profit, and their exploitation is positively sanctioned. However, according to Utz\u2019s Thomistic analysis, the good economy is \u201ca means for the realisation of life values\u201d, not of sheer pecuniary profit (3.1). On the other hand, a \u201cplanned economy\u201d, even if well-meaning and explicitly built upon ethically sound social aims, is bound to end in \u201cbankruptcy because of its neglect of self-interest\u201d, which is a powerful natural drive to be taken most seriously in view of a rational organisation of society (3). Productivity, meaningful self-direction and human dignity depend on it. The right path is somewhere in the middle. This middle ground is what Utz\u2019s \u201cteleological rationality\u201d aims for: individual self-interest is to be acknowledged, harnessed and steered towards the common good; it is not to be given into (e.g. the liberals\u2019 justification of callous selfishness), denied or underplayed (e.g. the socialists\u2019 rejection of private property; 3.2).<\/p>\n

The intellectual \u201cdetermination\u201d of the natural \u201csocio-ethical aims\u201d of human life is paramount, for no economic system can transgress repeatedly and consistently \u201chuman nature\u201d without leading to \u201cundesirable and inadmissible results\u201d, as best exemplified by the Earth\u2019s \u201cecology\u201d, which both liberal economists and socialist economic planners neglected for generations (3.3.1 & 3.3.2). Fundamental social equilibria must be paid heed as well. Thus Utz identifies additional, normatively relevant socio-ethical aims: \u201cthe free development\u2026 of every human being[,]\u2026 humane [and] dignified employment[,]\u2026 assistance to persons that are unable to work\u201d (3.3.2). These aims too must qualify and, if needed, limit the scope and the typology of allowed economic undertakings. Good norms are imperative. Given our imperfect nature, some stumbling along the logic of \u201ctrial and error\u201d is bound to persist in the domain of socio-economic organisation (3.3.2). Nonetheless, to possess a clearer notion of \u201cthe objectively founded aims of the economy\u201d is going to reduce the number of trials and the degree of the errors to be encountered (3.3.2).<\/p>\n

Chapter Four<\/strong><\/p>\n

If the standard, textbook liberal notion of economic rationality is deemed inadequate to capture the social as well as the diverse natural aims of human life, equally inadequate is deemed the standard, textbook liberal conception of \u201chuman needs\u201d (4). In this respect, according to Utz, the empirical research of \u201canthropologists, ethologists and psychologists\u201d should be used in order to integrate, refine and correct that of \u201ceconomist[s]\u201d, who seem prone to oversimplification because of factually unwarranted a priori<\/em> thinking (4). Furthermore, well beyond sheer empirical research, any serious \u201ceconomic ethics\u201d should reach back to \u201cthe essential determination, i.e. the abstract yet real nature of the human being\u201d (4.1). By doing so, it becomes possible, on the one hand, to discriminate between the natural and \u201cunnatural\u201d needs that comprehensive empirical research may come across (cf. Gerhard Merk\u2019s distinction between \u201cgoods\u201d and \u201cnon-goods\u201d, 4.2; Utz\u2019s own distinction between \u201cfactual needs\u201d and \u201clatent\u201d ones \u201cactivated\u201d by ethically \u201cdisturbing\u201d advertising, 4.3).[40]<\/u><\/a> On the other hand, it also becomes possible to \u201cassess their relative importance\u201d, e.g. \u201cenvironmental needs\u201d are \u201cprimary\u201d under whatever economic order one may wish to establish (4.1), and a starving man\u2019s need for bread has clear priority over the bread\u2019s well-fed owner\u2019s claim of private property (ergo<\/em>, as Aquinas argued, its furtive acquisition is not<\/em> \u201ctheft\u201d; 6.1.3.1). Granted such a richer, deeper and truer understanding of human needs, political decision-makers can produce, if willing, rational regulations, i.e. consistent with natura humana<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Utz agrees with the socialist economist Ota \u0160ik on what constitutes in abstracto<\/em> \u201cuniversal human needs\u201d, that is, \u201cfundamental material needs, needs of safety and health, needs of spiritual development, environmental needs, needs of psycho-physical self-realisation, social needs, needs of rest, needs of self-affirmation, needs of social activity\u201d (4.1). However, he disagrees with \u0160ik on whether even a reformed socialist economic order would be capable of being so efficient as to grant their satisfaction for all \u201cmembers of society\u201d, whether they are able to participate in \u201cthe economic process\u201d or not (e.g. minors, the unemployed, the gravely sick, the elderly, the severely handicapped, future generations; 4.1).<\/p>\n

Socialist economies, like monastic orders, presuppose the members\u2019 agreement on \u201cthe common end as the end of their own lives\u201d (4.3).[41]<\/u><\/a> Yet, the citizens of a socialist or, for that matter, of any other State have not made a free, thought-through and responsible decision to pursue such an end as their own. In fact, within any State, there can be considerable disagreement on, and diversity of, \u201cworldviews\u201d (4.3). This plurality of \u201cworldviews\u201d, i.e. individual preferences and value-attitudes, is what the market order, unlike the socialist or \u201ccommunist\u201d one, can acknowledge and deal with, at least to a significant extent, through its polycentric productive and allocative processes (4.3). That is why, according to Utz, market economies are better candidates than socialist ones vis-\u00e0-vis <\/em>the universal satisfaction of genuine human needs.<\/p>\n

Still, Utz does not praise market growth for growth\u2019s sake. Citing Aristotle, Augustine and Marx, Utz emphasises how humankind would be better off by needing less and better, rather than seeking endless increases of \u201cproductive force\u201d to match insatiable wants, especially if these wants result from the marketing experts\u2019 \u201cmanipulat[ion]\u201d of \u201cdemand\u201d (4.2 & 4.3). Pursuing endless growth is blatantly unnatural, indeed irrational, as the World\u2019s ecology keep telling us. Rules and regulations of the market order are, then, de rigueur<\/em>. Without them, \u201cliberalism\u201d can only face a \u201cshipwreck\u201d akin to the one suffered by communism in the 20th<\/sup> century (4.3).<\/p>\n

Chapter Five<\/strong><\/p>\n

The application of a Thomistic rational-teleological ethics to the economy means that, as done with the categories of rationality and need, also the standard understanding of \u201cthe factors of production\u201d must change (5).<\/p>\n

To begin with, \u201cland\u201d, i.e. \u201cnatural resources\u201d in the broadest possible sense (\u201cutilisable nature\u201d), must be considered in light of the \u201csuper-temporal\u201d needs of the human race, and not merely in light of the commonplace and yet myopic \u201ceconomic interest limited in time\u201d commanding its allegedly efficient and yet destructive exploitation (5.1). Once again, Utz highlights the issue of long-term ecological sustainability.<\/p>\n

Major emphasis is then placed by Utz on rethinking the second factor of production, i.e. \u201clabour\u201d (to which \u201cmanagement\u201d can be reduced; 5). \u201cLabour\u201d, whether \u201cintellectual\u201d or \u201cbodily\u201d, must not be treated like \u201cinvestments\u201d, which can be \u201ccut or regulated\u201d at will in order to generate higher returns (5.2). Labour is \u201cpart of human activities\u201d and, as such, it is ethically obligatory to \u201cpay heed to the conditions under which human agency preserves its own human dignity\u201d (5.2.1). Starting with Aristotle\u2019s distinction between \u201cactio immanens<\/em>\u201d (i.e. \u201can action that serves uniquely the perfecting of the agent\u201d e.g. \u201cplay or sport\u201d) and \u201cactio transiens<\/em>\u201d (i.e. \u201can action that produces an object that lies outside the agent\u201d e.g. the \u201ctoiling and damaging\u201d labour of \u201cslaves\u201d), Utz seeks a mediating conception of human labour (5.2.2). His mediation reads as follows: \u201cthe human being, in her economic agency, creates a product that serves the ends of her own nature and that, for this reason, is valued by the members of society because of its utility (use value)\u201d (5.2.2).<\/p>\n

\u201cManchester liberalism\u201d, which Marx rightly rejected, was culpable of lacking \u201crespect for the inseparability of labour qua <\/em>factor of production\u201d and \u201cthe moral essence of the human being\u201d, thus causing \u201cworkers\u2019 uprisings\u201d and, eventually, harm to \u201cthe economy itself\u201d (5.2.2). There exists therefore a \u201cright to labour\u201d, which is not the right to having jobs created ad hoc<\/em> for the unemployed by the State (as many socialists have argued), but the tangible expression of each person\u2019s rights \u201cto sustenance[,]\u2026 self-affirmation within social cooperation\u2026 [and social] integration\u201d (5.2.3). The fulfilment of this right is to be attained by means of a rational, comprehensive regulatory framework that facilitates job creation and, therefore, sets proper incentives and disincentives to all economic agents, such as \u201cinvest[ors], entrepreneurs and\u2026 even employed workers\u201d (5.2.3).<\/p>\n

It follows in practice from Utz\u2019s theoretical analysis that, within a well-regulated market economy, employment must be as broadly available as possible. It is only in this manner that most suitable individuals will take responsibility for their own self-perfection and participate constructively in the social generation of well-being via <\/em>the economic sphere. Not any line of employment will do, though. This ideally full employment must be in activities that are ecologically (cf. what said about \u201cland\u201d above), socially (e.g. not leading to \u201cuprisings\u201d) and economically sustainable in the long term (e.g. \u201chumanised\u201d working conditions allowing for the \u201creproduction\u201d of the workforce; 5.2.4). It must be personally meaningful, since \u201cpay alone\u201d is not enough; there is a \u201cspiritual root to all labour\u201d (e.g. \u201cthe worker expects to achieve her own social integration\u201d or \u201csocial status\u201d through her labour; 5.2.4 & 5.2.7). It must be consistent with the fundamental human needs (e.g. \u201cfamily life\u2026 [and] culture\u201d), aims (e.g. \u201cself-realisation\u201d) and dignity of each human person (5.2.3 & 5.2.4). That is why, in practice, there exist \u201clabour legislation or workers\u2019 protection\u201d, e.g. binding norms on \u201cfree time[,]\u2026 safety[,]\u2026 hygiene[,]\u2026 prevention of accidents[,]\u2026 unemployment benefits[,]\u2026 [and] special protections for women and children\u201d (5.2.5). That is also why there exist internationally codified universal social, economic and cultural rights to be respected, protected and fulfilled. Though costly in the short- and medium term from the perspective of a firm\u2019s bookkeeping, to do away with such binding norms and internationally codified universal rights would mean doing away with workers\u2019 human dignity. No society and, a fortiori<\/em>, no economic order could operate for long under such inhumane and undignified conditions, which would also destroy the humanity and hence the dignity of the workers\u2019 exploiters and their academic legitimisers.[42]<\/u><\/a> As Utz states, \u201cthe individual good must be integrated within the collective good\u201d, that is, whatever businesses and jobs are in place, they must serve the natural aims of human life (5.2.4). It is only under such a rational, comprehensive regulatory framework, i.e. \u201ca juridically ordered economic society\u201d, that there can be \u201cfreely stipulated\u2026 labour contract[s]\u201d as those advocated by the liberal tradition and, more broadly, an ethically justified market order (5.2.4).<\/p>\n

Much progress has been made since the callous \u2018iron laws\u2019 of classical liberalism and the industrial horrors of \u201cManchester liberalism\u201d, but much remains to be done, according to Utz. For one, \u201cinternational competition leads often to violations of humane labour policies\u201d (5.2.6). For another, \u201cabrupt technological revolution[s]\u201d cause frequently \u201cthe social misery of workers\u201d (5.2.6). The respect of the workers\u2019 \u201cteleological\u201d claim over \u201cproduction\u201d, in addition to the commonly recognised \u201ccausal\u201d one, finds still little acknowledgment in legal and business practice (e.g. workers\u2019 \u201cco-management\u201d of enterprises being rare; 5.2.7). In addition, \u201cgrowing capitalisation creates over time a mass of unemployed\u201d, and although socially responsible \u201cunemployment benefits\u201d may soften the blow, \u201cthe problem is not at all resolved\u201d at its root (5.2.6). Indeed, according to Utz, \u201cgiven the international economic network\u201d emerged with globalisation, \u201cthe imperative of the complete respect of the personal-individual character of labour cannot be fulfilled\u201d today (5.2.6).[43]<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n

As regards \u201ccapital\u201d (to which \u201ctechnology\u201d can be reduced; 5), Utz argues that any \u201ceconomic ethics\u201d trying to be \u201cgeneral\u201d must start with \u201ca definition\u201d that does not \u201cpresuppose a given economic or social system\u201d (5.3). At this level of abstraction, \u201ccapital\u201d cannot be \u201cproductive investments\u201d and even less \u201cmoney\u201d, both of which presuppose socio-historically specific institutions (5.4). Therefore, the definitions offered by Smith, Weber, Schumpeter and Eucken are rejected by Utz because too system-specific. Only B\u00f6hm-Bawerk\u2019s definition is praised, since it would apply \u201ceven to Robinson Crusoe\u201d (5.3). Following B\u00f6hm-Bawerk\u2019s lead, capital\u2019s \u201coriginal concept\u201d is defined by Utz as \u201ca reserve of useful services withdrawn from immediate use\u201d (5.3), or \u201cuseful service detracted from immediate consumption\u201d (5.4). Qua<\/em> \u201cfactor of production\u2026 capital is not a \u2018thing\u2019, but rather the function of a thing\u201d (5.4). In this perspective, even a Robinson Crusoe must put aside resources (e.g. food, seeds, timber, time and labour) that, later on, will enable him to produce further means of survival. \u201cSavings\u201d are then the heart of \u201ccapital\u201d, i.e. \u201cthe presupposition for the possibility of operating on the means of production\u201d (5.3). Contra <\/em>Keynes, Utz claims that \u201csavings come before investment, not vice versa\u201d (5.3). Moreover, from an Aristotelian perspective, \u201cproductive investments\u201d are \u201ccapital only \u2018potentially\u2019\u201d, for they must find adequate \u201cdemand\u201d, which can be absent, as Keynes rightly argued this time (5.4). \u201c[T]he actualisation of means of production\u201d constitutes \u201ccapital\u201d, in an Aristotelian perspective (5.4).[44]<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n

In a broader, more complex society, this abstract notion of \u201ccapital\u201d implies that a rational regulatory framework must be set up so as to save adequate resources to be employed in later forms of production \u201cleading to a useful growth that benefits the whole population\u201d, present as well as future (5.3). \u201c[E]nvironmental needs\u201d are once more highlighted most forcefully in this context, for both so-called \u201ccapitalist\u201d and socialist economies (or \u201cState capitalism\u201d) have been culpable of pursuing alleged efficiency whilst sacrificing the \u201cnourishing basis for the production of the means of production\u201d, i.e. they have \u201cfailed to save\u201d (5.4). Similarly, large-scale debts and expenditures, both public and private, are criticised by Utz, for they erode the \u201ccapital formation\u201d needed for future useful production (5.4). In a rational market economy, all economic agents, i.e. \u201cinvestors\u201d, \u201centrepreneurs\u201d, \u201cState authorities\u201d and \u201cworkers\u201d (especially through their \u201ctrade unions\u201d), must be free to operate in a self-interested manner, i.e. with their own particular good in mind (5.3 & 5.4). However, they must do so within reason<\/em>, that is, within a regulatory system that prevents excessive debt and expenditures and that aims at the \u201creal utility for the economic society\u201d in the long term, i.e. with the common good in mind (5.4).<\/p>\n

It is only under such premises of sound \u201cpolitical economy\u201d that one can justify \u201cinterest\u201d on borrowed credit\u2014a historically thorny matter for Christian scholars (5.3). In order not to be usury or speculation, interest on borrowed credit must be the just remuneration for a rendered service, namely the provision of \u201creal capital\u201d, i.e. \u201ca nourishing basis\u201d for the \u201cproduction of [further] means of production\u201d benefitting the common good (5.3 & 5.4). It may be olfactorily true that, as the Romans said, pecunia non olet<\/em>, but it does not mean that \u201ccapital formation\u201d is devoid of \u201can ethical role\u201d (5.4). According to Utz, it too must serve eventually \u201cthe perfection perceived in human nature\u201d, for its use to be ethically justified (5.4)<\/p>\n

Chapter Six<\/strong><\/p>\n

Utz\u2019s principled revision of basic economic categories tackles property too. Given the importance of this notion, and rather unusually for this book, Utz offers an ample historical overview of the main conceptions and justifications for different property regimes (6-6.1). The list of thinkers cited and discussed is extensive, somewhat uneven, and certainly stimulating. It goes from Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics in classical antiquity to Marx, Taparelli and Rawls in times closer to us, whilst also dealing with philosophers as diverse as Su\u00e1rez, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and Thomasius\u2014among others. Conceptual differences, but also continuities, are retrieved across the centuries. Some are pleasantly surprising (e.g. the early Church Fathers\u2019 \u201cparadisiac state\u201d and \u201cthe original position\u201d in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Rawls, or Marx\u2019s primeval communist societies; 6); others are intriguingly insightful (e.g. modern contractualists\u2019 abstraction from actual individual peculiarities in their thought experiments about \u201cthe original position\u201d as \u201cmasked natural-law reasoning\u201d i.e. closet metaphysics; 6.1.4).<\/p>\n

The centrepiece is, however, Thomas Aquinas\u2019 conception and justification of private property, to which Utz devotes four subsections (6.1.3.1-6.1.3.3 & 6.2.3). The emphasis placed on Aquinas\u2019 understanding is due primarily to Utz\u2019s belief in its ability to offer a point of equilibrium between the ancient approach, which focuses on the needs of society at large or \u201cthe common good\u201d, and the modern one, which focuses instead on the \u201cproperty rights\u201d of individuals endowed with private ownership (especially but not exclusively in the liberal tradition of Locke, Smith, Hayek, Buchanan and Friedman; 6.2.1). The former approach lacks specificity on individual rights and cannot guide \u201cthe praxis\u201d of concrete social organisations vis-\u00e0-vis<\/em> \u201ceasily controllable property relationships removed from any arbitrary authority, whether the legislator\u2019s or the administrator\u2019s\u201d (6.1.4.1). Too much emphasis on general justice jeopardises particular justice. In the name of socially valuable aims, the former approach can allow, \u201cone piece at the time[,]\u2026 the destruction of the order of private property, without a definite criterion delimiting the justification of State intervention\u201d (6.2.2). The latter approach, on its part, concentrates too much upon the claims of individuals who already own property and neglects \u201cthose who wish to become property owners[,]\u2026 the workers[,]\u2026 those who seek employment\u201d and, more broadly, \u201cthe utility of all human beings\u201d, present and future, who may not have any \u201ccapital\u201d at their disposal, or whose fundamental needs may not be served by owning any (6.2.1). Too much emphasis on commutative justice jeopardises general justice. Utz\u2019s present fears about global dehumanisation by way of societies\u2019 \u201ceconomicisation\u201d and the past horrors of Manchester liberalism loom largely in the background (3). For one, even if a competitive market economy can produce and allocate resources efficiently across much of society, it does not secure per se<\/em> genuine \u201cuniversal wellbeing, in a humanistic and not only material sense\u201d (6.2.1). Good rules and regulations are needed to secure this kind of wellbeing. For another, as Utz writes, persons \u201care not machine[s] that can be thrown away\u201d once they no longer bring in profits: \u201crebellion\u201d and its attendant \u201csocial costs\u201d are the likeliest outcomes of short-term profit-maximisation by way of economic exploitation, exclusion and insecurity (6.2.3). A more balanced position is required, which is what Aquinas can help us find.<\/p>\n

By no means individualistic and contractualistic in the modern fashion, Aquinas\u2019 approach makes use of the classical notion of \u201ccommon good\u201d, but it also includes a line of argument whereby \u201cthe absolute necessity to administer rationally the goods in view of economic productivity\u201d leads to the justification of private property qua<\/em> \u201cindividual\u2026 right\u201d (6.2.3). On a general, \u201cmetaphysical\u201d hence fundamental or \u201creal\u201d level, Aquinas acknowledges the \u201cduty to consider material goods as a gift from God for the advantage of the whole humankind and to behave accordingly.\u201d (6.1.3.1) Given her \u201crational nature\u201d, the human being was \u201cchosen\u201d by God as \u201cmaster of the World\u2026 so that she uses it in view of the ends proper to her nature.\u201d (6.1.3.1) Rational creatures ought to make a rational use of the existing resources, i.e. in view of rational ends. Accumulation of wealth for its own sake, or callous and undignified disparities in ownership and derived life-capacity, are irrational, i.e. contrary to human nature, which too ought to express the divine order of the universe. On a specific, historical and pragmatic level, the best system that can secure the goal of using rationally the existing resources for the sake of the common good is, according to Aquinas, one based upon private property. Here, Aquinas no longer thinks of humankind in general, metaphysically, or \u2018really\u2019. Rather, he thinks of concrete individuals under contingent socio-historical circumstances, such as those of the \u201cfallen natural state\u201d of humankind, whereby the \u201cdeplorable\u2026 inclination\u2026 to accord preference to one\u2019s own good over the common good\u201d has become almost as \u201cnatural\u201d as our inherent rationality (6.1.3.2; a \u201cquasi-nature\u201d, 7.8.2).[45]<\/u><\/a> Taking stock of this situation, hence thinking \u2018realistically\u2019 rather than just \u2018really\u2019, how can anyone \u201cprocure\u201d the material goods needed for \u201cbodily sustenance\u201d? (6.1.3.1) And how should she \u201cuse\u201d them, once they have been procured? (6.1.3.1)<\/p>\n

As regards the first question, Aquinas argues that a system of private property is preferable to one of \u201ccommunal property\u201d, e.g. those of ancient \u201cSparta and Taranto\u201d, about which Aristotle had written in his Politics<\/em> (6.1.1). Private property \u201cspurs [individual] industry, hence\u2026 productivity\u201d; it identifies clearly who is \u201cthe responsible person\u201d for given goods and services, and therefore \u201callows for a better administration devoid of confusion\u201d; and it secures \u201csocial peace\u201d by avoidance of \u201cdisagreements\u201d thanks to clear \u201clegal bounds\u201d on who owns what (6.1.3.1). As regards the second question, the answer ties back into the metaphysical level and the rational aims fulfilling natura humana<\/em>. Even if \u201cheld in private hands\u2026 all existing goods maintain their original destination, i.e. they must serve all human beings.\u201d (6.1.3.1) Therefore, even if \u201cthe owner may dispose of her possessions as she wishes\u201d, she is under \u201cthe grave obligation of helping those in need\u201d (6.1.3.1). As already recognised by the Church Fathers and, later, by Pope Leo XIII, the founder of the SDC, \u201cin the use of their property, the wealthy must be considered administrators, not owners\u201d (6.3)\u2014and a just administration of their wealth implies \u201cthe sustenance of the poor\u201d (6.1.3.1). Similarly, existing pecuniary reserves, once their owners\u2019 \u201cown use and production\u201d have been satisfied, should be made available to \u201csocial productivity\u201d as an ethical imperative (6.3).[46]<\/u><\/a> Fundamentally, as Utz states later in the book, \u201cthe order of private property\u201d is justified because it serves \u201csocial ends\u201d (7.7).<\/p>\n

Chapter Seven<\/strong><\/p>\n

No \u201ceconomic order\u201d or \u201csystem\u201d can exist \u201cwithout plans\u201d (7). Individuals, businesses and societies, unless pathologically lazy or mad, plan ahead all the time. Which forms of planning, however, are the most likely to \u201covercome or, at least, lessen the burden of the scarcity of goods, in order to meet the needs\u201d? (7) In order to find an answer to this interrogative, Utz outlines and discusses the main known paradigms of economic order, i.e. the liberal and the socialist, and some varieties thereof, assessing their strengths and weaknesses. The result is the longest and possibly most complex chapter in the whole book.<\/p>\n

Four economic aims are particularly important in Utz\u2019s ethical analysis of economic systems, i.e. (i) \u201cprice stability\u201d qua <\/em>\u201cduty of justice towards the saver\u201d; (ii) \u201cfull employment\u201d qua <\/em>\u201chuman right to labour\u201d; (iii) a \u201cwell-ordered balance of payments\u201d qua <\/em>\u201cjustice\u2026 [towards] partner States\u201d; and (iv) \u201ccontinuous growth\u201d qua <\/em>\u201cduty of the human being to pursue self-perfection\u201d (7.6). In light of the revised economic categories tackled in the previous chapters, Utz\u2019s understanding of these four aims is different from the one found in mainstream economics\u2019 textbooks. For one, \u201csaving\u201d applies to the \u201ccorrect use\u201d of \u201cecological goods\u201d rather than to mere money with which a consumer could buy \u201cenvironmentally harmful\u2026 luxury comforts\u201d (7.6.1). \u201cGrowth\u201d, on its part, cannot be \u201cmerely economic\u201d, i.e. measured by the sheer volume of produced and\/or traded goods and services, but must also include our \u201chuman perfection[,]\u2026 a growing knowledge of the universe[,]\u2026 spiritual values\u2026 [and] social costs\u201d (7.6.1), \u201cthe axiological ends of the human being[,]\u2026 the environment[,]\u2026 access to labour\u2026 [and] the living standards of the whole society.\u201d (7.8.1)<\/p>\n

As regards the market economic order of the liberal tradition, Utz tackles first classical and neoclassical economics, the latter with reference primarily to Hayek. Utz praises \u201cthe liberal vision\u2026 of the pure market economy\u201d for \u201cconstructing logically\u201d a \u201ctheoretically valid\u2026 argumentative scheme of the market economy\u201d based upon \u201cself-interest\u201d (7.1). Utz stresses the theoretical coherence leading from the 18th<\/sup>– and 19th<\/sup>-century philosophical roots of \u201csensualism\u201d and \u201cindividualism\u201d to the political and economic doctrine of \u201cliberalism\u201d (7.1.1). On the basis of such roots, \u201caltruism\u201d was deemed inadequate to form the basis for a well-functioning \u201cramified network of interactions, particularly in the field of economic agency\u201d, and the \u201cself-interest\u201d of \u201cprivate\u201d economic agents was therefore taken to be the prime \u201cmotive of human commitment\u201d in society (7.1.1). A system of \u201ccommutative justice alone\u201d emerges from it that demands \u201cperfect competition\u201d and \u201crational price formation\u201d, so that it is possible for \u201cthe goods required for the universal satisfaction of needs to be produced in the most economic manner\u201d, i.e. for the \u201cparsimoniously\u201d generated \u201csupply\u201d to meet most \u201cefficiently\u201d its corresponding \u201cpurchasing demand\u201d (7.1.1 & 7.1.2). Within this system, \u201cvalue\u201d, hence \u201csocial value\u201d too, means the \u201cprice\u201d of goods and services supplied, as their price is determined by the demand of \u201cpurchasers or consumers\u201d (7.1.1). This determination applies to all forms of \u201cgoods\u201d, including \u201clabour\u201d, \u201cland\u201d and \u201ccapital\u201d (7.1.2), and must operate free from price-distorting State interference on both \u201cnational\u201d and \u201cinternational\u201d levels (7.1.3). Under this perspective, \u201cprivate\u201d agency is paramount and preferable to that of public authorities at all levels, including \u201csocial security\u201d, \u201cunemployment\u201d remedies, \u201cpensions\u201d and \u201cexpecting mothers\u2019 protection on the workplace\u201d (7.1.4).<\/p>\n

Albeit a mere abstract \u201cimage\u201d or \u201cidea\u201d, many liberals have believed this system to be \u201cethically justified because of its economic efficiency\u201d and therefore worthy of being pursued in reality in a \u201ctotal\u201d, if not totalitarian, implementation (7.1.1). Were their abstract idea a real one, in the Thomistic sense of reality, then it could be a valuable operation. However, the liberal idea is deficient. Liberals may believe that they are depicting an image akin to the anatomist\u2019s perfect abstraction of a healthy body, but in actuality their depicted body is a mutilated one. Undoubtedly, self-interested \u201cindividualism\u201d has firm roots in reality, as also shown by the widespread \u201closs of honesty\u201d characterising \u201cthe modern age\u201d (7.1.5). As such, it cannot be excluded from view, like the Marxists would like to do. However, it is equally true that \u201cindividualism\u201d misses out many other aspects of human nature that, pace <\/em>Hayek (7.8.2), allow for the notion of \u201ccommon good\u201d to be intelligible and reasonable, our natural sociability in primis<\/em> (7.1.5). It is not possible to reduce \u201csociety\u201d to the \u201cindividualistic\u2026 market only\u201d, lest we wish to face unbearable contradictions (7.3.1).<\/p>\n

For example, liberals miss out the participation of human beings in a greater ecological order, which cannot and must not be sacrificed to \u201cunlimited growth\u201d as \u201cthe supreme end of political economy\u201d (7.1.5). Unless we intend to face worldwide environmental, social and, a fortiori<\/em>, economic collapse, standard economic criteria for \u201cgrowth\u201d must be revised radically (7.1.5). No major novel scientific discovery is needed to understand this point: \u201cThat cars pollute was known since the beginning\u2026 The same goes for oil-powered heating\u201d (7.1.5) Rather, \u201cthe moral renewal of society is necessary to save the market economy\u201d from sheer short-term self-interest, which has led to profitable venues being sought relentlessly without consideration for long-term ecological effects (7.2.4).[47]<\/u><\/a> Then, a viable \u201ccompromise\u201d between standard self-interested economic behaviour and an enlightened notion of the common good should be pursued, which makes an ecologically sound use of \u201ctaxes[,]\u2026 interest rates\u201d and \u201csubsidies (contra<\/em> the theory of the pure market economy)\u201d in order to attain an \u201cethically correct growth\u201d aiming \u201cat the global human ends.\u201d (7.1.5) Pace<\/em> the liberal idea of homo economicus<\/em>, \u201cthe individual must be able to think beyond her own self-interest in order to save the market economy.\u201d (7.2.4)<\/p>\n

Moreover, liberals self-contradict when dealing with the issues of \u201cunemployment\u201d and \u201cpoverty\u201d (7.1.5). If it is true, as liberals assume, that \u201cthe individual with her desires must be the norm for common behaviour\u201d, why should the unemployed or the poor be prevented from taking over the existing institutions, notably the State, and using them to improve their lot? Liberals claim that these individuals should not seek market-distorting means of coercive wealth \u201cdistribution\u201d and wait until \u201cgrowth\u201d will deliver improvements (7.1.5). Why should they wait, however, if individual self-interest is the fundamental norm? And for how long should they wait exactly, if they are willing to pay some heed to the liberals? There are countries in the World where poverty has been the legacy of several successive generations, despite liberal institutions being the norm in the economic sphere (cf. the United States of America; 7.1.5). At this point, \u201cthe individualistic principle placed at the beginning of the argument in favour of economic efficiency\u2026 is abandoned\u201d (7.1.5). Utz reveals how the key-criterion at work here is not concrete individual self-interest, but the \u201chighest possible growth\u201d of the \u201ceconomy as a totality\u201d (7.1.5). As long as economic growth is attained in accordance with the liberals\u2019 criteria, flesh-and-blood individuals can endure prolonged \u201cmartyrdom\u201d by way of, inter alia<\/em>, \u201cunemployment\u201d and ruthless exploitation on the workplace (7.1.5). The self-interested \u201cindividual\u201d about whom liberals speak so much is no concrete human being, but the abstract \u201chomo oeconomicus<\/em>\u201d of their aprioristic textbooks and theoretical models (7.1.5).<\/p>\n

This fiction, according to Utz, will not do. In order to function on a vast scale and over the long period, the \u201cmarket economy\u201d requires \u201chuman beings with a certain ethical and cultural level\u201d of competence and performance (7.2.). It is only in this way that they will pursue \u201ca common rational exploitation of the resources\u201d available to them and \u201cadvance\u201d beyond the present condition, guided by a \u201chigh degree of responsibility[,]\u2026 enthusiasm in personal initiative and the willingness to offer personal performances\u201d of the highest standard (7.2). Homo oeconomicus<\/em> does not possess all these attributes and inclinations. A far richer and more complex socio-cultural milieu generates the kind of individuals that a well-functioning market economy requires to come about, function and endure.[48]<\/u><\/a> Again, on top of being self-contradictory, the image of the self-interested individual lying at the heart of the liberal paradigm is shown to be severely incomplete. According to Utz, \u201cthe stability of the market economy depends on the moral behaviour of the members of society: honesty and responsibility\u201d in primis<\/em>: \u201cThe more wanting the respect of the moral conditions becomes, the more necessary prohibitions become and the more expensive the economic process turns out to be.\u201d (7.2.4)[49]<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n

After exploring and exploding the contradictions of liberalism in its classical and neoclassical versions, Utz tackles one variety of liberal thinking and economic policy that has tried to deal with the many elements of human nature forgotten by the classical and neoclassical versions, i.e. the social market economy (hereafter SME) of Eucken, R\u00fcstow and, \u201cabove all\u201d, M\u00fcller-Armack (7.3.2). Unlike classical and neoclassical liberalism, SME conceives of a market system that takes place within a set of well-specified legal, social, political and economic conditions that State authorities establish, monitor and enforce throughout, such as \u201can austere monetary order[,]\u2026 competitive credit[,]\u2026 State policy for competition[,]\u2026 labour and social rights[,]\u2026 environmental protection[,]\u2026 land planning[,]\u2026 consumer protection[,]\u2026 direct assistance to individual enterprises on a regional or typological basis, etc.\u201d (7.3.2). In particular, SME allows and aims for a \u201cfirst distribution\u201d of income that \u201coccurs within the economic process as wages and profits\u201d, as well as for a \u201csecond distribution\u201d reaching all those members of society that cannot participate in the first one, e.g. \u201cthe ill, the elderly, families, etc.\u201d (7.3.2). Within any society, there are individuals whose particular preferences are efficiently reflected in market transactions, but also \u201cthose who have no purchasing power\u2026 the unemployed\u201d and economically dependent persons whose \u201cneeds\u201d too must be \u201cmet\u201d (7.8.5). If only a privileged section of society benefits from the liberal economic system, then it is arduous to see the \u201cethical justification of the commutative justice underpinning the market.\u201d (7.3.2)<\/p>\n

Albeit appreciated by Utz for its holistic socio-ethical understanding, SME fails to tackle two major flaws of the liberal approach, with which SME has historically sided (SME is also known as ordoliberalism<\/em>; cf. 3.1). On the one hand, by accepting international competition and \u201cflexible labour contracts\u201d as positive givens of a well-functioning market economy, SME fails to notice how the global competitive system brings wreckage upon \u201cnational economies\u201d, to the point of causing dramatic \u201csociological\u201d and \u201cpolitical\u201d consequences (7.1.3). According to Utz, a worldwide market economy puts such a \u201cpressure\u201d on the \u201clevel of wages\u201d that these can \u201cdrop to the minimum needed for subsistence, if not below\u201d, which is a recipe for massive social and political instability (7.3.3). Moreover, whilst legally weak countries are selected by transnational businesses for their competitive low costs of production, stronger ones suffer waves of \u201cunemployment\u201d by way of delocalisation, loss of investments and inability to compete (7.3.3).[50]<\/u><\/a> These horrors being absent from view or neglected, SME\u2019s emphasis is set squarely on the fear of \u201cinflation\u201d instead, thus reflecting the chief preoccupation of moneyed individuals rather than, say, the working poor or the unemployed (7.3.3). On the other hand, SME accepts the trade unions\u2019 \u201ctaboo\u201d institutions of \u201cuniversally binding labour contracts\u201d and labour disputes by way of \u201cstrike and closedown\u201d qua <\/em>normal features of the market order, even if they are disruptive (e.g. harmful to production), ethically dubious (e.g. akin to extortion) and, above all, conceivably replaceable with sounder alternatives (7.3.3; cf. Ota \u0160ik). The combined result of international competition and the trade unions\u2019 power of blackmail is structural \u201cunemployment\u201d which, in the end, cannot be paid for by social provisions, since international competition reduces the resources available to State authorities, such as taxation and inflationary monetary largesse (7.3.3).[51]<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n

It is at this point that Utz introduces the \u201csocialist market economy\u201d (hereafter OS) of Ota \u0160ik as a better, albeit little known, combination of purely economic goals and socio-ethical concerns. Even if \u0160ik does not use the term, OS can be deemed \u201csocialist\u201d because it does not entail \u201cprivate property in the sense and forms of [standard] market economies\u201d and it is critical of \u201ccapitalist\u2026 systems\u201d in general (7.4). OS takes seriously the liberals\u2019 \u201cself-interest\u201d qua <\/em>chief human motive, but also SME\u2019s acknowledgment of the \u201cmajor importance\u201d of the \u201cState\u2026 for macro-level equilibrium\u201d, plus the traditional socialist emphasis on \u201cplanning\u201d (7.4.1). According to OS, minor \u201cmicro-level disequilibria\u201d are part of normal business life and generally acceptable, but major \u201cmacro-level\u201d ones require substantial State monitoring and careful planning by the public authorities (7.4.1). Without such monitoring and planning, \u201cincome distribution\u201d goes astray (7.4.1). Specifically, OS observes a systematic \u201cdisequilibrium\u201d at the macro level between \u201csupply\u201d and \u201cdemand\u201d in the capitalist economic order (7.4.1). This disequilibrium is caused by the capitalists having the upper hand in market economies, where entrepreneurs and stockholders enjoy too large a portion of the pie produced therein, hence leaving the workers with too small a portion of it. As a result, the historical experience of capitalist economies has shown repeatedly how the wealthy seek further profits by means of destabilising speculative manoeuvers and\/or industrial \u201coverinvestments\u201d (7.4.1). The latter are investments aimed at production and pecuniary gain that are unmatched by the workers\u2019 actual \u201cwages\u201d, which inexorably \u201clag behind\u201d and therefore lead into crises of \u201coverproduction\u201d, i.e. a macro-level mismatch between supply and demand, as also signalled waves of dramatic \u201cunemployment\u201d (7.4.1).<\/p>\n

As a first, fundamental solution to these problems, OS advises \u201cincome distribution\u201d not to be left to the market, but rather carefully \u201cregulated\u201d by the democratically elected authorities, e.g. by means of equal \u201cretributions\u201d for all workers performing the same job, wherever that may be (7.4.1). This way, private demand would be increased by better wages, to which OS adds also better pensions and targeted investments coordinated by State authorities (7.4.2). Additionally, the democratically controlled State authorities should make sure that environmental and workplace regulations are enforced too, as well as shorter working hours for the sake of \u201cfull employment\u201d (7.4.2). This democratic macro-level regulation applies also to the \u201cprofits of the enterprise\u201d, of which workers should become co-owners (7.4.1). This is OS\u2019 second fundamental solution to the problems of capitalist economies. Property must not be \u2018aristocratically\u2019 concentrated in a few hands, but \u2018democratically\u2019 distributed as widely as possible. In this way, the opposition between employers and employees can be abolished, so that the paralising industrial conflicts arising from such an opposition are abolished too, whilst at the same time allowing the citizens to acquire more balanced, less sectarian \u201cmotivations\u201d in politics (7.4.3). \u201cDemocracy\u201d must apply in the economic sphere, not just in the political one (7.4.1). This is possibly OS\u2019 most radical point. According to OS, a new, well-functioning economic system is not going to arise by the mere mixing of elements from the liberal and socialist camps, but from deeper changes in the \u201cpolitical order\u201d and the \u201cmentality\u201d of economic actors (7.4.1).[52]<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n

Utz claims OS to be an innovative and intelligent proposal, which is not immune to critique, however. As Utz argues, the State is granted by \u0160ik considerable power to exercise \u201cpressure\u201d on the private sector, as well as to decide \u201cretribution levels and investment quotas\u201d (7.4.3). This would be all good and well, if and only if democracy\u2019s chief pitfall did not exist, i.e. the voters\u2019 diverse \u201cmotivations\u201d and, above all, their diverse short-term self-interests, which could be in mutual agreement only under the unrealistic condition of equal distribution of property among them (7.4.3). Even less likely to succeed are systems where the State possesses the undemocratic power to enjoy the \u201ccentral planning of the economy\u201d (7.7). First of all, such systems fail to recognise the just and productive institution of \u201cprivate property\u201d and the self-interested \u201cmotivation of the persons involved in the economy\u201d as fundamental to any economic order (7.7). Secondly, by doing so, these systems\u2019 pursuit of \u201cefficiency\u201d and human \u201chappiness\u201d has always ended in failure: \u201cuntil now, no centrally planned economy has ever succeeded in fulfilling its own proposed plans.\u201d (7.7)<\/p>\n

Upon the basis of the previous six chapters and of his extensive analyses and critical assessments in the seventh chapter, Utz concludes by offering the \u201conly real\u2026 healthy\u2026 ethico-economic definition of the economic order: \u201cthe competition economy, founded on the universal right to private property, both for production and consumption, with the greatest possible diffusion of productive property, with stability of price levels and full employment<\/em>.\u201d (7.8.6; emphasis in the original)<\/p>\n

Chapter Eight<\/strong><\/p>\n

The \u201cjustification\u201d for the \u201cexistence\u201d of the \u201cmarket economy\u201d pivots around the issue of whether it can also address \u201cthose who, for whatever reason, have no purchasing power\u201d (8.1). \u201c[C]lassical theory\u201d focussed on \u201csupply\u201d so much that it became incapable of understanding and dealing with the problems proper to \u201cdemand\u201d, including noticing those who may not exercise any (cf. Say, Mill; 8.1). John M. Keynes, studying in depth the issue of \u201cunemployment\u201d, offered a significant and substantial integration of the liberal paradigm (8.1). Still, not even the State\u2019s injections and withdrawals of \u201cinvestments\u201d and \u201ccredit\u201d for the sake of \u201cfull employment\u201d and, with it, the balance between market \u201csupply and demand\u201d can address clearly and fully the issues of a \u201csocially\u201d and environmentally \u201csustainable economic growth\u201d, i.e. a growth that is truly consistent with natura humana <\/em>(8.1 & 8.2). Quite the opposite, by lack of adequate axiological criteria, Keynesianism remains trapped within a logic of indiscriminate \u201cconsumption\u201d that, especially via <\/em>the powerful means of modern \u201cadvertising\u201d, leads to life-disabling consequences on both individual and collective levels (8.2). Its \u201cethics of demand\u201d is flawed (8.2). And so is its \u201cethics of supply\u201d, for no genuine commitment is present therein to \u201cthe integral human good\u201d, but only a competitive scramble for \u201cprofits\u201d that, inherently, \u201cknows no morals\u201d (8.3).[53]<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n

No intrinsic logic of the market economy, or consequence thereof, serves specifically or primarily the good of natura humana<\/em>, as amply shown by past (e.g. Manchester liberalism) as well as present forms (e.g. car-related pollution) of capitalism. Pressured by morally enlightened persons, the State alone can introduce, monitor and enforce rational \u201claws\u2026 directing supply towards the common good\u201d (8.3). International competition works against State regulations, however. Entrepreneurs, seeking profits in a larger and increasingly competitive business environment, and managers, pressured by the imperative of maximising stockholder value, will resist, bend, circumvent and break the law, or move to countries where none or more \u201cpermissive\u201d laws can be found (8.3). Therefore, as Utz concludes, a \u201csocially\u201d and \u201cecological[ly]\u2026 just\u201d economic order requires the enforcement of rational \u201cregulation\u201d at the \u201cglobal level\u201d (8.3).<\/p>\n

Chapter Nine<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u201cMoney\u201d qua <\/em>\u201cuniversal and atemporal means of exchange\u201d is understood by Utz as both a \u201cclaim over goods of the same value\u201d and \u201ca legal right to participate in the fruits of socio-economic cooperation\u201d, present as well as future (9.1). With their money, the economic agents of market economies do not only buy goods and services, but stake claims over contemporary and later portions of the economic system\u2019s productivity (e.g. qua <\/em>interest payments and dividends). Besides, the value of money is not a mere matter of alloy, as it was in Aquinas\u2019 Middle Ages, or of equivalent purchasable goods, as it is still applicable today, but also of the overall \u201ceconomic prosperity\u201d to which money contributes (e.g. qua <\/em>productive investment; 9.1). In modern \u201cdynamic economies\u201d, money is much more than just a useful instrument to operate fair exchanges according to \u201ccommutative justice\u201d, for its value ties directly into the \u201csocial justice\u201d that \u201ceconomic prosperity\u201d is meant to serve (9.1).<\/p>\n

Keynes had already observed that \u201cthe value of money is not determined by its quantity, but its circulation\u201d (e.g. in periods of \u201cstagnation\u201d, the monetary mass may increase, yet the value of money remains unchanged; 9.1). Monetary and fiscal policies are therefore tools that State authorities can use in times of crisis. Yet, too much money poured into circulation may also lead to disruptive \u201cinflation\u201d, which is a \u201cscourge\u201d to be avoided, for it is \u201cunjust\u201d to the people whose rightfully earned money can no longer purchase as many or as valuable goods and services as when they earned that money (9.1 & 9.1.1). Above all, however, stand the social purposes which the circulation of money serves or facilitates. Not any circulation will do, even if conducive to short-term equilibrium between market \u201csupply and demand\u201d (9.1). For one, Utz deplores the increased economic roles and ownership levels attributed to State or other public authorities in the name of \u201cmanipulating at will\u201d the monetary mass, for they reduce the room for private initiative, responsibility and ownership (9.1). For another, Utz deplores the historical applications of Keynesianism, which were far too one-sided, i.e. keen on injecting money in times of crisis, but timid in withdrawing it in times of economic boom. The resulting conspicuous \u201cinflation\u201d experienced in many countries caused enduring harm to \u201cthe elderly\u201d, whose pensions lost value, and the youth, whose employment was made more unlikely, \u201cthe entrepreneurs\u201d preferring their \u201csubstitution by technological innovations\u201d to which the higher \u201cretributions extorted by the trade unions\u201d were not to be corresponded (9.1.1).<\/p>\n

Concerning \u201ccredit\u201d, Utz begins by recalling its Latin etymology (i.e. \u201ccreditum<\/em>\u201d), for it implies a bond of \u201ctrust\u201d between borrower and lender (9.2.1). Ipso dicto<\/em>, a viable credit system cannot do without the moral substratum of inter-personal trust underpinning human cooperation in the economic order. Also, Utz recalls how medieval \u201cscholastics, in connection with [the philosophy of] Aristotle\u201d, did firmly condemn \u201cusury\u201d, but also distinguished it from rightfully earned \u201cinterest\u201d, which applied whenever the loan involved: (i) \u201ca loss for the lender\u201d (i.e. \u201cdamnum emergens<\/em>\u201d, e.g. \u201cthe owner of a [lent] hammer\u2026 for the duration of the loan, had to use a more rudimentary tool\u201d); (ii) \u201cmissed profits\u201d (i.e. \u201clucrum cessans<\/em>\u201d, e.g. \u201cthe lender\u2026 [cannot make] an investment\u201d); (iii) the \u201crisk\u201d of loss of part or all of the loan (i.e. \u201cpericulum sortis<\/em>\u201d); and\/or (iv) its late \u201crestitution\u201d (i.e. \u201cpoena conventionalis<\/em>\u201d). Important is also for Utz the scholastics\u2019 acceptance of gains derived from \u201cinvestments\u201d in \u201csomebody else\u2019s enterprise\u201d, which are earned \u201cparticipation in profits\u201d, not unearned \u201crent\u201d (9.2.1). Medieval scholastics allowed money to be lent and hence interest to be rightfully gained for the sake of \u201cproductive aims\u201d (e.g. lending money to merchants launching a new fleet; 9.2.2). Their condemnation of \u201cusury\u201d applied to \u201cloans for the aim of consumption\u201d (e.g. giving money to a person to let her buy bread to eat; in this case, the restitution of the borrowed sum was all that should be allowed; 9.2.2).[54]<\/u><\/a> Not any profitable economic endeavour is a genuine \u201cproductive investment\u201d, however (9.2.3). A good \u201cgrowth\u201d is not \u201cquantitative\u201d, but \u201cqualitative\u201d, e.g. it avoids \u201cwaste and environmental damages\u201d even if doing so reduces consumer \u201ccomforts\u201d that we take for granted in today\u2019s societies (9.2.6). Seemingly old virtues need recovered and revaluated for their deep ethico-economic implications, e.g. \u201cparsimony, abstinence and patience\u201d constitute \u201cobjective presuppositions\u201d for capital formation (9.2.3).<\/p>\n

From Utz\u2019s perspective, serving the common good is the \u201cmore profound\u201d criterion that separates an unhealthy market economy from a \u201chealthy\u201d one (9.2.4). In the latter, \u201cthe owners of pecuniary patrimonies participate\u201d responsibly and freely with their \u201cproductive investments\u201d in a well-regulated market system, which is based upon \u201cprofits\u201d and \u201cprivate property\u201d (contra <\/em>\u201ccommunism\u201d; 9.2.5), and yet avoids a number of crucial evils that still plague market economies worldwide: \u201chigh taxes on enterprises\u2019 profits[,]\u2026 the enterprises\u2019 own exiguous dividends[,]\u2026 the stock-market oscillations caused by socio-economically unjustified speculations\u201d (9.2.4), excessive \u201cinflation\u201d (contra <\/em> \u201cthe Keynesians\u201d, 9.2.6), and \u201cthe oppressive debt\u201d induced by \u201cthe abuse of consumer credit\u201d (9.2.7).<\/p>\n

Rational regulation, i.e. laws and rules that have natura humana <\/em>as their axiological axis, is particularly paramount vis-\u00e0-vis <\/em>\u201cbanks and the stock exchange\u201d, for failure to do so leads to major crises \u201cdisturbing the whole economic process\u201d both in the short term (e.g. financial losses, unemployment spikes) and in the long one (e.g. post-crisis \u201crecession\u201d brings about \u201cmergers of banks\u201d that \u201cweaken competition\u201d and exercise unjustifiable \u201cinfluence over the entire credit market, economic policy and State politics\u201d; 9.3.1).[55]<\/u><\/a> It may be true that \u201cmoney has got its own market\u201d, but it cannot be treated like any other commodity: \u201cthe real economy\u201d depends on it in far too many and too crucial ways (e.g. price stability, investment decisions, wages; 9.3.1). For example, transnational \u201ccurrency speculation\u201d is sternly condemned as disruptive of both national and global economic orders (9.3.3). As Utz argues, \u201cindividual self-interest\u201d, which market economies harness to the fullest extent, \u201cmust remain inscribed within the general interest\u201d by way of powerful \u201clegal instruments\u201d applying at all levels, so that \u201cthe common good\u201d is served by the economic process (9.3.2 & 9.3.3).<\/p>\n

Chapter Ten<\/strong><\/p>\n

Rational regulation of the economic order is also at the basis of ethically justified contractual transactions. Without rational regulation, \u201cprices\u201d and \u201ccontracts\u201d can far too easily be formed devoid of \u201cgood faith\u201d, e.g. unbalanced transactions occurring because of another person\u2019s state of urgent need (\u201chunger\u201d; 10.1). In this case, speaking of free contracts, free trade and individual responsibility is either na\u00efve or hypocritical; it is like accepting as valid \u201csport performances\u201d by athletes taking forbidden drugs, or the \u201clegal order\u201d established by \u201cdictators\u201d who violate \u201chuman rights\u201d (10.1). For the system of \u201ccommutative justice\u201d known as the market economy to be justified, the conditions for \u201csocial justice\u201d must be in place first (10.2). These conditions may require some degree of State interference in economic activities, but they are not primarily and certainly not exclusively about that. \u201cSocial justice\u201d means that a just economic order presupposes a just social order, within which the former is contained and sustained (10.2).<\/p>\n

Following Augustine and Aquinas, Utz accepts the notion according to which an individual\u2019s assessment of the \u201cusefulness\u201d of certain goods is at the basis of price-formation in all commercial exchanges, rather than some abstract \u201contological value\u201d (10.2). However, as Aquinas had already highlighted, such assessments and exchanges take place within a \u201csocial space\u201d that is not \u201cempty\u201d, but filled instead with \u201csocial aims\u201d that ultimately justify the lawfulness and desirability of precisely such price-forming assessments and exchanges (10.2). For any \u201cethically just price\u201d to be, then, two fundamental conditions must be met, one ex ante<\/em> and another ex post<\/em>: (i) \u201cthe given economic order [must be] ethically justified\u201d; and (ii) \u201cthe price-formation occurring within it makes it possible for the needs of the members of society to be met completely.\u201d (10.3)<\/p>\n

Hypothetically, under the ideal textbook conditions of \u201cperfect competition\u201d, the liberals\u2019 market economy might be able to meet both conditions; however, in the real World, \u201cthere exists only an imperfect market.\u201d (10.3) Imperfection in the real World is what calls for and justifies State \u201cintromissions\u201d in \u201cmarket price-formation\u201d, including some that are often \u201cqualified with the disparaging term \u2018protectionism\u2019\u201d and yet are ethically imperative, especially when \u201cbasic food staples are at stake\u201d (10.3). As to the exact type and specifications of such intromissions, they vary with country, goods, services and time in history.[56]<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n

Chapter Eleven<\/strong><\/p>\n

Analogous considerations apply to the domain of \u201cincome\u201d and workers\u2019 \u201cretributions\u201d in particular (11.1). It is not the exploitative desire for profits of the entrepreneur (cf. 11.4), nor the ability for extortion developed by modern trade unions (cf. 11.4-7) that should determine the income of employers and employees in a rational market order. If anything, the inability to consider lucidly the other party\u2019s legitimate interests and their relevance for the long-term well-being of society are the chief source of frequent, deplorable and disruptive forms of \u201cwarfare\u201d within market economies (11.3), where the economic party enjoying \u201csuperior power\u201d wins the day (11.6). In earlier phases of capitalist history, workers had no other way to make their voice heard and their rights respected. Today, in conditions of widespread prosperity, that justification no longer applies. Utz is vehemently critical of the legally accepted and judicially defended rights to workers\u2019 \u201cstrike\u201d and employers\u2019 \u201clockdown\u201d in the private sector (11.4), as well as of the unfair \u201cdouble vote\u201d of personnel in \u201cthe public sector\u201d, whose \u201cright to\u2026 political strike\u201d blackmails \u201celected politicians\u201d while harming \u201cthe public\u201d that is supposedly to be served (11.5).<\/p>\n

In lieu <\/em>of such \u201ccivil wars\u201d (11.6), \u201cthe supreme norm of justice\u201d vis-\u00e0-vis <\/em>\u201cretributions\u201d should be \u201cthe overall economic productivity\u201d of whatever \u201ceconomic system\u201d is in place (11.1). Once again, this is no mere economic determination in standard liberal terms. Utz\u2019s understanding of \u201coverall economic productivity\u201d requires taking into full account \u201cthe global social issues\u201d that justify ethically the economic order, which a fortiori<\/em> may not: (i) \u201cseek\u2026 productivity\u2026 by increasing unemployment\u201d; (ii) do without \u201cfull employment\u201d qua<\/em> cardinal \u201cprinciple of justice\u201d; and (iii) imperil or ignore the imperative \u201cto ensure the future of the whole society\u201d, both in the short- or medium-term (e.g. the \u201csecond distribution of income\u201d to \u201cthe sick, the elderly, families\u201d) and in the long one (e.g. \u201cpopulation growth\u2026 and\u2026 cultural needs (schooling, formation, etc.).\u201d (11.1) In order to facilitate the respect of \u201cjustice\u201d in employer-employee relations and the consequent determination of due income, workers\u2019 \u201cunions\u201d and entrepreneurs\u2019 \u201ccartels\u201d must stop thinking of themselves as enemies (11.2). Therefore, \u201cjoint responsibility\u201d, cooperative behaviour and \u201ctrust\u201d within \u201cthe enterprise\u201d must be maximised by any available channel (11.2), e.g. novel forms of \u201ccontractual autonomy\u201d, Johannes Messner\u2019s plan for a \u201cglobal economic organisation\u201d independent of political pressures (11.3), or \u201ccollaboration in the formation of profit and capital, hence also in the entrepreneurial risk.\u201d (12.3).<\/p>\n

Chapter Twelve<\/strong><\/p>\n

In the concluding chapter, the notion of \u201cprofit\u201d is also tackled \u201cin connection with the global aims (social and cultural) corresponding to human nature\u201d, i.e. with natura humana <\/em>according to the Thomistic understanding of it (12.1). Ethically, there is nothing inherently wrong with the \u201cdesire for profit\u201d qua <\/em>\u201cadequately remunerated performance\u201d, this performance being measured according to the \u201cobjective\u201d standards of the existing economic order (12.1). If \u201cthe aim pursued through the desire for gain\u201d of an individual is (i) \u201chonest\u201d, (ii) contributes to \u201cgrowth in living standards\u201d, and (iii) sustains \u201cthe family[,]\u2026 the poor\u2026 [and] the State community\u201d, then it is possible to interpret the \u201cprofit\u2026 sought\u2026 [and] need[ed]\u201d by \u201cthe entrepreneur\u201d in a capitalist system as the ethically legitimate reward for \u201cindividual performance and responsibility\u201d (12.2). Contra <\/em>liberalism, which often conflates \u201cself-interest\u201d and \u201cselfishness\u201d, Aquinas\u2019 understanding of \u201cprofit\u201d emphasises its \u201cjustification\u201d on the basis of \u201cthe service rendered to the global economy\u201d by \u201cthe entrepreneur\u201d, her \u201centerprise\u201d and, within it, \u201cthe workers too\u201d, whose crucial \u201cparticipation\u201d must be acknowledged not only by means of decent \u201cwages\u201d, but also by \u201clonger paid holidays[,]\u2026 a reduction of the working hours[,]\u2026 social contributions\u2026 [and,] in particular, \u2026invested retributions\u201d that increase the workers\u2019 stakes in the enterprise (12.2 & 12.3).<\/p>\n

Concluding remarks<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

To express concisely Utz\u2019s stance, I adopt and adapt hereby the characterisation of the sort of economic transactions that truly life-enabling market economies should have, as these are described by Canada\u2019s leading value theorist John McMurtry in his famous Cancer Stage of Capitalism<\/u><\/em><\/a> (London: Pluto, 1999; 2nd<\/sup> ed. 2013). In symbolic formalisation, these ideal economic transactions read as follows:<\/p>\n

L –> $ –> MoL –> $1<\/span><\/sup> –> L1<\/span><\/sup><\/p>\n

Which means in extended formulation that:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Textbook for-profit market economic exchanges occur (i.e. input capital \u201c$\u201d generating output capital \u201c$1<\/sup>\u201d, e.g. profits, interests, dividends, etc.);<\/li>\n
  2. but in such a way (i.e. within such a strictly enforced binding legal framework) that the commodities (i.e. goods and services) therein produced, transported, traded, consumed and\/or disposed of are always and exclusively beneficial to life (i.e. \u201cMoL\u201d, means of life, e.g. zero-mile organic bread);<\/li>\n
  3. that is, they are neither destructive (e.g. weapons, carcinogenic pesticides, junk food) nor blind to life-aims and life-requirements (e.g. financial derivatives);<\/li>\n
  4. and they are conducive to broader and deeper levels of life-capacity (i.e. the initial input \u201cL\u201d engenders \u201cL1<\/sup>\u201d, e.g. healthier, happier and\/or more cultured individuals).[57]<\/u><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    This is as succinct and clear a theoretical template as I can provide of a rational, well-designed and well-conducted capitalist economic order that, at global and local levels, aims at securing life-fulfilment for present as well as future generations to the widest imaginable extent. It is the schematic depiction of a capitalist economic order that, via<\/em> the countless transactions that it engenders and the many institutions that it establishes, takes the World as it is right now and makes it into a better one\u2014a World where the conditions for continued human flourishing are secured.<\/p>\n

    McMurtry\u2019s Life-Value Onto-Axiology offers an articulate set of criteria to understand and direct such a flourishing (cf. EOLSS<\/u><\/em><\/a>, supra<\/em>: nn24 & 28). On his part, Utz characterises life-fulfilment in relation to the fundamental aims of natura humana<\/em>, i.e. the \u201csupreme principles\u201d of Aquinas\u2019 \u201cnatural law\u201d: \u201cself-preservation, self-perfection, mating, generation and education of the offspring, acquisition of knowledge, (natural) knowledge of God\u201d (6.1.3.2). In this perspective, a good economic order is one that facilitates throughout, say: longer and healthier human lives (cf. self-preservation), peaceful and happy personal existences (cf. self-perfection), a healthy demographic balance (cf. mating), universal schooling and free university education (cf. education of the offspring, acquisition of knowledge), freedom of conscience (cf. natural knowledge of God). The implications for economies and, in particular, for policy-making (Utz\u2019s \u201ceconomic policy\u201d), are obvious: a good market economy is one that secures the conditions above (and many others); a bad market economy is one that does the opposite (e.g. by facilitating the destruction of the Earth\u2019s life-support systems).[58]<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n

    There are implications for the study of economic phenomena too. Once Utz, true to Aquinas\u2019 legacy, has established that the human being possesses a certain nature, which determines de facto<\/em> and justifies de iure<\/em> certain socio-ethical and personal goals and not others, it follows logically that no economy we may choose to study can be isolated from its socio-cultural milieu, for it is therein that human agency unfolds, economic agency included. No economic category can be treated as though such a milieu did not exist or were irrelevant to such categories\u2019 conception, selection and\/or application. In particular, all forms of economic agency qua <\/em>human agency are, inherently, morally connoted, for they imply personal motives and social consequences that can be deemed ethically good or bad, whether economists realise it or not. Standard economics grasps and operates upon some <\/em>important features of human social existence; but equally do other social and natural sciences (Utz mentions anthropology, ethology and psychology), as well as much older disciplines, whose task is to delve deeper than the empirical sciences themselves (Utz speaks in this respect of philosophy, ethics, theology and natural-law jurisprudence). An intelligent economics capable of addressing the human condition holistically\u2014its fundamental needs, rights, duties and aims\u2014will have to be integrated, qualified and sometimes guided by these other disciplines. No discipline is an island, and most certainly not the discipline of economics. Above all, an intelligent economics will have to acknowledge how any legitimate and possibly good economy must serve what is good to the human person, now and in the future, universally.<\/p>\n

    It is unclear whether the 2008 global meltdown and the ongoing economic crisis resulted thereof have changed the way in which mainstream economics is pursued, not to mention the World\u2019s economic policy-making by State officials. As far as I have been able to ascertain, mainstream textbooks in economics have not been revised yet and it is far from clear whether State officials have stopped prioritising the corporate interests that they had been catering to before 2008 under the banner of globalisation, of which Utz is vocally critical. Perhaps, the powerful economists and the economic powers are as obtuse and as obstinate as the addicted patient who, as Utz mused, keeps harming herself by refusing to be cured. Utz-the-physician may yet be unheeded. Still, Utz\u2019s work does not come across as pessimistic. On the contrary, it is infused with Scholastic optimism in our natural faculties. The book assumes that human reason, albeit imperfect, can identify the essential aims of human existence and conceive of the institutions that are capable of maximising our likelihood to attain such aims.<\/p>\n

    For a book written by the member of a religious order, Economic Ethics <\/em>contains no mysticism, no appeal to faith, and very little theological commentary. It is in the paucity of scriptural sources that I observe the most striking difference between Utz\u2019s book and the founding documents of the SDC, namely the Popes\u2019 encyclicals on socio-political, economic and environmental matters.[59]<\/u><\/a> Conceptually, the similarity, indeed the identity of views, is patent to anyone familiar with SDC. Utz\u2019s stance in these matters is the one characterising the so-called \u201cthird way\u201d of much European Christian Democracy, which strikes a balance between liberal principles and socialist ones, whilst also endorsing others that are either neglected or opposed by both liberalism and socialism, at least in their historical manifestations (cf. Giovanni Franchi, \u201cArthur F. Utz als Interpret der pluralistischen Demokratie<\/u><\/a>\u201d, 2013).[60]<\/u><\/a> Thus, Utz\u2019s book can serve as an eminent example of SDC to anyone willing to explore this \u201cthird way\u201d and understand its philosophical foundations.<\/p>\n

    Appendix \u2013 A short note on Utz\u2019s Political Ethics<\/em><\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n

    Human actions are never purely economic, purely political, or purely legal; but all are moral (cf. 1.1.3). On the one hand, the agent\u2019s intentions typically combine multiple ends, such as serving one\u2019s own family\u2019s or closest associates\u2019 well-being (i.e. a political end) by conducting intelligently one\u2019s own for-profit business (i.e. an economic end), whilst keeping to the existing laws (i.e. a legal end). Depending on the family\u2019s notion of well-being, the sort of for-profit business and the spirit of the laws at issue, the agent\u2019s actions may be good, better, worse, or bad. For example, the family or associates at issue could be a mafia clan, the business an ecologically devastating one, and the laws to comply with the most permissive that persistent lobbying and generous bribing have bought. On the other hand, the agent\u2019s actions have consequences, which affect individuals, communities, societies, States, animals, natural environments, and the meaningful unity of the whole Creation. Depending on the consequences, the agent\u2019s actions may be good, better, worse, or bad. Maximising shareholder value by ecologically harmful licit business activities, whose legislation is the result of well-meaning business-friendly advice by liberal-minded international experts (cf. 3.1.8), is still going to cause negative consequences for present and future persons, even if no wicked intention is at play. Indeed, if the eventual goodness of the market order is assumed a priori<\/em> (e.g. the invisible hand\u2019s necessary beneficial spill-overs), such negative consequences may be easily overlooked.<\/p>\n

    It is logically possible and practically useful to separate different domains of investigation in the social sciences, which began their long path towards disciplinary specialisation in early modernity, thanks primarily to Machiavelli (cf. 3.2.1) and Bacon (cf. 1.1.3). Excessive separation, if not outright isolation, leads to monstrosities, though. Pure law, devoid of anchoring in metaphysics or ethics, accepts as valid the most unjust legal system, as long as it is formally and procedurally correct (e.g. Kelsen; cf. 1.2 & 2.1.1). Pure politics reduces the political arena to an unprincipled struggle for power (e.g. Weber; cf. 1.1.2), if not to preparation for or execution of war against an enemy (e.g. Schmitt; cf. 1.1.2). Unrestrained political struggle can lead to civil strife and\/or loss of legitimacy of the political system (cf. 3.2.5). War can be just, but it can be so by fulfilling very strict ethical criteria (cf. 5.2.3). Both must be seen holistically in order to be healthy, i.e. in connection with natura humana<\/em>. Even in its democratic manifestation, as long as no deeper principled ground is retrieved, politics is reduced to the competition among different aggregates of subjective preferences, which may be as largely and as voluntarily adhered to as possible, and yet remain thoroughly unjust (cf. 2.1.2), hence illegitimate (cf. 2.5.2, 3.16, 3.2.3). States cannot be utterly neutral on matters of fundamental value (cf. 2.2.3).<\/p>\n

    Not even the broadest shared interest of the democratic polity is necessarily the common good (cf. 3.1.5 & 3.16). For instance, popular votes and elections may bear witness to the widespread support for a leader, party or political programme that exclude, expel or even exterminate an undesired minority. Under such circumstances, we can easily perceive that there is something is amiss. In today\u2019s legal jargon, we would claim that someone\u2019s fundamental rights\u2014human rights\u2014are being violated (cf. 1.1.6). But what justifies and secures these rights against a large democratic consensus set squarely against them? And what justifies and sanctions, positively, open resistance to their negation? (cf. 4.6.2 & 6.1)<\/p>\n

    Universal human rights are not to be understood as mere individual rights bestowed upon individuals under a democratically run constitutional setting. They are not to be thought of as a matter of sheer agreement among individual citizens, which can change with changing circumstances. Universal human rights are the result of reflective abstractions from prolonged moral experiences, individual as well as collective. They are the fruit of centuries of socio-cultural and politico-legal consideration. They encapsulate our knowledge of the most important dimensions of what it means to be human. They express what makes it possible for us to be human beings, i.e.:<\/p>\n

      \n
    1. both in terms of our being (e.g. \u201cthe right of everyone to be free from hunger\u201d and \u201cto the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health\u201d, cf. ICESCR arts. 11(1) & 12(1));<\/li>\n
    2. and in terms of our humanity (e.g. \u201cthe widest possible protection and assistance\u2026 to the family\u201d, \u201cthe right of everyone to education\u2026 cultural activities\u2026 periodic holidays with pay\u2026 just and favourable conditions of work\u201d, cf. ICESCR arts. 10, 13(1), 15, 7(d) & 7).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      Following the Aristotelian and Thomistic traditions, Utz welcomes metaphysics and ethics as pivotal abstractive ontological reflections (i.e. reflections about facts of being) and includes them among the disciplines at our disposal in order to make sense of the World in which we live. Indeed, Utz includes also faith qua <\/em>knowledge based on good testimony (cf. 4.4.5) and the Christian religion qua <\/em>repository of axiological wisdom (cf. 6.2). His gaze is set primarily on Thomistic philosophy and the philosophical components of the doctrine of the Catholic Church, however, for they are not a matter of faith, but of rational reflection (cf. 6.2.2). Pace <\/em>Kant, metaphysical abstraction is claimed not to lead necessarily and uniquely to empty forms of the intellect, but, if properly conducted (e.g. Aquinas\u2019 recta ratio<\/em>), it can also grasp the fundamental principles of reality, including the aims that are natural to the human being and therefore good for us to pursue (cf. 1.1.1 & 1.1.2).<\/p>\n

      The natural-law tradition emerged upon the basis of such forms of abstraction is what provides the epistemic and moral foundation of human rights legislation and it explains why, even if all citizens of a democratic human community but one agreed upon the denial of that one person\u2019s fundamental rights, an intolerable injustice would have occurred (cf. 2.4.3). Injustices have occurred in the past and keep occurring in the present, sometimes on a massive scale. Utz claims that these injustices, in the long run, cause major socio-political catastrophes, for consistent and prolonged violation of the nature of things\u2014i.e. attacks on the integrity of their being\u2014is the dark fountainhead of the worst human tragedies (e.g. war, genocide, ethnic cleansing). Ontological error breeds practical horror. It may be true, as Hobbes argued, that \u201cauctoritas, non veritas facit legem<\/em>\u201d, but bad laws are not going to make such an authority enjoy prolonged legitimacy and success, for they contradict essential characters and aims (1.2.1.3).<\/p>\n

      The starkest example that Utz discusses in this connection is that of the ecology of the planet, which cannot be treated as we wish, no matter the degree of authority enjoyed, and no matter what extensive democratic agreement there may be (cf. 3.1.7). The nature of the Earth\u2019s ecosystems has to be seen for what it is, taken on its own terms, and allowed the ontological means required for its actual continuation, even if that may signify a considerable change in everybody\u2019s life-style. Though undesired and perhaps even painful for most, if not even for all the members of the present generation, such a considerable change of life-style ought to be accepted and pursued, so that life too, including human life, may continue in the future. The good of Earth is a splendid example of common good i.e. that which is good to human societies, but that cannot be reduced to the individuals therein comprised. Doing what is good for the planet is not the same thing, especially in the short- and medium-term, as what the individuals acknowledge as good and therefore want for themselves. Doing what is good for the planet cannot even be reduced to a matter of agreement, at least in theory. If all citizens of Earth preferred to continue with the current life-destructive life-style and waste away the planet\u2019s ecology, that would be still evil.<\/p>\n

      The human being has its own nature, which involves ends that are intrinsic to our being (i.e. the analogical final causes of the Aristotelian tradition; cf. 3.1.9). Pursuing happiness (aka perfection, aka well-being) is one of them, which can be delineated in many ways, depending on the specific circumstances that apply to each person, as well as derailed in many ways, given our freedom and capacity to err (cf. 4.2.1). Politics is one of the instruments at our disposal in the pursuit of happiness. Indeed, politics is, in concrete historical experience, one of the essential ends of the human being, for we are inherently social beings and we cannot seek perfection, individual selfishness notwithstanding, but in broader associations, which in large and complex cases take the form of political communities (cf. 4.3.5). States, or better, the societies that they serve, have therefore their own order of perfection, i.e. the common good.<\/p>\n

      Again, Utz emphasises how the common good is not an aggregate, but that which is good for society (e.g. the rule of law), even if it may not be obviously or immediately good for the individuals inside it (e.g. some individuals would be better off, most certainly in the short or medium term, by having chaos, civil strife, corrupt judges or inept policemen, rather than the rule of law; cf. 2.4.1). Utz believes it necessary to stress this point repeatedly, because modern civilisation, unlike the ancient and medieval ones, has broken the unity between intellect and reality (cf. Descartes, 3.1.3). This break has left our mind uncertain vis-\u00e0-vis<\/em> the validity of the claims of knowledge that we can make, and replaced the strong objectivity of older metaphysics with a weaker intersubjective one (cf. Kant, 4.6.7), which shifts the focus of our attention and admiration away from the World (and its Creator) and onto the individual instead. These are the philosophical roots of modern individualism, with which any contemporary political entity has to deal.<\/p>\n

      Endonotes<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

      [1]<\/u><\/a> The original version, Wirtschaftsethik<\/u><\/em><\/a> (Bonn: Scientia Humana Institut), is available online. All English translations of and from Utz\u2019s works in the present text are mine. I cannot claim major proficiency in German, but I believe my competence to be adequate to the present task. This essay is no in-depth critical study, but a reasoned, detailed synopsis and brief discussion of Economic Ethics<\/em>, of which I also consulted existing Italian and Spanish translations.<\/p>\n

      [2]<\/u><\/a> Born in Basel, Utz grew up in Germany and became a Swiss citizen in the 1950s (cf. Wolfgang Hariolf Spindler, \u201cArthur Fridolin Utz<\/u><\/a>\u201d, Thomistenlexicon<\/em>, Bonn: Nova & Vetera, 2007: 677-684).<\/p>\n

      [3]<\/u><\/a> Utz was a member of the Ordinis Praedicatorum<\/em> i.e. the Dominican Order. His Social Ethics <\/em>is neither confessional nor clerical, however. It is philosophical, and specifically Thomistic.<\/p>\n

      [4]<\/u><\/a> His most widely translated books are the eleven volumes of Utz\u2019s Bibliographie der Sozialethik<\/em> (Freiburg: Herder, 1960-1980). Extensive bibliographies and e-texts of Utz\u2019s works can be found on the websites Helmut Zenz: Arthur Fridolin Utz im Internet<\/u><\/a> and Stiftung Professor Dr. A. F. Utz<\/u><\/a>.<\/p>\n

      [5]<\/u><\/a> Koslowski knew of Utz\u2019s research, e.g.: his Principles of Ethical Economy <\/em>(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001) refer to the 1982 collection of essays entitled Kann der Christ Marxist sein? Mu\u03b2 er Kapitalist sein?<\/em>, edited by Utz (p.264); \u201cThe Common Good of the Firm as the Fiduciary Duty of the Manager\u201d, i.e. his contribution to the 2005 book Business<\/em> and<\/em> Religion: A Clash of Civilisations? <\/em>(edited by Nicholas Capaldi; Salem: M. & M. Scrivener Press, pp.301-312), includes a reference to Utz\u2019s 1958 first instalment of the Sozialethik<\/em>; his essay \u201cPublic Interest and Self-Interest in the Market and the Democratic Process\u201d (International Centre for Economic Research<\/em>, Working Paper No.9\/2004<\/u><\/a>) includes another to B. Kettern\u2019s 1992 monograph on Utz, entitled Sozialethik und Gemeinwohl. Die Begr\u00fcndung einer realistischen Sozialethik bei Arthur F. Utz<\/em> (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot). Also, Koslowski and Utz took part in a collaborative project on economic ethics (cf. Peter Koslowski & Yunquan Chen (eds.), Sozialistische Marktwirtschaft und Soziale Marktwirtschaft. Theorie und Ethik der Wirtschaftsordnung in China und Deutschland <\/em>(Dordrecht: Physica Verlag, 1996), from the book series Ethische \u00d6konomie. Beitr\u00e4ge zur Wirtschaftsethik und Wirtschaftskultur<\/em>, directed and co-edited by Koslowski). As to Utz, Economic Ethics<\/em> mentions five times Koslowski, whose work figures prominently in the bibliography.<\/p>\n

      [6]<\/u><\/a> To my knowledge, Utz\u2019s only English-language publication was \u201cThe Principle of Subsidiarity and Contemporary Natural Law\u201d, Natural Law Forum<\/em> 3(1)\/1958: 170-183. The present synopsis is therefore likely to be the most detailed English-language text on Utz\u2019s ethics of economics, larger even than Helen Alford\u2019s excellent essay \u201cThe Influence of Thomistic Thought in Contemporary Business Ethics\u201d (in Christoph Luetge (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics<\/u><\/em><\/a>, vol. 2, Dordrecht: Springer, 2013:\u00a0<\/u><\/i>pp.227-250).<\/p>\n

      [7]<\/u><\/a> Based on the older Catholic Union for Social and Economic Studies (est. 1885), the institute was affiliated with the University of Fribourg between 1946 and 1978; afterwards it became autonomous. Utz was also the director of the Institute for Social Sciences Walberberg (1966-1993) and the president of the International Foundation Humanum (1976-1998).<\/p>\n

      [8]<\/u><\/a> Dom\u00e8nec Mel\u00e9 states: \u201cUtz and Messner have made an outstanding contribution to social and economic ethics from a Thomistic approach.\u201d (\u201cScholastic Thought and Business Ethics: An Overview\u201d, in Christoph Luetge (ed.),\u00a0Op. cit<\/u><\/em><\/a>.<\/em>: p.137). Utz was most familiar with Messner\u2019s thought and edited a collection of essays<\/u><\/a> in his honour in 1980. The two thinkers agreed on all crucial issues, while disagreeing on some details. Their divergences in matters of economic ethics are addressed by Utz in the present book. Firstly, Utz adopts a stricter notion of human freedom than Messner (1.2.4). Secondly, albeit praising him for his \u201cunsurpassed\u2026 systematic exposition of economic ethics\u201d, Utz criticises Messner for not distinguishing sharply between the level of the \u201cabstract\u2026 theory of value\u201d applying to all forms of \u201csocial ethics\u201d and the level of the \u201ceconomic order\u201d best reflecting \u201cthe natural or quasi-natural behaviour of social members\u201d (1.2.5.3).<\/p>\n

      [9]<\/u><\/a> Utz had direct contact with several Popes, before and during their pontificates, especially Pius XII, John Paul II (who nominated Utz founding member of the Papal Academy of Social Sciences) and Benedict XVI (cf. Spindler, Op. cit.<\/u><\/em><\/a> & Herbert Schambeck, \u201cThe History of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences<\/u><\/a>\u201d, Sustainable Humanity, Sustainable Nature: Our <\/em>Responsibility, Rome: Pontifical Academy of Sciences, 2014, pp.1-8). Important in this connection are also Utz\u2019s 1963 extensive commentary<\/u><\/a> on Pope John XXIII\u2019s encyclical Pacem in Terris<\/u><\/em><\/a> and the many volumes on the SDC that he authored, co-authored and edited, such as Die katholische Sozialdoktrin in ihrer geschichtlichen Entfaltung<\/em> (Aachen: Scientia Humana Institut, 1976), Was ist katholische Soziallehre? <\/em>(K\u00f6ln: J.B. Bachem, 1978), and Die katholische Soziallehre und die Wirtschaftsordnung<\/em> (Trier: Paulinus, 1991).<\/p>\n

      [10]<\/u><\/a> Utz received in 1968 West Germany\u2019s Federal Cross of Honour.<\/p>\n

      [11]<\/u><\/a> Utz received in 1991 Austria\u2018s Great Golden Medal.<\/p>\n

      [12]<\/u><\/a> Other key-members were Joseph H\u00f6ffner (1906-1987) and Oswald Nell-Br\u00fcning (1890-1991). Utz is also known as part of the Walberberg intellectual circle, which comprised four more Dominicans: Laurentius Siemer (1888-1956), Eberhard Welty (1902-1965), Edgar Nawroth (1912-2010) and Basilius Streithofen (1925-2006) (cf. Wolfgang Ockenfels, \u201cThe Walberberg Circle. The Social Ethics of the German Dominicans<\/u><\/a>\u201d, in Francesco Compagnoni (ed.), Preaching Justice: Dominican Contributions to Social Ethics in the Twentieth <\/em>Century, Dublin: Dominican Publications, 2007: 330-355).<\/p>\n

      [13]<\/u><\/a> All original versions and partial Japanese translations of volume 5 are available online<\/u><\/a>.<\/p>\n

      [14]<\/u><\/a> An anonymous reviewer of the Italian translation of Utz\u2019s Political Ethics<\/em> describes his style as \u201ccompact, schematic, clear, assertive\u201d, whilst also praising \u201cthe absence of polemics\u201d and concluding: \u201cthis style of thought and expression is something that only old wise persons can afford.\u201d (cf. FASS<\/u><\/a>, 2008) The same can be said of Utz\u2019s Economic Ethics<\/em>, which reads like a series of calm yet trenchant logical steps following from the adoption of the Thomistic ethical perspective and its application to economic affairs. Utz observes and comments upon them in a way that is aloof from current intellectual fashions, priorities and prejudices. Looking at modernity from, so to speak, the 13th<\/sup> century, leads to remarkable lucidity.<\/p>\n

      [15]<\/u><\/a> The Thomistic epistemology of our inherent aims is articulate (cf. 6.1.3.2). Firstly, Utz mentions fundamental intuitions in the person\u2019s rational nature, requiring no articulate inference (i.e. Aquinas\u2019 lex naturalis<\/em>, e.g. the pursuit of happiness). Secondly, he speaks of general principles inferred from the person\u2019s rational nature (i.e. Aquinas\u2019 primary ius naturale<\/em>, e.g. the common good as prior to the private, human liberty). Thirdly, he speaks of general principles born out of rational reflection beyond the person\u2019s rational nature alone and aimed at fulfilling the previous two levels (i.e. Aquinas\u2019 secondary ius naturale<\/em> or ius gentium<\/em>, e.g. private property). Finally, he recalls how such principles apply to mutable circumstances.<\/p>\n

      [16]<\/u><\/a> Aquinas combined Aristotle\u2019s eudaimonism, whereby human beings seek by nature a fundamental end i.e. happiness (aka perfection, completion, well-being), and Christian belief, whereby final happiness lies in post mortem <\/em>beatitude.<\/p>\n

      [17]<\/u><\/a> Utz does not reduce \u201cthe common good\u201d to the sheer aggregate of individual goods. Seeking personal perfection is paramount for human happiness, but it must take place within, and in coherent connection with, the good of larger units, e.g. the Earth\u2019s ecology and the communities to which each person belongs and is duty-bound (cf. 3.3.2).<\/p>\n

      [18]<\/u><\/a> Utz derives from Aquinas the idea that all norms are identified by means of reasoned reflection (i.e. metaphysical abstraction) on the individual\u2019s inner experiences of moral duty and responsibility, which, however, can only be given, understood, formulated and acted upon in a socially established system of interpersonal existence, thought, language and mores situated beyond each individual. No man is an island; not even Robinson Crusoe (cf. 5.3 & 5.4).<\/p>\n

      [19]<\/u><\/a> Except for the preface, for which I make use of page numbers in the original German edition, in-text references are provided by way of numbers separated by full stops: the first number indicates the chapter, the second the section, the third the sub-section and the fourth the sub-sub-section. This should be an efficient solution for readers coming across different translations of the book, as well as an indication of its systematic organisation. I owe the idea to Giovanni Salmeri and Angelo Lanzoni, the Italian translators of Utz\u2019s volumes 4 and 5, which in the original editions employ respectively, though somewhat idiosyncratically, worded numerals, Roman numerals, Arabic numerals and letters of the Latin alphabet.<\/p>\n

      [20]<\/u><\/a> In his witty and insightful 1933 book on Saint Thomas Aquinas<\/u><\/em><\/a>, G.K. Chesterton writes about Aquinas\u2019 \u201coptimism\u201d vis-\u00e0-vis<\/em> the epistemic potential of human reason (section I). This positive attitude is reflected in Utz’s own confidence, and the Catholic Church’s at large, in the willingness and ability of individuals and institutions to do the right thing, our fallen nature notwithstanding.<\/p>\n

      [21]<\/u><\/a> Pace <\/em>today\u2019s ordinalist, post-modernist, relativistic and variously consensus-based World-views, Helen Alford praises Utz\u2019s Thomistic position in light of the on-going environmental collapse of our planet: \u201cthe possibility of seeing nature, including human nature, as a guide for human action in general could be more widely recognized\u201d because of \u201cthe current recognition of the \u2018nature\u2019 of the environment, that is, that we cannot treat our planet only according to our supposed \u2018consensus\u2019 (many would say \u2018what consensus?\u2019), but that we need to treat it according to its own nature.\u201d (Op. cit<\/u><\/em><\/a>.<\/em>: p.238)<\/p>\n

      [22]<\/u><\/a> Whether the will follows reason\u2019s discovery and assessment of natural inclinations is a different issue. Given our imperfect condition, there is no guarantee. The Christian revelation, under this perspective, comes to our assistance, e.g. God\u2019s grace, Christian rites and sacraments, character education in religious schools, etc.<\/p>\n

      [23]<\/u><\/a> As Helen Alford observes in her study of Utz\u2019s book, ethics explores paths that scientists trod upon inevitably but blindly: \u201cTechnical disciplines that do not recognize that they are based on more profound assumptions or premises that they take as self-evident (unexamined) and on which they are built do in fact have such assumptions, but their experts are not aware that this is the case, and\u2026 [it] is not a question on which they reflect.\u201d (Op. cit.<\/u><\/em><\/a>: p.239)<\/p>\n

      [24]<\/u><\/a> Utz\u2019s book echoes the mounting literature in value theory, environmental thought and \u2018green\u2019 economics accusing mainstream economics\u2019 conceptions of aiding the destruction of Earth\u2019s life support systems (cf. UNESCO, Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems<\/u><\/em><\/a> (EOLSS), 2002-2015).<\/p>\n

      [25]<\/u><\/a> These natural or rational aims correspond almost point-by-point to the \u201csupreme principles\u201d of Aquinas\u2019 \u201cnatural law\u201d, i.e. \u201cself-preservation, self-perfection, mating, generation and education of the offspring, acquisition of knowledge, (natural) knowledge of God.\u201d (6.1.3.2)<\/p>\n

      [26]<\/u><\/a> Aquinas\u2019 notion of harmonious inter-connection of moral virtues for the sake of human happiness is possibly the oldest key-theme in the philosophical work of Utz, whose first published book was his university thesis De connexione virtutum moralium inter se secundum doctrinam sancti Thomae Aquinatis<\/em> (Oldenburg: Albertus Magnus, 1937).<\/p>\n

      [27]<\/u><\/a> Utz and \u0160ik belong to two different philosophical traditions, both of which acknowledge the fundamental equality of all persons. As such, they stand opposed to traditions that separate them into casts (e.g. Nietzsche), races (e.g. Gobineau), orders (e.g. Adam Smith), makers\/takers (e.g. Ayn Rand), proletarians\/bourgeois (e.g. Stalinism), and grant them accordingly different rights (e.g. classical liberals\u2019 opposition to universal suffrage), if any at all.<\/p>\n

      [28]<\/u><\/a> Together with Scottish-Icelandic jurist Rachael Lorna Johnstone, I have described and discussed in 2011<\/u><\/a> and 2013<\/u><\/a> the substantial overlap between the human rights legally and internationally recognised by the United Nations\u2019 ICESCR and John McMurtry\u2019s \u201clife ground\u201d. This notion is part of what constitutes to date the most ambitious theory of value developed by any 21st<\/sup>-century philosopher, i.e. Life-Value Onto-Axiology (cf. UNESCO, EOLSS<\/u><\/em><\/a>, 2002-2015).<\/p>\n

      [29]<\/u><\/a> This definition is the only \u201creal\u201d one, even if it may not describe any concrete imperfect economy: \u201cin anatomy, the physician does not define the sick man, but the healthy one.\u201d (7.8.6)<\/p>\n

      [30]<\/u><\/a> Helen Alford argues that mainstream economists are likely to find peculiar the thematic order and the areas of emphasis of Utz\u2019s book (e.g. a mere handful of pages on profit \u201cin a book of 300 odd pages\u201d). Yet both reflect the fact that the book is \u201cabout the ethics<\/em>\u201d of economics, not economics as such, as well as its intention to erect \u201ca Thomistic economic system\u201d of great \u201cbreadth and coherence\u201d, which she claims Utz to succeed in, thanks to his \u201cencyclopaedic knowledge\u201d (\u201cAn Unusual Animal: A Coherent Economic Ethics<\/u><\/a>\u201d, Oikonomia<\/em> 2(2)\/2000).<\/p>\n

      [31]<\/u><\/a> Garrett Barden and Tim Murphy reach the same conclusion in their 2010 book Law and Justice in Community <\/em>(Oxford: Oxford University Press), which too reflects the natural-law tradition.<\/p>\n

      [32]<\/u><\/a> Responsible acceptance of good restraints to freedom is a standard feature of Christian thought. Even from John Milton\u2019s radically Protestant and anti-Catholic perspective, to seek freedom above all was Satan\u2019s misguided aim: \u201c\u2026Here at least \/ We shall be free\u2026 Better to reign in hell, than serve in heaven<\/em>.\u201d (Paradise Lost<\/em>, Book I, verses 258-259 & 263).<\/p>\n

      [33]<\/u><\/a> Utz\u2018s book addresses frequently \u201ccommutative\u201d and \u201cdistributive justice\u201d, which are respectively fairness in the exchanges between individuals, and fairness in the distribution of goods and responsibilities among the same individuals. Aquinas described both forms of justice as the two species of particular justice<\/em>, i.e. virtuous behaviour directed to the good of individual<\/em> members of the community (e.g. specific customers, employers, spouses, etc.). The book contains also references to general justice<\/em>, i.e. virtuous behaviour directed to \u201cthe common good\u201d i.e. the good of the community<\/em> in which the individual members operate (e.g. being law-abiding citizens). Following Aquinas\u2019 19th<\/sup>-century scholar Taparelli, who mentored Leo XIII, Utz refers to general (aka legal) justice as \u201csocial justice\u201d and claims it to have priority over particular justice (5.2.6): after all, a dysfunctional society will inevitably fail the well-being of its individual members.<\/p>\n

      [34]<\/u><\/a> Such a debatable ethical character explains why, according to Utz, John Rawls developed a novel criterion for the justification of wealth disparity, alternative to the Pareto optimality commonly endorsed by liberals (1.2.2).<\/p>\n

      [35]<\/u><\/a> Utz\u2019s scepticism vis-\u00e0-vis<\/em> the centrally planning State has old roots in his reflection, e.g. Das Subsidiarit\u00e4tsprinzip<\/u><\/em><\/a> (Heidelberg: Kerle, 1953) and Formen und Grenzen der Subsidiarit\u00e4tsprinzips<\/em> (Heidelberg: Kerle, 1956).<\/p>\n

      [36]<\/u><\/a> Giovanni Bertuzzi argues that Utz\u2019s book shows how Christians should not rely upon the Gospels alone for the understanding of socio-historical phenomena. The Thomistic tradition offers \u201can objective abstraction-based knowledge[,]… natural law[,]… and the teleological interpretation of human ethics\u201d, all of which, albeit eventually consistent with revealed doctrine, spring out of reason, not faith (\u201cNon basta il Vangelo a guidare il cristiano?<\/u><\/a>\u201d, Oikonomia<\/em> 2(2)\/2000).<\/p>\n

      [37]<\/u><\/a> Giovanni Pallanti highlights the importance of Utz\u2019s critique with regard to major negative side-effects of \u201cglobalisation\u201d, such as the increased job insecurity caused by the \u201cpulverisation of productive systems\u201d into a plethora of \u201cflexible\u201d contractual forms, the widespread varieties of denial of \u201clabour rights\u201d in the name of \u201ccompetition\u201d, and the return of outright \u201cexploitation\u201d in \u201cAsia, North Africa, Eastern Europe\u201d (\u201cDiritto al lavoro e dignit\u00e0 del lavoro<\/u><\/a>\u201d, Oikonomia<\/em> 2(2)\/2000).<\/p>\n

      [38]<\/u><\/a> Utz prefers describing the good (aka natural, aka rational) \u201cvalues\u201d as \u201cteleological decisions based on nature\u201d, so as to separate them clearly from mere individual preferences, which are subjective (contra <\/em>Scheler; cf. Political Ethics<\/em>, 6.3).<\/p>\n

      [39]<\/u><\/a> Paolo Carlotti argues that Utz\u2019s Thomistic interpretation of \u201cfinancial ethics\u201d leaves the concrete field of business agency open to many profitable operations, as long as \u201cthey allow and favour the adequate development of necessary economic functions\u201d and, a fortiori<\/em>, its \u201csocial aims\u201d (\u201cL\u2019etica economica finanziaria di A.F. Utz<\/u><\/a>\u201d, Oikonomia<\/em> 2(2)\/2000).<\/p>\n

      [40]<\/u><\/a> In a later sub-section, Utz argues that market economies cultivate and exploit immature consumers that are very far from the rational self-interested individuals assumed by liberal textbooks: \u201cCompetition among producers degenerates into the advertising market, where the one who wins is the one that can afford the most expensive advertising\u201d, even if the sold \u201cgoods\u201d are \u201charmful to the environment, the health, or the morality of society\u201d (7.2.2). The influence of John Kenneth Galbraith on Utz\u2019s analysis of modern consumer societies is most evident here.<\/p>\n

      [41]<\/u><\/a> Communist States and monastic orders are compared and contrasted in Utz\u2019s 1982 book Das Wirtschaftssystem der religi\u00f6sen Order oder: Ist der Kommunismus m\u00f6glich?<\/u><\/em><\/a> (Bonn: Institut f\u00fcr Gesellschaftswissenschaften Walberberg).<\/p>\n

      [42]<\/u><\/a> Consider, for example, the classical liberal Drummond professor of political economy William Nassau Senior (1790-1864) who, when told that a million Irishmen had already died in the potato famine (1845-1849), famously replied: \u201cIt is not enough!\u201d\u2014the iron law of supply and demand had not yet run its full course. Or Adam Smith, who had argued in his 1776 Wealth of Nations<\/u><\/em><\/a>: \u201cin civilized society it is only among the inferior ranks of people that the scantiness of subsistence can set limits to the further multiplication of the human species; and it can do so in no other way than by destroying a great part of the children which their fruitful marriages produce.\u201d (I.8.38) In recent times, Lawrence Summers, then Chief Economist for the World Bank, issued on the 12th December 1991 an internal memo<\/u><\/a>, later leaked to the public, in which he claimed that \u201cthe economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable.\u201d As he argued, countries where the inhabitants are paid \u201cthe lowest wages\u201d and where, even if their natural environments are \u201cUNDER-polluted\u2026 compared to Los Angeles or Mexico City\u201d, they statistically die younger than \u201cpeople\u201d in richer nations, who instead \u201csurvive to get prostrate cancer\u201d, are also the countries in which \u201chealth impairing pollution\u201d can be \u201cdone\u2026 [at] the lowest cost\u201d, for such already poorer and shorter-lived populations have less to lose, i.e. lower \u201cforegone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality\u201d. The memo does not address the fact that such an impeccable logic, if followed, would also be self-reinforcing, hence condemning shorter-lived populations to remain shorter-lived.<\/p>\n

      [43]<\/u><\/a> Utz reiterates his critique of \u201csudden\u201d and \u201ccomplete opening of the markets\u201d in the seventh chapter: \u201ceach individual national economy was born out of particular social conditions, which cannot be changed abruptly without social and political shocks\u201d (7.6.2). Also, delocalisation into Third-World countries, the US pressures over the EU to establish a common agricultural market despite the US\u2019 less healthily regulated agricultural sector, and the corporation-friendly processes of \u201cGATT and European unification\u201d are all criticised in light of their nefarious \u201csocial consequences\u201d (7.6.2). In particular, Utz singles out \u201cunemployment\u201d, \u201cthe exploitation of poor populations\u201d, necessity-driven \u201cimmigration\u201d, and \u201cidentity loss\u201d in the socio-cultural and political spheres (7.6.2; in his Political Ethics <\/em>he expresses preoccupation vis-\u00e0-vis<\/em> migration from Muslim countries and doubts on its effective integration within Europe, cf. 4.4.4, 4.4.7, 4.4.8 & 6.2.1).<\/p>\n

      [44]<\/u><\/a> Ferruccio Marzano argues that Keynes\u2019 actual ethico-economic stance was close to Utz\u2019s one, especially as regards the social functions of \u201cmoney and credit\u201d, the disruptive nature of unfettered financial speculation, and the economic key-role of \u201csavings\u201d and individual \u201cresponsibility\u201d (\u201cIl punto di vista di un economista keynesiano<\/u><\/a>\u201d, Oikonomia <\/em>2(2)\/2000).<\/p>\n

      [45]<\/u><\/a> Though pivotal, common interest trumps self-interest, e.g. the liberals\u2019 own acknowledgment of the citizens\u2019 duty of military service \u201cin case of war\u201d and the justification of their own policies as beneficial to \u201cthe common good\u201d (7.8.2).<\/p>\n

      [46]<\/u><\/a> This moral duty has legal repercussions that, however, are discussed mostly in other chapters. For example, a person that, \u201cfallen in a state of need\u201d, stealthily alienates some of an unhelping wealthy person\u2019s goods, is no criminal. By failing to meet her \u201cmoral duty\u201d, the wealthy person \u201closes her right over those goods\u201d (6.1.3.1). Costly legal, judiciary and administrative institutions must be established too, in order to ensure that \u201csocial justice\u201d is actually served, for \u201csocial justice\u201d has \u201cpriority over market law\u201d i.e. \u201ccommutative justice\u201d, as exemplified by: (i) unemployment benefits funded by a money pool in which \u201call enterprises\u201d participate (5.2.6 & 7.1.1); (ii) a tax-based \u201ccommon fund\u201d aimed at integrating the income of low-paid workers so that they are able to provide for \u201ca family\u201d (5.2.7); (iii) a centrally administered monitoring and steering authority that, by means of \u201cfiscal\u201d dis\/incentives, leads to \u201cthe productive use of the land\u201d (7.7; cf. Summers\u2019s 1991 memo as a reasoning based on commutative justice alone, devoid of social justice: supra<\/em> n42).<\/p>\n

      [47]<\/u><\/a> Industrial \u201cresearch\u201d in market economies has been geared towards \u201cthe most powerful engines\u2026 the most comfortable heating systems\u201d, not towards \u201crenewable energy sources\u201d (7.1.5). In actual market economies, \u201cindustry\u201d keeps resisting \u201cchange\u2026 because of the previous investments that have been made\u201d and for \u201cfear of unemployment\u201d (7.1.5).<\/p>\n

      [48]<\/u><\/a> Utz includes in his bibliography Cornelius Castoriadis, to whom our NSU research group devoted three years of study. The great Greek-French thinker had similarly argued that \u201ccapitalism\u2026 inherited these anthropological types from previous historical periods: the incorruptible judge, the Weberian civil servant, the teacher devoted to his task, the worker whose work was, in spite of everything, a source of pride. Such personalities are becoming inconceivable in the contemporary age: it is not clear why today they would be reproduced, who would reproduce them, and in the name of what they would function.\u201d (\u201cThe Rising Tide of Insignificancy<\/u><\/a>\u201d, notbored.org<\/em>, 1994, p.137)<\/p>\n

      [49]<\/u><\/a> Consider US president Obama claiming \u201cethic of greed\u201d as the prime cause of the 2008 international financial meltdown (cf. Jeanne Cummings, \u201cObama blames \u2018ethic of greed\u2019 for economy<\/u><\/a>\u201d, Politico<\/em>, 27 March 2008). Utz\u2019s stance resembles Michael Polanyi\u2019s: \u201cpublic liberties\u201d are prior to \u201cprivate liberties\u201d, since a freedom-loving citizen must be committed to social values (e.g. beauty, justice, knowledge) in order to enjoy room for personal idiosyncrasy, eccentricity, obsession and isolation, which are justifiable insofar as they benefit society (cf. The Logic of Liberty<\/em>, U. of Chicago Press, 1951).<\/p>\n

      [50]<\/u><\/a> Because of its nefarious psychological, social and political effects, unemployment was the issue that most preoccupied Utz as regards the dysfunctional traits of actual market economies, cf. Die massive Arbeitslosigkeit und die Wirtschaftsordnung<\/em> (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 1998).<\/p>\n

      [51]<\/u><\/a> Keynesianism is treated briefly by Utz as a variation on the liberal theme. It is stated that, in its original formulation, it correctly individuated the \u201csignificance of demand\u201d, hence seeking a solution to a glaring and recurring market failure, to be contrasted by \u201cincreasing the money supply\u201d for some time; doing it indefinitely would lead to skyrocketing \u201cinflation\u201d, however (7.5). As such, Keynesianism was primarily a temporary solution to one specific problem of the liberal order, not a new overall conception. In its \u201cpost-Keynesian\u201d developments, it is praised by Utz as much more realistic than either classical or neoclassical liberalism, for it is capable of considering \u201cthe effective constellations of power within society and the economy[,]\u2026 the family[,]\u2026 regional, social and cultural units and institutions\u201d (7.5). Still, no distinction is drawn by post-Keynesians between \u201cmutable\u201d and \u201cimmutable\u201d socio-economic institutions in the way \u201cnatural law\u201d would do (e.g. \u201cmatrimony and family\u201d); nor have they developed a critique of \u201cthe classic liberal conception of growth\u201d, which is \u201ceconomic\u201d only in a most short-sighted sense (e.g. growth leading to greater human fulfilment versus <\/em>growth that is life-destructive; 7.5; cf. Summers\u2019 1991 memo: supra<\/em> n42).<\/p>\n

      [52]<\/u><\/a> Utz recommends letting workers \u201cparticipate\u201d in the \u201cformation\u201d and \u201cownership\u201d of \u201ccapital\u201d in a \u201cmarket economy\u201d, so that they too be personally \u201cco-responsible\u201d for its proper, productive use (7.8.6). This is a tenet of the SDC that has had a small impact on business life (e.g. cooperatives), which mostly takes employers and employees as two tribes at war with each other. Utz claims this to be the \u201coriginal sin\u201d of historical market economies, where \u201ccapitalists, for the sheer sake of profit, refused capital formation in the workers\u2019 hands.\u201d (7.8.6) The opposition between \u201ccapitalist-entrepreneurs\u201d and \u201cworkers\u201d ensued, which continues today with its chaotic legacy of uncooperative and conflictual \u201cclass spirit\u201d (7.8.6).<\/p>\n

      [53]<\/u><\/a> Buoyant and balanced buying and selling of goods is all that liberals can perceive as good, including Keynesians. Utz helps us gauge instead the distinction between natural and unnatural goods, i.e. good and bad goods (4.2 & 4.3).<\/p>\n

      [54]<\/u><\/a> Utz criticises Weber\u2019s superficial knowledge of medieval economics, which Sombart studied much more closely. The latter identified the \u201croot\u201d of \u201ccapitalism\u201d already in Aquinas\u2019 thought and age (9.2.2). Following Sombart, Utz highlights the teachings of Antonin of Florence and Bernardino of Siena, who took as \u201ccapital\u201d the money serving for \u201cproductive investment\u201d, hence setting it aside and above \u201cloans\u201d, some of which could be unjust \u201cusury\u201d (Antonin of Florence studied even the ratio between the \u201cvelocity of capital movement\u201d and \u201cprofit increase\u201d; 9.2.2).<\/p>\n

      [55]<\/u><\/a> Utz deals with State capture by private interests, lobbies and pressure groups in his Political Ethics<\/em> (cf. 2.1.4).<\/p>\n

      [56]<\/u><\/a> Universal abstract principles, even the most just and most consistent with natura humana<\/em>, must be applied to particular, concrete contexts. In his Political Ethics<\/em>, Utz argues that consideration for local conditions means that caution must be exercised not only with regard to the opening of national economies to liberal standards of international trade, but also to their reorganisation around liberal standards of government (e.g. \u2018exported\u2019 democracy). The traditional virtue of prudence leads to gradualism, not to revolution, whether the latter is sought in the name of equality or of liberty (cf. 3.1.8).<\/p>\n

      [57]<\/u><\/a> I presented McMurtry\u2019s work to the NSU audience on a previous occasion (cf. \u201cCapitalism and Freedom: The Core of a Contradiction<\/u><\/a>\u201d, Nordicum-Mediterraneum<\/em> 8(2)\/2008).<\/p>\n

      [58]<\/u><\/a> Utz\u2019s own list is simple, generic and possibly incomplete, if compared to McMurtry\u2019s comprehensive study for UNESCO. Also, the interpretation of Aquinas\u2019 supreme principles may also vary, e.g. what may constitute a suitable family capable of raising children: a standard Catholic stance would contrast with a standard secular one (Utz\u2019s Political Ethics<\/em> contains a strong condemnation of abortion as a violation of the unborn child\u2019s rights, for instance; cf. 6.1). Still, I do not intend to pursue here a detailed analysis of the points of disagreement between Utz\u2019s traditional Thomistic account and McMurtry\u2019s Life-Value Onto-Axiology. Quite the opposite, I wish to highlight the points of agreement, or overlap. In particular, Utz\u2019s account is akin to McMurtry\u2019s in denouncing back in the 1990s: (i) the life-destructive consequences of globalisation; (ii) the primacy of environmental concerns; (iii) the asymmetric focus of liberal economists and policy-makers over the risk of inflation rather than unemployment; and (iv) the degeneration of finance into a speculative cradle of instability, which the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers and the ensuing international economic crisis have made visible to all today.<\/p>\n

      [59]<\/u><\/a> SDC began with Leo XIII\u2019s encyclical letter Rerum Novarum<\/u><\/em><\/a> (1891) and had its latest instalment in 2015 with Francis\u2019 own Laudato si\u2019<\/u><\/em><\/a>. The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church<\/u><\/em><\/a>, issued by the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace in 2004, makes extensive reference to encyclicals, in addition to Biblical, authoritative (e.g. Augustine, John Chrysostom, Aquinas) and other Church documents (i.e. constitutions, decrees and declarations by ecumenical and pontifical councils, documents issued by congregations, the Holy See\u2019s charter of rights, canon law, the Catechism). Prominent in this respect are Rerum Novarum<\/em>, Pius XI\u2019s Quadragesimo Anno<\/u><\/em><\/a> (1931), John XXIII\u2019s Mater et Magistra<\/u><\/em><\/a> (1961) and Pacem in Terris<\/u><\/em><\/a> (1963), Paul VI\u2019s Populorum Progressio<\/u><\/em><\/a> (1967), and John Paul II\u2019s Laborem Exercens<\/u><\/em><\/a> (1981), Sollicitudo Rei Socialis<\/u><\/em><\/a> (1987), Centesimus Annus<\/u><\/em><\/a> (1991), Veritatis Splendor<\/u><\/em><\/a> (1993) and Evangelium Vitae<\/u><\/em><\/a> (1995). References to international law are also present, i.e. the Charter of the United Nations<\/u><\/em><\/a> (1945), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights<\/u><\/em><\/a> (1948), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child<\/u><\/em><\/a> (1990).<\/p>\n

      [60]<\/u><\/a> In Economic Ethics<\/em>, Utz mentions the expression \u201cthird way\u201d with respect to OS (7.4.1). Still, on previous occasions, Utz used it to describe his own approach in politics and economics as well as the overall stance of SDC, e.g. the 1978 book cited in the introduction (Zwischen Neoliberalismus und Neomarxismus: <\/em>die Philosophie des dritten Weges<\/em>) and his essay \u201cDas Grundanliegen der Pluralismusidee in der freiheitlichen Gesellschaftskonzeption und der Dritte Weg\u201d, included in the collection Neomarxismus und pluralistische Wirtschaftsordnung<\/u><\/em><\/a> (Bonn: Scientia Humana Institut, 1979: 77-104), edited by Utz himself. Its distinctiveness from both liberalism and socialism makes several public stances of SDC, especially when stated by Popes in the public arenas, sound right-wing at times (e.g. the sanctity of private property) and left-wing at others (e.g. strict environmental regulation), thus drawing praise as well as attacks from both political camps.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

      The present essay offers a detailed, reasoned synopsis and a brief discussion of the 1994 book Economic Ethics<\/em>, written by the German-Swiss social philosopher Arthur Fridolin Utz (1908-2001). Utz is known chiefly in German-speaking theological circles and in Catholic ones in particular. He is also known in those of southern Europe where, to date, only a few of his many books have been translated into Spanish, French and Italian. Utz\u2019s research deserves attention, both for its inherent value and in connection with Peter Koslowski\u2019s reflections on economic ethics, about which Jacob Dahl Rendtorff has recently reported to our NSU research group. Thus, this essay is a spin-off of Jacob\u2019s own foray into economic ethics and an integration of the same, for it deals with a different, well-established approach. Equally, it is an attempt at bringing to the attention of Nordic scholars, especially in the human and social sciences, the work of a thinker that is still hardly known in my adoptive country, Iceland, as well as in Scandinavia. Finally, given the absence of English-language translations and comprehensive studies of Utz\u2019s books, it is also a useful reference work for Anglophone academia at large.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":254,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_exactmetrics_skip_tracking":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_active":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_note":"","_exactmetrics_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1337],"tags":[533,361,1428,288,390,1423,1430,1425,221,222,1427,658,282,365,1012,1371,87,211,1370,1426,1422,1429,180,1368,1369,1424],"coauthors":[990],"class_list":["post-1430","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-conference-proceeding-volume-11-no-3-2016","tag-adam-smith","tag-aquinas","tag-buchanan","tag-castoriadis","tag-catholic","tag-catholic-social-teaching","tag-christian-democracy","tag-dominican","tag-economics","tag-ethics","tag-galbraith","tag-hayek","tag-human-rights","tag-justice","tag-koslowski","tag-laissez-faire","tag-liberalism","tag-mcmurtry","tag-ordoliberalism","tag-sik","tag-social-doctrine-of-the-church","tag-social-market","tag-socialism","tag-third-way","tag-thomism","tag-walberberg"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1430","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/254"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1430"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1430\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1557,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1430\/revisions\/1557"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1430"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1430"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1430"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nome.unak.is\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=1430"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}