

1. Capitalism as the economic expression of onto-theology

It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages[2].

The words of Adam Smith, originally used to justify liberalist economy, presently sound like an act of accusation. Classic capitalism encourages pure egotism, relying on an 'invisible hand'[3], which should promote the public interest together with the individual one. However, the hand of the market is not invisible, is pitiless. Capitalism is nothing but a pursuit of money, of more and more money. Then, as time goes by, wealth accrues in the hands of fewer and fewer people[4]. Marx already predicted the concentration of capital as a necessary consequence of free competition. However, he could not predict the birth of financial capitalism. Neo-liberalism spread over Western countries, leading to financialization, that is 'the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies'[5].

While classic capitalism links money to production, financial capitalism is based on uncertainty[6]. Money increases or decreases according to the Stock Exchange prices. Since they are unpredictable, people could gain or lose fortunes in a day: a risky investment is nothing but gambling. In this way, the concentration of capital in a few hands comes faster. Those who are not successful go broke and damage other people: bankers and brokers lose the money of whole companies and families, shopkeepers and businessmen close their activities and dismiss people who work for them. There are not only employers and workers

who pay the price, but also small capitalists. Unemployment increases and consumes decrease. In this way, even production decreases and the system itself collapses.

This is a devastating situation, depending not so much on the structure of the system, as on its moving principle. Capitalism, in its classic definition, should stimulate production and consuming, appealing to individual interest. But the course of egotism is one-way: it aims to individual affluence, regardless of its impact on the others.

Capitalist economic systems are characterized by the private ownership of property and the consensual exchange of goods and services in a free market.[\[7\]](#)

According to this recent definition, common both to classic and financial capitalism, egotism reveals to be their driving force. The expression 'private ownership' refers to individual possession and power, while 'free market' indicates liberty of action.

Philosophically speaking, capitalism is nothing but the economic expression of onto-theology. Exactly like the Ego of Western philosophy[\[8\]](#), it is regardless of the Other. The theoretical I subjects everything to its structures and the practical I cares only about its freedom. In the economic case, the Ego subdues the Other to the main category of capitalism, that is profit. The practical consequence of this philosophical statement is that an indiscriminate pursuit of money causes the exploitation of environment, animals and people. The Ego prevails on the Other, but would be powerless without Him. Profit has to be made at the expense of somebody, who cannot be too weak, otherwise he will die or become a slave. The free market disappears without a certain balance: money can circulate only among people who produce, work, and consume. This is why, if the Ego takes too much power, then will lose everything.

The current economic crisis could be seen as a critical moment when, philosophically speaking, the I is capable of annihilating the Other. The next step would be the following: a few people with a high concentration of money, laying down the law to the majority and spoiling the environment of its resources.

There are two solutions to avoid this disaster: the first is destroying capitalism and adopting another economic model, communism for instance; the second is putting limits to capitalism itself. The former corresponds, in philosophy, to the annihilation of both the I and the Other, and to the birth of an anonymous subject; the latter would be the introduction of a different relation between identity and alterity, that is responsibility. If neglecting ethics is destroying capitalism, adopting ethics will save it.

2. A general lack of ethics

The present economic crisis is the symptom of a disease. Capitalism could be seen as a living organism, whose childhood, adolescence and youth were quite healthy. Some temporary illnesses, as the crisis of 1929 and the post-war situation, did not destroy it. Capitalism is, at the moment, in its maturity. After a fast and flourishing growth, it took a definite shape: at the top there are the investors (individuals, private and public institutions), who finance with their money the whole system; they fund producers and providers of services, who distribute their products and services through mediators and sellers; in order to produce, sell and put in operation, a great amount of manpower (workers and employees) is necessary; at the end, there are the consumers, who buy products and services. Every element of capitalism has to

work correctly, like the organs in a living system. If one of them has problems, it affects the other elements and the system collapses.

Capitalism is presently affected by a disease and is in great danger. The most acute stage passed away, but the organism is not regaining its health. First of all, it is necessary to identify the illness and the affected parts of the organism. Fortunately, the diagnosis is not difficult: the crisis started from financial institutions and companies (Lehman Brothers and Bernard Madoff Investment Securities, for instance). Their collapse created a sudden lack of money and damaged producers, providers and money savers in general. In this way, there were indirectly affected also mediators, sellers, workers and employees, who saw their revenues decreasing or vanishing. And, since every member of the system is a consumer, products and services were bought to a lesser extent. The crisis of consumption caused, on the other hand, a new crisis of production and service-providing^[9]. It is a vicious circle generating a gap between the majority of people, who progressively lose their wealth, and a few people, who hold money and power. This gap already exists, but is becoming greater and greater.

The crisis is due, primarily, to the heads of financial capitalism, but it would be a mistake to blame only them. There are also other people who are responsible in a similar way, people who hold a great amount of money and power: executives and owners of national and multinational companies, big traders and mediators. In Italy it happened, for instance, that Calisto Tanzi, President of the food company Parmalat, was guilty of bankruptcy fraud and criminal association. His immoral policy, nourished by the connivance of some politicians and bankers, led to the ruin of a great number of investors. The bankruptcy happened in 2003, four years before the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in the United States. Then the current crisis came, as a product of a diffused malpractice. When powerful people do not behave in a responsible way, they create a great damage to society. The crisis is not the disease of capitalism, but a serious symptom of it: the disease is what produced the crisis itself, that is a general lack of ethics.

Before giving a definition of what 'lack of ethics' means, it is necessary to define ethics itself. Capitalism is seen, in this paper, as the economic expression of the Ego of onto-theology. According to Levinas, the guiding principles of the Western I are intentionality and freedom: the former is a grasp of what is external to the subject; the latter is the ability to act through free will. Levinas takes position against Husserl, the father of phenomenology and of conscience as intentionality[10]. Even if his criticism could be considered exaggerated (Husserl had no intention to theorize a 'tyrannical subject'[11]), the author of 'Totality and Infinity' is extraordinary in delineating ethics.

Morality is not added to the preoccupations of the I, so as to order them or to have them judged; it calls in question, and puts at a distance from itself, the I itself [...]. The "vision" of the face as face is a certain mode of sojourning in a home, or [...] a certain form of economic life. No human or interhuman relationship can be enacted outside of economy; no face can be approached with empty hands and closed home. Recollection in a home open to the Other -hospitality - is the concrete and initial fact of human recollection and separation[12].

Levinas points out the 'separation' between the Ego and the Other: the latter is not an alter-ego, another subject, but someone radically different. The other person is irreducible to the Ego. Notwithstanding this separation, there is an original relation between them: the subject approaches the other person in a particular 'economic' way. Since 'economy' means 'management of a household' (from the Greek words oikos, 'house', and nomos, 'law' or 'rule'), every relation with something or somebody has to do with interiority. While the objects are included in the domestic dimension of the subject (as nourishment, tools or furniture), the other person cannot be grasped. The interhuman relationship is hospitality, is opening one own's doors to the other.

According to Levinas, ethics is not only reception, but also responsibility. The identity of the subject is orientated to the alterity of the other, 'without a prior commitment'[13].

Responsibility precedes freedom, it is independent from every choice. One is responsible of the other 'despite oneself'[\[14\]](#), thus nobody can avoid responsibility.

From the economic point of view, it is a very important principle: it is not based on what one 'chooses' to do, but on what one 'is'. Applying Levinas' statements to capitalism, one could say the following: if one 'is' richer and more powerful, then one 'will be' more responsible, despite one's choices. It does not mean that freedom is not important, but that responsibility founds freedom. Responsibility is the moving principle of ethics, while freedom is what makes it concrete. Behaviour depends on free will, which acts 'according to' or 'against' responsibility. This is the reason why a single action or a whole behaviour is responsible or irresponsible. Shortly, if ethics is based on responsibility, then moral activity will be responsible and immoral activity irresponsible.

Adapting Levinas' phenomenology to economic analysis, one could state the following: intentionality and freedom exactly correspond to the 'private ownership' and 'free market' of capitalism. They are based on egotism and on an instrumental relation to the other. If egotism coincides, in capitalism, with obtaining profit, the other will be seen as a mean to make money. This relation to the other is absolutely unethical. Ethics, instead, is moved by responsibility and sees the other as the main addressee of action.

However, Levinas' thought is too radical to be concretely applied: according to him, the subject should give itself unconditionally, because it is guilty from time immemorial[\[15\]](#). Levinas' ethics is oriented to non-reciprocity and, economically speaking, it is inapplicable. In order to move the market, a balance between one's needs and the others' needs is necessary. It would be better, in this case, to follow Ricoeur's reciprocal ethics: one should see 'oneself as another', that is an intimate implication of otherness in identity[\[16\]](#). Ethics requires both an original relation to the other (Levinas) and a practical bi-directional attitude (Ricoeur).

The Golden Rule and the imperative of the respect owed to persons do not simply have the same field of exercise, they also have the same aim: to establish reciprocity wherever there is a lack of reciprocity[17].

The keyword is 'respect': respect of every person as the aim of morality, respect of oneself and the other in the same amount (it recalls the Christian principle 'love your neighbour as yourself'[18]). 'Reciprocal' does not mean 'claiming something in exchange', since the logic of 'exchange' is based on egotism. Reciprocity is seen as a bi-directional respect, towards oneself and towards the other.

At this point, if ethical behaviour is respectful, unethical behaviour will be disrespectful. Unethical behaviour could be defined as a certain number of actions, fulfilling one's aims and directly damaging (or putting in danger) the other. 'Directly' means that there could also be indirect consequences of one's own action, not imputable to the agent. Unethical behaviour means betraying one's responsibility towards the other. Phenomenology usually considers the other as 'the other person', but human actions do not effect only people. The other could be a human being, as well as an animal or the environment. They cannot do anything 'in exchange', but it does not matter, since reciprocity, in this case, does not involve exchange.

A concrete example of what unethical behaviour means is given by various bankers in the United States and United Kingdom. During the economic crisis, they violated ethics in this way: through 'deception' and 'half truths given to authorities' (lying), 'violation of securities legislation' and 'allegations of fraud', 'misleading balance sheets', promoting an 'excessive bonus culture', 'ignoring internal corporate risk controls', 'conflict of interest', 'undue short-termism', 'excessive risk-taking', 'callousness towards impoverished home owners', 'over-

concentration of economic power by large banks'[19].

These actions are directly imputable to bankers, who violated both ethics and law. In this way, they caused a great damage to society, especially when financial institutions collapsed. Having an over-concentration of economic power gave an enormous amount of responsibility to the bankers, who used it, paradoxically, to escape responsibility itself.

Marx thought that the crisis of capitalism depended on over-production and concentration of money in a few hands[20]. The evolution of capitalism through financialization, together with globalization, changed the economic situation. The current crisis is not due to over-production, but to an indiscriminate pursuit of money. Capitalism is in danger not for its dialectical movement, but for a lack of ethics. The moving principle of ethics is responsibility, so 'lack of ethics' means 'violation of responsibility'. Moreover, everyone is responsible of oneself and other people, and more power means more responsibility. For this reason, a lack of ethics is worst in powerful people than in common ones, because the consequences are more serious. An ethical revolution is then necessary and has to involve, primarily, the higher levels of the economic system.

3. A Phenomenological perspective on ethical revolution

An ethical revolution could be considered from several points of view. In this paper, a phenomenological perspective is adopted. 'Phenomenology' is here considered as an

equivalent of 'egology': everything is considered, perceived, and felt 'in first person', from the point of view of the subject. On the ethical side, it has some interesting consequences. First of all, phenomenology claims an original responsibility towards the other.

The knot tied in subjectivity, which when subjectivity becomes a consciousness of being is still attested to in questioning, signifies an allegiance of the same to the other, imposed before any exhibition of the other, preliminary to all consciousness [...]. This allegiance will be described as responsibility of the same for the other, as a response to his proximity before any question[21].

Ethics does not 'proceed' from consciousness, but 'precedes' it. The human subject has a moral character, so that he cannot avoid responsibility. The latter is part of his ontological (Levinas writes 'pre-ontological'[22]) constitution. The subject is introduced, from its birth, in a relational world. When it lives distant from people, it is related with animals and nature. Loneliness is nothing but an abstraction. Using Sartre's words, 'the fact of the other is incontestable and touches me to the heart'[23]. Human beings are then relational (not only social) beings. The way in which they interact is based on responsibility. From the economic point of view, it is very important, because it implies the following: no one can avoid responsibility towards the other. An economic subject is responsible of the strategy chosen, of its application, and of its consequences. Violating responsibility implies paying for one's own mistakes.

A second consequence of a phenomenological perspective is the singularity of both the ego and the other. Every subject has a common core[24], typical of human knowledge, perception, and feeling, but a concrete ego is absolutely unique. Moreover, it relates to an other who is absolutely unique as well.

Reason presupposes these singularities or particularities, not as individuals open to conceptualization, or divesting themselves of their particularity so as to find themselves to be identical, but precisely as interlocutors, irreplaceable beings, unique in their genus, faces[25].

Ethics refers to singular beings, either subjects and addressees. Every ego is different and relates to a different other. From the ethical point of view, no one can be replaced in assuming responsibility. Every person, here and now, is called to an original relation to the other. This relation does not consist in universal principles, belonging to universal subjects, and applied to universal addressees. Phenomenology does not theorize either norms, or rules. It does not matter 'what' the subject does ('this act', 'that act'), but 'how' it does it ('respecting' or 'not respecting' the other). An ethical behaviour is that which follows one's original responsibility towards one's concrete neighbour.

In capitalism, it means that every single member of the system (executive, trader, worker, employee, customer) is not responsible for what the others do, but for what he or she does. The amount of responsibility is greater according to the amount of money and power one has. If, for instance, an employee behaves in a bad way towards a customer, he or she will have to pay for his or her single action. If an executive adopts an irresponsible strategy, he or she will have to pay not only for the action, but also for all that follows. In the case of people with great power, a single mistake has many consequences and involves many people.

Thirdly, phenomenology avoids two kinds of danger: anonymity and alienation. The uniqueness of both the ego and the other preserves them from the tyranny of universality. From the philosophical point of view, the singular avoids a subordination to the Same (or

Being, or Spirit)[26]. In economy, it gets away from Hegel's ethical State and Marx's socialism. The difference between the former and the latter is that Idealism maintains private property, while communism abolishes it. In both cases, the 'good' of individuals is established by State institutions, which manipulate everything, from the economy to private life[27]. Equality is guaranteed, but at the price of making individuals anonymous beings.

Phenomenology also helps against alienation. In this case, it is better to adopt Ricoeur's version: the thought of Husserl is inclined to alienate the other ('all that which holds for myself holds, as I know, for all other human beings'[28]), while Levinas risks to alienate the subject ('the-one-for-the-other goes to the extent of the-one-being-hostage-for-the-other'[29]). According to Ricoeur, oneself is seen as another, implying respect on both sides.

This ethical principle is necessary to heal the plague of capitalism, that is the alienation of a part of the system. Marx thinks that there are only two classes, oppressors and oppressed. The former are capitalists, the latter proletarians. Workers are alienated by owners of companies, who make profit with the exploitation of proletarian labour[30]. However, financial capitalism is characterized by a more complex structure. Alienation usually concerns the parts of the system who own less money: workers, employees and small businessmen, for instance. Phenomenology leads, in its ethical and reciprocal form, to a balance between stronger and weaker members of the system.

Ethical capitalism, that is capitalism passing through ethical revolution, is a third way between communism and classic/financial capitalism. The former reduces all subjects to anonymity, the latter is a source of alienation. Phenomenology theorizes uniqueness (Levinas) and reciprocity (Ricoeur) between the ego and the other.

Fourthly, a phenomenological perspective warns against a pseudo-ethical behaviour. 'Being ethical' does not mean 'having an ethical coat'. There are companies who put 'something ethical' in their product or in their policy, in order to attract investor, partners or customers. For example, an enterprise produces part of its eggs, breeding hens in open air. In this way, it attracts people who are sensitive to the living condition of animals. These customers will pay a higher price to buy this kind of eggs. However, there are also people who are content if hens are not in cages, even if they are bred indoor. And there are customers who do not care about animal conditions, but only about price. The latter will buy eggs produced by hens bred in batteries. This is exactly the case of the Italian company AIA:[\[31\]](#) its executives understood that better conditions for animals attract more customers. But the company is not moved by ethical reasons, otherwise it would limit the whole production to free-range eggs. Companies like AIA purely act for profit.

If the purpose of a behaviour is other than ethical, such a behaviour will be not really ethical. However, a moral appearance is useful to make money: being good pays. An ethical film enhances profit, even if the substance is unethical. First of all, not all the people are sensitive to moral behaviour, because most of them rather prefer to avoid an immoral behaviour. Secondly, they pay willingly an higher price up to a certain threshold (30%, 50% of sustainable production, for instance). This threshold is not clearly determinable and is different case by case.[\[32\]](#) This is why companies do something ethical, as much as it does not hinder profit.

Phenomenology rejects such a kind of behaviour. 'Being ethical' means 'acting responsibly'. When a company follows a moral conduct, it does not limit itself to some good actions. Ethics is neither charitable, nor instrumental. An ethical producer of eggs, for instance, breeds chicken in open air, provides them with healthy food, leaves them space enough to live comfortably, heals them when they are sick, avoids to raise too many hens if good conditions cannot be guaranteed. This kind of behaviour is ethical because it respects both customers and animals: it provides buyers with eggs of the best quality and, at the same time, allows chicken to have a good life. This kind of behaviour is, philosophically speaking, oriented towards the other.

If moral behaviour is, on the contrary, money-oriented, it will not be moral at all. Since current capitalism aims to profit, it meets ethics only by accident. Ethics is usually a limitation to profit: the “obsessive materialism which capitalist economy promote is one of the weaknesses of capitalism when it is considered from an ethical point of view”[33]. An ethical behaviour is not necessarily ascetical and includes material goods and pleasures: in order to avoid alienation, the ego has to preserve itself. Capitalism does not purely promote self-preservation, but an indiscriminate pursuit of materialism. As the economic expression of onto-theology, capitalism is ruled by egotism.

Phenomenology goes beyond the tyranny of the Same, of the universal subject, of indiscriminate property and freedom. Stating the importance of ethics, of original responsibility, of uniqueness, phenomenology does not destroy the subject, but makes it ‘singular’. Definitely, it has to renounce to its tyrannical power, but not to itself. What is here suggested is not to alienate the ego in behalf of the other. Building one’s own identity is necessary to self-preservation and, moreover, to have ‘something to give’. If the subject is alienated, it cannot offer anything to the other. Ethics should not imply a fission of one’s identity[34], but an equilibrated inclination to giving.

The economic consequence of such a perspective is not the end of capitalism. If capitalism is based on egotism and egotism is ‘partially’ preserved by phenomenology, then capitalism will be ‘partially’ preserved by phenomenology. Phenomenology does not accept capitalism in its current form, because it is ‘wholly’ based on egotism, that is indiscriminate freedom and property. However, it accepts a different form of capitalism, which is only ‘partially’ ruled by egotism. This new kind of system is called ‘ethical capitalism’ and is based on respectful freedom and property.

Defining what is and what is not 'respectful' is the most difficult task to accomplish, due to the open character of phenomenology. Phenomenology is not a normative system, but a perspective. For this reason, it does not suggest a precise behaviour, but a different way to approach the world. Classic and financial capitalism are based on individual interest; ethical capitalism is based on responsibility. One's freedom and property are not destroyed or 'limited' by the other's freedom and property. One's freedom and property is directed both to self-preservation and preservation of the other, that is the environment and its inhabitants. Ethical capitalism is not self-oriented, but other-oriented: it is directed both to the other and to the self as another. Responsibility is opposed to alienation, because it is bi-directional. This is why a responsible behaviour, on large scale, could save capitalism from its gaps and from its ruin.

[1] Cf. Hein, E., *The Macroeconomics of Finance-dominated Capitalism and its Crisis*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012, p. 1.

[2] Smith, A., *The Glasgow edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith*, vol. 2a, edited by R.H. Cambell and A.S. Skinner, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976, pp. 26-7.

[3] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 456.

[4] 'It is concentration of capitals already formed, destruction of their individual independence, expropriation of capitalist by capitalist, transformation of many small into few large capitals' (Marx, K., *Capital [Cap.]*, Volume 1, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954, p. 586).

[5] Epstein, G. A., 'Introduction: Financialization and the World Economy', in Epstein, G. A. (ed.), *Financialization and the World Economy*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005, p. 3.

[6] In 1938, George Edwards already individuated finance as an element of instability: the current form of capitalism converts real equity in financial one. Edwards was even afraid of a conspiracy by financial institutions. See Edwards, G. W., *The Evolution of Finance Capitalism*, London: Longmans Green, 1938.

[7] Bishop, J. D., 'Ethics and Capitalism. A Guide to the Issues', in Bishop, J. D. (ed.), *Ethics and Capitalism*, University of Toronto Press Incorporated: Toronto-Buffalo-London, 2000, p. 4.

[8] 'Ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy of power' (Levinas E., *Totality and Infinity: an Essay on Exteriority* [TI], Duquesne: Pittsburgh, 1969, p. 9).

[9] For a specific description of this mechanisms, see Hein 2012.

[10] Levinas criticizes the thought of Husserl in several writings. Cf., for example, TI, pp. 109-110, 121-126; Id., *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence* [OB], Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1981, pp. 8, 33, 63-66; Id., *Discovering Essence With Husserl*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998, pp. 74-75, 124-126, 176-177.

[11] Husserl considers the Other as an Ego-subject, but neither identical, nor subject to the Ego. 'Each has its place from which he sees the physical things present; and, accordingly, each has different physical-things appearances. Also, for each of the fields of actual perception, actual memory, etc., are different, leaving aside the fact that intersubjectively common objects of consciousness in those field are intended to as to having different modes, different manners of apprehension, different degrees of clarity, and so forth' (Husserl, E., *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book* [Ideas I], The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982, pp. 55-56).

[12] TI, p. 172.

[13] OB, p. 153.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 51, 54-56, 74.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 26, 51, 87.

[16] Cf. Ricoeur, P., *Oneself as Another*, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1992, p. 3.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 225.

[18] Matthew 22:39; Mark 12:31; Luke 10:27.

[19] Thomas, R., 'Ethics - or the Lack of Ethis - in the Global Financial Crisis 2007-2010', in Rosamund M. Thomas (ed.), *Business Ethics*, Cambridge: Ethics International Press, 2011, p. 75.

[20] Cf. Cap., p. 587.

[21] OB, pp. 25-26.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44, 78.

[23] Sartre, J.-P., *Being and Nothingness. An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, New York: Philosophical Library, 1956, p. 367. Even if Sartre is better known as an existentialist, *Being and Nothingness* can be considered as a phenomenological masterwork. Anyway, the constitutive inter-subjectivity of human beings was first stated by Heidegger, according to which 'being-in-the-world' (*in-der-Welt-sein*) is also 'being-with' (*Mit-sein*). Cf. Heidegger, M., *Being and Time*, State University of New York Press: Albany, 1996, p. 112.

[24] The phenomenological epoché, theorized by Husserl, searches for a pure consciousness, abstracting from the concrete Ego-subjects. 'It therefore remains as the "phenomenological residuum," as a region of being which is of essential necessity quite unique and which can indeed become the field of a science of a novel kind: phenomenology' (*Ideas I*, pp. 65-66).

[25] TI, p. 252.

[26] Cf. TI, pp. 46-47, 143, 269-271.

[27] Cf. Hegel, G. W. F., *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, §§ 257-258; Marx, K.- Engels, F., *The Communist Manifesto [Manifesto]*, New York: Russell and Russell, 1963, Chap. 2. According to Hegel, the State is the reality of reason and will, which coincides with individual freedom. According to Marx, communism implies centralization of credit, means of communication, production and education in the hands of the State. Both authors theorize, in order to guarantee equality, a strong Statism.

[28] *Ideas I*, p. 55.

[29] OB, p. 141.

[30] Cf. Manifesto, pp. 25-26; Marx, K., Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, New York: International Publishers, 1964, pp. 108-111.

[31] Products numbered B5110, for instance, come from hens farming to barn, while B5114 are free-range eggs. The other products come from hens bred in batteries. This is why, in 2001, AIA was condemned by the Italian Antitrust. The company showed on its egg-packages images of hens eating on lawns and the proposition 'uova fresche allevate a terra' ('fresh eggs bred ashore'). It could led customers to think that they were free-range eggs, while hens were crowded into big barns (intensive livestock farming).

[32] Cf. Trudel, R.- Cotte, J., 'Does It Pay To Be Good?', MIT Sloan Management Review, vol. 50, 2, 2009, pp. 66-68.

[33] Groarke, L., 'Can Capitalism Save Itself? Some Ruminations on the Fate of Capitalism', in Bishop 2000, p. 204.

[34] Cf. OB, pp. 49, 104, 141, 180, 185.

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